




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THE
WORKS

OF

XENOPHON.

VOL. IV.

THE

WORKS

OF

JENOPHON.



VOL. IV.

THE
WORKS
OF
XENOPHON.

Translated from the Greek.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

CONTAINING

THE MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES;
THE BANQUET; HIERO; AND THE ECONOMICS.

LONDON:

Printed by J. Moyes, Greville Street, Hatton Garden;
FOR J. WALKER; F. WINGRAVE; R. LEA; J. NUNN; WHITE, COCHRANE,
AND CO.; LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME, AND BROWN;
JOHN CUTHELL; LACKINGTON, ALLEN, AND CO.;
AND J. FAULDER.

1813.

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XENOPHON.

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LONDON:

Printed by J. Smith, Greek Street, Holborn (London).
J. G. WATKINS, 11, PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, W.C.2.
AND G. H. LONGMAN, 1, PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, W.C.2.
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MINOR WORKS

XENOPHON

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XENOPHON.

ECONOMICS,

OR THE SCIENCE OF GOOD REASONING.

Translated from the Greek by G. D. D. D.

LONDON:

Printed by J. Moxon, at the Office of the British Museum, in the Strand.

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1813.

PREFACE

TO

THE MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES.

ALTHOUGH the translator of the following Memoirs was fully persuaded, that the far greater number of those who favoured her with their names, and assisted her with their interest, were influenced by much nobler motives, than the expectation of receiving any thing very extraordinary from her hand; yet, so little did this appear to her any reason for relaxing her endeavours, that, on the contrary, she considered it as laying her under an additional obligation to do all the justice she possibly could to her author. It was partly on that account; partly from sickness; and partly from some other accidents, not more within her power to regulate, than the state of her own health, that the publication of these Memoirs hath been deferred beyond the time first mentioned in the proposals: but if the task is, at last, discharged tolerably, the mind of the translator will be set much at ease; and the reader find somewhat to repay him for his waiting.

That the Memoirs of Socrates, with regard to the greatest part, are held in the highest estimation, is most

certain; and if there are some passages which seem obscure; and of which the use doth not so plainly appear to us at this distance of time; and from the dissimilarity of our customs and manners; yet, perhaps, we might not do amiss, in taking Socrates himself for our example in this particular, as well as in many others; who being presented by Euripides with the writings of Heraclitus, and afterwards asked his opinion of their merit;—"What I understand," said he, "I find to be excellent; and therefore believe that to be of equal value, which I do not understand."—"And, certainly," continues the admired modern writer, from whom the quotation above was taken, "this candour is more particularly becoming us in the perusal of the works of ancient authors; of those works which have been preserved in the devastation of cities; and snatched up in the wreck of nations: which have been the delight of ages; and transmitted as the great inheritance of mankind, from one generation to another: and we ought to take it for granted, that there is a justness in the connexion, which we cannot trace; and a cogency in the reasoning, which we cannot understand." The translator of the following sheets would willingly bespeak the same candour, in reading the translations of the ancient writers, which hath above been thought so necessary for judging right of the originals. In the preface to the Life of Cicero, the celebrated writer of it thus expresses himself:—"Nor has that part of the task," said he, (speaking of the several passages he had translated from the writings of Cicero) "been the easiest to me; as those will readily believe who have ever attempted to translate the classical writings of Greece and Rome." It may, perhaps, be objected, "That candour alone is not

sufficient for the present occasion :” to which it can only be answered, “ That *something* was to be done ; and, that no pains hath been spared, to do it as well as possible.”

The translator is sorry to find, that the title affixed to this work hath not been approved of universally : and, in truth, that inundation of trifles, follies, and vices, lately introduced into the world, under the general appellation of Memoirs, hath occasioned such an unhappy association of ideas, as doth not well suit with a Xenophon’s giving a relation of what a Socrates once said and did : but the translator takes shelter for herself, under the respectable names of Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Carter ; the one having, as she thinks, explained the word Memoir in a manner consistent with the present application of it ; and the other actually made choice of it, for the very same purpose as is here done.

sufficient for the present occasion;" to which it can only be answered, "That something was to be done; and, that no pains had been spared, to do it as well as possible."

The translator is sorry to find, that the time allotted to this work had not been approved of universally; and, in truth, that inundation of trifles, follies, and vices, lately introduced into the world, under the general appellation of *Manners*, had occasioned such an unhappy association of ideas, as did not well suit with a Xenophon's giving a relation of what a Spartan once said and did: but the translator takes shelter for herself, under the respectable names of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Gaird; the one having, as she thinks, explained the word *Manners* in a manner consistent with the present application of it; and the other actually made choice of it for the very same purpose as is here done.

THE
DEFENCE OF SOCRATES

BEFORE
HIS JUDGES.

BY XENOPHON.

I HAVE always considered the manner in which Socrates behaved after he had been summoned to his trial, as most worthy of our remembrance; and that, not only with respect to the defence he made for himself, when standing before his judges; but the sentiments he expressed concerning his dissolution. For, although there be many who have written on this subject, and all concur in setting forth the wonderful courage and intrepidity wherewith he spake to the assembly; so that it remaineth incontestable that Socrates did thus speak: yet that it was his full persuasion, that death was more eligible for him than life at such a season, they have by no means so clearly manifested; whereby the loftiness of his style, and the boldness of his speech, may wear at least the appearance of being imprudent and unbecoming.

But Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, was

his intimate friend; and from him it is we have heard those things of Socrates, as sufficiently prove the sublimity of his language was only conformable to the sentiments of his mind. For, having observed him, as he tells us, choosing rather to discourse on any other subject than the business of his trial; he asked him, "If it was not necessary to be preparing for his defence?" And "What!" said he, "my Hermogenes, suppose you I have not spent my whole life in preparing for this very thing?" Hermogenes desiring he would explain himself: "I have," said he, "steadily persisted, throughout life, in a diligent endeavour to do nothing which is unjust; and *this* I take to be the best, and most honourable preparation."

"But see you not," said Hermogenes, "that oft-times here in Athens, the judges, influenced by the force of oratory, condemn those to death who no way deserve it; and, not less frequently, acquit the guilty, when softened into compassion by the moving complaints, or the insinuating eloquence, of those who plead their cause before them?"

"I know it," replied Socrates; "and therefore, *twice* have I attempted to take the matter of my defence under consideration: but THE GENIUS* always opposed me."

* Various have been the opinions concerning this Genius, or Demon, of Socrates; and too many for the translator to enumerate. What seems the most probable and satisfactory is, that the Genius of Socrates, so differently spoken of, was nothing more than an uncommon strength of judgement and justness of thinking; which measuring events by the rules of prudence, assisted by long expe-

Hermogenes having expressed some astonishment at these words, Socrates proceeded :

“ Doth it then appear marvellous to you, my Hermogenes, that God should think *this* the very best time for me to die? Know you not, that hitherto I have yielded to no man that he hath lived more uprightly or even more pleasurable than myself; possessed, as I was, of that well-grounded self-approbation, arising from the consciousness of having done my duty both to the gods and men : my friends also bearing their testimony to the integrity of my conversation!

And, from the experience and much observation, unclouded and unbiassed by any prejudices or passions, rendered Socrates capable of looking, as it were, into futurity, and foretelling what would be the success of those affairs about which he had been consulted by others, or was deliberating upon for himself. And, in support of this opinion, they urge his custom of sending his friends—Xenophon, for example—to consult the oracle when any thing too obscure for human reason to penetrate was proposed to him : to which might be added, as no mean testimony, his own practice on all such occasions. But from whence this notion arose, of his being thus uncommonly assisted, is not easy to determine. It might perhaps be from nothing more, as some have imagined, than from his having casually said on some occasion, “ My Genius would not suffer me ;” alluding to the notion which prevailed with many, that every one had a Genius to watch over and direct him. And although nothing more was at the first either intended or understood by it, than when we say, “ My good angel forbade me ;” or, said so and so to me ; yet, being verified by the event, it came at length to be considered, by a superstitious people, as something supernatural : and, as it added much weight to his counsel and instructions, neither Socrates nor his friends were in haste to discredit such an opinion; not looking upon themselves as obliged to it by any one duty whatsoever.

But now,—if my life is prolonged, and I am spared even to old age,—what can hinder, my Hermogenes, the infirmities of old age from falling upon me? My sight will grow dim; my hearing, heavy: less capable of learning, as more liable to forget what I have already learnt: and if, to all this, I become sensible of my decay, and bemoan myself on the account of it; how can I say that I still lived pleasantly? It may be too,” continued Socrates, “that God, through his goodness, hath appointed for me, not only that my life should terminate at a time which seems the most seasonable; but the manner in which it will be terminated shall also be the most eligible: for, if my death is now resolved upon; it must needs be, that they who take charge of this matter will permit me to choose the means supposed the most easy; free too from those lingering circumstances which keep our friends in anxious suspense for us, and fill the mind of the dying man with much pain and perturbation. And when nothing offensive, nothing unbecoming, is left on the memory of those who are present; but the man is dissolved while the body is yet sound, and the mind still capable of exerting itself *benevolently*; who can say, my Hermogenes, that so to die is not most desirable? And with good reason,” continued Socrates, “did the gods oppose themselves at what time we took the affair of my escape under deliberation, and determined, that every means should be diligently sought after to effect it; since, if our designs had been carried into execution, instead of terminating my life in the manner

I am now going, I had only gained the unhappy privilege of finding it put an end to by the torments of some disease, or the lingering decays incident to old age, when all things painful flow in upon us together, destitute of every joy which might serve to soften and allay them.

“ Yet think not, my Hermogenes, the desire of death shall influence me beyond what is reasonable: I will not set out with asking it at their hands: but if, when I speak my opinion of myself, and declare what I think I have deserved both of gods and men, my judges are displeased; I will much sooner submit to it, than meanly entreat the continuance of my life, whereby I should only bring upon myself many, and far greater evils, than any I had taken such unbecoming pains to deprecate.”

In this manner Socrates replied to Hermogenes and others: and his enemies having accused him of “ *not believing in the gods, whom the city held sacred; but, as designing to introduce other and new deities; and, likewise, of his having corrupted the youth:*” Hermogenes farther told me, that Socrates, advancing towards the tribunal, thus spake:

“ What I chiefly marvel at, O ye judges! is this; whence Melitus inferreth that I esteem not those as gods whom the city hold sacred. For that I sacrificed at the appointed festivals, on our common altars, was evident to all others; and might have been to Melitus, had Melitus been so minded. Neither yet doth it seem to be asserted with greater reason, that my design was to intro-

duce new deities among us, because I have often said, ‘ That it is the voice of God which giveth me significations of what is most expedient;’ since they themselves, who observe the chirping of birds, or those ominous words spoken by men, ground their conclusions on no other than voices. For, who among you doubteth whether thunder sendeth forth a voice? or whether it be not the very greatest of all auguries? The Pythian priestess herself; doth not she likewise, from the tripod, declare, by a *voice*, the divine oracles? And, truly, that God foreknoweth the future, and also showeth it to whomsoever he pleaseth, I am no way singular either in believing or asserting; since all mankind agree with me herein; this difference only excepted, that whereas they say it is from auguries*, omens, symbols, and diviners, whence they have their notices of the future; I, on the contrary, impute all those premonitions, wherewith I am favoured, to a Genius; and I think, that, in so doing, I have spoken not only more truly, but more piously, than they who attribute to birds the divine privilege of declaring things to come: and that I lied not against God, I have this indisputable proof; that whereas I have often communicated to many of my friends the divine counsels, yet hath no man ever detected me of speaking falsely.”

No sooner was this heard, but a murmuring arose among his judges; some disbelieving the

* See the learned Mr. Harris’s Notes on these several particulars, *infra*, b. i. p. 18.

truth of what he had said; while others envied him for being, as they thought, more highly favoured of the gods than they. But Socrates, still going on; "Mark!" said he, "I pray; and attend to what is yet more extraordinary, that such of you as are willing, may still the more disbelieve that I have been thus favoured of the deity: Chærephon, inquiring of the oracle at Delphos concerning me, was answered by Apollo himself, in the presence of many people, "That he knew no man more free, more just, or more wise than *I*."

On hearing this, the tumult among them visibly increased: but Socrates, still going on,—"And yet Lycurgus, the Lacedæmonian lawgiver, had still greater things declared of him: for, on his entering into the temple, the deity thus accosted him: "I am considering," said he, "whether I shall call thee a god, or a man!" Now Apollo compared me not to a god. This, indeed, he said, "That I by far excelled man." Howbeit, credit not too hastily what ye have heard, though coming from an oracle; but let us thoroughly examine those things which the deity spake concerning me.

"Say then, where have you ever known any one less enslaved to sensual appetite; whom more *free* than the man who submits not to receive gift, or reward, from the hands of any other? Whom can you deservedly esteem more just, than he who can so well accommodate himself to what he hath already in his own possession, as not even to de-

sire what belongeth to another? Or how can he fail of being accounted wise, who, from the time he first began to comprehend what was spoken, never ceased to seek, and search out, to the very best of his power, whatever was virtuous, and good for man? And, as a proof that in so doing I have not laboured in vain, ye yourselves know, that many of our citizens, yea, and many foreigners also, who made virtue their pursuit, always preferred, as their chief pleasure, the conversing with me. Whence was it, I pray you, that when every one knew my want of power to return any kind of pecuniary favour, so many should be ambitious to bestow them on me? Why doth no man call me his debtor, yet many acknowledge they owe me much? When the city is besieged, and every other person bemoaning his loss, why do *I* appear as in no respect the poorer than while it remained in its most prosperous state? And what is the cause, that when others are under a necessity to procure their delicacies from abroad, at an exorbitant rate, *I* can indulge in pleasures far more exquisite, by recurring to the reflexions in my own mind? And now, O ye judges! if, in whatsoever I have declared of myself, no one is able to confute me as a false speaker; who will say I merit not approbation, and that not only from the gods, but men?

“Nevertheless, you, O Melitus, have asserted, that I,—diligently applying myself to the contemplation and practice of whatever is virtuous—*‘corrupt the youth:’*—and, indeed, we well

know what it is to corrupt them. But show us, if in your power, whom, of pious, I have made impious; of modest, shameless; of frugal, profuse? Who, from temperate is become drunken; from laborious, idle, or effeminate, by associating with me? Or, where is the man who hath been enslaved, by my means, to any vitious pleasure whatsoever?"

"Nay, verily!" said Melitus; "but I know of many whom thou hast persuaded to obey thee rather than their *parents*."

"And with good reason," replied Socrates, "when the point in question concerned education; since no man but knows that I made this my chief study: and which of you, if sick, prefers not the advice of the physician to his parents? Even the whole body of the Athenian people,—when collected in the public assembly,—do not they follow the opinion of him whom they think the most able, though he be not of their kindred? And, in the choice of a general, do you not to your fathers, brothers, nay even to yourselves, prefer the man whom ye think the best skilled in military discipline?"

"Certainly," returned Melitus; "neither can any one doubt of its being most expedient."

"How then could it escape being regarded even by you, Melitus, as a thing deserving the highest admiration, that while in every other instance the man who excels in any employment is supposed not only entitled to a common regard, but receives many, and those very distinguishing,

marks of honour; *I*, on the contrary, am persecuted even to death, because I am thought by many to have excelled in that employment which is the most noble; and which hath for its aim the greatest good to mankind; by instructing our youth in the knowledge of their duty, and planting in the mind each virtuous principle!"

Now, doubtless, there were many other things spoken at the trial, not only by Socrates, but his friends, who were most zealous to support him; but I have not been careful to collect all that was spoken, yet think I have done enough to show, and that most plainly, that the design of Socrates in speaking at this time, was no other than to exculpate himself from any thing that might have the least appearance of impiety towards the gods, or of injustice towards men. For, with regard to death, he was no way solicitous to importune his judges, as the custom was with others: on the contrary, he thought it the best time for him to die. And, that he had thus determined with himself, was still the more evident after his condemnation: for, when he was ordered to fix his own penalty*, he refused to do

* In all cases where the laws had fixed the penalty, one single verdict was thought sufficient; but where the laws were silent, a second was necessary, to declare the punishment the offender had incurred. Before this second sentence was pronounced, the judges were ordered to *value* the crime, as Cicero calls it; and the offender himself was asked, What penalty he thought due to it? and the merits of the case being afterwards debated, the valuation

it, neither would he suffer any other to do it for him; saying, that to fix a penalty implied a confession of guilt. And, afterwards, when his friends would have withdrawn him privately, he would not consent; but asked them, with a smile, "If they knew of any place beyond the borders of Attica where death could not approach him?"

The trial being ended, Socrates, as it is related, spake to his judges in the following manner:

"It is necessary, O ye judges! that all they who instructed the witnesses to bear, by perjury, false testimony against me, as well as all those who too readily obeyed their instructions, should be conscious to themselves of much impiety and injustice: but that I, in any wise, should be more troubled and cast down, than before my condemnation, I see not, since I stand here unconvicted of any of the crimes whereof I was accused: for no one hath proved against me that I sacrificed to any new deity; or by oath appealed to, or even made mention of the names of, any other than Jupiter, Juno, and the rest of the deities, which, together with these, our city holds sacred: neither have they once shown what were the

was admitted, or rejected, as the judges saw reason: but Socrates incensed them so much with the answer he made them, that they proceeded, without any delay, to pass the second, or decretory sentence against him, and he was immediately condemned to suffer death.—POTT. *Antiq.*

means I made use of to *corrupt* the *youth*, at the very time that I was inuring them to a life of patience and frugality. As for those crimes to which our laws have annexed death as the only proper punishment,—sacrilege, man-stealing*, undermining of walls, or betraying of the city,—my enemies do not even *say* that any of these things were ever once practised by me. Wherefore I the rather marvel that ye have now judged me worthy to die.

“ But it is not for *me* to be troubled on that account: for, if I die unjustly, the shame must be theirs who put me unjustly to death; since, if injustice is shameful, so likewise every act of it; but no disgrace can it bring on me, that others have not seen that I was innocent. Palamedes likewise affords me this farther consolation: for being, like me, condemned undeservedly, he furnishes, to this very day, more noble subjects for praise, than the man who had iniquitously caused his destruction †. And I am persuaded that I

* It was the practice of many to steal slaves, or freemen's children in order to sell for slaves, which was made capital at Athens.—POTTER.

† When the Grecian kings were to go to the siege of Troy, Ulysses, to save himself from going, counterfeited madness; which Palamedes suspecting, ordered they should lay Ulysses's son in the furrow where the father was ploughing with an ox and an ass, and sowing salt. Ulysses immediately stayed the plough to save his child; by which being discovered, he was compelled to go to the wars. For this, and for other reasons, Ulysses hated Palamedes, and artfully contrived his death.—See *infra*, b. iv.

also shall have the attestation of the time to come, as well as of that which is past already, that I never wronged any man, or made him more depraved; but, contrariwise, have steadily endeavoured, throughout life, to benefit those who conversed with me; teaching them, to the very utmost of my power, and that without reward, whatever could make them wise and happy."

Saying this, he departed; the cheerfulness of his countenance, his gesture, and whole deportment, bearing testimony to the truth of what he had just declared. And seeing some of those who accompanied him weeping, he asked what it meant? and why they were *now* afflicted? "For, knew ye not," said he, "long ago, even by *that* whereof I was produced, that I was born mortal? If, indeed, I had been taken away when the things which are most desirable flowed in upon me abundantly, with good reason it might have been lamented; and by myself, as well as others: but if I am only to be removed when difficulties of every kind are ready to break in upon me, we ought rather to rejoice, as though my affairs went on the most prosperously."

Apollodorus being present,—one who loved Socrates extremely, though otherwise a weak man,—he said to him, "But it grieveth me, my Socrates! to have you die so unjustly!" Socrates, with much tenderness, laying his hand upon his head, answered, smiling, "And what, my much-loved

Apollodorus! wouldst thou rather they had condemned me justly?"

It is likewise related, that on seeing Anytus pass by, "There goes a man," said he, "not a little vain-glorious, on supposing he shall have achieved something great and noble, in putting me to death, because I once said, 'that since he himself had been dignified with some of the chief offices in the city, it was wrong in him to breed up his son to the trade of a tanner.' But he must be a fool," continued Socrates, "who seeth not that he who at all times performs things useful, and excellent, is *alone* the hero. And, truly," added Socrates, "as Homer makes some, who were near the time of their dissolution, look forward into futurity; *I*, likewise, have a mind to speak somewhat oraculously. Now it happened I was once, for a short time, with this same son of Anytus; and plainly perceiving he neither wanted talents nor activity, therefore I said, it was not fitting that the young man should continue in such a station: but continuing, as he still doth, destitute at the same time of any virtuous instructor, to guide and restrain him within the bounds of duty, he must soon fall a prey to some evil inclination, that will hurry him headlong into vice and ruin."

And, in thus speaking, Socrates prophesied not untruly; for the young man delighted so much in wine, that he ceased not drinking, whether night or day; whereby he became perfectly useless to his country, to his friends, and even to himself.

The memory of Anytus was likewise held in the highest detestation*; and that not only on the account of his other crimes, but for the scandalous manner in which he had educated his son.

Now, it cannot be doubted but Socrates, by speaking thus highly of himself, incurred the more envy, and made his judges still the more eager to condemn him; yet I think, indeed, he only obtained that fate which the gods decree to those they most love;—a discharge from life, when life is become a burthen; and that by a means, of all others, the most easy. Yet here, as well as on every other occasion, Socrates demonstrated the firmness of his soul. For, although he was fully persuaded that to die would be the best for him, yet did he not discover any anxious solicitude, any womanish longings for the hour of his dissolution; but waited its approach with the same steady tranquillity, and unaffected complacency, with which he afterwards went out of life. And, truly, when I consider the wisdom and greatness of soul, so essential to this man, I find it not more out of my power to forget him, than to remember, and not praise him. And if, among those who are most studious to excel in

* The Athenians soon became sensible of the mischief they had done in putting Socrates to death; and so hated the authors of it, that they would not suffer any of them to light fire at their hearths: they would not answer them a question: they would not bathe with them; and if they were seen to touch ever so large a vessel of water, they threw it away as impure: till, at last, these men, unable to bear this usage any longer, hanged themselves.—
PLA. in PHÆD.

virtue, there be any who hath found a person to converse with, more proper than Socrates for promoting his design, — verily we may well pronounce him *the most fortunate of all mankind.*

XENOPHON'S MEMOIRS

OF

SOCRATES.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

I HAVE often wondered by what arguments the accusers of Socrates could persuade the Athenians that he had behaved in such a manner towards the republic as to deserve death: for the accusation preferred against him was to this effect:

“ Socrates is *criminal*; inasmuch as he acknowledged not the gods whom the republic holds sacred, but introduceth *other* and *new* deities.—He is likewise *criminal*, because he corrupteth the youth.”

Now, as to the first of these, *that he acknowledged not the gods whom the republic held sacred*,—what proof could they bring of this, since it was manifest that he often sacrificed both at home and on the common altars? Neither was it in secret that he made use of *divination*; it being a thing *well known* among the people, that Socrates

should declare his *genius* gave him frequent intimations of the future; whence, principally, as it seems to me, his accusers imputed to him the crime of *introducing new deities*. But, surely, herein Socrates introduced nothing *newer*, or more *strange**, than any other, who, placing confidence in divination, make use of auguries†, and omens‡, and symbols||, and sacrifices§. For these men

* The sense of this passage, together with the notes which here follow upon the several particulars contained in it, were obligingly given me by one not more known for his learning, than esteemed for his candour and benevolence,—Mr. Harris, of Salisbury.

† AUGURIES. In Greek *ὀϊωνοί*, which originally signifying birds, was, by metaphor, taken to signify that discovery of futurity to which birds were supposed instrumental.

‡ OMENS. In Greek *Φήμαι*, voices; either declarations of the gods, by express words of their own, heard in temples, groves, and other places; or incidental expressions dropt by human beings, who, without intending it themselves, were supposed to be made channels of divine communications. Thus, when Paulus Æmilius was just returned from the senate, where the conduct of the war with the Macedonian king Perses had been decreed to his care, he found his little daughter Tertia in tears. On his tenderly kissing her, and demanding the cause: “My dear father,” says she, “*poor Persia is dead.*” Persia (according to the Latin idiom for Perses) was the name of her lap-dog. The father, eagerly embracing her, cries out, “*Accipio omen, mea filia.*”—*My child, I seize the omen.* Æmilius soon after went, and Perses was conquered. *Cic. de Divinat. lib. i. cap. 46.* According to this idea of the word *omen* the old etymologists very properly inform us, that it was originally written *oremen quod fit ex ore*, as being a method of divination *which proceeds from the mouth*.

|| SYMBOLS. In Greek *Σύμβολα*, or *Σύμβολοι*, signs, symbols, or external types, by which something else more latent was signified; on the explanation of which depended the skill of the diviner. Thus, from Cicero, in the same tract above quoted, we

suppose not that the birds, or persons they meet unexpectedly, *know* what is good for them; but that the gods, by their means, give certain intimations of the *future*, to those who apply themselves to divination. And the same also was his opinion, only with this difference, that while the greatest part say they are *persuaded*, or *dissuaded*, by the flights of birds, or some accidental occurrence, Socrates, on the contrary, so asserted concerning these matters, as he knew them from an *internal consciousness*; declaring it was his *genius* from whom he received his information. And, in consequence of these significations, (communicated, as he said, by his *genius*,) Socrates would frequently forewarn his friends what might be well for them to *do*, and what to *forbear*; and such as were guided by his advice found their advantage in so doing, while those who neglected it had no small cause for repentance*.

learn, that when king Midas was a child, the ants, as he was sleeping, filled his mouth with grains of corn; and that when Plato was sleeping in his cradle, the bees came and seated themselves on his lips. These symbols were explained to foretel the future riches of the first, and the future eloquence of the latter.—*Cic. de Div. lib. i. cap. 36.*

§ SACRIFICES. In Greek *Θυσίαι*. The inspection of the entrails of victims, and the divination thence deduced, are too well known to need explanation.

* As an instance of this, it is said, that after the defeat of the Athenians, at the battle of Delium, he told Alcibiades, and those who were with him, “that he had just received intimations from “his genius, that they should not take the same road the greatest “part of their broken forces had taken, but turn into some other.” By which means those who paid regard to his admonitions

Now, who is there that will not readily acknowledge, that Socrates could have no desire to appear to his friends either as an enthusiast, or arrogant boaster? which, however, would have been unavoidable, had he openly asserted that *notices of the future* had been given him by the Deity; while a failure in the event made the falsehood of the assertion notorious to all. Wherefore, it is manifest Socrates foretold nothing but what he firmly believed would, hereafter, be fulfilled:—But, *where* could he place this full confidence, exclusive of a *deity*; and how could one, who *thus* confided, be said to acknowledge *no* gods?

Farther:—Although Socrates always advised his followers to perform the necessary affairs of life in the best manner they were able; yet, with regard to every thing, the event whereof was doubtful, he constantly sent them to consult the oracle, whether it *ought*, or *ought not*, to be undertaken. He likewise asserted, that the science of divination was necessary for all such as would govern, successfully, either cities or private families: for, although he thought every one might choose his own way of life, and afterwards, by his industry, excel therein; whether architecture, mechanics, agriculture, superintending the labourer, managing

escaped: while the rest, being overtaken by a party of the enemy's horse, were either killed on the spot or made prisoners. Neither doth this, or any of the like instances, oppose the opinion of those who say Socrates's genius was nothing more than sound judgement or reason, free from all the warpings and mists of passion; improved by experience and a careful observation of nature and things. Cornelius Nepos called *prudence* a kind of divination.

the finances, or practising the art of war; yet even *here*, the gods, he would say, thought proper to reserve to themselves, in all these things, the knowledge of that part of them which was of the most importance; since he, who was the most careful to cultivate his field, could not know, of a certainty, who should reap the fruit of it. He who built his house the most elegantly, was not sure who should inhabit it. He who was the best skilled in the art of war, could not say, whether it would be for his interest to command the army: neither he who was the most able to direct in the administration, whether for his to preside over the city. The man who married a fair wife, in hopes of happiness, might procure for himself a source of much sorrow; and he who formed the most powerful alliances, might come in time, by their means, to be expelled his country. Socrates, therefore, esteemed all those as no other than madmen, who, excluding the Deity, referred the success of their designs to nothing higher than *human prudence*. He likewise thought those not much better who had recourse to divination on every occasion, as if a man was to consult the oracle whether he should give the reins of his chariot into the hands of one ignorant or well versed in the art of driving; or place at the helm of his ship a skilful or unskilful pilot. He also thought it a kind of impiety to importune the gods with our inquiries concerning things of which we may gain the knowledge by number, weight, or measure; it being, as it seemed to him, incumbent on man to

make himself acquainted with whatever the gods had placed within his power : as for such things as were beyond his comprehension, for *these* he ought always to apply to the oracle ; the gods being ever ready to communicate knowledge to those whose care had been to render them propitious.

Socrates was almost continually in men's sight. The first hours of the morning were usually spent in the places set apart for walking, or the public exercises ; and from thence he went to the forum, at the time when the people were accustomed to assemble. The remainder of the day was passed where might be seen the greatest concourse of the Athenians ; and, for the most part, he so discoursed, that all who were willing might hear whatsoever he said : yet no one ever observed Socrates either speaking or practising any thing impious or profane ; neither did he amuse himself, like others, with making curious researches into the works of Nature ; and finding out how *this*, which sophists call the *world*, had its beginning ; or what those powerful springs which influence celestial bodies. On the contrary, he demonstrated the folly of those who busied themselves much in such fruitless disquisitions ; asking, whether they thought they were already sufficiently instructed in *human* affairs, that they undertook only to meditate on *divine* ? Or, if passing over the *first*, and confining their inquiries altogether to the *latter*, they appeared, even to themselves, to act wisely, and as became *men*. He marvelled they should not perceive, it was not for man to investigate

such matters; for those among them who arrogated the most to themselves, because they could with the greatest facility talk on these subjects, never agreed in the same opinion; but like madmen, some of whom tremble when no danger is near; while others fear no harm at the approach of things hurtful: so these philosophers; some of them asserting there was no shame in saying or doing any thing before the people; others sending their disciples into solitude, as if nothing innocent could be performed by us in public: some regarding neither temples nor altars, nor reverencing any thing whatsoever as divine; while others thought nothing could be found too vile for an object of their adoration. Even among those who laboriously employed themselves in studying the universe, and the nature of all things, some imagined the whole of being to be simply *One only*; others, that *beings are in number infinite*: some, that all things are *eternally moving*; others, that *nothing can be moved at all*: some, that all things are *generated and destroyed*; others, that *there can never be any generation or destruction of any thing**.

* This passage, with the following note upon it, together with the note marked *, page 24, were given to the translator by Mr. Harris.

In this passage Socrates has reference to the speculations, partly physical, partly metaphysical, of the philosophers who lived before him, and whose writings now are either wholly lost, or only preserved in fragments by Aristotle, Cicero, Simplicius, &c. The names of these ancient sages were Melissus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Democritus, &c. It would be superfluous in this place to say any thing concerning their opinions, the diversity among

He would ask, concerning these busy inquirers into the nature of such things as are only to be produced by a divine power, whether, as those artists who have been instructed in some art, believe they are able to practise it at pleasure, so they, having found out the immediate *cause*, believe they shall be able, for their own benefit, or that of others, to produce winds and rain, the vicissitudes of time, or the change of seasons? Or if indeed altogether destitute of this hope, they could content themselves with such *fruitless* knowledge?

In this manner would he reason concerning those people who gave themselves up to such useless speculations. As for himself, *man*, and what related to man, were the only subjects on which he chose to employ himself. To this purpose, all his inquiries and conversation turned upon what was pious, what impious; what honourable, what base; what just, what unjust; what wisdom, what folly; what courage, what cowardice; what a state or political community, what the character of a statesman or politician; what a government of men*, what the character of one equal to such government. It was on these, and other matters of the same kind, that he used to dissert; in which

them is sufficiently set forth by our author, and it is *on this diversity* rests the force of his argument.

* He speaks here of the government of *men* in contradistinction to that of *brutes*, as practised over sheep by shepherds, over cattle by herdsmen, over horses by horsemen. The brutes all considered as *irrational*, but man as *rational*. See this matter finely illustrated by Xenophon, in the beginning of his *Cyropædia*.

subjects, those who were knowing he used to esteem men of honour and goodness; and those who were ignorant, to be no better than the basest of slaves*.

That the judges of Socrates should err concerning him, in points wherein his opinion might not be apparently manifest, I marvel not; but that such things as had been spoken *plainly*, and acted *openly*, should have no weight with them, is indeed wonderful; for, being of the senate, and having taken, as was customary, the senatorial oath, by which he bound himself to act in all things conformable to the laws, and arriving in his turn to be president of the assembly of the people†, he boldly refused to give his suffrage to the iniquitous sentence which condemned the nine captains‡, two of whom were Erasmides and Thrasellus, to an unjust death; being neither intimidated with the menaces of the great, nor the fury of the people; but

* Epictetus confines the study and inquiries of men to yet narrower bounds; for he says,—“ As the subject-matter of a carpenter, is wood; of a statuary, brass; so of the art of living, the subject-matter is, each person’s *own life*.”—But the more enlarged scheme of Socrates seems more amiable, as more just.

† Epistate.

‡ The crime alleged against these men was, their not having taken care to pay the last rites to the dead after a sea-fight with the Lacedemonians, though they could plead in excuse for the not doing it, the being prevented by a violent storm. Socrates, notwithstanding Theramenes, one of his followers and friends, had preferred the accusation, opposed it strongly; and when called upon to put the judgement in writing, as his office required him, he told them at first he was unacquainted with the law-terms; and at last absolutely refused to do it.

steadily preferring the sanctity of an oath to the safety of his person: for he was persuaded the gods watched over the actions and the affairs of men in a way altogether different to what the vulgar imagined; for while *these* limited their knowledge to *some* particulars only, Socrates, on the contrary, extended it to *all*; firmly persuaded, that every word, every action, nay even our most retired deliberations, were open to their view*; that they were every where present, and communicated to mankind all such knowledge as related to the conduct of human life: wherefore, I greatly wonder the Athenians could ever suffer themselves to be persuaded that Socrates retained sentiments injurious to the Deity! He, in whom nothing was ever observed unbecoming that reverence so justly due to the gods; but, on the contrary, so behaved towards them, both in regard to his words and his actions, that whoever shall hereafter demean himself in such a manner, *must* be, in fact, and *ought* also to be esteemed, a man of the truest and most exemplary piety.

* “When you have shut your door,” saith Epictetus, “and darkened your room, remember never to say, You are *alone*: for God is within, and your genius is within, and what need they of light to see what you are doing?”—CARTER’S EPIC.

CHAP. II.

BUT it is still matter of more wonder to me, that any one could be prevailed on to believe that Socrates was a *corrupter of youth*! Socrates, the most sober and the most chaste of all mankind! supporting with equal cheerfulness the extreme, whether of heat or cold*! who shrunk at no hardships, declined no labour, and knew so perfectly how to moderate his desires, as to make the *little* he possessed altogether sufficient for him! Could such a one be an encourager of impiety, injustice, luxury, intemperance, effeminacy? But, so far from any such thing, that on the contrary he reclaimed many from these vices, by kindling in their minds a love of virtue; encouraging them to think, that by a steadfast perseverance they might make themselves esteemed, by becoming virtuous men: and although he never undertook to be a *teacher of others*; yet, as he practised the virtues he sought to recommend, those who conversed with him were animated with the hopes of becoming one day wise, from the influence of his example. Not that Socrates ever omitted a due con-

* It was his custom never to drink on his return from his exercises, till after having poured abroad the first bucket of water, though ready to die with thirst and heat; and this, as he said, to exercise his patience, and accustom his sensual appetites the better to obey his reason.

cern for his body ; neither did he commend those who did : he would even frequently blame the people whose custom it was to eat to excess, and afterwards use immoderate exercise ; saying, that men should only eat till nature was satisfied, and then apply themselves to some moderate exercise ; which would not only keep the body in health, but set the mind at liberty for the more proper discharge of its peculiar duties.

In his apparel nothing was either delicate or ostentatious ; and the same might be said with respect to his whole manner of living : yet no man ever became avaricious from having conversed with Socrates : on the contrary, many were reclaimed from this infamous vice, by his example, as they had been already from many others ; while they observed him not only to forbear the taking any reward of those who sought his conversation, but heard him earnestly contend it was necessary to do so, for any one who desired to avoid *slavery* : for such, he would say, as submit to receive a pecuniary return for the instructions they bestow, are no longer at liberty to *give*, or *withhold* them ; but, like so many slaves, are at the will of those from whom they are content to receive wages : therefore he much admired, that the man who professed himself a *teacher of virtue*, should debase himself so far ; unless he either understood not, that to gain a virtuous friend was the greatest of all acquisitions ; or at least feared, that such as had been made wise and virtuous by his instructions, might yet be wanting in gratitude to their greatest benefactor.

But, far from any such absurdity, Socrates, without setting himself up for an instructor, had full confidence, that all who attended to his discourses, and embraced his doctrines, would never fail in point of friendship, either to him or to each other:—How then could a man like *this*, be a *corrupter of youth*; unless, haply, the study of virtue should be the way to corrupt the morals, and incline mankind to become more dissolute?

But, say his accusers, “Socrates makes those who converse with him contemners of the laws; calling it madness to leave to *chance* the election of our magistrates; while no one would be willing to take a pilot, an architect, or even a teacher of music, on the same terms; though mistakes in such things would be far less fatal than errors in the administration.” With *these*, and the like discourses, he brought (as was said) the youth by degrees to ridicule and contemn the established form of government; and made them thereby the more headstrong and audacious.

Now, it seemeth to me, that whoever applies himself to the study of wisdom, in hopes of becoming one day capable of directing his fellow-citizens, will not *indulge*, but rather take pains to *subdue* whatever he finds in his temper of turbulent and impetuous; knowing that enmity and danger are the attendants on force; while the path of *persuasion* is all security and good-will: for they who are compelled hate whoever compels them, supposing they have been injured; whereas we conciliate the affection of those we gain by per-

suasion; while they consider it as a kindness to be applied to in such a manner. Therefore it is only for those to employ *force* who possess strength without judgement; but the well-advised will have recourse to other means. Besides, he who pretends to carry his point by *force*, hath need of many associates; but the man who can *persuade*, knows that he is of himself sufficient for the purpose: neither can such a one be supposed forward to shed blood; for, who is there would choose to *destroy* a fellow-citizen, rather than make a *friend* of him, by mildness and persuasion?

But, adds his accuser, "Critias and Alcibiades were two of his intimate friends; and these were not only the most profligate of mankind, but involved their country in the greatest misfortunes; for, as among *the thirty* none was ever found so cruel and rapacious as Critias; so, during the democracy, none was so audacious, so dissolute, or so insolent, as Alcibiades."

Now I shall not take upon me to exculpate either of these men; but shall only relate at what *time*, and, as I think, to what *end*, they became the followers of Socrates.

Critias and Alcibiades were, of all the Athenians, by nature the most *ambitious*; aiming, at what price soever, to set themselves at the head of the commonwealth, and thereby exalt their names beyond that of any other: they saw that Socrates lived well satisfied with his own scanty possessions; that he could restrain every passion within

its proper bounds, and lead the minds of his hearers, by the power of his reasoning, to what purpose he most desired. Understanding *this*, and being such men as we have already described them, will any one say it was the *temperance* of Socrates, or *his way of life*, they were in love with; and not rather, that by hearing his discourses, and observing his actions, they might the better know how to manage their affairs, and harangue the people?

And, truly, I am thoroughly persuaded, that if the gods had given to these men the choice of passing their whole lives after the manner of Socrates, or dying the next moment, the last would have been preferred, as by much the most eligible. And their own behaviour bears sufficient testimony to the truth of this assertion; for, no sooner did they imagine they surpassed in knowledge the rest of their contemporaries, who, together with themselves, had attended on Socrates, but they left him, to plunge into business and the affairs of the administration; the only end they could propose, in desiring to associate with him.

But, perhaps, it may be objected, that Socrates ought not to have discoursed with his followers on the affairs of government, till he had first instructed them how to behave with temperance and discretion. Far am I from saying otherwise: and shall only observe, that it is commonly the practice with those who are teachers of others, to perform in the presence of their pupils the things they would recommend; to the end, that while they enforced

them on their minds, by the strength of their reasonings, they might set forth, by their example, the *manner* in which they are done.

Now, with respect to *either* of these methods of instruction, I know not of any who went beyond Socrates; his whole life serving as an *example* of the most unblemished integrity; at the same time that he ever reasoned with a peculiar force and energy, on virtue, and those several duties which are becoming us as men. And it is certain, that even Critias and Alcibiades themselves behaved soberly and wisely all the time they conversed with him; not that they feared punishment; but as supposing a regular conduct would best serve the end they had in view.

Nevertheless, I know there are many who value themselves on the account of their philosophy; who allow not that a *virtuous man* can ever be any other than *virtuous*, but, that he who is once temperate, modest, just, must *always* remain so; because the habits of these virtues being deeply imprinted, cannot afterwards be erased out of the minds of men. But I hold not this opinion; for, as the body from disuse may come in time to be deprived of all its powers, so the mental faculties may lose all their energy, through a neglect of their being exerted *duly*, and *the man* no longer able to act, or not act in the manner that best becomes him. Therefore fathers, although otherwise well assured of the good disposition of their children, forget not to warn them against the company of ill men; knowing, that as to converse with the good must exercise and improve every virtue;

so to associate with the bad must prove no less pernicious and baneful. And to this purpose also the poet* :

“ Although *unconscious* of the pleasing charm,
The mind still bends where friendship points the way :
Let *virtue* then thy partner's bosom warm,
Lest *vice* should lead thy soften'd soul astray.”

And that other :

“ In the *same* mind, now good, now bad, prevails.”

And with these do I agree ; for as we may observe people who have learnt verses soon forget them, if not frequently repeated, so will it prove with regard to the precepts of philosophy ; they slip out of the memory, and along with them we lose the very ideas which kindled and nourished in our souls the *love* of virtue ; which ideas once gone, no wonder if the *practice* of it ceases soon after. I have observed farther, that such men as are hurried away with an inordinate love, whether of wine or women, become less capable of attending to what will be for their advantage, or refraining from what is to their harm ; so that it hath often happened that many, who before were remarkable for their economy, no sooner became slaves to one or other of these passions, but all things went to ruin ; and having squandered away their substance, were compelled, through want, to

* THEOGNIS.—The character of this poet is, “ that he rescued poetry from trifling and useless subjects, to employ it in the service of virtue and goodness.” He was born in the 39th Olympiad.

☞ This elegant translation was given me by a kind friend.

submit to such offices as they themselves had once thought *shameful*. How then shall we say, that he who is *once* temperate *cannot* become intemperate? or that he who acts uprightly at one time, *cannot* at another act the very *contrary*? For myself, I am persuaded that no one virtue can subsist that is not diligently and duly exercised, and temperance more especially; because our sensual desires, being seated with our minds in the *same* body, are continually soliciting us to a compliance with those appetites Nature hath implanted, though at the expense of virtue and all things virtuous: wherefore I can well imagine that even Alcibiades and Critias could restrain their vitious inclinations while they accompanied with Socrates and had the assistance of his example; but being at a distance from him, Critias retiring into Thessaly, *there* very soon completed his ruin, by choosing to associate with libertines rather than with such as were men of sobriety and integrity; while Alcibiades, seeing himself sought after by women of the highest rank, on account of his beauty; and at the same time much flattered by many who were then in power, because of the credit he had gained, not only in Athens, but with such as were in alliance with her: in a word, perceiving how much he was the favourite of the people, and placed, as it were, above the reach of a competitor, neglected that care of himself which alone could secure him: like the athletic, who will not be at the trouble to continue his exercises, on seeing no one near able to dispute the prize with him. Therefore, in such an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances as

befell these men, puffed up with the nobility of their birth, elated with their riches, and inflamed with their power, if we consider the company they fell into, together with their many unhappy opportunities for riot and intemperance, can it seem wonderful, separated as they were from Socrates, and this for so long a time too, if at length they became altogether degenerate, and rose to that height of pride and insolence to which we have been witnesses?

But the crimes of these men are, it seems, in the opinion of his accuser, to be charged upon Socrates; yet allows he no praise for keeping them within the bounds of their duty in that part of life which is generally found the most intemperate and untractable: nevertheless, on all other occasions, men judge not in this manner. For, what teacher of music, or any other art or science, was ever known to incur censure, because the scholar, whom he had well instructed, forgot all he had been taught, when placed under the care of some other master? Or what father would condemn those companions of his son with whom the first years of his life had been spent innocently, because afterwards he had been drawn aside into riot and debauchery by associating himself with very different people? Will he not rather bestow the greater praise on the *one*, by how much more he sees his son hath been corrupted by the *other*? Even parents themselves are not blamed for the faults of their children, though educated under their own eye, provided they are careful not to set before them any ill example.

Here, then, is the test whereby to have tried Socrates: "Hath his life been wicked? let him be considered, and condemned, as a wicked man: but, if otherwise; if he hath steadily and invariably persevered in the paths of virtue, accuse him not of crimes which his soul never knew."

"Yet it may be he countenanced those vices in others which in his own person he chose not to commit."

But far from Socrates were all such compliances! On the contrary, when Critias was insnared with the love of Euthydemus, he earnestly endeavoured to cure him of so base a passion; showing how illiberal, how indecent, how unbecoming the man of honour, to fawn, and cringe, and meanly act the beggar: before him, too, whom of all others he the most earnestly strove to gain the esteem of; and, after all, for a favour which carried along with it the greatest infamy. And when he succeeded not in his private remonstrances, Critias still persisting in his unwarrantable designs, Socrates, it is said, reproached him in the presence of many, and even before the beloved Euthydemus; resembling him to a swine, the most filthy and disgusting of all animals. For this cause Critias hated him ever after; and, when one of *the Thirty*, being advanced, together with Charicles, to preside in the city, he forgot not the affront; but, in order to revenge it, made a law, wherein it was forbidden that any should teach *philosophy* in Athens*: by which he meant, having nothing in

* This law was again abrogated upon the expulsion of the thirty tyrants.—See POTTER's *Grecian Antiquities*, vol. i. chap. 25.

particular against Socrates, to involve him in the reproach cast by this step on *all* the philosophers; and thereby render him, in common with the rest, odious to the people: for *I* never heard Socrates say that he *taught* philosophy; neither did I know any who ever did hear him: but Critias was stung; and he determined to show it.—Now, after *the Thirty* had put to death many of the citizens, and some of them of the best rank*, and had given up the reins to all manner of violence and rapine, Socrates had said somewhere, “that it would astonish him much, if he who lost part of the herd every day, while the rest grew poorer and weaker under his management, should deny his being a *bad* herdsman: but it would astonish him still more, if he who had the charge of the city, and saw the number of his citizens decrease hourly, while the rest became more dissolute and depraved under his administration, should be shameless enough not to acknowledge himself an *evil* ruler.” These words, therefore, of Socrates, being told to Critias and Charicles, they sent for him; and showing him the law, straitly forbade him to discourse any more with the young men. Socrates then asked, “if it was permitted him to propose some questions touching some parts of the said law, which he said he could not thoroughly understand;” and being answered it was permitted: “I am always,” said he, “most ready

* It is said, that the number of those put to death by these tyrants was fourteen hundred; and this, without the least form of law: besides five thousand, who were driven into banishment.

to obey the laws; but, to the end I may not transgress unwittingly, inform me, I pray you, whether you take philosophy, as it stands here condemned by you, to consist in reasoning *right*, or reasoning *wrong*; since, if you intend it to imply the first, then must we henceforth beware how we reason *right*; but if the latter is meant, the consequence is plain, then must we endeavour to mend our reasoning."

At these words Charicles being much enraged, said to him, "Since you are so ignorant, Socrates, and withal so dull of apprehension, we will express ourselves in terms somewhat more easy to be understood: refrain altogether from talking with the young men."

"It is well," answered Socrates: "but that nothing of ambiguity may remain in the present case, tell me, I pray you, how long are men called *young*?"

"So long," replied Charicles, "as they are refused admittance into the senate, as supposed not yet arrived at maturity of judgement: or, in other words, till they are thirty."

"But suppose I should want to buy something of a merchant, must I not ask the price of it if the man is under thirty?"

"Who says any such thing?" returned Charicles. "But, Socrates," said he, "it is so much your custom to ask questions when you are not ignorant of the matter in hand, that I do not wonder at your doing so now. Let us, however, have done for the present with your trifling interrogatories."

“ But what if some *young man*, as he passes along, should ask me in haste, ‘ Where lives Charicles? where’s Critias gone?’ Must I not answer him?”

“ It is hardly intended to prohibit such things,” returned Charicles: when Critias interrupting them; “ And I, Socrates, I can inform thee of something more thou hast to refrain from: keep henceforth at a proper distance from the carpenters, smiths, and shoemakers; and let us have no more of your examples from among them. And, besides, I fancy they are sufficiently tired with your bringing them in so often in your long discourses.”

“ Must I likewise give up the consequences,” said Socrates, “ deducible from these examples, and concern myself no longer with justice and piety, and the rules of right and wrong?”

“ Thou must, by Jupiter!” replied Charicles. “ And, Socrates,” said he, “ to make all sure, trouble not thyself any more with the *herdsmen*, for fear *thou* shouldst occasion the loss of more cattle*.”

Now, from *this*, it is evident, that what Socrates once said concerning the *cattle*, being told these

* Some understand this as referring to a certain coin in use among the Athenians, whereon was stamped the figure of an ox, as if Charicles had threatened Socrates with a fine; but there are others, and seemingly with more reason, who think that Charicles aimed his menace rather at the *life* than *wealth* of Socrates, when he thus turns his own words upon him, and bids him take care “ that he himself does not occasion the loss of more cattle.” It seems a witticism, too, well suiting such a man.

men, had greatly inflamed their rage against him. Hence also may be seen how long Critias continued to associate with Socrates, and what the affection they had for each other. I might here likewise add, how seldom it is we make proficiency under people who are not pleasing to us; and that the conversation of Socrates did not render him so either to Critias or Alcibiades, may well be supposed. Even at the very time they followed him, their chief delight was in conversing with such persons as they believed the most skilful in the affairs of state; their only design being to govern the republic. And, agreeably to *this*, they tell us that Alcibiades, when under the age of twenty, coming to Pericles his tutor, and at that time sole director of the Athenian state, entered into the following conversation with him concerning the laws;

“My Pericles,” said he, “can you explain to me what a *law* is?” “Undoubtedly,” returned the other. “Then, I conjure you by the immortal gods!” said Alcibiades, “instruct *me* in this point; for when I hear men praised for their strict observance of the laws, it seems to me evident, that he can no way pretend to that praise who is altogether ignorant what a *law* is.”

“Your request,” my Alcibiades, “is not difficult to be complied with: for that is a law, which the people agree upon in their public assemblies, and afterwards cause to be promulgated in a proper manner; ordaining what *ought*, or *ought not*, to be done.”

“ And what do they ordain ; to do *good*, or to do *evil* ? ”

“ *Not* evil, most assuredly, my young man.”

“ But what do you call that,” said Alcibiades, which in states where the *people* have no rule, is advised and ordained by *the few* who may be then in power ? ”

“ I call *that* likewise a *law*,” replied Pericles ; “ for *the laws* are nothing but the injunctions of such men as are in possession of the sovereign authority.”

“ But when a tyrant is possessed of this sovereign authority, are the things *he* ordains to be received as *laws* ? ”

“ As *laws*,” returned Pericles.

“ What then is *violence* and *injustice* ? ” said Alcibiades : “ Is it not when the *strong* compel the more weak, not by *mildness* and *persuasion*, but *force*, to obey them ? ”

“ I think it is.”

“ Will it not then follow, that what a tyrant decrees, and compels the observance of, not only *without*, but *contrary to* the will of the people ; is not *law*, but the very reverse to it ? ”

“ I believe it may,” answered Pericles ; “ for I cannot admit that as a *law*, which a tyrant enacts, contrary to the will of the people.”

“ And when the *few* impose their decrees on *the many*, not by *persuasion*, but *force* ; are we to call *this* also violence ? ”

“ We are : and truly, I think,” said Pericles, “ that whatever is decreed and enforced without

the consent of those who are hereafter to obey, is not law, but violence."

"Then ought *that* also, which is decreed by the people, contrary to the will of the nobles, to be deemed violence, rather than law?"

"No doubt of it," replied Pericles: "But, my Alcibiades," continued he, "at your age we were somewhat more acute in these subtilties, when we made it our business to consider them, as we now see you."

To which, it is said, Alcibiades returned answer: "Would to the gods then, my Pericles, I might have conversed with you at the time when you *best* understood these sort of things!" In consequence, therefore, of this most ambitious disposition, no sooner did these men suppose they had acquired some advantages over the persons then employed in the administration, but they forbore to associate any longer with Socrates: for, besides that his company was no way pleasing to them, on other considerations; they could still less brook his frequent remonstrances for the many irregularities of their lives: therefore they plunged at once into business, and the affairs of the commonwealth; the only *end* for which they had ever been among his followers.

But Crito, Chærephon, Chærecrates, Simmias, Cebes, Phædo, and many others, were continually with him; not from the hope of becoming, by his means, better *orators*, whether at the bar, or before the people; but better *men*: capable of discharging all those duties which they owed to

themselves, to their country, to their families, their friends, their fellow-citizens. And, so far were these men from practising what was dishonest, that whether in youth or in age, not one of them ever incurred even the *suspicion* of any crime.

But, saith his accuser, "Socrates encourageth his followers to despise their parents; inasmuch as he persuadeth them that *he* is able to make them wiser than *they*; declaring still farther, that as it is lawful for a son to confine his father in chains when convicted of madness, so ought the ignorant also to be confined by him who is possessed of superior knowledge."

Now, whatever his accuser might endeavour to insinuate, it is certain Socrates was very far from being of such an opinion. On the contrary, it was common with him to say; "that whoever pretended to confine another on the account of his ignorance, might *himself* be thus treated by those who were still more knowing." And, to this purpose, he would often discourse on the essential difference between *madness* and *ignorance*: saying, on such occasions, plainly and clearly; "that it was indeed necessary, and for the benefit of *himself*, as well as his *friends*, that the *mad-man* should be unchained; but, that he who was ignorant in any thing *useful*, should only be instructed, by such persons as were qualified to give him proper instruction."

His accuser, however, went on to assert, "that Socrates not only taught the youth to have a contempt for their parents, but for the rest of their

kindred; since he would frequently declare, that when men were sick, or had a law-suit upon their hands, they had not recourse to any of their kindred for relief; but to the lawyer in one case, and the physician in the other. And, with regard to *friendship*, he would likewise say, “that an *useless* good-will, unaccompanied with the power of serving, was little to be accounted of: but the man to be esteemed and preferred, should be *one* who not only *knows* what is for our advantage, but can so explain it as to make *us* likewise know it;” thereby insinuating, as was pretended, into the minds of the youth, that *he* himself was the friend to be chosen before any other, as being the best able to direct in the way of wisdom; while the rest of mankind, in comparison with him, were of small estimation.

Now, that I myself have heard him talk after some such manner, concerning relations, fathers, and friends, is most certain. And I remember him saying, “that when the soul, in which thought and reason alone reside, retires from the body, although it may be the body of a father, or a friend, we remove it from our sight as speedily as well may be. And whereas no man can be doubted as to the love he beareth to his *own* body; yet who is there, would he ask, that scruples to take away from it the part that is superfluous? to cut the hair, or pair the nails; or remove the *whole* limb, when mortified? for which purpose the surgeon is called in, and the steel and the caustick not only readily submitted to, but the hand which applies them liberally rewarded. The spittle, he

would say, men were glad to cast from them, because, remaining in the mouth, it was both useless and offensive. But, notwithstanding all this, Socrates never intended, though he talked in such a manner, that fathers were to be buried alive, or that he himself should have a limb taken off; but he intended to let us see, that whatever is *useless* can be of no estimation; in order to excite in his hearers a desire to improve, and make themselves, as far as may be, serviceable to others; to the end, that if they wished to be regarded by their parents, or respected and honoured by their brethren or kindred, they might urge their claim on the account of *merit*, and not owe the *whole* only to *consanguinity*." "But," says his accuser, "Socrates, the better to *convey*, and at the same time *conceal* the malignity of his intentions, hath chosen many passages from our most celebrated poets, whereby to convey his poison to the people, and dispose them the more readily to fraud and oppression;" for having often cited that line of Hesiod's,

"Employ thyself in *any thing*, rather than stand idle;"

It was pretended he meant to insinuate it as the poet's opinion, "that *no* employment whatever could be unjust or dishonourable from whence profit might arise:" whereas, in truth, nothing could be farther from the design of Socrates: for, although he constantly maintained that labour and employment were not only *useful*, but *honourable*; and idleness no less *reproachful*, than *pernicious* to man; yet he never concluded without

saying, “ that *he* alone could be considered as *not* idle, who was employed in procuring some good to mankind; but that the gamester, the debauchee, and every other whose end was only evil, were emphatically to be called so; and, in *this* sense, he might, with good reason, adopt that line of Hesiod’s,

“ Employ thyself in *any thing*, rather than stand idle.”

But it was still farther alleged, that Socrates frequently introduced these lines of Homer; where, speaking of Ulysses, he says,

“ Each prince of name, or chief in arms approv’d,
He fir’d with praise, or with persuasion mov’d:

‘ Warriors like you, with strength and wisdom blest,
By brave examples should confirm the rest:’

“ But if a clam’rous vile plebeian rose,
Him with reproof he checkt, or tam’d with blows:

‘ Be still, thou slave, and to thy betters yield;

Unknown alike in council and in field!’ POPE.

These words, it was said, he would explain in such a manner, as if the poet hereby meant to recommend roughness, severity, and stripes, as the only proper arguments to be made use of against the vulgar and the indigent. But Socrates was not absurd enough to draw such conclusions; for how then could he have complained, if he himself had been rudely treated? But he asserted, and might strengthen his assertion with these lines from Homer; “ that such as could neither *counsel* nor *execute*, equally *unfit*, whether for the city or the camp; these, and such as these, and

more especially when insolent and unruly, ought to be reduced to reason, without any regard to the extent of their possessions."

And it is certain nothing more could be intended: for, as to himself, Socrates loved the people: his benevolence even extended to all mankind; insomuch that, although he was sought after by foreigners as well as Athenians, he took no reward from any who applied to him, but *freely* imparted that wisdom he was endued with. Yet so did not others. On the contrary, many, who were become rich by his liberality, sold, at no mean price, but a small part of that which had cost them nothing: while, uninfluenced by his example, and bearing no resemblance to him in affection to the people, they refused to converse with any who were not able to pay, and that *largely*, for their instruction.

And, indeed, by this conduct Socrates had rendered the city of Athens renowned throughout all Greece; so that, if it was said of Lychas, the Lacedemonian, "that he was the *glory* of Sparta," because he entertained, at his own expense, the strangers who resorted thither at one of the feasts made in honour of Apollo, much rather might be said of Socrates, "that he was the *glory* of Athens," whose whole life was one continued largess; and who, dispensing with a liberal hand his inestimable treasure, sent no one ever away from him without making him, if willing, a wiser and a happier man. Wherefore, it should seem, that had Socrates been treated by the Athenians according to his merit, *public honours* would have

been decreed him much rather than a *shameful death*. And, after all, for whom do the laws appoint this punishment? Is it not for the thief? for the assaulter on the highway? for the underminer of walls, and the committer of sacrilege? But where, among mankind, shall we find any one at so great a distance from any of these crimes as Socrates? Who can accuse him of holding intelligence with the common enemy? of spreading sedition and treason throughout the city? or of having been the cause of any one public calamity whatsoever? Where is he who, in private life, can say, "Socrates hath defrauded me of my possessions, or hath injured me in any kind?" Nay, when did he incur even the suspicion of any of these things? And as to the points whereof he stood accused, could *he* be a *denier* of those *very* gods whom in so eminent a manner he worshipped? Could *he* be a *corrupter of youth*, whose only employment was to root out of the mind of man every vicious inclination, and plant in their stead a love of that virtue, which is so amiable in itself, and so becoming us as men, and which alone hath the power to make, whether cities or private families, flourishing and happy? *This* being so, who seeth not how much his country stood indebted to Socrates? and that *honours*, not *ignominy*, should have been his reward?

CHAP. III.

Now, as I am persuaded the benefit arising to all those who accompanied with Socrates was not less owing to the irresistible force of his example than to the excellency of his discourses, I will set down whatever occurs to my memory, whether it relates to his words or his actions.

And first, with respect to sacred rites and institutions. In these things it was ever his practice to approve himself a strict observer of the answer the Pythian priestess gives to all who inquire the proper manner of sacrificing to the gods, or paying honours* to their deceased ancestors; "*Follow,*" saith the god, "*the custom of your country:*" and therefore Socrates, in all those exercises of his devotion and piety, confined himself altogether to what he saw practised by the republic; and to his friends he constantly advised the same thing,

* These honours consisted of sacrifices, libations, and various other rites and ceremonies, and were performed on the 9th and 30th days after burial, and repeated when any of their friends arrived who had been absent from the solemnity; and upon all other occasions which required their surviving relations to have the deceased in memory. On these public days it was the custom to call over the names of their dead relations, one by one, excepting such as died under age, or had forfeited their title to this honour by dissipating their paternal inheritance, or for some other crime.—POTT. *Antiq.*

saying, it only savoured of vanity and superstition in all those who did otherwise.

When he prayed, his petition was only this—
“*That the gods would give to him those things that were good.*” And this he did, forasmuch as they alone knew what was good for man. But he who should ask for gold or silver, or increase of dominion, acted not, in his opinion, more wisely than one who should pray for the opportunity to fight, or game, or any thing of the like nature; the consequence whereof being altogether *doubtful*, might turn, for aught he knew, not a little to his disadvantage. When he sacrificed, he feared not his offering would fail of acceptance in that he was poor; but, giving according to his ability, he doubted not, but, in the sight of the gods, he equalled those men whose gifts and sacrifices overspread the whole altar. And, indeed, he made no scruple to assert, that it would not be agreeable to the nature of the gods to respect the costly offerings of the rich and the great, whilst the poor man’s gift was altogether disregarded. For, by this means, it might happen, nor yet unfrequently, that the sacrifice of the wicked would find the most acceptance: which, if so, he thought *life* itself would not be desirable to a reasonable creature. But Socrates always reckoned upon it as a most indubitable truth, that the service paid the Deity by the pure and pious soul, was the most grateful sacrifice; and therefore it was he so much approved that precept of the poet, which bids us “*offer to the gods according to our power.*” And not only on these, but on every other occa-

sion, he thought he had no better advice to give his friends, than *that they should do all things according to their ability*. Farther, whenever he supposed any intimations had been given him by the Deity concerning what ought or ought not to be done, it was no more possible to bring Socrates to act otherwise, than to make him quit the guide, clear sighted and well instructed in the road he was to go, in favour of one not only ignorant but blind. And, to this purpose, he always condemned the extreme folly of those, who, to avoid the ill opinion and reproach of men, acted not according to the direction of the gods: looking down with contempt on all the little arts of human prudence, when placed in competition with those divine notices and admonitions which it is oftentimes their pleasure to communicate to man.

As to his manner of living, it may be said, that whoever is willing to regulate and discipline his body and his mind after the example of Socrates, can hardly fail, no deity opposing, to procure for himself that degree of health and strength as cannot easily be shaken. Neither shall he want large sums for such a purpose. On the contrary, such was his moderation, that I question whether there ever was any man, if able to work at all, but might have earned sufficient to have supported Socrates. His custom was to eat as long as it gave him any pleasure; and a good appetite was to him what delicious fare is to another: and as he only drank when thirst com-

pelled him, whatever served to allay it could not fail of being grateful. So that it was easy for him, when present at their feasts, to refrain from excess, which other men find so much difficulty in doing. And as to such persons as gave proof how very little they could command themselves, to these he would counsel even the not *tasting* of those delicacies which might allure them to eat when they were not hungry, and drink when they were not dry; since the *fruits* (he said) of so doing were not only pains in the head and loss of digestion, but disorder and confusion in the mind of man. And it was frequent with him to say, between jest and earnest, “that he doubted not its being with charms like these that Circe turned the companions of Ulysses into swine; while the hero himself, being admonished by Mercury, and, from his accustomed temperance, refusing to *taste* the enchanting cup, happily escaped the shameful transformation.”

With regard to love, his counsel always was to keep at a distance from beautiful persons; saying, it was difficult to approach any such and not be insnared. As for himself, his great continence was known to every one; and it was more easy for him to avoid the most beautiful objects, than for others *those* who were the most disgusting. But although this was the manner in which Socrates lived, yet could he not be persuaded that he enjoyed less of the pleasures of life than the voluptuous man, who employed all his thoughts in the eager pursuit of them; at the same time

that he escaped all that vexation and grief so sure to attend on those who too freely indulge in sensual gratifications.

CHAP. IV.

Now, should there be any inclined to believe what some on conjecture have undertaken to advance, both in their conversations and writings, “that Socrates could indeed inflame his hearers with the love of virtue, but could never influence them so far as to bring them to make any great proficiency therein:” let these, I say, consider what his arguments were, not only when his design was to refute such men as pretended to know every thing, but even in his retired and familiar conversation, and then let them judge whether Socrates was not fully qualified for the bringing his followers and his friends to make proficiency in the paths of virtue.

And, for this purpose, I will now relate the manner in which I once heard him discoursing with Aristodemus, surnamed *the Little*, concerning the Deity. For, observing that he neither prayed nor sacrificed to the gods, nor yet consulted any oracle, but, on the contrary, ridiculed and laughed at those who did, he said to him:

“Tell me, Aristodemus, is there any man whom you admire on account of his merit?”

Aristodemus having answered, "*Many.*"—
"Name some of them, I pray you."

"I admire," said Aristodemus, "Homer for his epic poetry, Melanippides for his dythrambics, Sophocles for tragedy, Polycletes for statuary, and Xeuxis for painting."

"But which seems to you most worthy of admiration, Aristodemus;—the artist who forms images void of motion and intelligence; or one who hath the skill to produce animals that are endued, not only with activity, but understanding?"

"The *latter*, there can be no doubt," replied Aristodemus, "provided the production was not the effect of *chance*, but of wisdom and contrivance."

"But since there are many things, some of which we can easily see the *use* of, while we cannot say of others to what purpose they were produced; which of these, Aristodemus, do you suppose the work of wisdom?"

"It should seem the most reasonable to affirm it of those, whose fitness and utility is so evidently apparent."

"But it is evidently apparent, that He, who at the beginning made man, endued him with senses *because* they were *good* for him; eyes, wherewith to behold whatever was visible; and ears, to hear whatever was to be heard. For say, Aristodemus, to what purpose should odours be prepared, if the sense of smelling had been denied? Or why the distinctions of bitter and sweet, of savoury and unsavoury, unless a palate had been likewise given,

conveniently placed, to arbitrate between them, and declare the difference? Is not that Providence, Aristodemus, in a most eminent manner conspicuous, which, because the eye of man is so delicate in its contexture, hath therefore prepared eyelids like doors, whereby to secure it; which extend of themselves whenever it is needful, and again close when sleep approaches? Are not these eyelids provided, as it were, with a fence on the edge of them, to keep off the wind and guard the eye? Even the eyebrow itself is not without its office, but, as a penthouse, is prepared to turn off the sweat, which, falling from the forehead, might enter and annoy that no less *tender* than *astonishing* part of us! Is it not to be admired that the ears should take in sounds of every sort, and yet are not too much filled by them? That the fore-teeth of the animal should be formed in such a manner as is evidently best suited for the cutting of its food, as those on the side for grinding it in pieces? That the mouth, through which this food is conveyed, should be placed so near the nose and the eyes, as to prevent the passing, *unnoticed*, whatever is unfit for nourishment; while Nature, on the contrary, hath set at a distance, and concealed from the senses, all that might disgust or any way offend them? And canst thou still doubt, Aristodemus! whether a disposition of parts like *this* should be the work of chance, or of wisdom and contrivance?"

"I have no longer any doubt," replied Aristodemus: "and, indeed, the more I consider it, the more evident it appears to me, that man must be

the *masterpiece* of some great artificer; carrying along with it infinite marks of the love and favour of Him who hath thus formed it."

"And what thinkest thou, Aristodemus, of that *desire* in the individual which leads to the continuance of the species? Of that tenderness and affection in the female towards her young, so necessary for its preservation? Of that unremitted love of life, and dread of dissolution, which take such strong possession of us from the moment we begin to be?"

"I think of them," answered Aristodemus, "as so many regular operations of the same great and wise Artist, deliberately determining to *preserve* what he hath once made."

"But, farther, (unless thou desirest to ask me questions,) seeing, Aristodemus, thou thyself art conscious of reason and intelligence, supposest thou there is no intelligence elsewhere? Thou knowest thy body to be a small part of that wide-extended earth which thou every where beholdest: the moisture contained in it, thou also knowest to be a small portion of that mighty mass of waters whereof seas themselves are but a part, while the rest of the elements contribute, out of their abundance, to thy formation. It is the soul then alone, that intellectual part of us! which is come to *thee* by some lucky chance, from I know not where. If so be, there is indeed no intelligence elsewhere: and we must be forced to confess, that this stupendous universe, with all the various bodies contained therein—equally amazing, whether we consider their magnitude or number,

whatever their use, whatever their order—all have been produced, not by *intelligence*, but *chance*!”

“It is with difficulty that I can suppose otherwise,” returned Aristodemus; “for I behold none of those gods, whom you speak of, as *making* and *governing* all things; whereas I see the artists when at their work here among us.”

“Neither yet seest thou thy soul, Aristodemus, which, however, most assuredly *governs* thy body: although it may well seem, by thy manner of talking, that it is *chance*, and not *reason*, which governs thee.”

“I do not despise the gods,” said Aristodemus: “on the contrary, I conceive so highly of their excellence, as to suppose they stand in no need either of me or of my services.”

“Thou mistakest the matter, Aristodemus; the greater magnificence they have shown in their care of *thee*, so much the more honour and service thou owest them.”

“Be assured,” said Aristodemus, “if I once could be persuaded the gods took care of man, I should want no monitor to remind me of my duty.”

“And canst thou doubt, Aristodemus, if the gods take care of man? Hath not the glorious privilege of walking upright been *alone* bestowed on him, whereby he may, with the better advantage, survey what is around him, contemplate, with more ease, those splendid objects which are above, and avoid the numerous ills and inconveniences which would otherwise befall him? Other animals, indeed, they have provided with feet, by

which they may remove from one place to another; but to *man* they have also given *hands*, with which he can form many things for his use, and make himself happier than creatures of any other kind. A tongue hath been bestowed on every other animal; but what animal, except man, hath the power of forming words with it, whereby to explain his thoughts, and make them intelligible to others? And to show that the gods have had regard to his very *pleasures*, they have not limited them, like those of other animals, to *times* and *seasons*, but man is left to indulge in them, whenever not hurtful to him.

“ But it is not with respect to the body alone that the gods have shown themselves thus bountiful to man! their most excellent gift is that *soul* they have infused into him, which so far surpasses what is elsewhere to be found. For, by what animal, except man, is even the *existence* of those gods discovered, who have *produced*, and still *uphold*, in such regular order, this beautiful and stupendous frame of the universe? What other species of creatures are to be found that can serve, that can adore them? What other animal is able, like man, to provide against the assaults of heat and cold, of thirst and hunger? That can lay up remedies for the time of sickness, and improve the strength nature hath given by a well-proportioned exercise? That can receive, like him, information and instruction; or so happily keep in memory what he hath seen, and heard, and learnt? These things being so, who seeth not that man is, as it were, *a god* in the midst of

this visible creation; so far doth he surpass, whether in the endowments of soul or body, all animals whatsoever that have been produced therein! For, if the *body* of the *ox* had been joined to the *mind* of *man*, the acuteness of the latter would have stood him in small stead, while unable to execute the well-designed plan; nor would the *human* form have been of more use to the brute, so long as it remained destitute of understanding! But in thee! Aristodemus, hath been joined to a wonderful *soul*, a body no less wonderful: and sayest thou, after *this*, “the gods take no thought for me!” What wouldst thou then more to convince thee of their care?”

“I would they should send, and inform me,” said Aristodemus, “what things I *ought* or *ought not* to do, in like manner as thou sayest they frequently do to thee.”

“And what then, Aristodemus! supposest thou, that when the gods give out some oracle to *all* the Athenians, they mean it not for *thee*? If, by their prodigies, they declare aloud to all Greece,—to *all* mankind,—the things which shall befall them; are they dumb to *thee* alone? And art *thou* the only person whom they have placed beyond their care? Believest thou they would have wrought into the mind of man a persuasion of their being *able* to make him happy or miserable, if so be they had no such *power*? or would not even man himself, long ere this, have seen through the gross delusion? How is it, Aristodemus, thou rememberest, or remarkest not, that the kingdoms and commonwealths most renowned as well

for their *wisdom* as antiquity, are those whose piety and devotion hath been the *most* observable? and that even *man* himself is never so well disposed to serve the Deity, as in that part of life when reason bears the greatest sway, and his judgement supposed in its full strength and maturity. Consider, my Aristodemus! that the soul which resides in thy body can govern it at pleasure; why then may not the soul of the universe, which pervades and animates every part of it, *govern* it in like manner? If thine eye hath the power to take in *many* objects, and these placed at no small distance from it; marvel not if the eye of the Deity can, at one glance, comprehend *the whole*! And as thou perceivest it not beyond thy ability to extend thy care, at the same time, to the concerns of Athens, Egypt, Sicily; why thinkest thou, my Aristodemus! that the providence of God may not easily extend itself throughout the whole universe? As, therefore, among men, we make best trial of the affection and gratitude of our neighbour, by showing him kindness; and discover his wisdom, by consulting him in our distress; do thou, in like manner, behave towards the gods: and, if thou wouldst experience what their wisdom, and what their love, render thyself deserving the communication of some of those divine secrets which may not be penetrated by man; and are imparted to those alone, who consult, who adore, who obey the Deity. Then shalt thou, my Aristodemus! understand there is a Being whose eye pierceth throughout all nature, and whose ear is open to every sound; *extended* to all places; *extending*

through all time ; and whose bounty and care can know no other bounds than those fixed by his own creation !”

By this discourse, and others of the like nature, Socrates taught his friends that they were not *only* to forbear whatever was impious, unjust, or unbecoming before *men* ; but even, when alone, they ought to have a regard to all their actions ; since the gods have their eyes continually upon us ; and none of our designs can be concealed from them.

CHAP. V.

AND now, if temperance be a virtue conducing to the honour and happiness of man, let us see in what manner Socrates endeavoured to stir up his followers to the practice of it.

“ My fellow citizens ! would he say, when war is declared, and it becomes necessary for you to make choice of a general, choose ye the man enslaved to wine or women ; luxurious in his diet ; intemperate in his sleep ; incapable of labour ; impatient of fatigue ? Can ye, from *such a one*, expect *safety* to yourselves ; or *conquest* over your enemies ? Or, when death draweth nigh, and no thought remaineth but for the welfare of your children ; do ye then inquire for the debauchee wherewith to intrust them ? Is it *he* who must direct in the virtuous education of your sons, and guard the chastity of your virgin daughters ; or

secure to them the inheritance from the hand of the oppressor? Do ye intrust your flocks or your herds to the conduct of him who is overcharged with drunkenness? or expect from such a one despatch to your affairs? Would even the slave be received, though sent as a *gift*, who came to us branded with so loathsome a vice? If, therefore, intemperance appears to us so odious when seen only in the slave, how should we dread the being ourselves degraded by it! The rapacious and covetous have the pleasure of growing *rich*, and add to their *own* substance what they take from *others*: but the dissolute man injures his neighbour without profit to himself; nay, he injures every one, and himself most of all, if the ruin of his family, his health, his body, and his mind, may be termed *injuries*? Neither can such a one add to the pleasures that arise from social conversation: for what pleasure can *he* give whose only delight is in eating and drinking, and, destitute of shame, prefers the company of the common prostitute to that of his *best* friend? Hence, therefore, we may see how necessary it is to make temperance our *chief* study; since, without *this*, as its basis, what other virtue can we attain? How can we *learn* what is profitable, or *practise* what is praiseworthy? Neither can we conceive a state more pitiable, whether in respect to body or mind, than the voluptuary, given up to all the *drudgery* of intemperance. And, certainly, we should wish no worthy man may be encumbered with a slave of this disposition: or, however, we are sure all slaves who abandon themselves to such irregu-

larities ought to entreat the gods that they may fall into the hands of mild and gentle masters,—their only chance to save them from utter ruin.”

Thus would Socrates talk concerning temperance; and if the whole tenour of his discourse showed his regard for this virtue, the whole tenour of his life served more abundantly to confirm it. For he was not only superior to the pleasures of sense, but the desire of gain: it being his full persuasion, that the man who received money, bought himself a master; whose commands, however *humbling*, could not *honestly* be rejected.

CHAP. VI.

It may not be improper, nor yet to the discredit of Socrates, to relate a conversation he had with Antipho the sophist*. Now, this man having a

* These were a sort of men, who, as Socrates says, pretended to know, and teach every thing: geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, natural philosophy, eloquence, politics, &c. Their promises, however, always ended in giving some slight superficial notions of these several sciences; and they exercised their disciples chiefly in idle disputations, whereby they might learn to defend whatever they had a mind to affirm. Those who studied under them, were filled with pride, and vain conceit of their own abilities; while the sophist, on his side, regarded nothing but his own gain: and it is said, that one Protagoras, although there were at that time many others of them in Greece, accumulated by this profession ten times the sum that Phidias, the famous statuary, could ever gain by his trade.

design to draw to himself the followers of Socrates, came to him one day ; and, in the presence of many of them, accosted him as follows :

“ I always thought,” said he, “ that philosophy served to make men *happier* ; but the fruit of your wisdom, Socrates, seems to be the very reverse : for I know not that slave who would tarry with his master a single day, if compelled to live in the manner that you do. You eat and drink the meanest of every thing. Your habit is not only coarser than others, but you make no difference between summer and winter ; and *your* feet are always naked. You will take no money, though we find no little pleasure in accumulating wealth : and besides, when a man hath once made his fortune, he hath nothing more to do than to live nobly, and go on at his ease. Now, if all who attend to your *instructions* are to follow your *example*, as is commonly the case of pupils with their masters ; may we not well say you only teach men how to be miserable ?”

To which Socrates : “ I perceive, Antipho, you have formed to yourself so woful a picture of my manner of life, as shows you had much rather die than live as I do : let us therefore examine what it is you are so much afraid of. You think *I* am to be pitied for not taking money : Is it because *those* who do, are no longer masters of their own time, but must perform their engagements, however contrary to their inclinations ; while *I* am at liberty to talk, or not talk, as best suits my humour ? The manner in which I eat may not be to your mind : Doth my dinner afford less

nourishment than yours? doth it cost more? or is it, do you think, more difficult to procure? And though I allow the things they provide for *your* table may be more delicious than those on mine, consider, Antipho, he who sits down with a good appetite hath no want of rich sauce to give a relish to his food: neither will *he* wish for the high flavoured wine, who hath already with delight quenched his thirst with water. As to my habit:—You know, Antipho, he who changes his dress, doth it on account of the heat or cold; and puts on shoes only that the ruggedness of the road may not prevent his passing it: but tell me, I desire you, when hath the cold kept me within doors? or where did you see me contend for the *shade*, to avoid the scorching heat of the sun? or, when was I hindered by the anguish of my feet from going wherever my fancy led me? Besides, you cannot but know many, whose constitution being naturally weak, have brought themselves by the force of exercise to bear labour and fatigue far better than those of a more robust make, who through indolence and sloth have shamefully neglected it. Why then should you not suppose that *I*, who have always accustomed myself to bear with patience whatever might fall to my lot, may do it at present with somewhat more ease than *you*, Antipho, who, perhaps, have not so much as *once* thought of the matter? If I am observed to be not over delicate in my diet, if I sleep little, nor *once* taste of those infamous delights which others indulge in, assign no other cause than my being possessed of pleasures in themselves far more

eligible, which delight not alone for the moment in which they are enjoyed, but gladden with the hope of yielding perpetual satisfaction. Now, you must have remarked, Antipho, that people who doubt their affairs go ill, are never cheerful; while those who think they are in the way to succeed, whether in agriculture, traffic, or whatever it may be, are happy as if they had already succeeded. But suppose you there can arise from any of *these* a pleasure equal to what the mind experiences while it is conscious of improving in the paths of virtue, and sees the wise and the good add to the number of its friends? Yet *these* are the purposes to which I think I employ myself; and *this*, the reward I have for *my* labour! Besides, should we suppose our friends or our country wanting assistance, *who* would be judged the best able to bestow it; he, Antipho, who lives as *I* do; or he who is engaged in that course of life which seems to you so very delightful? Or, when called on to bear arms, which would you think the most likely to discharge the duty of a good soldier; *he* who sits down dissatisfied to his table unless loaded with delicacies, however difficult to be obtained; or *he* who is not only content, but rises *well* pleased from whatever is set before him? And if the city is besieged, which will be the *first* to advise the surrendering it up to the enemy? It should seem your opinion, Antipho, that happiness consisted in luxury and profusion; whereas, in truth, I consider it as a perfection in the gods that they want *nothing*; and, consequently, *he* cometh the nearest to the divine nature, who standeth in want of the

fewest things : and seeing there is nothing which can transcend the divine nature, whoever approacheth the *nearest* thereto, approaches the *nearest* to sovereign excellence."

At another time, Antipho disputing with him, said, " I am willing to acknowledge you a *just* man, Socrates, but surely not a man of *much knowledge* ; and of this you seem to be yourself aware, since you refuse to receive any reward for your instructions. Now it is certain you would not give your house, or even your cloak, for *nothing* ; nay, nor for less than the full worth of them ; yet you will talk, it is well known, for a whole day gratis ;—a plain proof how the case stands with you. Now it is for this very reason I commend your honesty, that will not suffer you, through desire of gain, to deceive any : but then you must give up all pretences to knowledge, since you hereby declare you have none worth purchasing."

To which Socrates :—" You know, Antipho, that among us it is imagined there is no small similarity between *beauty* and philosophy ; for that which is praiseworthy in the one, is so likewise in the other ; and the same sort of vices are apt to blemish *both*. Now, when we see a woman bartering her beauty for gold, we look upon such a one as no other than a common prostitute ; but she who rewards the passion of some worthy youth with it, gains at the same time our approbation and esteem. It is the very same with philosophy : *he* who sets it forth for public sale, to be disposed of to the *best* bidder, is a sophist, a public prostitute ! But *he*

who becomes the instructor of some well-disposed youth, and makes thereby a *friend* of him, we say of such a one, he discharges as he ought the duty of a good citizen. And besides, Antipho, as there are some who delight in fine horses, others in dogs, and others in other animals; my pleasure is in the company of my friends. If I know any thing whereby they may at all be profited, I communicate it to them, or recommend them to those whom I think better qualified for carrying them on in the paths of virtue. When we are together, we employ ourselves in searching into those treasures of knowledge the ancients have left us: we draw from the same fountains: and running over whatever these sages have left behind them; where we find any thing excellent, we remark it for our use; and think ourselves not to have profited a little, when we see mutual love begin to flourish among us."

Thus did Socrates reply: and truly, when I have heard him talk in this manner, I could not doubt of his being a *happy* man; nor yet of his kindling in the minds of his hearers an ardent love for that virtue which in him appeared so amiable.

Being asked at another time by the same man, "Why he, who fancied himself so able to make skilful statesmen of others, did not himself engage in state affairs?"—"And by which of these methods," said Socrates, "supposest thou I shall most advantage the commonwealth? taking on me some office, which, however *well* executed, would only be the service of *one* man; or, by

instructing *all* I meet, furnish the republic with many *good* citizens, every one capable of serving it well*?"

CHAP. VII.

AND now let us examine, whether, by dissuading his friends from vanity and arrogance, he did not excite them to the practice of virtue. It was his custom to assert, "that the only way to *true* glory, was for a man to be *really* excellent; not affect to appear so:" and to show this the more plainly, he would often make use of the following example. "Let us suppose," said he, "that one altogether ignorant in music desires to be thought an excellent musician. To this pur-

* Epictetus talks to the same purpose concerning his cynic philosopher, but in terms somewhat more haughty than the humble Socrates. "Ask me, if you please, too, whether a cynic will engage in the administration of the commonwealth? What commonwealth do you inquire after, blockhead, greater than what he administers? Whether *he* will harangue among the Athenians about revenues and taxes, whose business is to debate with all mankind; with the Athenians, Corinthians, and Romans, equally; not about taxes and revenues, or peace and war, but about happiness and misery, prosperity and adversity, slavery and freedom. Do you ask me, whether a man engages in the administration of the commonwealth, who administers such a commonwealth as this!—CARTER'S *Epic.*

pose he takes care to imitate whatever is imitable in those who are the greatest proficient in the art. He is uncommonly curious in the choice of his instruments; and a crowd must follow him, to cry him up for a wonder wherever he goes, as they do the most admired masters: but, for all this, he must never venture the public with a specimen of his skill, lest his ignorance, as well as arrogance, should instantly appear; and *ridicule*, not *fame*, prove the reward of his ill-judged expenses. The case," he would say, "is the same with the man who endeavours to pass for an *able* general, or a *good* pilot, without knowing any thing of the matter. If his word is *not* taken, he is displeased: if it is, what will become of him when called to preside at the helm, or command the army? what but shame to himself, and perhaps ruin to his *best* friends, can possibly be the result of the vain undertaking? Neither will he, who foolishly affects the character of valiant, or rich, or strong, be exposed to less danger. By the help of some false appearance he may be called, indeed, to some honourable employment; but it is an employment exceeding his abilities to perform: and his mistakes will not be pardoned by those whom he imposed on. For, as the man can be deemed no other than a *cheat*, who refuseth to return the money, or the cloak, which, through his fair demeanour, hath been lent him by his neighbour; much rather ought he to be stigmatized as such, who, destitute of every talent necessary for the purpose, shall dare impose him-

self on the state, as one well qualified to direct in the administration."

Thus Socrates endeavoured to make vanity and ostentation the more odious to his followers, by showing clearly how much folly attended the practice of it.

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XENOPHON'S MEMOIRS
OF

SOCRATES.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

IT is likewise my opinion that Socrates contributed not a little by his discourses to make his followers more patient of hunger, and thirst, and labour; contemn heat and cold; despise sleep; with every other sensual gratification. For hearing that one of them lived too effeminately, he asked him, saying, "Suppose now, Aristippus, the education of two young men was submitted to your direction; the one intended to bear rule in the state; the other to obey: What method would you take with them? Shall we examine the matter, and begin with their food?"

"It will be right to do this, most certainly," replied Aristippus, "since food seems to be the support of life."

"It is probable then," said Socrates, "that you will accustom them both to eat and drink at certain stated hours?"

“Most probably.”

“But which would you teach to relinquish this stated hour of repast, when urgent business called him away from it?”

“He whom I intend for sovereignty, most assuredly, that the affairs of the commonwealth may not suffer from delay.”

“And the power of enduring thirst patiently, ought not this likewise to be added?”

“Certainly.”

“And *which* of these would you accustom to rise *early* and go to rest *late*; or pass, when necessary, whole nights in watching? *which* to subdue even love itself, with every tender inclination; while fatigue and labour are not *shunned*, but with cheerfulness submitted to?”

“The same, no doubt of it.”

“But if there is an art teaching us in what manner we may best subdue our enemies, *which* of these young men would you endeavour to make master of it?”

“He whom I intended for rule,” replied Aris-
tippus; since, without this art, all the rest will be useless.”

“One should suppose then,” said Socrates, “that a man thus educated would not so readily fall into the snares that are laid for him, as those animals, whereof some, we know, are destroyed by their gluttony, while they rush forward, however timorous by nature, to seize the bait thrown out to allure them: others, with equal greediness, swallow down the liquor which has been prepared and set for that very purpose; and, intoxicated

therewith, are easily taken: while the partridge and quail find their destruction in running too eagerly after the female's call."

Aristippus assenting to this, Socrates went on: "But is it not then most shameful, Aristippus, when men *do* fall into the same snares with which those foolish animals are taken? Yet so doth the adulterer. He meanly submits to be shut up like a prisoner in the chamber of the man whom he is seeking to injure. Neither the rigour of the laws*, nor the fear of a discovery, though sensible how many evils besides that of infamy must attend it, are sufficient to restrain him; but, regardless of the danger, and neglecting those many rational and creditable amusements which are still within his power, and might serve to divert him from so shameful a passion, he rushes headlong to his ruin! And can any other be said of so wretched a being, but that some fury hath possessed him?"

"So it should seem," said Aristippus.

"But," continued Socrates, "since so many, and those the most important employments of life,—as war, husbandry, and others,—are of necessity to be carried on in the open fields, from under shelter; do you not think, Aristippus, that mankind are much to blame in neglecting to inure themselves to the inclemencies of the air, and the changes of the seasons? Above all, should not *he* endeavour to bring himself to bear these inconveniences with patience, who expects one day to command others?"

* See POTTER'S *Antiq.* b. iv. ch. 12.

“ I believe he should.”

“ But if *he* who has thus brought himself to endure pain and inconvenience, is *alone* qualified for command; they who have not done this, ought never to pretend to it?”

This being granted, Socrates went on:—“ Seeing then you so well perceive, Aristippus, the rank to which each of these properly belong; in which would you rather we should place *you*?”

“ Not with those, Socrates, who are intended to command; I envy not these: and, indeed, since men are obliged to take so much pains to provide for their own wants, I see no great wisdom in undertaking to supply the wants of a *whole community*. For, while he who does this is forced to relinquish many of the things he most ardently desires; it will be held highly criminal, if, during his administration, any one wish of the capricious multitude remains ungratified: these behaving towards their governors exactly in the manner I do to my slaves. I expect them to prepare what I am to eat and drink, and all other necessaries; but suffer them to take no part for themselves. The people likewise require that plenty and abundance should flow in upon them from every quarter; but permit not the person, to whose care they owe this, even to *taste* of those indulgencies he hath so amply provided for others. Such, therefore, Socrates, as are fond of employment, and have been educated in the manner you mentioned, may do very well to make governors; but, as for *me*, I am for a life of more ease and tranquillity!”

“ Let us see then, Aristippus, which of the two

leads a life of the greatest tranquillity and ease; those who *govern*, or they who *obey*? Among the nations that are known to us; in Asia, the Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians, are subject to the Persians; in Europe, the Meotians to the Scythians; and, in Africa, the Carthaginians lord it over all the rest: Which of these do you take to be in the most eligible situation? Or here, in Greece, where you are placed, which seem to you the most happy; they who are possessed of the sovereign power, or those who are compelled to submit to it?"

"I do not desire to be ranked among slaves," returned Aristippus: but there is a station equally remote from sovereignty and servitude: *this* is the true path of liberty; and in this *I* would walk, as the surest road to happiness."

"This path," replied Socrates, "which lieth so equally clear, whether of sovereignty or servitude, might perhaps be supposed to have some existence in nature, could we place it beyond the bounds of human society: But how, Aristippus, to live among *men* without governing or being governed? Do you not see that the strong will always oppress the weak; and compel them at last, by repeated injuries, both public and private, to fly, as it were, to slavery for refuge? If they refuse to submit willingly, their lands are ravaged, their trees cut down, their corn ruined: till, wearied out at last by oppression of every kind, they are obliged to give up the unequal combat. Also, in private life; see you not how the bold and strong trample upon such as are weak, or want courage to defend themselves?"

“I do see it,” said Aristippus: “and to the end it may not fall out so with me, I confine myself to no one commonwealth, but move here and there, and think it best to be a *stranger* every where.”

“Truly,” said Socrates, “this method of providing for your safety hath something peculiar in it: and it should seem, Aristippus, that since the days of Sinnis, Sciro, and Procrustes*, no man hath dared to molest the traveller. What, then! *those* who remain continually in their own country have the laws to secure them against violence of every sort; they have their relations, their friends, their dependants, to assist them; their cities are fortified; they have arms for their defence: and, to strengthen them still more, they make alliance with their neighbours: yet shall not all this secure *them* from falling sometimes into the snares of bad men: while *you*, destitute of all those various advantages; exposed continually to the many dangers, in a manner *unavoidable* to those who pass from one place to another; nor yet can enter *that* city whose very meanest inhabitant doth not surpass you in credit: *you*, who shall then be seen in that situation wherein all the world would wish the man whom they purposed to betray: will they then spare *you*, Aristippus, because you are a *stranger*? or, because the public faith hath been given, that neither at your entrance *into*, or going *from* the city, you shall meet with any molestation?

* Famous robbers, who infested Greece in the times of Theseus, and were slain by him.

But perhaps you think yourself of so *little* worth, that no one will be found willing to purchase you*: and in truth, Aristippus, I know not that man who would wish to have such a slave in his family, as would do nothing, and yet expect to live well. But shall we see how masters generally manage such sort of people? If their appetites and passions are very outrageous, fasting is made use of to reduce them to order. If they are inclined to take what does not belong to them, every thing valuable is kept carefully out of their way. If escape is meditated, chains shall secure them: and when inclined to be lazy, stripes are called in, to quicken their motions. And you, Aristippus, if you discovered such a slave among your domestics, in what manner would you treat him?"

"I would certainly leave no sort of severity untried," said Aristippus, "till I had brought him to better manners. But let us return to our first subject, Socrates; and tell me, if you please, wherein the happiness of sovereignty consists, which you make such account of; if pain and fatigue, and hunger and cold, and ten thousand other inconveniences, not only pave the way to it, but are afterwards the *chosen* portion of the man who undertakes to command others? As to my part, I see no greater difference between the strokes of the whip which we give ourselves, and those laid on by the order of another: for, if my body is to be tortured, it matters not the hand by which it

* Those who fell into the hands of robbers were commonly sold by them for slaves.

is done: except that *folly* may also be added to the account, when the pain appears of our own procuring."

"Is it so then, Aristippus, that you perceive no difference between the things we submit to *voluntarily*, and those we undergo, compelled to it by some other? Now, he who through *choice* abstains from his food may *return* to his food whenever he pleases: and he who endures thirst because he is so minded, may, when minded otherwise, as easily remove it: but the case is not the same when we have *constraint* to encounter. Besides, he who of his own accord engages in what may be attended with labour, hath the hopes of success to animate him in the way: and the fatigue of the chase never discourages the hunter.

But, if the prospect of acquiring what he is in pursuit of, however worthless in itself, is sufficient to make him regard neither thirst nor hunger; what may not *he*, whose aim is to procure the friendship of the good, conquer his enemies, gain the command over himself, and wisely govern his own family, benefit his friends, serve his country! Will such a one shrink at fatigue and pain? Rather, will he not court them, while they add to the delight arising from his own consciousness, and the united approbation of those who best know him? And, to show still farther how necessary labour and pain are judged for all who would perform any thing laudable; it is a maxim of those who instruct youth, to regard the exercises that are gone through with ease, or give pleasure on their first performance, as of little worth; whether in form-

ing the body or improving the mind: whereas those which require patience, application, and labour; *these* are they which prepare the man for illustrious deeds and noble undertakings, as many who were excellent judges have told us; and, among the rest, Hesiod, for he speaks somewhere or other after the following manner:

“ See Vice, preventing ev’n thy wish, appears
To lead through down-hill paths and gay parterres,
Where Pleasure reigns; while Virtue, decent maid,
Retires from view in yon sequester’d shade.
Craggy and steep the way that to her leads;
Fatigue and pain, by order of the gods,
Stern sentry keep. But, if nor pain, nor toil,
Can check the gen’rous ardour of thy soul,
Exert thy powers, nor doubt thy labour’s need;
Conquest and joy shall crown the glorious deed *.”

Epicharmus saith likewise,

“ *Earn* thy reward—the gods give nought to sloth.”

And again,

“ Seek not the sweets of life, in life’s first bloom;
They ill prepare us for the pain to come!”

And the wise Prodicus is also of the same opinion; for to him is the allegory given. Now this writer tells us, to the best of my remembrance, “ that Hercules having attained to that stage of life when man, being left to the govern-

* These lines were translated by the same hand with those of Theognis, in the first book.

ment of himself, seldom fails to give certain indications whether he will walk in the paths of virtue or wander through all the intricacies of vice, perplexed and undetermined what course to pursue, retired into a place where silence and solitude might bestow on him that tranquillity and leisure so necessary for deliberation, when two women, of more than ordinary stature, came on towards him. The countenance of the one, open and amiable, and elevated with an air of conscious dignity. Her person was adorned with native elegance, her look with modesty, every gesture with decency, and her garments were altogether of the purest white. The other was comely, but bloated, as from too high living. Affecting softness and delicacy, every look, every action, was studied and constrained; while *art* contributed all its powers to give those charms to her complexion and shape which nature had denied her. Her look was bold, the blush of modesty she was a stranger to, and her dress was contrived, not to *conceal*, but *display* those beauties she supposed herself possessed of. She would look round to see if any observed her; and not only so, but she would frequently stand still to admire her own shadow. Drawing near to the place where the hero sat musing, eager and anxious for the advantage of first accosting him, she hastily ran forward; while the person who accompanied her moved on with her usual pace, equal and majestic. Joining him, she said, "I know, my Hercules! you have long been deliberating on the course of life you should pursue; engage with me

in friendship, and I will lead you through those paths which are smooth and flowery, where every delight shall court your enjoyment, and pain and sorrow shall not once appear. Absolved from all the fatigue of business and the hardships of war, your employment shall be to share in the social pleasures of the table, or repose on beds of down; no sense shall remain without its gratification; beauty shall delight the eye and melody the ear, and perfumes shall breathe their odours around you. Nor shall your care be once wanted for the procuring of these things: neither be afraid lest time should exhaust your stock of joys, and reduce you to the necessity of purchasing new, either by the labour of body or mind: it is to the toil of *others* that you alone shall owe them! Scruple not, therefore, to seize whatever seemeth most desirable*; for this privilege I bestow on *all* who are my votaries."

"Hercules having heard so flattering an invitation, demanded her name.—"My friends," said she, "call me *Happiness*; but they who do not love me endeavour to make me odious, and therefore brand me with the name of *Sensuality* †."

By this time the other person being arrived, thus addressed him in her turn:

"I also, O Hercules! am come to offer you

* This is finely imagined, to show how closely injustice and oppression are connected with intemperance.

† It is hoped the having chosen to denominate this person by the word sensuality, rather than *pleasure*, hitherto commonly used, may be allowed, as it seemed that pleasure should always be considered, not as contrary *to*, but a sure attendant on virtue.

my friendship, for I am no stranger to your high descent; neither was I wanting to remark the goodness of your disposition in all the exercises of your childhood; from whence I gather hopes, if you choose to follow where I lead the way, it will not be long ere you have an opportunity of performing many actions glorious to *yourself* and honourable to *me*. But I mean not to allure you with specious promises of pleasure, I will *plainly* set before you things as they *really* are, and show you in what manner the gods think proper to dispose of them. Know therefore, young man! these wise governors of the universe have decreed, that nothing great, nothing excellent, shall be obtained without care and labour. They give no *real* good, no *true* happiness, on *other* terms. If, therefore, you would secure the favour of these gods, adore them. If you would conciliate to yourself the affection of your friends, be of *use* to them. If to be honoured and respected of the republic be your aim, show your fellow-citizens how effectually you can serve them. But if it is your ambition that all Greece shall esteem you, let all Greece share the benefits arising from your labours. If you wish for the fruits of the earth, cultivate it. If for the increase of your flocks or your herds, let your flocks and your herds have your attendance and your care. And if your design is to advance yourself by arms, if you wish for the power of defending your friends, and subduing your enemies, learn the art of war under those who are well acquainted with it; and, when learnt, employ it to the best advantage. And if

to have a body ready and well able to perform what you wish from it be your desire, subject yours to your reason, and let exercise and hard labour give to it strength and agility."

At these words, as Prodicus informs us, the other interrupted her:—"You see," said she, "my Hercules, the long, the *laborious* road she means to lead you; but *I* can conduct you to happiness by a path more short and easy."

"Miserable wretch!" replied Virtue, "what happiness canst thou boast of? *Thou*, who wilt not take the least pains to procure it! Doth not satiety always anticipate desire? Wilt thou wait till hunger invites thee to eat, or stay till thou art thirsty before thou drinkest? Or, rather, to give some relish to thy repast, must not art be called in to supply the want of appetite? while thy wines, though costly, can yield no delight, but the ice in summer is sought for to cool and make them grateful to thy palate! Beds of down, or the softest couch, can procure no sleep for *thee*, whom *idleness* inclines to seek for repose; not *labour* and *fatigue*, which *alone* prepare for it. Nor dost thou leave it to nature to direct thee in thy pleasures, but *all* is art and shameless impurity. The night is polluted with riot and crimes, while the day is given up to sloth and inactivity: and, though immortal, thou art become an *outcast* from the gods, and the contempt and scorn of all good men. Thou boastest of *happiness*; but what *happiness* canst thou boast of? Where was it that the sweetest of all sounds, the music of just self-praise, ever reached thine ear?

Or when couldst thou view, with complacency and satisfaction, *one* worthy deed of thy own performing? Is there any who will trust thy word, or depend upon thy promise; or, if sound in judgement, be of thy society? For, among thy followers, which of them, in youth, are not altogether effeminate and infirm of body? Which of them, in age, not stupid and debilitated in every faculty of the mind? While wasting their prime in thoughtless indulgence, they prepare for themselves all that pain and remorse so sure to attend the close of such a life! Ashamed of the past, afflicted with the present, they weary themselves in bewailing that folly which lavished on youth all the joys of life, and left nothing to old age but pain and imbecility!

As for *me*, my dwelling is alone with the gods and good men; and, without *me*, nothing great, nothing excellent, can be performed, whether on earth or in the heavens; so that my praise, my esteem, is with *all* who know me! I make the labour of the artist pleasant, and bring to the father of his family security and joy; while the slave, as his lord, is alike my care. In peace I direct to the most useful councils, in war approve myself a faithful ally; and *I* only can tie the bond of indissoluble friendship. Nor do my votaries even fail to find *pleasure* in their repasts, though small cost is wanted to furnish out their table; for hunger, not art, prepares it for them; while their sleep, which follows the labour of the day, is far more sweet than whatever expense can procure for idleness: yet, sweet as it is, they

quit it unreluctant when called by their duty, whether to the gods or men. The young enjoy the applause of the aged, the aged are revered and respected by the young. Equally delighted with reflecting on the past, or contemplating the present, their attachment to me renders them favoured of the gods, dear to their friends, and honoured by their country. And when the fatal hour is arrived, they sink not, like others, into an inglorious oblivion, but, immortalized by fame, flourish for ever in the grateful remembrance of admiring posterity! Thus, O Hercules! thou great descendant of a glorious race of heroes! thus mayest thou attain that supreme felicity wherewith I have been empowered to reward all those who willingly yield themselves up to my direction."

"See here, my Aristippus," continued Socrates; "see here the advice which, Prodicus tell us, Virtue gave the young hero. He clothes it, as you may suppose, in more exalted language than I have attempted; but it will be your wisdom if you endeavour to profit from what he hath said, and consider at present what may befall you hereafter*."

* One would have thought this single conversation alone sufficient to have reclaimed Aristippus; but the badness of his disposition, like to that of Critias and Alcibiades, prevailed over the precepts of Socrates, illustrated as they were by the beautiful picture borrowed from Prodicus. He became afterwards the founder of a sect of philosophers, whose leading tenet was, "that man was born for pleasure, and that virtue is only so far laudable as it conduces thereto." One of his disciples taught publicly, that there were *no* gods:—a short and easy transition from vice and sensuality to atheism.

CHAP. II.

SOCRATES seeing his eldest son, Lamprocles, enraged with his mother, spoke to him in the following manner: "Tell me, my son," said he, "did you ever hear of any who were called *ungrateful*?"

"Many," replied Lamprocles.

"Did you consider what gained them this appellation?"

"They were called ungrateful, because having received favours, they refused to make any return."

"Ingratitude, then, should seem one species of *injustice*?"

"Most certainly."

"Have you ever examined thoroughly what *this* sort of injustice is? Or do you think, Lamprocles, because we are only said to be unjust when we treat our friends ill, not so when we injure our enemies; therefore we are indeed unjust when we are ungrateful to our *friends*, but not so when only ungrateful to our *enemies*?"

"I have considered it thoroughly," replied Lamprocles; "and am convinced, that to be *ungrateful*, is to be *unjust*; whether the object of our ingratitude be friend or foe."

"If then," continued Socrates, "ingratitude is injustice, it will follow, that the greater the be-

nefit of which we are unmindful, the more we are *unjust*?"

"Most assuredly."

"But where shall we find the person who hath received from any one, benefits so *great* or so *many*, as children from their parents? To them it is they owe their very existence; and, in consequence of *this*, the capacity of beholding all the beauties of nature, together with the privilege of partaking of those various blessings which the gods have so bountifully dispensed to all mankind. Now these are advantages universally held so inestimable, that to be deprived of them exciteth our very strongest abhorrence; an abhorrence well understood, when the wisdom of the legislator made death to be the punishment of the most atrocious crimes: rightly judging, that the terror wherewith every one beheld it, would serve the most powerfully to deter from the commission of such offences, as they saw must bring upon them this greatest of all evils. Neither shouldst thou suppose it sensuality alone which induceth mankind to enter into marriage, since not a *street* but would furnish with other means for its gratification: but our desire is to find out one wherewith to unite ourselves, from whom we may reasonably expect a numerous and a healthful progeny. The husband then turneth his thoughts in what manner he may best maintain the wife whom he hath thus chosen, and make ample provision for his children yet unborn; while she, on her part, with the utmost danger to herself, bears about with her, for a long time, a most painful burthen. To *this*

she imparts life and nourishment, and brings it into the world with inexpressible anguish: nor doth her task end here; she is still to supply the food that must afterward support it. She watches over it with tender affection; attends it continually with unwearied care, although she hath received no benefit from it; neither doth it yet know to whom it is thus indebted. She seeks, as it were, to divine its wants: night or day her solicitude and labour know no intermission; unmindful of what hereafter may be the fruit of all her pain. Afterward, when the children are arrived at an age capable to receive instruction, how doth each parent endeavour to instil into their minds the knowledge which may best conduce to their future well-doing! And if they hear of any better qualified than themselves for this important task, to these they send them, without regard to the expense; so much do they desire the happiness of their children!"

"Certain it is," replied Lamprocles, "although my mother had done *this*, and a thousand times more, no man could bear with so much ill humour."

"Do not you think it easier to bear the anger of a mother, than that of a wild beast?"

"No, not of such a mother."

"But what harm hath she done you? Hath she kicked you, or bit you, as wild beasts do when they are angry?"

"No, but she utters such things as no one can *bear* from any body."

"And you, Lamprocles, what have *you* not

made this mother *bear*, with your continual cries and untoward restlessness! what fatigue in the day! what disturbance in the night! and what pangs when sickness at any time seized you!"

"But, however, I never did or said any thing to make her ashamed of me."

"It is well. But why, Lamprocles, should you be more offended with your mother, than people on the stage are with one another? There is nothing so injurious or reproachful that these do not often say, yet no one becomes outrageous against the man whom he hears threaten and revile him, because he well knows he intends him no real injury: but you, although you as well know that no hurt is designed you, but, on the contrary, every kindness; you fly out into rage against your mother! or, perhaps, you suppose she intended you some harm?"

"Not at all," replied Lamprocles; "I never once suspected any such matter."

"What! a mother who thus loves you! who, when you are sick, spareth no means, no pains for your recovery; whose care is to supply your every want; and whose vows to the gods are so frequent on your behalf! Is she harsh and cruel? Surely the man who cannot *bear* with such a mother, cannot *bear* with that which is most for his advantage. But tell me," continued Socrates, "doth it seem to you at all necessary to show respect or submission to any one whatsoever? Or are you indeed conscious of such a degree of self-sufficiency, as makes it needless to pay any regard, whether to magistrate or general?"

“ So far from it,” said Lamprocles, “ I endeavour all I can to recommend myself to my superiors.”

“ Perhaps, too, you would cultivate the goodwill of your neighbour, that he may supply you with fire from his hearth, when you want it; or yield you ready assistance, when any accident befalls you?”

“ I would, most surely.”

“ And if you were to go a journey, or a voyage with any one, it would not be indifferent to you, whether they loved or hated you?”

“ No, certainly!”

“ Wretch! to think it right to endeavour to gain the good-will of these people; and suppose you are to do nothing for a mother, whose love for you so far exceeds *that* of any other! Surely you have forgot, that while every other kind of ingratitude is passed over unnoticed by the magistrate, those who refuse to return good offices, in any other case, being only punished with the *contempt* of their fellow-citizens; the man who is wanting in respect to his parents, *for* this man public punishments are appointed*: the laws yield him no longer their protection; neither is he permitted any share in the administration, since they think no sacrifice offered by a hand so impious, can be acceptable to the gods, or beneficial to man: and conclude the mind so altogether de-

* Neither was this confined to their immediate parents, but equally understood of their grandfathers, grandmothers, and other progenitors.—POTTER'S *Antiq.*

generate, equally incapable of undertaking any thing *great*, or executing any thing *justly*. For such, too, as neglect to perform the rites of sepulture for their parents; for *these*, the same punishments have been allotted by the laws: and particular regard is had to these points, when inquiry is made into the lives and behaviour of those who offer themselves candidates for any public employment. You, therefore, O my son! will not delay, if wise, to entreat pardon of the gods; lest they, from whom your ingratitude cannot be hid, should turn away their favour from you: and be you likewise careful to conceal it from the eyes of men, that you find not yourself forsaken by all who know you; for no one will expect a return to his kindness, however considerable, from *him* who can show himself unmindful of what he oweth to his parents."

CHAP. III.

SOCRATES having observed that Chærephon and Chærecrates, two brothers, with whom he was acquainted, were at variance; he wished very much to reconcile them to each other. To which end, meeting one of them, he said to him, "What, are *you* then, Chærecrates, one of those mercenary kind of people, who prefer riches to a brother; and forget that these being only inanimate things,

require much vigilance and care to protect them; whereas a brother endued with reason and reflection, is able to give assistance and protection to you? And, besides, *brothers* are somewhat less plentiful than gold! It is strange a man should think himself injured because he cannot enjoy his brother's fortune! Why not equally complain of injury done him by the rest of his fellow-citizens, because the wealth of the whole community doth not centre in him alone? But in this case they can argue right; and easily see, that a moderate fortune secured by the mutual aid of society, is much better than the riches of a whole city attended with the dangers to which solitude would expose them; yet admit not this reasoning in regard to a brother. If rich, they buy slaves in abundance to serve them: they endeavour all they can to gain friends to support them; but make at the same time no account of a brother, as if *nearness* in blood disqualified for friendship! But, surely, to be born of the same parents, and educated in the same house, ought rather to be considered as many powerful cements, since even wild beasts themselves show some inclination to animals they are brought up with. And besides, Chærecrates, he who hath a *brother*, is much more regarded than he who hath none; his enemies too will be the less forward to molest him."

"I will not deny," replied Chærecrates, "that a *brother*, when such as he should be, is, as you say, an *inestimable* treasure; and therefore we ought to bear long with one another; so far from quarrelling on every slight occasion: but when this *bro-*

ther fails in every particular, and is indeed the very reverse of all he ought to be; to keep on terms with such a one, is next to an impossibility."

"Your brother then, my Chærecrates, is displeasing to every one? Or are there some to whom he can make himself very agreeable?"

"Therefore he the more deserves my hatred," said Chærecrates; "because wherever he comes he fails not to make himself pleasing to *others*; whereas he seems to aim at nothing but displeasing *me*."

"But may not this happen, Chærecrates, from your not knowing how to converse *properly* with a brother? As the horse, not untractable to others, becomes altogether unmanageable to the unskilful rider."

"And why should *I*, who well know how to return any kindness shown me either in words or actions, be supposed ignorant in what manner to behave properly to a brother? No: but when I see a man catch at every opportunity to vex and disoblige me, shall I, after *this*, show kindness to *such* a one? I cannot, Socrates; nor will I even attempt it!"

"You surprise me, Chærecrates! Suppose you had a dog who watched and defended your sheep diligently: this dog fawns and caresses your shepherds, but snarls at you whenever you come near him. What do you on this occasion? Fly out into rage? Or endeavour, by kindness, to reconcile him to you? You acknowledge a brother, when such as he ought to be, an *invaluable* treasure:

you say you are not unacquainted with the arts of conciliating favour and affection, but yet are resolved to employ none of them, to gain the love of Chærephon!"

"I do not believe, Socrates, I have arts sufficient to succeed in such an attempt."

"And yet I should imagine," said Socrates, "no *new* one necessary: practise only those you are already master of, and you will find them sufficient to regain his affection."

"If you know what these are, of favour inform me," replied Chærecrates; "for they are unknown to *me*."

"Suppose, Chærecrates, you wished some friend to invite you to his feast when he offered sacrifice; what means would you take to induce him thereto?"

"Invite him to one of mine."

"And if you wanted him, in your absence, to manage your affairs; what then?"

"I would try what I could to engage his *gratitude*, by first rendering him the service I wished to receive."

"But, suppose you desired to secure for yourself an hospitable reception in some foreign country, what would you do?"

"When any of that place came to Athens, I would invite them to my house," said Chærecrates; "and would spare no pains to assist them in despatching the business they came for; that they, when I went thither, might help me in return to expedite mine."

“ Is it so then !” replied Socrates ; “ and are you so well skilled in all the arts of conciliating favour and affection, yet know nothing of the matter ? But you are afraid, Chærecrates, of making the first advances to your brother, lest it should degrade you in the opinion of those who hear it ? Yet surely it ought not to be less glorious for a man to anticipate his friends in courtesy and kind offices, than get the start of his enemies in injuries and annoyance ! Had I thought Chærephon as well disposed as you towards a reconciliation, I should have endeavoured to have prevailed on him to make the first advances ; but you seemed to me the better leader in this affair ; and I fancied success the most likely to ensue from it.”

“ Nay now, Socrates,” cried out Chærecrates, “ you certainly speak not with your usual wisdom. What ! would you have *me*, who am the youngest, make overtures to my brother ; when in all nations it is the undoubted privilege of the first-born to lead the way ?”

“ How !” replied Socrates ; “ is it not the custom every where for the younger to yield precedence to the elder ? Must not he rise at his approach and give to him the seat which is most honourable ; and hold his peace till he hath done speaking ? Delay not, therefore, my Chærecrates, to do what I advise : use your endeavour to appease your brother ; nor doubt his readiness to return your love. He is ambitious of honour ; he hath a nobleness of disposition : sordid souls, indeed, are only to

be moved by mercenary motives; but the brave and liberal are ever best subdued by courtesy and kindness."


"But suppose, my Socrates, when I have acted as you advise, my brother should behave no better than he has done?"

"Should it prove so, Chærecrates, what other harm can arise to you from it, than that of having shown yourself a good man, and a good brother to one whose badness of temper makes him undeserving of your regard? But I have no apprehension of so unfavourable an issue to this matter: rather, when your brother shall see it your intention to conquer by courtesy, he himself will strive to excel in so noble a contest. As it is, nothing can be more deplorable than your present situation; it being no other than if these hands, ordained of God for mutual assistance, should so far forget their office, as mutually to impede each other: or these feet, designed by Providence for a reciprocal *help*, should entangle each other to the hindrance of both. But, surely, it shows no less our ignorance and folly, than works our harm, when we thus turn those things into *evil* which were not created but for our *good*. And, truly, I regard a brother as one of the best blessings that God hath bestowed on us; two brothers being more profitable to each other than two eyes or two feet, or any other of those members which have been given to us in pairs, for partners and helps, as it were, to each other by a bountiful Providence. For, whether we consider the hands or feet, they assist not each other unless placed at no great

distance : and even our eyes, whose power evidently appears of the widest extent, are yet unable to take in, at one and the same view, the front and the reverse of any one object whatsoever, though placed ever so near them : but no situation can hinder brothers, who live in amity, from rendering one another the most essential services."

CHAP. IV.

I ALSO remember a discourse that Socrates once held concerning friendship ; which I think could not but greatly benefit his hearers ; since he not only taught us how we might *gain* friends, but how to behave towards them when gained. On this occasion he observed, " that although the generality of mankind agreed in esteeming a firm and virtuous friend an invaluable possession, yet were there very few things about which they gave themselves less trouble. They were diligent, he said, to purchase houses and lands, and slaves, and flocks, and household goods ; and, when purchased, would take no little pains to preserve them ; but were no way solicitous either to purchase or preserve a friend, however they might talk of the advantages of having one. Nay, he had seen people, who, if they had a friend and a slave sick at the same time, would send for the physician, and try every means to recover the slave, while the friend was



left to take care of himself; and, if both died, it was easy to see how each stood in their estimation. Of all their possessions this alone was neglected: they would even suffer it to be lost for want of a little attention*. Their estates here and there they could with readiness point out to you; but ask them of their friends, how many and what they are, and you reduce them to some difficulty. The number, though acknowledged small, is more than they can well make out to you; so little do these people concern themselves about the matter. And yet, what possession shall be placed in competition with a *friend*? What slave so affectionate to our persons, or studious of our interest? What horse able to render us such service? From whence, or from whom, can we at all times and on every occasion receive so many and such essential benefits? Are we at a loss in our own private affairs, or in those the public have intrusted to our ma-

* One proof we have of this want of attention, even in Pericles himself; and which possibly Socrates might have in his eye, though, out of respect to his memory, he forbore to mention it; for he suffered Anaxagoras, to whom he stood indebted for so much useful knowledge both in philosophy and politics, to be reduced to such distress, that, partly from want, and partly from vexation, he determined to starve himself to death: and having muffled up his head in his cloak, he threw himself on the ground to expect its coming. Indeed, Pericles no sooner heard of this but he flew to his assistance; begging him to live, and bewailing his own loss, in case he was deprived of so wise a counsellor. When, opening his cloak, the philosopher, in a feeble and low voice, said to him, "Ah, Pericles! they who need a lamp, do not neglect to supply it with oil!" A gentle reproof; but therefore the more piercing to an ingenuous mind.

nagement? A friend will supply every deficiency. Do we wish for the pleasure of giving assistance to some other? A friend will furnish us with the power. Are we threatened with danger? He flies to our assistance; for he not only dedicates his *fortune* to our service, but his life to our defence.—Do we purpose to persuade? His eloquence is ever ready to second all we say.—Are we compelled to contend? His arm is ever found among the foremost to assist us. He doubles the joy which prosperity brings, and makes the load of affliction less heavy. Our hands, our feet, our eyes, can yield us small service in comparison to that we receive from a friend: for what we are not able to do for ourselves; that which we neither *see*, nor *hear*, nor *think* of, when our own interest is the question; a friend will perceive, and perform for us. And yet, this friend, whilst the plant that promiseth us fruit shall be carefully cultivated; this friend we neglect to nourish and improve; though *where else the tree* from whence *such* fruit is to be found!"

CHAP. V.

I REMEMBER likewise another discourse of his, wherein he exhorteth his hearers to look well into themselves, and see in what estimation they might *reasonably* hope their friends should hold them.

For, having observed one of his followers desert a friend when oppressed with penury, he thus questioned Antisthenes in the presence of the man, together with many others: "Pray say, Antisthenes, is it allowable to value our friends as we do our slaves: for one of these we perhaps rate at five mina*; while we think another dear at two: these again we will give ten for; and for some, it may be, twenty: nay, it is said that Nicias, the son of Niceratus, gave no less than a whole talent† for one he intended to set over his mines. May we estimate our friends in the same manner?"

"I think we may," replied Antisthenes; "for, while I know *some* whose affection I would purchase at no mean price, there are *others* whom I would scarcely thank for theirs, if I might have it for nothing. And there are, my Socrates, whose favour and friendship I should be glad to secure, though at the expense of the last farthing."

"If this is the case," replied Socrates, "it behoves us not a little to consider of how much worth we really are to our friends; at the same time that we use our diligence to raise our value with them as much as we can, that they may not lay us aside like useless lumber. For when I hear this man cry out, "My friend hath deserted me;" and another complain, "that one whom he thought most strongly attached to him, had sold his friendship for some trifling advantage;" I am inclined to ask, Whether, as we are glad to get rid of a bad

* The Attic mina, worth three pounds sterling.

† The talent, worth sixty mina.

slave at any rate, so we may not wish to do the same by a *worthless* friend? since, after all, we seldom hear of the *good* friend being forsaken, any more than of the *good* slave wanting a master."

CHAP. VI.

AND here, on the other hand, I will relate a conversation Socrates once had with Critobulus; from whence we may learn to try our friends, and find out such as are worthy of our affection.

"Suppose," said he, "Critobulus, we wanted to choose a worthy friend, what should be our method of proceeding in this matter? Should we not beware of one much addicted to high living? to wine or women? or of a lazy disposition? since, enslaved to such vices, no man could be of use either to himself, or any other."

"Certainly."

"Suppose we met with a man whose possessions being small, he is yet most lavish in his expenses; who stands daily in need of his friend's purse, as a necessary supply for his own profusion; with whom, however, all that is *lent*, is *lost*; yet, whom to refuse is most deadly to offend: Would not such a one prove rather troublesome, think you?"

"No doubt, Socrates."

"And if there was a person, provident indeed

enough, but withal so covetous, as never to be content unless he hath the advantage of you on every occasion?"

"I think of him worse than of the other."

"But what do you say to the man, Critobulus, who is so much bent on making a fortune, as to mind nothing but what serves to that end?"

"I say, leave him to himself," returned Critobulus; "since it is sure he will never be of use to any other."

"And suppose one of so turbulent a disposition, as to be daily engaging his friends in some quarrel on his account?"

"I would keep clear of such a one, most certainly, my Socrates."

"But what if the man were free from these defects, and had only such a sort of selfishness belonging to him, as made him always ready to receive favours, not at all solicitous about *returning* any?"

"Why certainly," replied Critobulus, "no person would wish to have any thing to say to such a one. But, my Socrates," continued he, "since none of these people will serve our purpose, show me, I desire you, what sort of man he must be whom we should endeavour to make a friend of?"

"I suppose," said Socrates, "he should be the very reverse of all we have been saying: moderate in his pleasures, a strict observer of his word, fair and open in all his dealings; and who will not suffer even his *friend* to surpass him in gene-

rosity; so that all are gainers with whom he hath to do."

"But how shall we find such a one," said Critobulus; "or make trial of these virtues and vices, without running some hazard by the experiment?"

"When you are inquiring out the best statuary, Critobulus, you trust not to the pretences of any, but examine the performances of all; and conclude, that he who hath hitherto excelled, gives the best grounded assurance of excelling for the future."

"So you would have us infer, Socrates, that he who hath already discharged the duties of a good friend towards those with whom he hath been formerly connected, will not fail to do the same when connected with you?"

"Undoubtedly," my Critobulus: "just as I should infer, that the groom who hath taken proper care of your horses, will do the same by mine, whenever I send him any."

"But," my Socrates, "when we have found out a man whom we judge proper to make a friend of; what means may we use to engage his affection?"

"In the first place," returned Socrates, "we must consult the gods, whether it be agreeable to their will that we engage in friendship with him."

"But suppose the gods disapprove not of our choice, what way shall we take to obtain his favour?"

"Not hunt him down, Critobulus, as we do

hares; nor catch him by stratagem, as we do birds; neither are we to seize him by force, as we are wont to serve our enemies; for it would prove an arduous task to make a man your friend in spite of inclination. To shut him up like a criminal might create aversion; but would never conciliate favour and esteem."

"But what must we do then?"

"I have heard," said Socrates, "of certain words that have all the force in them of the most powerful charms. There are likewise other arts, wherewith such as know them seldom fail to allure to themselves whomsoever they please."

"And where can we learn these words?" said Critobulus.

"You know the song the Syrens used to charm Ulysses? It begins with,

"O stay, O pride of Greece, Ulysses stay!"

POPE'S *Odyssey*.

"I do know it, Socrates. But did they not mean to detain others by these charms, as well as Ulysses?"

"Not at all, Critobulus; words like *these* are only designed to allure noble souls, and lovers of virtue."

"I begin to understand you," said Critobulus; "and perceive the *charm* which operates so powerfully, is *praise*: but, in order to make it effectual, we must bestow it with discretion, lest ridicule should seem intended by us, rather than applause. And, indeed, to commend a man for his beauty, his strength, or his stature, who knows himself to

be weak, little, and deformed, would be to incur his resentment, not conciliate his affection; and make mankind not *seek*, but *shun* our society.—But do you know of no other charms?”

“No: I have heard, indeed, that Pericles had many, wherewith he charmed the city, and gained the love of all men.”

“By what means did Themistocles procure the affection of his fellow-citizens?”

“By no incantations, most certainly,” replied Socrates; “if you except that of serving the state.”

“You would insinuate then,” my Socrates, “that, in order to obtain a virtuous friend, we must endeavour first of all to be ourselves virtuous?”

“Why, can you suppose, Critobulus, that a *bad* man can gain the affection of a *good* one?”

“And yet,” said Critobulus, “I have seen many a sorry rhetorician live in great harmony with the best orator in Athens: and a general, perfectly well skilled in the art of war, shall admit others to his intimacy, who know nothing of the matter.”

“But did you ever see a man, Critobulus, who had no one good quality to recommend him;—for that is the question;—did you ever see such a one gain a friend of distinguished abilities?”

“I do not know I ever did. But if it is so clear, Socrates, that *those* who have much merit, and they who have none, can never unite together in friendship; are the virtuous equally sure of being beloved by all the virtuous?”

“ You are led into this inquiry, my Critobulus, from observing that the great and the good, although alike enemies to vice, and equally engaged in the pursuit of glory, are so far from expressing this mutual good-will, that enmity and opposition sometimes prevail among them; and are with more difficulty reconciled to each other, than even the most worthless and vile of all mankind. This you see, and are concerned at.”

“ I am so,” replied Critobulus; “ and the more, as I observe this not confined to particulars, but communities: those, too, where vice finds its greatest discouragement, and virtue its best reward; even *these* shall engage in hostilities against each other! Now when I see this, my Socrates, I almost despair to find a friend! for where shall I seek one? Not among the vicious; for, how can one who is ungrateful, profuse, avaricious, idle, intemperate, faithless, be a friend? He may hate, but cannot love. Neither yet is it more possible for the virtuous and the vicious to unite in the bonds of amity; since, what concord can subsist between those who commit crimes, and they who abhor them? And if, after this, we are to add the virtuous; if ambition can sow enmity among the best of men; if *these*, desirous all of the highest places, can envy and oppose each other, where can friendship be found? or where the asylum on earth, for fidelity and affection?”

“ My Critobulus,” answered Socrates, “ we shall find it no easy matter to investigate this point. Man is made up of contrarieties. Inclined to friendship from the want he finds in himself of

friends, he compassionates the sufferer; he relieves the necessitous; and finds complacency and satisfaction, whether his turn is to *receive* or *confer* an obligation. But as one and the same thing may be an object of desire to *many*; strife, enmity, and ill-will, become thereby unavoidable: benevolence is extinguished by avarice and ambition; and envy fills the heart, which till then was all affection! But *friendship* can make its way, and surmount every obstacle, to unite the just and good. For virtue will teach these to be contented with their own possessions, how moderate soever: nay, infinitely prefer them to the empire of the world, if not to be had without hatred and contention. Assisted by *this*, they willingly endure the extreme of thirst and hunger, rather than injure, or bear hard on any: nor can love itself, even when the most violent, transport them beyond the rules of decency and good order. They are satisfied with whatever the laws have allotted them: and so far from desiring to encroach on the *rights* of others, they are easily inclined to resign many of their own. If disputes arise, they are soon accommodated, to the contentment of each party: anger never rises so high, as to stand in need of repentance; nor can envy once find admission into the minds of *those* who live in a mutual communication of their goods; and plead a kind of *right* in whatever a friend possesses. Hence, therefore, we may be very sure, that virtuous men will not oppose, but assist each other in the discharge of the public offices. Those, indeed, who only aim at the highest honours, and posts of the greatest power, that

they may accumulate wealth, riot in luxury, and oppress the people, are too profligate and unjust to live in concord with any : but he who aspires to an honourable employment, for no other end than to secure himself from oppression, protect his friends, and serve his country ; what should hinder his uniting with those whose intentions are no other ? Would it render *him* less able to accomplish these designs ? Or would not his power become so much the more extensive, from having the wise and the good associated in the same cause with him ? In the public games, continued Socrates, we permit not the skilful, and the strong, to unite themselves together, as knowing that in so doing they must bear away the prize in every contention : but here, in the administration of the public affairs, we have no law to forbid the honest from joining with the honest ; who are generally, too, the most able ; and on that account to be chosen rather for associates than opponents. Besides, since contentions will arise, confederates should be sought for ; and the greater number will be necessary, if those who oppose us have courage and ability. For this purpose, and to make those whom we engage the more zealous in serving us, favours and good offices are to be dispensed with a liberal hand : and even *prudence* will direct us to prefer the virtuous, as not being many : besides, evil men are always found insatiable. But however this may be, my Critobulus, take courage ; make yourself, in the first place, a virtuous man, and then boldly set yourself to gain the affection

of the virtuous: and *this* is a chase wherein I may be able to assist you, being myself much inclined to love. Now, whenever I conceive an affection for any, I rest not till it becomes reciprocal; but, borne forward towards them by the most ardent inclination, I strive to make my company equally desirable. And much the same management will *you* find necessary, my Critobulus, whenever you would gain the friendship of any: conceal not, therefore, from me the person whose affection you most desire. For, as I have made it my study to render myself pleasing to those who are pleasing to me, I believe I am not ignorant of some of the arts best calculated for such a purpose."

"And I," replied Critobulus, "have long been desirous of receiving some instructions herein; and more especially if they will help me to gain the affection of those who are desirable on account of the beauty of their persons, as well as the graces of their minds."

"But all compulsion is entirely excluded my scheme," continued Socrates; "and I verily believe," says he, "that the reason why all men fled the wretched Scylla, was, from her employing no other means; since we see them easily detained by the Syren's song; and, forgetful of every thing, yield themselves up to the enchanting harmony."

"Be assured, Socrates," said Critobulus, "I shall never think of taking any man's affection by storm: of favour, therefore, proceed, I beseech you, to your instructions."

“ You must promise me, likewise, to keep at a proper distance, and not give way to over-much fondness.”

“ I shall make no great difficulty to promise you this, Socrates, provided the people are not very handsome.”

“ And those who are so will be in less danger, as far less likely to suffer you than those who are more plain.”

“ Well, I will not transgress in this point,” said Critobulus; “ only let me know how I may gain a friend.”

“ You must permit me then,” said Socrates, “ to tell him how much you esteem him, and how great your desire to become one of his friends.”

“ Most readily, my Socrates; since I never knew any one displeased with another for thinking well of him.”

“ And that your observation of his *virtue* hath raised in you great affection for his person; Would you think I did amiss, and might hurt you in the man’s opinion?”

“ The very reverse, I should imagine; for I find in myself a more than ordinary affection towards those who express an affection for me.”

“ I may go then so far in speaking of you to those you love: but will you allow me to proceed, Critobulus, and assure them, that the sweetest pleasure you know is in the conversation of virtuous friends? That you are constant in your care of them? That you behold *their* honourable achievements with no less satisfaction and complacency than if you yourself had performed

them, and rejoice at *their* prosperity in like manner as at your *own*? That, in the service of a friend, you can feel no weariness, and esteem it no less honourable to surpass him in generosity than your enemy in arms? By this, or something like this, I doubt not to facilitate your way to the forming of many very excellent friendships."

"But why do you ask my leave, Socrates, as if you were not at liberty to say what you please of me?"

"Not so," returned Socrates; "for I have often heard Aspasia* declare, that matchmakers succeed pretty well if they keep to the truth in what they say of each party; whereas, if falsehood is employed, nothing but vexation can ensue; for they who have been deceived hate one another, and those most of all who brought them together. Now, I hold this observation of Aspasia to be right, and not less to concern the point in question: and, therefore, I think I cannot urge anything in your behalf, Critobulus, which strict truth will not make good."

"Which is as much as to say," replied Critobulus, "that if I have good qualities sufficient to

* A person well known on the account of her eloquence, and her illustrious pupils; for both Pericles and Socrates attended her lectures. Her conversation was not more brilliant than solid; uniting the symmetry arising from art, with the vehemence and warmth which flows from nature. She is generally allowed to have composed the famous Funeral Oration which Pericles pronounced with so much applause, in honour of those who fell in the Samian war. She was likewise well versed in many other parts of useful knowledge; particularly politics and natural philosophy.—*PLUTARCH'S Life of Pericles.*

make myself beloved, I may *then* have *your* helping hand: but, otherwise, you are not so *very* much my friend as to be at the trouble to feign any for me."

"And by which of these methods shall I best serve you, Critobulus? Bestowing on you some praise, which, after all, is not your due, or exhorting you to act in such a manner as may give you a *just* claim to it, and that from all mankind? Let us examine the matter, if you are still doubtful. Suppose I should recommend you to the master of a ship as a skilful pilot, and on this you were admitted to direct at the helm, must not destruction to yourself, as well as the loss of the ship, be the inevitable consequence? Or suppose I spoke of you every where as a great general, or able statesman; and you, on the credit of this false representation, were called to determine causes, preside in the council, or command the army; would not your own ruin be involved in that of your country? Nay, were I only to commend you as a good economist to my neighbour, and thereby procure for you the management of his affairs, and the care of his family, would not you expose *yourself* to much ridicule, at the same time that you were exposing *him* to ruin? But the *surest*, as the *shortest* way, to make yourself beloved and honoured, my Critobulus, is, to be *indeed* the very man you wish to appear. Set yourself, therefore, diligently to the attaining of every virtue, and you will find, on experience, that no one of them whatsoever but will flourish and gain strength when properly exercised. *This is the counsel I*

have to give you, my Critobulus. But, if *you* are of a contrary opinion, let me know it, I entreat you."

"Far from it," replied Critobulus; "and I should only bring shame upon myself by contradicting you, since thereby I should contradict the sure principles of truth and virtue."

CHAP. VII.

SOCRATES had the greatest tenderness for his friends. Had ignorance or imprudence brought them into difficulties, Socrates, by his good advice, would often set them at ease. Or, if sinking under poverty, he would procure to them relief, by pressing upon others the duty of mutual assistance.

I will give some instances of his sentiments on such occasions.

Perceiving on a time a deep melancholy on the countenance of one of his friends, "You seem oppressed," said he, "Aristarchus; but impart the cause of it to your friends; they may be able to relieve you."

"I am indeed," said Aristarchus, "oppressed with no small difficulty: for, since our late troubles, many of our men being fled for shelter to the Piræus, the women belonging to them have all poured down upon me; so that I have at present no less than *fourteen* sisters, and aunts,

and cousins, *all* to provide for! Now, you know, my Socrates, we can receive no profit from our lands, for these our enemies have got into their possession: nor yet from our shops and houses in the city, since Athens hath scarcely an inhabitant left in it. Nobody to be found neither to purchase our wares; nobody to lend us money, at what interest soever: so that a man may as well hope to find it in the very streets as to borrow it any where! Now, what am I to do, my Socrates, in this case? It would be cruel not to relieve our relations in their distress; and yet, in a time of such general desolation, it is *impossible* for *me* to provide for so great a number."

Socrates having patiently heard out his complaint:—"Whence comes it," said he, "that we see Ceramo not only provide for a large family, but even become the richer by their very means; while you, Aristarchus, are afraid of being starved to death, because some addition hath been lately made to *yours*?"

"The reason is plain," replied Aristarchus; "Ceramo's people are all *slaves*; whereas those with me are every one of them *free*."

"And which, in your opinion, do you rate the highest? Ceramo's slaves, or the *free* people your house is filled with?"

"There can be no comparison!"

"But is it not then a shame," said Socrates, "that your people, who so far exceed in worth, should reduce you to beggary, whilst those with Ceramo make him a rich man?"

“Not at all,” replied Aristarchus: “the slaves with him have been brought up to trades; but those I speak of had a liberal education.”

“May we be said to be masters of some trade when we understand how to make things which are *useful*?”

“No doubt of it.”

“Is flour or bread *useful*?”

“Certainly.”

“And clothes, whether for men or women, are they *useful*?”

“Who doubts it?” said Aristarchus.

“But the people with you are altogether ignorant in these things?”

“So far from it,” replied Aristarchus, “that I question not their being able to perform any one of them.”

“But of what are you afraid then, my Aristarchus! Nausycides with *one* of these can maintain himself and family; and not only so, but buy flocks and herds, and accommodate the republic with a round sum on occasion: Cyribes also supports his household in ease and affluence by making bread: Demeas, the Collytensian, his, by making cassocks: Menon his, by making of cloaks; and the Megarensians theirs, by making of short jackets.”

“That is true,” interrupted Aristarchus; “for the way with *these* is to buy Barbarians, whom they can compel to labour: but I can do no such thing with the *women* who live with me; they are *free*, they are my *relations*, Socrates!”

“ And so, because they are *free*, and *related* to *you*, they are to do nothing but eat and sleep! Do you suppose, Aristarchus, that such as live in this manner are more content than others? or enjoy more happiness than they, who by their labour earn bread for their families? Suppose you that idleness and inattention can gain any useful knowledge, or preserve in the memory what hath been already gained? That *they* can keep the man in health, add strength to his body, and gold to his stores, or give security to what he hath already in his possession; and shall labour and industry stand him in no stead? To what purpose, I pray you, did *your relations* learn any thing? Did they resolve at the time to make no use of their knowledge? Or, rather, did they not intend from it some advantage to themselves, or benefit to others? Surely we give small proof of our wisdom when we thus decline all employment! For, which is most reasonable—procuring to ourselves the things that are useful, by exerting the powers which nature hath bestowed; or, with arms across, sit listless and musing, considering only the means by which others may provide for us? And verily, if I may speak my mind to you *freely*, I should suppose, Aristarchus, you cannot have any great love for your guests, in your present situation; nor they for you. *You* think them a burthen; and *they* perceive you think them so: and it will be well if discontent does not increase daily, till all gratitude and affection are compelled to give way. But show them once in what manner they may become useful; and you will henceforth

regard them with complacency and satisfaction; while they, perceiving it, will hardly be wanting in affection to you. They will be able to look back with pleasure, not pain, on all you have done for them: and the sweet familiarity of friendship, together with all the tender charities arising from the sacred ties of consanguinity, will again be restored to your happy society! Were the employments indeed of that nature as would bring shame along with them, death itself were to be chosen rather than a subsistence so obtained: but such as they are skilled in, are, as I suppose, decent and honourable; to be performed with *pleasure*, since they can perform them with so much *ease*. Delay not then, my Aristarchus, to propose what may be of so much advantage both to them and you; and doubt not their compliance with what they must perceive to be so very reasonable."

"O Heavens!" cried Aristarchus; "what truths have I now heard! But your advice, my Socrates, shall be regarded as it ought: hitherto I have been afraid to borrow money of my neighbour, as not knowing, when spent, by what means to repay it; but my scruples are now over: this moment I will buy such materials as may be wanted."

Nor did he at all cool in his resolutions:—Wool, with whatever was necessary for the working of it, were sent in by Aristarchus; and each one was employed from morning to night. Melancholy gave way to continual cheerfulness; and mutual confidence took the place of that mutual suspicion, which, till then, had possessed the minds of

Aristarchus and his guests. They consider him now as their generous protector; and his love for them increased in proportion to their usefulness.

Some time afterward, Aristarchus coming to see Socrates, related with much pleasure in what manner they went on: "But my guests," said he, "begin now to reproach *me*, for being, as they say, the only idle person in the whole family."

"Acquaint them," answered Socrates, "with the fable of the dog. You must know," continued he, "that in the days of yore, when brutes could talk, several of the sheep coming to their master, 'Is it not strange, sir!' say they to him, 'that *we*, who provide you with milk, and wool, and lambs, have nothing at all given us but what we can get off the ground ourselves; while the dog there, who cannot so much as help you to one of them, is pampered and fed with the very bread you eat of?'—'Peace!' cries the dog, who overheard their complaint; 'it is not without reason *I* am taken most care of; for *I* secure you from the thief and the wolf; nor would *you*, wretches! dare to eat at all, if *I* did not stand sentinel, to watch and defend you.' The sheep, saith the fable, on hearing this, withdrew, convinced that the dog had reason on his side: and do you, Aristarchus, convince your guests that it is by *your* care they are protected from harm; and enjoy a life of security and pleasure."

CHAP. VIII.

At another time, Socrates meeting his old friend Eutherus, whom he had not seen for many years, asked him, "Where he came from?"

"From no great distance, at present," replied Eutherus. "Towards the end of our late destructive war, I returned, indeed, from a long journey: for, being dispossessed of all the estate I had on the frontiers of Attica; and my father dying, and leaving me nothing here, I was obliged to gain a subsistence by my labour wherever I could: and thought it better to do so, than beg of any one; and borrow I could not, as I had nothing to mortgage."

"And how long," said Socrates, "do you imagine your labour will supply you with necessities?"

"Not long."

"And yet age increases the number of our wants, at the same time that it lessens our power of providing for them?"

"It does so."

"Would it not then be more advisable, my Eutherus, to seek out for some employment, which might enable you to lay up some little for old age? What if you were to go to some wealthy citizen, who may want such a person, to assist him in gathering in his fruits; inspecting

his affairs; and overlooking his labourers; whereby you might become a mutual benefit to each other?"

"But slavery, my Socrates, is a thing I can ill submit to."

"Yet magistrates, Eutherus, and those who are employed in public affairs, are so far from being considered as slaves on that account, that, on the contrary, they are held in the highest estimation."

"It may be so, Socrates, but I never can bear the being found fault with."

"And yet," saith Socrates, "you will be hard set to do any one thing whose every circumstance is secure from blame. For it is difficult so to act, as to commit no error; which yet if we could, I know of no security against the censure of ill judges: and truly I should wonder, Eutherus, if what you are at present employed about could be performed in such a manner as to escape all blame. It seems therefore to me, that all you can do, is only to take care, as far as may be, to keep clear of those people who seem glad to find fault; and seek out such as are more candid. Which done, pursue with steadiness and alacrity whatever you undertake, but beware how you undertake any thing beyond your power. Thus will your indigence find relief, without the hazard of much blame to you. Certainty shall take the place of a precarious subsistence, and leave you to the full enjoyment of all the peaceful pleasures of old age!"

CHAP. IX.

I REMEMBER one day Crito complaining how difficult it was at Athens for a man who loved quiet to enjoy his fortune in security: "For," said he, "I have now several lawsuits on my hands, for no other reason, that I can guess at, but because they know I would rather pay my money than involve myself in business and perplexity."

Socrates asked, "If he kept never a dog, to defend his sheep from the wolves?"

"I keep several," said Crito, "as you may imagine; and they are of no small use to me."

"Why then," said Socrates, "do you not engage some person in your service, whose vigilance and care might prevent others from molesting you?"

"So I would, my Socrates, did I not fear that this very man might, at last, turn against me."

"But wherefore should you fear this? Are you not pretty certain, that it may be more for the interest of people to keep on good terms with you, than have you for an enemy? Believe me, my Crito, there is many a man in Athens who would think himself very much honoured by your friendship." Saying this, Archidemus came immediately into their mind; a man able and eloquent, and, withal, well versed in business; but poor, as being one of those *few* who are not for having whatever

they can lay hands on. He loved honest men; though he would often say, nothing was more easy than to grow rich by calumny. To this man, Crito, in consequence of what Socrates had said to him, would send corn, or wool, or wine, or oil; or any other produce of his estate, when they brought him those things from the country: and when he sacrificed to the gods, he sent for him to the feast; nor even omitted any opportunity of showing respect to him. Archidemus seeing this, began to detach himself from all other dependencies, and consider Crito's house as the place that would shelter him from every want. He therefore gave himself entirely to him: and discovering that Crito's false accusers were guilty of many crimes, and had made themselves many enemies, he undertook to manage them. He therefore summoned one of them to answer for an offence, which, if proved against him, must subject him at least to a pecuniary mulct, if not to corporal punishment. The man, knowing how little he could defend his male-practices, endeavoured by every art to make Archidemus withdraw his prosecution; but to no purpose; for he would never lose sight of him till he had compelled him not only to leave Crito in peace, but purchased his *own* with no inconsiderable sum of money. Archidemus having conducted this affair, and many others of the same nature, successfully, Crito was thought not a little happy in having his assistance: and as the shepherds oftentimes avail themselves of their neighbour's dog, by sending their sheep to pasture near him; Crito's friends would entreat him to lend

Archidemus to them. He, on his side, was glad of an opportunity to oblige his benefactor ; and it was observed, that not only Crito himself, but all his friends, lived free, for the future, from any molestation. Likewise, when any reproached him with having made his court to Crito for his own interest : “ And which,” said he, “ do *you* think the most shameful? serving the good who have already served *you* ; and joining with them in their opposition to the wicked ; or, confederating with the bad, assist them the more effectually to oppress the virtuous ; and thereby make every honest man your enemy ? ”

From this time Archidemus lived in the strictest intimacy with Crito ; nor did Crito’s friends less honour and esteem him.

CHAP. X.

I REMEMBER Socrates once saying to Diodorus, “ Suppose, Diodorus, one of your slaves ran away from you, would you be at any pains to recover him ? ”

“ Yes, certainly,” said the other ; “ and I would even go so far as to publish a reward for whoever would bring him to me.”

“ And if any of them were sick, you would take care of them, I imagine ; and send for a physician to try to save them ? ”

“ Undoubtedly !”

“ But what if a friend, something of more worth to you than a thousand slaves, were reduced to want, would it not become you, Diodorus, to relieve him? You know him for a man incapable of ingratitude; nay, one who would even blush to lie under an obligation without endeavouring to return it. You know too, that the service of him who serves from inclination—who not only can execute what you command, but of himself find out many things that may be of use to you—who can deliberate, foresee, and assist you with good counsel—is infinitely of more value than many slaves? Now good economists tell us, it is right to purchase when things are most cheap; and we can scarcely recollect the time, at Athens, when a good friend might be had such a pennyworth.”

“ You are in the right,” said Diodorus; “ therefore you may bid Hermogenes come to me.”

“ Not so, neither,” returned Socrates; “ for, since the benefit will be reciprocal, it seems just as reasonable that *you* go to him, as *he* come to you.”

In consequence of this discourse, Diodorus went himself to Hermogenes, and, for a small consideration, secured a valuable friend, whose principal care was to approve his gratitude, and return the kindness shown him with many *real* services.

XENOPHON'S MEMOIRS

OF

SOCRATES.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

WE will now relate in what manner Socrates was useful to such of his friends as aimed at any honourable employment, by stirring them up to the attainment of that knowledge which alone could qualify them for discharging it properly.

Being told that one Dionysidorus was come to Athens, and there made public profession of teaching the military art, Socrates from thence took occasion to address the following discourse to a young man of his acquaintance, whom he knew at that very time soliciting for one of the principal posts in the army:—"Is it not," said he, "a most scandalous thing, for one who aims at commanding the forces of his country, to neglect an opportunity of gaining the instructions necessary for it? And does he not deserve to be more severely treated, than he who undertakes to form a statue without having learnt the statuary's art? In time

of war, no less than the safety of the whole community is intrusted to the general: and it is in his power either to procure to it many and great advantages, by a prudent discharge of the duties of his station, or involve his country, through misconduct, in the very deepest distress: and therefore that man must be worthy of no small punishment, who, whilst he is unwearied in his endeavours to obtain this honour, takes little or no thought about qualifying himself properly for executing a trust of such vast importance."

This reasoning wrought so powerfully upon the mind of the young man, that he immediately applied himself to the gaining of instruction. And coming a little time after where Socrates was standing with other of his friends, Socrates, on his approach, said to them laughing, "You remember, sirs, that Homer, speaking of Agamemnon, styles him venerable? Do you not think our young man here has acquired new dignity, and looks far more respectable, now he hath learnt the art of commanding? For, as he who is a master of music, will be a master of music, though he touches no instrument; and he who hath the skill of a physician, will be a physician, though not actually employed in the practice of his art: so, no doubt of it, this young man, now that he hath gained the knowledge of a general, is, incontestably, a general, though he never should be chosen to command the army: whereas it would be to very little purpose for an ignorant pretender to get himself elected, since this could no more make a general of him, than it would make a man

a physician, to call him one. But," continued Socrates, turning towards him, "since it may fall out that some of us may command a company, or a cohort under you, inform us, I pray you, with what point your master began his instructions, that *we* may not be altogether ignorant of the matter?"

"With the very same point with which he ended," replied the other; "the right ordering of an army, whether in marching, fighting, or encamping."

"Surely," answered Socrates, "this is but a small part of the office of a general: for he must likewise take care that none of the necessaries of war be wanting, and that his soldiers are supplied with every thing needful, as well for their health as daily subsistence. He should be diligent, patient, fruitful in expedients, quick of apprehension, unwearied in labour: mildness and severity must each have their place in him: equally able to secure his *own*, and take away that which belongeth to *another*. Open, yet reserved; rapacious, yet profuse; generous, yet avaricious; cautious, yet bold; besides many other talents, both natural and acquired, necessary for him who would discharge properly the duties of a good general. Yet I do not esteem the right disposition of an army a slight thing: on the contrary," said he, "nothing can be of so much importance; since, without order, no advantage can arise from numbers any more than from stones, and bricks, and tiles, and timber, thrown together at random: but when these are disposed of in their proper places;

when the stones and the tiles, as least perishable, are made use of for the foundation and the covering; the bricks and timber, each likewise in their order; then we may see a regular edifice arising, which afterward becomes no inconsiderable part of our possessions."

"Your comparison," interrupted the other, "makes me recollect another circumstance, which we were told the general of an army ought to have regard to; and that is, to place the best of his soldiers in the front and in the rear; whilst those of a doubtful character being placed in the middle, may be animated by the one, and impelled by the other, to the performance of their duty."

"Your master then," said Socrates, "taught you how to know a good soldier from a bad one; otherwise this rule could be of no use: for if he ordered you, in the counting of money, to place the good at each end of the table, and that which was adulterated in the middle, without first instructing you by what means to distinguish them, I see not to what purpose his orders could be."

"I cannot say," replied the other; "but it is very sure my master did no such thing: we must therefore endeavour to find it out ourselves."

"Shall we consider this point then a little farther," said Socrates, "that so we may the better avoid any mistake in this matter? Suppose," continued he, "the business was to seize some rich booty; should we not do well to place in the front, those whom we thought the most avaricious?"

"Certainly."

"But where the undertaking is attended with

peril, there, surely, we should be careful to employ the most ambitious, the love of glory being sufficient to make men of this stamp despise all danger: neither shall we be at a loss to find out these people; since they are always forward enough to make themselves known. But this master of yours," continued Socrates, "when he taught you the different ways of ranging your forces, taught you at the same time the different use you were to make of them."

"Not at all, I do assure you."

"And yet a different disposition of the army should be made, according as different occasions require."

"That may be," replied the other; "but he said not a word to me of the matter."

"Then return to him," said Socrates, "and question him concerning it; for if he is not either very ignorant, or very impudent, he will be ashamed of having taken your money, and sent you away so little instructed."

CHAP. II.

MEETING with one who had been newly elected general, Socrates asked him, "Why hath Agamemnon the title of *pastor of the people* given him by Homer? Must it not be for this reason, think you, that like as a shepherd looks carefully to

the health of his flock, and provides them pasture; so *he*, who hath the command of the army, should provide his soldiers with all things necessary; and procure those advantages to them for which they endure the hardships of war, conquest over their enemies, and to themselves more happiness? Why also doth the same poet praise Agamemnon for being

“Great in the war; and great in arts of sway,”

POPE.

but to show in him, that *personal* bravery, however remarkable, is not enough to constitute the *general*, without he animates his whole army with courage, and makes every single soldier *brave*? Neither,” continued he, “can that prince be celebrated for *the arts of sway*, however successful he may be in regulating his domestic affairs, who doth not cause felicity and abundance to be diffused throughout his whole dominion. For kings are not elected that their cares should afterwards centre in their own *private* prosperity; but to advance the happiness of those who elect them, are they called to the throne. As, therefore, the only motive for submitting to war, is the hope of rendering our future lives more secure and happy; and commanders are chosen for no other purpose, than to lead the way to this desirable end; it is the duty of a general to use his utmost endeavours not to disappoint the people therein: for, as to answer their expectations will bring to him the highest glory; so, to fail through misconduct, must be attended with the greatest shame.”

We may here see, from what hath been just said, that Socrates designed to give us his idea of a *good* prince; passing over every other consideration; confines it to him alone, *who diligently promotes the happiness of his people.*

CHAP. III.

MEETING at another time with a person who had been chosen general of the horse, Socrates said to him, “As I doubt not, my young man, your being able to give a good reason why you desired the command of the cavalry, I should be glad to hear it: for I cannot suppose you asked it only for an opportunity of riding before the rest of the army, as the archers on horseback must go before *you*: neither could it be, to make yourself the more taken notice of; for madmen will still have the advantage of you there. But your design, I conclude, was to reform the cavalry, in hopes of making them of more service to the republic.”

“I did design this, most certainly.”

“A noble intention!” replied Socrates, “if you can but accomplish it. But your station obliges you to have an eye to your horses, as well as men.”

“Undoubtedly.”

“ Pray tell us then,” said Socrates, “ what method you will take to get good horses?”

“ O, that,” answered the general, “ belongs not to me: the rider himself must look to that particular.”

“ Very well,” said Socrates. “ But suppose you wanted to lead them on to charge the enemy: and you found some of them lame; and others so weak, from being half-starved, that they could not come up with the rest of the army: while others again were so restive and unruly, as to make it impossible to keep them in their ranks: of what use would such horses be to you? or you to the republic?”

“ You are in the right,” said the other; “ and I will certainly take care what sort of horses are in my troop.”

“ And what sort of men too, I hope,” replied Socrates.

“ Certainly.”

“ Your first endeavour, I suppose then, will be, to make them mount their horses readily?”

“ It shall,” said the other, “ to the end they may stand a better chance to escape, if they are thrown off them.”

“ You will likewise take care,” said Socrates, “ to exercise them often: sometimes in one place, and sometimes in another; particularly there where it seems the most like to that in which you expect to meet the enemy, that your troops may be equally dexterous in all: for you cannot, I suppose, when going to engage, order your enemies to come and fight you on the plain, because there

alone you were accustomed to exercise your army? You will likewise instruct them in throwing the dart: and if you would indeed make good soldiers, animate them with the love of glory, and resentment against their enemies: but, above all, be careful to establish your authority; since neither the strength of your horses, nor the dexterity of the riders, can be of much use to you without obedience."

"I know it, Socrates: But what must I do to bring them to this obedience?"

"Have you not observed," said Socrates, "that all men willingly submit to those whom they believe the most skilful; in sickness, to the *best* physician; in a storm, to the *best* pilot; and in agriculture, to him whom they consider as the *best* husbandman?"

"I have," replied the other.

"If so, may we not well conclude, that he who is known to have the most skill in conducting the cavalry, will always find himself the most willingly obeyed?"

"But need I do no more than convince them of my superior abilities?"

"Yes; you must likewise convince them that both their glory and safety depend on their obedience."

"But how shall I be able to convince them of this?"

"With less trouble," replied Socrates, "than you can prove to them it is better and more for their advantage to be vitious than virtuous."

"But, at this rate, it will be necessary for a

general to add the study of the *art of speaking* to all his other cares."

"And do you imagine," said Socrates, "he can discharge his office without *speaking*? It is by the medium of speech the laws are made known to us for the regulation of our conduct; and whatsoever is useful in any science, we become acquainted with it by the same means; the best method of instruction being in the way of conversation: and he who is perfectly master of his subject will always be heard with the greatest applause. But have you never observed," continued Socrates, "that, throughout all Greece, the Athenian youth bear away the prize, in every contention, from those sent by any other republic? Even a chorus of music going from hence to Delos, exceeds, beyond all comparison, whatever appears from any other places. Now the Athenians have not, naturally, voices more *sweet*, or bodies more *strong*, than those of other nations; but they are more ambitious of glory, which always impels to generous deeds and noble undertakings. Why, therefore, may not our cavalry be brought in time to excel any other; whether in the beauty of their horses and arms; whether in their discipline, order, and courage; were they but shown that conquest and glory would almost prove the infallible result of it?"

"I see not why, indeed," answered the other, "if we could but convince them this would be the event."

"Lose no time, then," said Socrates; "but go, excite your soldiers to the performance of their

duty; that while you make *them* of use to *you*, *they* may likewise make *you* of some use to your country."

"I certainly shall make the attempt," replied the general.

CHAP. IV.

SEEING, at another time, Nichomachides return from the assembly of the people, where they had been choosing the magistrates, Socrates asked, whom they had fixed upon to command the army? "Could you have thought it!" said the other, "the Athenians, my Socrates, paid no regard to me, who have spent my whole life in the exercise of arms! passed through every degree, from that of common sentinel to colonel of the horse, covered with these scars, (showing them on his bosom,) my whole strength wasted with fighting in defence of them! while Antisthenes, one who never served among the infantry, nor ever did any thing remarkable among the horse, him they have elected, though all his merit seems to consist in being able to get money."

"No bad circumstance," replied Socrates: "we may hope, at least, to have our troops well paid."

"But a merchant can get money as well as Antisthenes: doth it follow from thence that a merchant is a fit man to command an army?"

"You overlook, Nichomachides, that Antis-

thenes is likewise a lover of glory, and seeks to excel in whatever he undertakes;—a quality of some worth in the commander of an army. You know, whenever he led the chorus, he always took care to carry off the prize.”

“But, surely, there is some difference between commanding an army and ordering the chorus?”

“And yet,” replied Socrates, “Antisthenes has no great knowledge himself either in music or the laws of the theatre; but as he had penetration sufficient to find out those who excelled in them, you see how, by their assistance, he came off conqueror.”

“He must have somebody then to fight, and give out his orders, when at the head of his army?”

“Be that as it may,” returned Socrates, “it is certain that he who follows the counsel of such as are best skilled in any art, let it be war or music, or any thing else, is pretty sure of surpassing all who are engaged in the same pursuit with him. Neither is it probable that he, who so liberally expends his money when the affair is no more than to amuse the people, and purchase a victory which only brings honour to himself and to his own tribe*, will be more sparing when the point is to gain a conquest far more glorious over the enemies of his country, and in which the whole republic are equally concerned.”

* The citizens of Athens were all divided into tribes, which had their peculiar customs and honour.

“We are to conclude, then,” returned the other, “that he who knows how to preside properly at a public show, knows in like manner how to command an army.”

“It is certain,” said Socrates, “so much may be concluded, that he who has judgement enough to find out what things are best for him, and ability to procure them, can hardly fail of success, whether his design be to direct the *stage* or govern the *state*,—manage his own house or command the army.”

“Truly,” replied Nichomachides, “I scarcely expected to hear from you, Socrates, that a good economist and a good commander was the same thing.”

“Do you think so?” answered Socrates: “Let us inquire then, if you please, into the duty of each; and see what agreement we can find between them. Is it not the business of them both to endeavour to make the people who are placed under them tractable and submissive?”

“It is.”

“Must they not see that every person be employed in the business he is most proper for? Are they not, *each* of them, to punish those who do wrong, and reward those who do right? Must they not gain the love of the people who are placed under their authority; and procure to themselves as many friends as may be, to strengthen, and stand by them, in time of need? Should they not know how to secure their own? And, in short, should not *each* of them be diligent and unwearied in the performance of his duty?”

“ So far,” replied Nichomachides, “ it may be as you say ; but surely the comparison can scarcely hold, when the case is to engage an enemy.”

“ Why so ?” said Socrates ; “ have they not each of them enemies to engage ?”

“ Certainly.”

“ And would it not be for the advantage of *both*, to get the better of these enemies ?”

“ No doubt of it, Socrates ! But I still see not of what use economy can be to a general, when the hour is come for his soldiers to fall on.”

“ The very time,” said Socrates, “ when it will be the most : for, as economy will show him his greatest gain must arise from conquest, his greatest loss from being overcome ; he will for that reason be very careful not to take any one step whatsoever which may hazard a defeat ; wisely declining an engagement while in want of any thing ; but equally ready to seize the hour, when, provided with all that is necessary, victory seems to him no longer doubtful. Thus you see of what use economy may be to a general : nor do you, Nichomachides, despise those who practise it ; since the conduct of the state, and that of a private family, differ no otherwise than as greater and less ; in every thing else there is no small similarity. The business is with men, in either case : neither do we know of one species of these, whereby to manage the affairs of government, and another for carrying on the common concerns of life ; but the prince at the helm, and the head of his family, must serve themselves from the same mass. And, to complete the parallel, be

assured, Nichomachides, that whoever hath the skill to use these instruments properly, hath also the best secret for succeeding in his design; whether his aim be to direct the state, or limit his care to the concerns of his own household: while he who is ignorant of this point must commit many errors, and of course meet with nothing but disappointments."

CHAP. V.

BEING in company with Pericles, son to the great Pericles, Socrates said to him,—“ I hope, my young man, when you come to command the forces of the republic, the war may be carried on with more glory and success than we have lately known it.”

“ I should be glad if it were so,” replied the other; “ but how it is to be done I cannot easily see.”

“ Shall we try,” said Socrates, “ to get some light into this matter? You know the Beotians are not more numerous than we.”

“ I know they are not.”

“ Neither are they stronger or more valiant.”

“ They are not.”

“ But the Beotians, it may be, are more united among themselves?”

“ So far from it,” said Pericles, “ that the Beo-

tians hate the Thebans on account of their oppression; whereas *we* can have nothing of this sort in Athens."

"But then we must own," said Socrates, "that the Beotians are not only the most courteous of all mankind, but the most ambitious; and they who are so, the love of glory, and of their country, will impel to undertake any thing."

"But I know not," replied Pericles, "that the Athenians are deficient in any of these particulars."

"It must be acknowledged," said Socrates, "if we look back to the actions of our forefathers, and consider either the lustre or the number of *their* glorious deeds, no nation can exceed us: and having such examples, taken out too from among ourselves, they cannot but inflame our courage, and stir us up to a love of valour and of virtue."

"And yet you see," answered Pericles, "how much the glory of the Athenian name is tarnished since the fatal defeat of Lubea, wherein Tolmides lost more than a thousand men; and that other at Delium, where Hipocrates was slain: for whereas, till then, the Beotians feared to make head against us, though in defence of their own country, without the assistance of the Lacedemonians and the rest of Peloponnesus; they now threaten to invade us, and that with their own forces *only*: while the Athenians, instead of ravaging, as formerly, Beotia at pleasure, when not defended by foreign troops, are made to tremble in their turn,

lest Attica itself should become the scene of slaughter."

"The case," said Socrates, "is, I fear, as you have stated it: but for that reason it seemeth to me, my Pericles, the very time wherein to desire the command of our armies. It is of the nature of security to make men careless, effeminate, and ungovernable; while fear, on the contrary, awakens their diligence, renders them obedient, and reduces them to order. We may see this among our seamen. So long as they are under no apprehension of danger they give themselves over to riot and disorder; but at the sight of a pirate, or the appearance of a storm, become immediately other men: not only diligent in performing whatever is commanded, but even watching, in silence, the master's eye, ready to execute, as in a well-ordered chorus, whatever part he shall think proper to assign them."

"Supposing," replied Pericles, "the people of Athens were at present in such a state as might dispose them to obedience, what way shall we take to rouse them to an imitation of our ancestors; that, with their virtues, we may restore the happiness and the glory of the times they lived in?"

"Was it our desire," answered Socrates, "to stir up any one to regain an inheritance now in the possession of another, what more should we need than to tell them it was theirs by long descent from their progenitors? If, therefore, my Pericles, you wish our Athenians to hold the

foremost rank among the virtuous, tell them it is their right, delivered down to them from the earliest ages; and that, so long as they are careful to maintain this pre-eminence in virtue, pre-eminence in power cannot fail to attend it. You would likewise do well to remind them, how highly the most ancient of their forefathers were esteemed and honoured on account of their virtue."

"You mean when, in the time of Cecrops, the people of Athens were chosen, in preference to all others, to arbitrate in the dispute which had arisen among the gods*?"

"I do," said Socrates; "and I would have you go on, and relate to them the birth and the education of Erictheus, the wars in his time with all the neighbouring nations; together with that undertaken in favour of the Heraclides against those of Peloponnesus. That also, in the days of Theseus, when our ancestors gained the reputation of surpassing all their contemporaries both in conduct and courage, ought not to be passed over. After which, it may not be amiss to recall to their minds what the descendants of these heroes have performed in the ages just before us. Show them the time when, by their own strength alone, they made head against the man who lorded it over all Asia, and whose empire extended even into Europe itself, as far as Mace-

* Alluding to the fabled contest between Neptune and Minerva for the patronage of Athens, which was determined, by the Athenians, in favour of Minerva.

donia; inheriting from his forefathers a formidable army, as well as wide dominions, that had already made itself famous for many noble undertakings. Tell them at other times of the many victories, both by sea and land, when in league with the Lacedemonians; men no less famous than themselves on the account of military courage: and, although innumerable have been the revolutions throughout the rest of Greece, whereby many have been compelled to change their habitations, show them the Athenians still in possession of their ancient territories; and not only so, but oftentimes made arbiters of the rights of other people, while the oppressed, on every side, have had recourse to them for protection."

"When I think of these things, my Socrates, I marvel by what means our republic hath sunk so low."

"I suppose," replied Socrates, "the Athenians acted in this respect like men, who, seeing themselves exalted above the fear of a competitor, grow remiss, and neglect discipline; and become thereby more despicable than the people whom they once despised: for, no sooner had our virtue set us above the rest of our contemporaries but we sunk into sloth, which ended, as you see, in a *total* degeneracy."

"But how shall we recover the lustre of the ancient virtue?"

"Nothing more easy to point out," replied Socrates: "let but our people call to mind what were the virtues and discipline of their forefathers, and diligently endeavour to follow their

example, and the glory of the Athenian name may rise again as high as ever! But, if this is too much for them, let them copy at least the people, whom, at present, they are compelled to consider as far above them: let them apply themselves with the same diligence to perform the same things, and let them not doubt of becoming again their equals: their *superiors*, if so be they will but surpass them in virtue."

"You speak, my Socrates, as if you thought our Athenians at no little distance from it. And, indeed," continued Pericles, "when do we see them, as at Sparta, reverencing old age? Or, rather, do we not see them showing their contempt of it even in the person of a father? Can they be expected to imitate that republic in the exercises which render the body healthful, who make sport of those who do? Will people who even glory in *despising* their rulers, submit readily to their commands? Or will concord and unanimity subsist among men, who seek not to help, but injure one another, and bear more envy to their fellow-citizens than to any other of mankind? Our assemblies, both public and private, are full of quarrels and contentions, whilst we harass each other with perpetual suits at law; choosing by that means some trifling advantage, though with the ruin of our neighbour, rather than content ourselves with an honest gain, whereby each party might be equally profited. The magistrate's aim is altogether his own interest, as if the welfare of the community no way concerned him. Hence that eager contention for

places and power, that ignorance and mutual hatred among those in the administration, that animosity and intrigue which prevail among private parties. So that I fear, my Socrates, lest the malady should rise to such a height, that Athens itself must, ere long, sink under it!"

"Be not afraid, my Pericles, that the distemper is incurable. You see with what readiness and skill our people conduct themselves in all naval engagements: how regular in obeying those who preside over their exercises, lead the dance, or direct the chorus."

"I am sensible of this," said Pericles: "and hence, my Socrates, is the wonder, that, being so complying on all such occasions, our soldiers, who ought to be the choice and flower of this very people, are so frequently disposed to mutiny and disobedience."

"The senate of the Areopagus," said Socrates; "is not *this* likewise composed of persons of the greatest worth?"

"Most certainly."

"Where else do we see judges who act in such conformity to the laws, and honour to themselves? Who determine with so much uprightness between man and man; or discharge, with such integrity, whatever business is brought before them?"

"I cannot reproach them," said Pericles, "with having failed in any thing."

"Therefore, let us not give up our Athenians, my Pericles, as a people altogether degenerate."

"Yet in war," replied Pericles, "where de-

cency, order, and obedience, are more especially required, they seem to pay no regard to the command of their superiors."

"Perhaps," returned Socrates, "some part of the blame may belong to those who undertake to command them? You hardly know of any man, I believe, pretending to preside over a chorus, directing the dance, or giving rules to the athletics, whilst ignorant of the matter. They who take upon them to do any of these things, must tell you *where*, and by *whom* they were instructed in the art they now pretend to teach others; whereas the greater part of our generals learn the first rudiments of war at the head of their armies. But I know, my Pericles, you are not of that sort of men; but have made it your employment to study the military art; and have gone through all the exercises so necessary for a soldier. In the memorials of your father, that great man! I doubt not your having remarked, for your own advantage, many of those refined stratagems he made use of; and can show us many more of your own collecting. These you study: and to the end that nothing may be omitted by one who hopes to command our armies, when you find yourself either deficient or doubtful, you are not unwilling to own your ignorance; but seek out for such as you imagine more knowing; while neither courtesy of behaviour, nor even gifts, are wanting, whereby to engage them to give you assistance."

"Ah, Socrates!" cried Pericles, interrupting him, "it is not that you think I have done these

things, but wish me to do them, that you talk in this manner!"

"It may be so," replied Socrates. "But to add a word or two more. You know," continued he, "that Attica is separated from Beotia by a long chain of mountains, through which the roads are narrow and craggy; so that all access to our country from that side, is both difficult and dangerous."

"I know it," said Pericles.

"It has been told you too, I imagine, how the Mysians and Pisidians, having seized for themselves several considerable places, and a large tract of land, in the territories of the king of Persia, are able, from the advantages of their situation, not only to secure their own liberty, but with their light-armed horse greatly annoy their enemies, by making perpetual inroads upon them?"

"Yes, I have heard this," replied the other.

"Why then may it not be supposed," said Socrates, "that if we secured those passes on the mountains which divide us from Beotia, and sent there our youth properly armed for making incursions, we might in our turn give some annoyance to our enemies; while these mountains, as so many ramparts, secured us from their hostilities?"

"I agree with you," said Pericles, "this might turn to our advantage, and that all you have said hath been much to the purpose."

"If you think so," replied Socrates, "and that my observations may be of service, you have nothing more to do than to carry them into execu-

tion. Should success be the consequence, *you*, my friend, will have the honour, and the republic much gain. If you fail through want of power, no great mischief can ensue; Athens will not be endangered; nor shall you, my Pericles, incur either shame or reproach, for having engaged in such an undertaking."

CHAP. VI.

GLAUCO, the son of Aristo, was so strongly possessed with the desire of governing the republic, that, although not yet twenty, he was continually making orations to the people: neither was it in the power of his relations, however numerous, to prevent his exposing himself to ridicule; though sometimes they would drag him, by very force, from the tribunal. Socrates, who loved him on the account of Plato and Charmidus, had alone the art to succeed with him. For meeting him, he said, "Your design then, my Glauco, is to be at the very head of our republic?"

"It is so," replied the other.

"Believe me," said Socrates, "a noble aim! For, this once accomplished, and you become, as it were, absolute; you may then serve your friends, aggrandize your family, extend the limits of your country, and make yourself renowned, not only

in Athens, but throughout all Greece: nay, it may be, your fame will spread abroad among the most barbarous nations, like another Themistocles: while admiration and applause attend wherever you go!"

Socrates having thus fired the imagination of the young man, and secured himself a favourable hearing, went on: "But if your design is to receive honour from your country, you intend to be of use to it; for nothing but that can secure its applause."

"Undoubtedly," replied Glauco.

"Tell me then, I entreat you, what may be the first service you intend to render the republic?"

Glauco remaining silent, as not knowing what to answer: "I suppose," said Socrates, "you mean to enrich it? for *that* is generally the method we take, when we intend to aggrandize the family of some friend."

"This is indeed my design," returned the other.

"But the way to do this," said Socrates, "is to increase its revenues."

"It is so."

"Tell me then, I pray you, whence the revenues of the republic arise, and what they annually amount to; since I doubt not of your having diligently inquired into each particular, so as to be able to supply every deficiency; and, when one source fails, can easily have recourse to some other."

"I protest to you," said Glauco, "this is a point I never considered."

“ Tell me then only its annual expenses ; for I suppose you intend to retrench whatever appears superfluous ? ”

“ I cannot say,” replied Glauco, “ that I have yet thought of this affair any more than of the other.”

“ We must postpone then our design of enriching the republic to another time,” said Socrates : “ for I see not how a person can exert his endeavours to any purpose so long as he continues ignorant both of its income and expenses.”

“ Yet a state may be enriched by the spoils of its enemies.”

“ Assuredly,” replied Socrates : “ But, in order to this, its strength should be superior, otherwise it may be in danger of *losing* what it hath already. He, therefore, who advises war, ought to be well acquainted not only with the forces of his own country, but those of the enemy ; to the end, that if he finds superiority on his side, he may boldly persist in his first opinion ; or recede in time, and dissuade the people from the hazardous undertaking.”

“ It is very true,” returned the other.

“ I pray you, then, tell me what are our forces by sea and land ; and what the enemy’s ? ”

“ In truth, Socrates, I cannot pretend to tell you, at once, either one or the other.”

“ Possibly you may have a list of them in writing ? If so, I should attend to your reading it with pleasure.”

“ No, nor this,” replied Glauco, “ for I have

not yet begun to make any calculation of the matter."

"I perceive then," said Socrates, "we shall not make war in a short time; since an affair of such moment cannot be duly considered at the beginning of your administration. But I take it for granted," continued he, "that you have carefully attended to the guarding our coasts; and know where it is necessary to place garrisons; and what the number of soldiers to be employed for each: that while you are diligent to keep those complete which are of service to us, you may order such to be withdrawn as appear superfluous."

"It is my opinion," replied Glauco, "that every one of them should be taken away, since they only ravage the country they were appointed to defend."

"But what are we to do then," said Socrates, "if our garrisons are taken away? How shall we prevent the enemy from overrunning Attica at pleasure? And who gave you this intelligence, that our guards discharge their duty in such a manner? Have you been among them?"

"No; but I much suspect it."

"As soon then," said Socrates, "as we can be thoroughly informed of the matter, and have not to proceed on conjecture only, we will speak of it to the senate."

"Perhaps," replied Glauco, "this may be the best way."

"I can scarcely suppose," continued Socrates,

“ that you have visited our silver mines so frequently, as to assign the cause why they have fallen off so much of late from their once flourishing condition?”

“ I have not been at all there,” answered Glauco.

“ They say indeed,” answered Socrates, “ that the air of those places is very unhealthful; and this may serve for your excuse, if the affair at any time should be brought under deliberation.”

“ You rally me, Socrates, now,” said the other.

“ However,” said Socrates, “ I question not but you can easily tell us how much corn our country produces; how long it will serve the city; and what more may be wanted to carry us through the year, that so you may be able to give out your orders in time; that scarcity and want may not come upon us unawares.”

“ The man,” replied Glauco, “ will have no little business on his hands, who pretends to take care of such a variety of things.”

“ Yet so it must be, my Glauco,” said Socrates: “ You see even here, in our own private families, it is impossible for the master to discharge the duties of his station properly, unless he not only inquires out what is necessary for those who belong to him, but exerts his utmost endeavours to supply whatever is wanted. In the city there are more than ten thousand of these families to provide for; and it is difficult to bestow upon them, at one and the same time, that attention and care which is necessary for each of them: I therefore think you had better have given the first proof of

your abilities in restoring the broken fortunes of one in your own family, from whence, if succeeding, you might afterwards have gone on to better those of the whole community; or finding yourself unable to do the one, thought no longer of the other; for surely the absurdity of the man is most apparent, who, knowing himself not able to raise fifty pound weight, shall nevertheless attempt the carrying of five thousand."

"But I make no doubt," replied Glauco, "of my having been able to have served my uncle, and that very considerably, if he would have followed my advice."

"Alas!" returned Socrates, "if you could not to this hour prevail on so near a relation as your uncle to follow your counsel, how can you hope that all Athens, this very man too among others, should submit to your direction? Beware then, my Glauco; beware lest a too eager desire of glory should terminate in shame. Consider how much they hazard who undertake things, and talk on subjects of which they are ignorant. Call to mind those of your acquaintance who have thus talked and thus done, and see whether the purchase they made for themselves had not more of censure than applause in it; of contempt, than admiration. Consider, on the other hand, with what credit they appear, who have made themselves masters of the point in question: and when you have done this, I doubt not your seeing that approbation and glory are alone the attendants of capacity and true merit; while contempt and shame are the sure reward of ignorance and temerity. If, therefore,

you desire to be admired and esteemed by your country beyond all others, you must exceed all others in the knowledge of those things which you are ambitious of undertaking: and thus qualified, I shall not scruple to ensure your success, whenever you may think proper to preside over the commonwealth."

CHAP. VII.

ON the other hand, having observed that Charmidas, the son of Glauco, and uncle to the young man of whom we have been speaking, industriously declined any office in the government, though otherwise a man of sense, and far greater abilities than many who at that time were employed in the administration; Socrates said to him, "I pray you, Charmidas, what is your opinion of one, who being able to win the prize at the Olympic games, and thereby gain honour to himself and glory to his country, shall, nevertheless, decline to make one among the combatants?"

"I should certainly look upon him," said Charmidas, "as a very effeminate and mean-spirited man."

"And suppose there may be one who hath it in his power, by the wisdom of his counsels, to augment the grandeur of the republic, and raise at the same time his own name to no common pitch

of glory, yet timorously refusing to engage in business; should not *this* man be deemed a coward?"

"I believe he should," replied Charmidas: "But wherefore this question to me?"

"Because," said Socrates, "you seem to be this very man; since, able as you are, you avoid all employment; though, as citizen of Athens, you are certainly a member of the commonwealth, and, consequently, ought to take some share in serving it."

"But on what do you ground your opinion of my ability?"

"I never once doubted it," said Socrates, "since I once saw you in conference with some of our leading men: for, when they imparted any of their designs to you, you not only counselled what was best to be done, but expostulated freely and judiciously, when you thought they were mistaken."

"But surely there is some difference," said Charmidas, "between discoursing in private and pleading your own cause before a full assembly."

"And yet," said Socrates, "a good arithmetician will not calculate with less exactness before a multitude than when alone: and he, who is a master of music, not only excels while in his own chamber, but leads the concert with applause in presence of the full audience."

"But you know, Socrates, the bashfulness and timidity nature hath implanted, operates far more powerfully in us when before a large assembly, than in a private conversation."

"And is it possible," said Socrates, "that you,

who are under no sort of concern when you speak to men who are in power, and men who have understanding, should stand in awe of such as are possessed of neither? For, after all, Charmidas, who are the people you are most afraid of? Is it the masons, the shoemakers, the fullers, the labourers, the retailers! Yet *these* are the men who compose our assemblies. But to converse thus at your ease, before people who hold the highest rank in the administration, (some of them, perhaps, not holding you in the highest estimation,) and yet suffer yourself to be intimidated by those who know nothing of the business of the state, neither can be supposed at all likely to despise you, is, certainly, no other than if he, who was perfectly well skilled in the art of fencing, should be afraid of one who never handled a file. But you fear their laughing at you?"

"And do they not often laugh at our very best speakers?"

"They do," replied Socrates; "and so do the others—those great men whom you converse with daily. I therefore the rather marvel, Charmidas, that you who have spirit and eloquence sufficient to reduce even these last to reason, should stand in awe of such stingless ridiculers! But endeavour, my friend, to know yourself better; and be not of the number of those who turn all their thoughts to the affairs of others, and are, the meanwhile, utter strangers at home. Be acquainted with your own talents, and lose no occasion of exerting them in the service of your country; and make Athens, if it may be, more flourishing than

it is at present. The returns they bring will be glorious! Neither is it the commonwealth alone that shall be advantaged by them; yourself, my Charmidas, and your best friends, shall share the benefit."

CHAP. VIII.

ARISTIPPUS being desirous to retaliate in kind for having been formerly put to silence by Socrates, proposed a question in so artful a manner, as he doubted not would pose him. Socrates, however, was at no loss for an answer; though regardful rather of the improvement of his hearers than the ordering of his speech. The question was, "If he knew any thing that was *good*?"—Now, had it been said of food, money, health, strength, courage, or any thing else of the like nature, that *they* were good, Aristippus could with ease have demonstrated the contrary, and shown that each, and all of them, were oftentimes evil: but Socrates was better provided with a reply; for, knowing with what eagerness we wish to be relieved from whatever molests us—"What," said he, "Aristippus, do you ask me if I know any thing good for a fever?"

"No, not so," returned the other.

"For an inflammation in the eye?"

"Nor that, Socrates."

“Do you mean any thing good against a famine?”

“No, nor against a famine.”

“Nay, then,” replied Socrates, “if you ask me concerning a *good*, which is *good* for *nothing*, I know of none such; nor yet desire it.”

Aristippus still urging him: “But do you know,” said he, “any thing beautiful?”

“A great many,” returned Socrates.

“Are these all like one another?”

“Far from it, Aristippus: there is a very considerable difference between them.”

“But how can beauty differ from beauty?”

“We want not many examples of it,” replied Socrates; “for the same disposition of the body which is beautiful in him who runs, is not beautiful in the wrestler; and while the beauty of the shield is to cover him well who wears it, that of the dart is to be swift and piercing.”

“But you return,” said Aristippus, “the same answer to this question as you did to the former.”

“And why not, Aristippus; for do you suppose there can be any difference between beautiful and good? Know you not, that whatever is beautiful, is, for the same reason, good? And we cannot say of any thing,—of virtue, for example,—that on *this* occasion it is good, and on the *other*, beautiful. Likewise, in describing the virtuous character, say we not of it, “It is fair and good?” Even the bodies of men are said to be fair and good, with respect to the same purposes: and the same we declare of whatever else we meet with, when suited to the use for which it was intended.”

“ You would, perhaps, then call a dung-cart beautiful ? ”

“ I would,” said Socrates, “ if made proper for the purpose ; as I would call the shield ugly, though made of gold, that answered not the end for which it was designed.”

“ Possibly you will say too,” returned Aris-
tippus, “ that the same thing is both handsome
and ugly.”

“ In truth I will,” said Socrates ; “ and I will go still farther, and add, that the same thing may be both good and evil : for I can easily suppose, that which is good in the case of hunger, may be evil in a fever ; since what would prove a cure for the one, will certainly increase the malignity of the other ; and in the same manner will beauty, in the wrestler, change to deformity in him who runneth. For whatsoever,” continued he, “ is suited to the end intended, with respect to that end it is good and fair ; and, contrariwise, must be deemed evil and deformed, when it defeats the purpose it was designed to promote.”

Thus, when Socrates said that “ *beautiful* houses were ever the most *convenient*,” he showed us plainly in what manner we ought to build. To this end he would ask, “ Doth not the man who buildeth a house, intend, principally, the making it useful and pleasant ? ”

This being granted, Socrates went on : “ But to make a house pleasant, it should be cool in summer and warm in winter.” This also was acknowledged. “ Then,” said he, “ the building which looketh towards the south will best serve this pur-

pose : for the sun, which by that means enters and warms the rooms in winter, will, in summer, pass over its roof. For the same reason, these houses ought to be carried up to a considerable height, the better to admit the winter sun ; whilst those to the north should be left much lower, that they may not be exposed to the bleak winds which blow from that quarter : for, in short," continued Socrates, " that house is to be regarded as beautiful, where a man may pass pleasantly every season of the year, and lodge with security whatever belongs to him." As for paintings, and other ornaments, he thought they rather impair than improve our happiness.

With regard to temples and altars ;—Socrates thought the places best fitted for these were such as lay at some distance from the city, and were open to the view ; for, when withheld from them, we should pray with more ardour, while in sight of those sacred edifices : and being sequestered from the resort of men, holy souls would approach them with more piety and devotion.

CHAP. IX.

SOCRATES being once asked, " Whether he took courage to be an acquisition of our own, or the gift of Nature?"—" I think," said he, " that, as in bodies some are more strong, and better able to

bear fatigue than others ; even so, among minds, may be discerned the same difference ; some of these, being by Nature endued with more fortitude, are able to face dangers with greater resolution. For we may observe," continued he, " that all who live under the same laws, and follow the same customs, are not equally valiant. Nevertheless, I doubt not but education and instruction may give strength to that gift Nature hath bestowed on us ; for, from hence it is we see the Thracians and the Scythians fearing to meet the Spartans with their long pikes and large bucklers ; while, on the contrary, the Spartans are not less afraid of the Scythians with their bows, or of the Thracians with their small shields and short javelins. The same difference is likewise observable in every other instance : and so far as any man exceedeth another in natural endowments ; so may he, proportionably, by exercise and meditation, make a swifter progress towards perfection. From whence it follows, that not only the man to whom Nature hath been less kind, but likewise he whom she hath endowed the most liberally, ought constantly to apply himself, with care and assiduity, to whatsoever it may be he wishes to excel in*."

Socrates made no distinction between wisdom and a virtuous temperance : for he judged, that he who so discerned what things were laudable

* Though I am sorry to lessen the merit of this excellent philosopher ; yet I cannot but wish the reader might see how much more usefully this subject hath been treated by a Christian moralist, in Number 106 of *The Adventurer*.

and good, as to choose them; what evil and base, as to avoid them; was both wise and virtuously tempered. And being asked, "Whether those persons who knew their duty, but acted contrary to it, were wise and virtuously tempered?" his answer was, "that they ought rather to be ranked among the ignorant and foolish: for that all men whatever do those particular things, which having first selected out of the various things possible, they imagine to be well for their interest. I am of opinion, therefore," added Socrates, "that those who do not act right, are, for that very reason, neither wise nor virtuously tempered."

Agreeable to this, Socrates would often say, "That justice, together with every other virtue, was wisdom; for that all their actions being fair and good, must be preferred as such by all who were possessed of a *right* discernment: but ignorance and folly could perform nothing fair and good; because, if attempted, it would miscarry in their hands. Whence it follows, that as whatever is just and fair must be the result of sound wisdom; and as nothing can be fair and just where virtue is wanting; therefore, justice, and every other virtue, is wisdom."

And although Socrates asserted that madness was the very reverse of wisdom, yet did he not account all ignorance madness. But for a man to be ignorant of himself; and erect those things into matters of opinion, belief, or judgement, with which he was totally unacquainted: this he accounted a disorder of the mind bordering on madness. He farther said, that "the vulgar never

deemed any one mad, for not knowing what was not commonly known: but to be deceived in things wherein no other is deceived; as when he thinks himself too tall to pass upright through the gates of the city; or so strong as to carry the house on his shoulders: in these, and such like cases, they say at once, "the man is mad;" but pass over, unnoticed, mistakes that are less striking. For, as they only give the name of love to that which is the very excess of the passion; so they confine their idea of madness to the very highest pitch of disorder that can possibly arise in the human mind."

Considering the nature of envy, he said, "It was a grief of mind which did not arise from the prosperity of an enemy, or the misfortunes of a friend; but it was the *happiness* of the last the envious man mourned at." And when it seemed strange that any one should grieve at the happiness of his friend, Socrates showed them, "It was no uncommon thing for the mind of man to be so fantastically disposed, as not to be able to bear either the pains or the pleasures of another; but that while it spared for no labour to remove the first, it would sicken and repine on seeing the other: but *this*," he said, "was only the punishment of minds ill-formed: the generous soul was above such weaknesses."

As to idleness, Socrates said he had observed very few who had not some employment; for the man who spends his time at the dice, or in playing the buffoon to make others laugh, may be said to do *something*: but, with Socrates, these, and such

as these, were in reality no better than idlers, since they might employ themselves so much more usefully. He added, that no one thought himself at leisure to quit a good occupation for one that was otherwise: if he did, he was so much less excusable, as he could not plead the want of employment.

Socrates likewise observed, that a sceptre in the hand could not make a king; neither were they rulers in whose favour the lot or the voice of the people had decided, or who by force or fraud had secured their election, unless they understood the art of governing. And although he would readily allow it not less the province of the prince to command, than the subjects to obey; yet he would afterwards demonstrate, that the most skilful pilot would always steer the ship; the master, no less than the mariners, submitting to his direction. "The owner of the farm left the management of it," he said, "to the servant whom he thought better acquainted than himself with the affairs of agriculture. The sick man sought the advice of the physician; and he, who engaged in bodily exercises, the instructions of those who had most experience. And whatever there may be," continued Socrates, "requiring either skill or industry to perform it, when the man is able, he doth it himself; but if not, he hath recourse, if prudent, to the assistance of others, since in the management of the distaff a woman may be his instructor: neither will he content himself with what he can have at hand; but inquireth out with care for whoever can best serve him."

It being said by some present, “that an arbitrary prince was under no obligation to obey good counsel.” — “And why so,” replied Socrates; “must not he himself pay the penalty of not doing it? Whoever rejects good counsel commits a crime; and no crime can pass unpunished.” It being farther said, “That an arbitrary prince was at liberty to rid himself even of his ablest ministers.” — “He may,” returned Socrates: “but do you suppose it no punishment to lose his best supports? or think you it but a slight one? For, which would this be; to establish him in his power; or the most sure way to hasten his destruction?”

Socrates being asked, “What study was the most eligible and *best* for man?” answered, “TO DO WELL.” And being again asked by the same person, “If *good fortune* was the effect of *study*?” “So far from it,” returned Socrates, “that I look upon good fortune and study as two things entirely opposite to each other: for that is *good fortune*, to find what we want, without any previous care or inquiry: while the success which is the effect of study, must always be preceded by long searching and much labour, and is what I call DOING WELL: and I think,” added Socrates, “that he who diligently applies himself to this study, cannot fail of success*; at the same time that he

* “Since but to wish more virtue, is to gain:”

He has virtually attained his *end*, at the very time that he seems only busied about the *means*. As the term *Ευπραξία*, which is here translated, TO DO WELL, is equivocal, and implies in it *rectitude of conduct*, as well as *prosperity* and *success*, as commonly understood

is securing to himself the favour of the gods and the esteem of men. They, likewise, most commonly excel all others in agriculture, medicine, the business of the state, or whatever else they may engage in; whereas they who will take no pains, neither can know any thing perfectly, or do any thing WELL; they please not the gods, and are of no use to man."

CHAP. X.

BUT all the conversations of Socrates were improving. Even to the artists while engaged in their several employments, he had always somewhat to say which might prove instructive. Being on a time in the shop of Parrhasius the painter, he asked him, "Is not painting, Parrhasius, a representation of what we see? By the help of canvass and a few colours, you can easily set before us hills and caves, light and shade, straight and crooked, rough and plain, and bestow youth and age, where and when it best pleaseth you: and when you would give us perfect beauty, (not

by these words; it seems to be *chiefly*, in respect to the first of these, viz. *rectitude of conduct*, that Socrates here promises success to those who diligently make it their study and endeavour; not omitting to point out to us the favourable influence care and industry commonly have on whatever we engage in.

being able to find in any one person what answers your idea,) you copy from many what is beautiful in each, in order to produce this perfect form."

"We do so," replied Parrhasius.

"But can you show us, Parrhasius, what is still more charming,—a mind that is gentle, amiable, affable, friendly? Or is this inimitable?"

"And how should it be otherwise than *inimitable*, my Socrates, when it hath neither colour, proportion, nor any of the qualities of those things you mentioned, whereby it might be brought within the power of the pencil? In short, when it is by no means visible?"

"Are men ever observed to regard each other with looks of kindness or hostility?"

"Nothing more frequently observed," replied Parrhasius.

"The eyes, then, discover to us something?"

"Most undoubtedly."

"And, in the prosperity or adversity of friends, is the countenance of him who is anxiously solicitous, the same with theirs who are indifferent about the matter?"

"Far otherwise, Socrates: for he who is solicitous, hath a countenance all cheerfulness and joy, on the prosperity of a friend; pensive and dejected, when this friend is in affliction."

"And can this also be represented?"

"Certainly."

"Likewise, where there is any thing noble and liberal; or illiberal and mean; honest, prudent, modest; bold, insolent, or sordid; are any of these to be discovered in the countenance and de-

meanour of a man, when he sits, stands, or is in motion?"

"It may."

"And imitated?"

"Imitated, no doubt of it."

"And which yields the most pleasure, Parrhasius;—the portrait of him on whose countenance the characters of whatever is good, virtuous, and amiable, are impressed; or his, who wears in his face all the marks of a base, evil, and hateful disposition?"

"Truly," returned Parrhasius, "the difference is too great, my Socrates, to admit of any comparison."

Entering another time into the shop of Clito, the statuary, he said to him: "I marvel not, my Clito, at your being able to mark out to us even the difference between the racer and the wrestler, the pancratiast and gladiator; but *your* statues are very men! Tell me, I pray, by what means you effect this?"

Clito hesitating, as at a loss how to reply; Socrates went on: "But, perhaps, you are particularly careful to imitate persons who are living; and that is the reason why your statues are so much alive?"

"It is," returned Clito.

"Then you have certainly remarked, and that with no little exactness, the natural disposition of all the parts, in all the different postures of the body: for, whilst some of these are extended, others remain bent; when *that* is raised above its

natural height, *this* sinks below it; these are relaxed, and those again contracted, to give the greater force to the meditated blow: and the more these sort of things are attended to, the nearer you approach to human life."

"You are right, my Socrates."

"But it undoubtedly gives us the greatest pleasure, when we see the *passions* of men, as well as their *actions*, represented?"

"Undoubtedly."

"Then the countenance of the combatant going to engage the enemy, must be menacing and full of fire; that of the conqueror, all complacency and joy?"

"They must."

"Therefore," concluded Socrates, "he will ever be deemed the best sculptor, whose statues best express *the inward workings of the mind*."

Socrates entering the shop of Pistias, the armourer, was shown some corslets that were thought well made.

"I cannot but admire," said Socrates, "the contrivance of those things which so well cover that part of the body which most wants defending, and yet leave the hands and arms at liberty. But tell us, Pistias, why you sell your armour so much dearer than any other, when it is neither better tempered, stronger, nor the materials of it more costly?"

"I make it better proportioned," said Pistias; "and therefore I ought to have a better price."

"But how are we to find out this proportion,

Pistias? Not by weight, or measure: for as you make for different people, the weight and the size must likewise differ, or they will not fit."

"We must make them to fit," said Pistias; "otherwise the armour would be of little use."

"And are you aware that all bodies are not justly proportioned?"

"I am."

How can you make a well-proportioned suit of arms for an ill-proportioned body?"

"I make it fit; and what fits is well proportioned."

"Then you are of opinion, that when we declare any thing well proportioned, it must be in reference to the use for which it was intended: as when we say of this shield, or this cloak, it is well proportioned, for it fits the person for whom it was made? But I think," added Socrates, "there is still another advantage, and that no small one, in having arms made to fit the wearer."

"Pray what is that?"

"Armour which fits," replied Socrates, "doth not load the wearer so much as that which is ill made, although the weight may be the same: for that which doth not fit hangs altogether upon the shoulders, or bears hard upon some other part of the body; and becomes, thereby, almost insupportable; whereas the weight of that which is well made, falls equally on all;—the shoulders, breast, back, loins;—and is worn with ease, not carried as a burthen."

"It is for this very same reason," said Pistias, "that I set such a value on those I make: never-

theless, my Socrates, there are who pay more regard to the gilding and carving of their arms than to any other matter."

"And yet," answered Socrates, "these people will make but a bad bargain with all their gilding and various colours, if they buy such arms as do not sit easy. But," continued Socrates, "since the position of the body is not always the same, being sometimes stooping and sometimes erect, how can the arms, that are made with such exactness, be at all times easy?"

"Neither can they," replied the other.

"You think then, Pistias, the arms which are well made are not those which are exact, or sit close to the body, but give the least trouble to him who wears them?"

"*You* think so," said Pistias; "and have certainly taken the matter right."

CHAP. XI.

THERE was a courtezan at Athens, called Theodota, of great fame on the account of her many lovers. It being mentioned in company that her beauty surpassed all description, that painters came from all parts to draw her picture, and that one was now gone to her lodgings for that very purpose,—“We should do well,” said Socrates,

“ to go ourselves and see this wonder, for we may then speak with more certainty when we speak from our own knowledge, and do not depend on the report of others.”

The person who first mentioned this seconding the proposal, they went that instant to the lodgings of Theodota, and found her, as was said, sitting for her picture. The painter being gone, Socrates said to those who came along with him : “ What say you, sirs, which of the two ought to think themselves the most obliged : we to Theodota, for the sight of so much beauty ; or she to us, for coming to see it ? Now, if the advantages of showing herself are found to be altogether on her side, then certainly is she indebted to us for this visit : if otherwise, indeed, we must thank her.”

The reasonableness of what was said being assented to by the rest, Socrates proceeded— “ The praises we bestow at present, ought not even these to be had in some estimation by Theodota ? But when we come to blaze abroad the fame of her beauty, what manifold advantages may not arise to her from it ! while all our gain from the sight of so many charms can terminate in nothing but fruitless longing ! We take our leave with hearts full of love and anxiety, and are henceforth no other than so many slaves to Theodota, with whom she has no more to do than to show them her pleasure ! ”

“ If this is the case,” replied Theodota, “ I am to thank you for coming to see me.”

Socrates, during this conversation, had observed

how sumptuously she was adorned, and that her mother was the same; her attendants, of whom there was no small number, expensively clothed, and all the furniture of her apartment elegant and costly: he therefore took occasion from thence to ask her concerning her estate in the country; adding, it must of necessity be very considerable?

Being answered, "she had not any."

"You have houses then," said he, "in the city, and they yield you a good income?"

"No, nor houses, Socrates."

"You have certainly many slaves then, Theodota, who by the labour of their hands supply you with these riches?"

"So far," replied Theodota, "from having many, that I have not one."

"But whence then," said Socrates, "can all this come?"

"From my friends," returned Theodota.

"A fair possession, truly!" replied Socrates; "and a herd of friends we find to be a far better thing than a flock of sheep or a herd of cattle. But tell me, pray, Do you trust fortune to bring these friends home to you, as flies fall by chance into the spider's web, or do you employ some art to draw them in?"

"But where, Socrates, shall I be furnished with this art?"

"You may procure it," said Socrates, "with far greater ease than the spider her web. You see how this little animal, who lives only upon her prey, hangs her nets in the air, in order to entangle it?"

“You advise me, then, to weave some artificial nets,” said Theodota, “in order to catch friends?”

“Not so neither,” returned Socrates; “it is necessary to go a little less openly to work in a pursuit of such importance. You see what various arts are employed by men to hunt down hares; which, after all, are of little value. As these are known to feed chiefly in the night, they provide dogs to find them out at that season: and as they lie concealed in the day, the sharp-scented hound is employed to trace them up to their very forms: being swift of foot, the greyhound is let loose upon them, as more swift of foot than they: and, lest all this should not be sufficient for the purpose, they spread nets in the paths to catch and entangle them.”

“Very well,” replied Theodota; “but what art shall *I* make use of to catch friends?”

“Instead of the hunter’s dog,” said Socrates, “you must set somebody to find out those who are rich and well-pleased with beauty, whom afterwards they shall force into your toils.”

“And what are my toils?” replied Theodota.

“You are certainly mistress of many,” said Socrates, “and those not a little entangling. What think you of that form of yours, Theodota, accompanied as it is with a wit so piercing, as shows you at once what will be most for your advantage? It is this which directs the glance, tunes the tongue, and supplies it with all the shows of courtesy and kindness. It is this which teaches you to receive with transport him who

assiduously courts your favour, and scorn such as show you no regard. If your friend is sick, you spare for no pains in your attendance upon him : you rejoice in all his joy, and give every proof of having bestowed your heart on him who seems to have given his to you. In short, I make no doubt of your being well versed in all the arts of allurements, and dare venture to say, the friends you have, if *true*, were not gained by compliments, but substantial proofs of kindness."

"But," said Theodota, "I never practise any of the arts you mention."

"And yet," answered Socrates, "some management is necessary, since a friend is a sort of prey that is neither to be caught nor kept by force ; a creature no otherwise to be taken and tamed, but by showing it kindness, and communicating to it pleasure."

"You say right, Socrates ; but why will you not help me to gain friends ?"

"And so I will," said Socrates, "if you can find out how to persuade me to it."

"But what way must I take to persuade you ?"

"Do *you* ask that ?" returned Socrates : "You will find out the way, Theodota, if you want my assistance."

"Then come to me often."

Socrates, still joking with her, said laughing :—
"But it is not so easy for me to find leisure : I have much business both in public and private, and have my friends too, as well as you, who will not suffer me to be absent night or day, but

employ against me the very charms and incantations that I formerly taught them."

"You are then acquainted with those things?"

"Verily!" returned Socrates; "for what else can you suppose, Theodota, engaged Apollodorus and Antisthenes to be always with me? Or Cebes and Simmias to leave Thebes for my company, but the charms I speak of*?"

"Communicate these charms to me," said Theodota, "and the first proof of their power shall be upon you."

"But I would not be attracted to *you*, Theodota; I would rather you should come to *me*."

"Give me but a favourable reception," said Theodota, "and I will certainly come."

* Antisthenes lived at the port Piræus, about five miles from Athens, and came from thence every day to see Socrates. Cebes and Simmias left their native country for his sake; and almost the whole of what we know of Apollodorus is the violence of his affection for Socrates. But the proof which Euclides gave of his was the most extraordinary: for, when the hatred of the Megareans was so great that it was forbidden on pain of death for any one of them to set foot in Attica, and the Athenians obliged their generals to take an oath, when they elected them, to ravage the territories of Megara twice every year, Euclides used to disguise himself in the habit of an old woman, and covering his head with a veil, set out in the evening for Megara; and arriving in the night time at the house of Socrates, staid till the next evening with him, and then returned in the same manner; so much stronger was his affection than the fear of death. And when, to friends like these, we may still add many others, Plato, Chærephon, Crito, and, to mention no more, our amiable Xenophon; almost all of them the wisest as well as the best men of their age; who can suspect the virtue of Socrates,—who can doubt his being a happy man!

“So I will,” replied Socrates, “provided I have then no one with me whom I love better.”

CHAP. XII.

SOCRATES having taken notice how very awkward Epigenes, one of his followers, was in all his actions; and that he was moreover of a sickly constitution; both which he attributed to a neglect of those exercises which make so large a part of a liberal education*; he reprov'd him for it, saying, “How unbecoming it was in him to go on in such a manner.” Epigenes only answered, “He was under no obligation to do otherwise.”

“At least as much,” replied Socrates, “as he who hath to prepare for Olympia. Or do you suppose it, Epigenes, a thing of less consequence to fight for your life against the enemies of your country, whenever it shall please our Athenians to command your service, than to contend for a prize at the Olympic games? How many do we see, who, through feebleness and want of strength, lose their lives in battle; or, what is still worse, save themselves by some dishonourable means! How

* No slaves were allowed to anoint, or perform exercises in the Palæstra.—POTT. *Antiq.*

many fall alive into the enemy's hand, endure slavery of the most grievous kind for the remainder of their days, unless redeemed from it by the ruin of their families! Whilst a third procures himself an evil fame; and the charge of cowardice is given to imbecility. But, perhaps, Epigenes, you despise all the ills which attend on bad health; or account them as evils that may easily be borne?"

"Truly," replied the other, "I think them rather to be chosen, than so much fatigue and labour for the purchase of a little health."

"It may be, then," answered Socrates, "you equally condemn all the advantages arising from a contrary complexion; yet, to me, they seem to be many and great; since he who is possessed of a good constitution, is healthful, strong, and hardy; and may acquit himself with honour on every occasion. By the means of this he oft-times escapes all the dangers of war; he can assist his friends, do much service to his country, and is sure of being well received wherever he shall go. His name becomes illustrious: he makes his way to the highest offices; passes the decline of life in tranquillity and honour; and leaves to his children the fair inheritance of a good example. Neither ought we to neglect the benefits arising from military exercises, though we may not be called upon to perform them in public; since we shall find ourselves not the less fitted for whatever we may engage in, from having a constitution healthful and vigorous: and as the body must bear its part, it imports us much to have it in

good order: for, who knoweth not," continued Socrates, "that even *there*—where it seems to have least to do—who knoweth not how much the *mind* is retarded in its pursuits after knowledge, through indisposition of the body: so that forgetfulness, melancholy, fretfulness, and even madness itself, shall sometimes be the consequence, so far as to destroy even the very traces of all we have ever learned. But he whose constitution is rightly tempered, need fear none of these evils; and, therefore, he who hath a just discernment will choose with pleasure whatever may best secure him from them. Neither doth an inconsiderable shame belong to the man who suffers himself to sink into old age, without exerting to the utmost those faculties Nature hath bestowed on him; and trying how far they will carry him towards that perfection, which laziness and despondence can never attain to; for dexterity and strength are not produced spontaneously."

CHAP. XIII.

A CERTAIN man being angry with another for not returning his salutation, Socrates asked, "Why he was not enraged when he met one who had less health than himself; since it would not be more ridiculous, than to be angry with one who was less civil?"

Another bemoaning himself because he could not relish his food ; “ There is an excellent remedy for this complaint,” answered Socrates : “ Fast often. By this means you will not only eat more pleasantly, but likewise better your health, and save your money.”

Another complaining that the water which ran by his house was too warm to drink ; “ You are lucky, however,” said Socrates, “ in having a bath thus ready prepared for you.”

“ But it is too cold to bathe in,” replied the other.

“ Do your domestics complain of it when they drink or bathe ?”

“ So far from it,” answered the man, “ that it is often my wonder to see with what pleasure they use it for both these purposes.”

“ Which do you account,” said Socrates, “ the warmest ; this water you speak of, or that in the temple of Esculapius ?”

“ O ! that in the temple,” replied the other.

“ And how is it,” said Socrates, “ that you do not perceive yourself more froward and harder to please, not only than your own servants, but even people who are sick ?”

Socrates seeing one beat his servant immoderately, asked him, “ What offence the man had committed ?”

“ I beat him,” replied the other, “ because he is not only a drunkard and a glutton, but avaricious and idle.”

“ You do well,” said Socrates ; “ but judge

for yourself which deserves the most stripes, your servant, or you?"

Another dreading the length of the way to Olympia; Socrates asked him, "What he was afraid of? For is it not your custom," said he, "to walk up and down in your own chamber almost the whole day? You need therefore but fancy you are taking your usual exercise between breakfast and dinner, and dinner and supper, and you will find yourself, without much fatigue, at the end of your journey; for you certainly walk more in five or six days, than is sufficient to carry you from Athens to Olympia. And as it is pleasanter to have a day to spare, than to want one, delay not, I advise you; but set out in time, and let your haste appear, not at the end, but the beginning of your journey*."

A certain person complaining of being tired with travelling, Socrates asked, "If he had carried any thing?"

"Nothing but my cloak," replied the other.

"Was you alone?" said Socrates.

"No; my servant went along with me."

"And did *he* carry any thing?"

"Yes, certainly, he carried all I wanted."

"And how did *he* bear the journey?"

"Much better than I."

* Many of the circumstances here mentioned seem as if they should not be so much considered as things spoken by Socrates, as Socrates; but by Socrates whom Xenophon most tenderly loved.

“What, if *you* had carried the burthen; how then?”

“I *could* not have done it,” replied the other.

“What a shame,” said Socrates, “for a man who hath gone through all his exercises, not to be able to bear as much fatigue as his servant!”

CHAP. XIV.

It being generally the custom, when they met together, for every one to bring his own supper*; Socrates observed, that whilst some of them took such care of themselves, as to have more than was sufficient; others were compelled to be content with less. He, therefore, so ordered the matter, that the small portion of him who brought little

* The feasts, or entertainments of the Grecians, were of different sorts. In the primitive ages, entertainments were seldom made but on the festivals of their gods; for it was not customary with them to indulge in the free use of wine, or delicacies, unless they did it on a religious account. Afterwards, when a more free way of living was introduced, they had three distinct sorts of entertainments, of which the marriage entertainment was one. Of the other two, one was provided at the sole expense of one person; the other was made at the common expense of all present. Hither also may be referred those entertainments wherein some of the guests contributed more than their proportion; and that other, (*which is, I believe, what Socrates had in this place more particularly in his eye,*) in which it was the custom for any man, after he had

should be offered about to all the company in such a manner, that no one could, civilly, refuse to partake of it; nor exempt himself from doing the like with what he brought: by which means a greater equality was preserved among them. There was also this farther advantage arising from it; the expenses of the table were considerably abridged: for when they saw, that whatever delicacy they brought thither, the whole company would have their share of it, few chose to be at the cost to procure it: and thus luxury was in some degree put a stop to in these entertainments.

Having observed, at one of these meetings, a young man who ate his meat without any bread: and the discourse turning at that time on the cause why *this* or *that* person had procured to themselves some particular appellation—"Can you tell me, sirs," said Socrates, "why they call a man a gormandizer, since not one of us here but takes part of whatever is set before him; and therefore we cannot suppose *this* to be the reason?"

"I suppose it cannot," replied one of the company.

"But," continued Socrates, "when we see any

provided his supper (the Grecian's best meal), to put it in a basket, and go and eat it in another man's house.—POTT. *Antiq.*

The Greek name for an entertainment defined by Plutarch, "a mixture of seriousness and mirth, discourses and actions."

They who forced themselves into other men's entertainments were called flies; a general name of reproach for such as insinuated themselves into company where they were not welcome.

one greedily swallowing down his meat without mixing any bread with it, may we not call this man a gormandizer? For, if otherwise, I know not where we shall meet with one." And being asked by another, who was present, What he thought of him who ate a little bread to a great deal of meat? "The same," answered Socrates, "as I did of the other: and while the rest of mankind supplicate the gods to find them plenty of corn, these men must pay for an abundance of the well-mixed ragout."

The young man whom this discourse glanced at, suspecting it was meant for him, thought proper to take a *little* bread, but, at the same time, continued to cram down his meat as formerly; which Socrates observing, called to one who sat near him, to take notice "whether his neighbour ate his meat for the sake of the bread, or his bread for the sake of the meat."

At another time, seeing a person dip a piece of bread into several different sauces, Socrates asked—"Whether it was possible to make a sauce so costly, and at the same time so little good, as this person had made for himself? For, as it consisted of a greater variety, there could be no doubt of its costing more: and as he had mixed such things together as no cook ever once thought of, who could doubt his having spoiled all? Besides," said Socrates, "what folly to be curious in searching after cooks, if a man is to undo at once all they have done for us!" Moreover, he who is accustomed to indulge in variety, will feel dissatisfied when not in his power to

procure it: but the man who generally restrains himself to one dish, will rise well satisfied from every table. He used also to say, that the compound verb, which in the Attic dialect signified to *feast*, or *fare well**, meant to *eat*; and that the term WELL was added to express the eating in such a manner as neither to disorder the body nor oppress the mind; and with such plainness that the food could not be difficult to come at; so that this Attic verb was only applicable to such persons as ate with decency and temperance, and agreeably to the nature of social rational beings.

* The verb here mentioned by Socrates is *Εὐωχεῖσθαι*, to feast, or make one at a banquet, which comes from *Εὐωχία*, a feast or banquet. Of this last word we have two etymologies; the first deduces it from *Εὐ*, *bene*, and *ὀχὺ*, *cibus*, because those who attend feasts are *well fed*; the second deduces it from *Εὐ* *ἔχειν*, *bene sese habere*, because those who attend feasts *are well off*; they find their advantage in being there, from *faring so sumptuously and well*. Whichever etymology we admit, the ingenuity of Socrates remains the same; who, by transferring the term *Εὐ* in *Εὐωχεῖσθαι*, from its vulgar and gross meaning into a moral and rational one, has the address to transform a verb of luxury and excess into a verb of temperance and decorum. This method of conveying knowledge, by discussing the meanings of words and their etymologies, was much practised by Socrates. Many instances occur in this work; in particular see lib. iv. cap. 2, where *διαλέγεσθαι* is etymologized. Plato wrote an entire dialogue, called *Cratylus*, upon this subject. From these early philosophers the Stoics took the practice, as may be seen in Cicero *de Natura Deor.* and also Arrian, lib. i. cap. 17; where the learned editor, Mr. Upton, has fully illustrated his author, and given a multitude of similar passages.—Mr. HARRIS.

XENOPHON'S MEMOIRS

OF

SOCRATES.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

IN this manner would Socrates make himself useful to all sorts of men, of whatsoever employment. Indeed no one can doubt the advantages arising from his conversation, to those who associated with him whilst living; since even the remembrance of him, when dead, is still profitable to his friends. Whether serious or gay, whatever he said carried along with it something which was improving. He would frequently assume the character and the language of a lover; but it was easy to perceive it was the charms of the mind, not those of the body, with which he was enamoured, as the objects he sought after were always such as he saw naturally inclining towards virtue. Now he thought an aptness to learn, together with a strength of memory to retain what was already learnt, accompanied with a busy inqui-

sitiveness into such things as might be of use for the right conduct of life, whether as head only of a single family or governor of the whole state, indicated a mind well fitted for instruction, which, if duly cultivated, would render the youth in whom they were found not only happy in themselves, and their own families, but give them the power of making many others the same; since the benefits arising from thence would be diffused throughout the whole community. His method, however, was not the same with all; but whenever he found any who thought so highly of themselves on the account of their talents as to despise instruction, he would endeavour to convince them, that of all mankind *they* stood in the greatest want of it: like to the high bred horse, which having more strength and courage than others, might be made for that very reason of so much the more use, if properly managed; but, neglected while young, becomes thereby the more vicious and unruly. Also those dogs which are of the nobler kind: these, being trained to it, are excellent in the chase; but, left to themselves, are good for nothing. And it is the same, would he say, with respect to men; such of them to whom Nature hath dealt the most liberally, to whom she hath given strength of body and firmness of mind, as they can execute with greater readiness and facility whatever they engage in, so they become more useful than others, and rise to nobler heights of virtue, if care is taken to give them a right turn: but, this not being done, they excel only in vice; and become, by the means of

these very talents, more hurtful to society : for, through ignorance of their duty, they engage in a bad cause, and make themselves parties in evil actions ; and, being haughty and impetuous, they are with difficulty restrained and brought back to their duty ; so that many and great are the evils they occasion.

As to those men who relied upon their riches, and imagined they stood in no need of instruction, as their wealth would be sufficient to supply all their wants, and procure them every honour : these Socrates would endeavour to reduce to reason, by showing how foolish it was to imagine they could of themselves distinguish between things that were useful, and those which were hurtful, without having first been shown the difference. Or, wanting this power of discriminating, still vainly supposed, that because they could purchase the things they had a mind to, they could therefore perform whatever would be to their advantage ; or, if not, could yet live safe and easy, and have all things go well with them. “ Neither was it,” he said, “ less absurd in them to suppose that wealth could supply the want of knowledge, and make the possessor of it pass for a man of abilities ; or at least procure for him that esteem which is only acquired by true merit.”

CHAP. II.

BUT, on the other hand, when he met with any who valued themselves on account of their education, concluding they were qualified for every undertaking; we see the method Socrates took to chastise their vanity, from the manner in which he treated Euthedemus, surnamed the Fair.—This young man having collected many of the writings of the most celebrated poets and sophists, was so much elated by it, as to fancy himself superior to any other of the age, both in knowledge and abilities; and doubted not to see himself the very first man in Athens, whatever the business; whether to manage the affairs of the state, or harangue the people. Being, however, as yet too young to be admitted into the public assemblies, his custom was to go into a bridle cutter's shop, which stood near to the forum, when he had any business depending: which Socrates observing, he also went in thither, accompanied by some of his friends; and one of them asking, in the way of conversation, "Whether Themistocles had been much advantaged by conversing with philosophers; or, whether it were not chiefly the strength of his own natural talents which had raised him so far above the rest of his fellow citizens, as made them not fail to turn their eyes towards him whenever the state stood in need of a person of

uncommon ability?" Socrates, willing to pique Euthedemus, made answer: "It was monstrous folly for any one to imagine, that whilst the knowledge of the very lowest mechanic art was not to be attained without a master; the science of governing the republic, which required for the *right* discharge of it all that human prudence could perform, was to be had by intuition."

Socrates went no further at that time; but plainly perceiving that Euthedemus cautiously avoided his company, that he might not be taken for one of his followers, he determined to attack him something more openly. To this purpose, when he was next along with him; Socrates, turning to some who were present, "May we not expect," said he, "from the manner in which this young man pursues his studies, that he will not fail to speak his opinion even the very first time he appears in the assembly, should there be any business of importance then in debate? I should suppose too, that the proem to his speech, if he begins with letting them know that he hath never received any instruction, must have something in it not unpleasant. 'Be it known to you,' will he say, 'O ye men of Athens! I never learnt any thing of any man: I never associated with persons of parts or experience; never sought out for people who could instruct me: but, on the contrary, have steadily persisted in avoiding all such; as not only holding in abhorrence the being taught by others, but careful to keep clear of every the least suspicion of it: but I am ready, notwithstanding, to give you such advice as chance shall

suggest to me.'—Not unlike the man," continued Socrates, "who should tell the people, while soliciting their voices; 'It is true, gentlemen, I never once thought of making physic my study; I never once applied to any one for instruction; and so far was I from desiring to be well versed in this science, I even wished not to have the reputation of it: but, gentlemen, be so kind as to choose me your physician; and I will gain knowledge by making experiments upon *you*.'

Every one present laughed at the absurdity of such a preface; and Euthedemus, after this, never avoided the company of Socrates: but still he affected the most profound silence, hoping, by that means, to gain the reputation of a modest man. Socrates, desirous to cure him of his mistake, took an opportunity of saying to some of his friends, Euthedemus being present, "Is it not strange, sirs, that while such as wish to play well on the lute, or mount dexterously on horseback, are not content with practising in private as often as may be, but look out for masters, and submit willingly to their commands, as the only way to become proficient and gain fame; the man whose aim is to govern the republic, or speak before the people, shall deem himself aptly qualified for either without the trouble of any previous instruction? Yet surely the last must be owned the most difficult; since, out of the many who force themselves into office, so few are seen to succeed therein; and therefore it should seem, that diligence and study are here the most needful."

By these and the like discourses, Socrates dis-

posed the young man to enter into farther conference, and give him a patient hearing. Which having observed, he took an opportunity of going on a time *alone* into the bridle-cutter's shop, where Euthedemus then was; and sitting down by him—"Is it true," said he, "Euthedemus, that you have collected so many of the writings of those men whom we call wise?"

"Most undoubtedly it is true," replied the other; "neither shall I give over collecting till I have gained as many of them as I well can."

"Truly," said Socrates, "I admire you much for thus endeavouring to accumulate wisdom rather than wealth: for by this, Euthedemus, you plainly discover it to be your opinion, that gold and silver cannot add to our merit; whereas we furnish ourselves with an inexhaustible fund of virtue, when we thus treasure up the writings of these great men."

Euthedemus was not a little pleased with hearing Socrates speak in such a manner; concluding his method of obtaining wisdom had met with approbation; which Socrates perceiving, he continued the discourse.

"But what employment do you intend to excel in, Euthedemus, that you collect so many books?"

Euthedemus returning no answer, as at a loss what to say:

"You perhaps intend to study physic," said Socrates; "and no small number of books will be wanting for that purpose."

"Not I, upon my word."

“Architecture, perhaps, then? and for this too you will find no little knowledge necessary.”

“No, nor that,” replied Euthedemus.

“You wish to be an astrologer, or a skilful geometrician, like Theo?”

“Not at all.”

“Then you possibly intend to become a rhapsodist, and recite verses; for I am told you are in possession of all Homer’s works?”

“By no means,” replied Euthedemus, “will I do this; for however ready these men may be with their verses, it doth not prevent their being thought troublesome, wherever they come.”

“Perhaps you are desirous of that knowledge, my Euthedemus, which makes the able statesman or good economist? which qualifies for command, and renders a man useful both to himself and others?”

“*This*, indeed, is what I sigh for, and am in search of,” replied Euthedemus, with no small emotion.

“Verily!” answered Socrates, “a noble pursuit: for *this* is what we call the *royal* science, as it belongeth in a peculiar manner to kings. But have you considered the matter, Euthedemus, whether it will not be necessary for the man to be *just*, who hopes to make any proficiency therein?”

“Certainly, Socrates; for I know very well, he who is not *just* cannot make even a good citizen.”

“Then you are a just man, Euthedemus?”

“I think I am, as much as any other.”

“Pray say, Euthedemus, may one know when

a just man is engaged in his proper work, as we can when the artist is employed in his?"

"Undoubtedly."

"So that—as the architect, for example, can show us what he is doing; so the just man likewise?"

"Assuredly, Socrates; nor should there be any great difficulty in pointing out what is *just* or *unjust*, in actions about which we are conversant daily."

"Suppose, Euthedemus, we should make two marks; an *A* here, and a *D* there; under which to set down the things that belong to *justice* and *injustice*?"

"You may," replied Euthedemus, "if you think there wants any such method."

Socrates having done this, went on:

"Is there any such thing as lying?"

"Most certainly."

"And to which side shall we place it?"

"To injustice, surely."

"Do mankind ever deceive each other?"

"Frequently."

"And where shall we place this?"

"To injustice still."

"And injury?"

"The same."

"Selling those into slavery who were born free?"

"Still the same, certainly."

"But suppose," said Socrates, "one whom you have elected to command your armies should take

a city belonging to your enemies and sell its inhabitants for slaves?—Shall we say of this man, he acts *unjustly*?”

“ By no means.”

“ May we say he acteth justly?”

“ We may.”

“ And what if, while he is carrying on the war, he deceiveth the enemy?”

“ He will do right by so doing.”

“ May he not likewise, when he ravages their country, carry off their corn and their cattle without being guilty of *injustice*?”

“ No doubt, Socrates; and when I seemed to say otherwise, I thought you confined what was spoken to our friends only.”

“ So then, whatever we have hitherto placed under our letter *D*, may be carried over, and ranged under *A*?”

“ It may.”

“ But will it not be necessary to make a further distinction, Euthedemus, and say, that to behave in such a manner to our enemies is just; but, to our friends, unjust: because to these last the utmost simplicity and integrity is due?”

“ You are in the right, Socrates.”

“ But how,” said Socrates, “ if this general, on seeing the courage of his troops begin to fail, should make them believe fresh succours are at hand; and by this means remove their fears? To which side shall we assign this falsehood?”

“ I suppose to justice.”

“ Or if a child refuseth the physic he stands in

need of, and the father deceiveth him under the appearance of food—where shall we place the deceit, Euthedemus?”

“With the same, I imagine.”

“And suppose a man in the height of despair should attempt to kill himself; and his friend should come and *force* away his sword; under what head are we to place this act of violence?”

“I should think, where we did the former.”

“But take care, Euthedemus, since it seemeth from your answers that we ought not *always* to treat our friends with candour and integrity, which yet we had before agreed was to be done.”

“It is plain we ought not,” returned Euthedemus; and I retract my former opinion, if it is allowable for me so to do.”

“Most assuredly,” said Socrates; “for it is far better to change our opinion, than to persist in a wrong one. However,” continued he, “that we may pass over nothing without duly examining it; which of the two, Euthedemus, appears to you the most unjust; he who deceives his friend wittingly, or he who does it without having any such design?”

“Truly,” said Euthedemus, “I am not certain what I should answer, or what I should think; for you have given such a turn to all I have hitherto advanced, as to make it appear very different to what I before thought it: however, I will venture so far as to declare that man the most unjust who deceiveth his friend designedly.”

“Is it your opinion, Euthedemus, that a man

must learn to be just and good, in like manner as he learneth to write and read?"

"I believe so."

"And which," said Socrates, "do you think the most ignorant, he who writes or reads ill designedly, or he who doth it for want of knowing better?"

"The last, certainly," replied Euthedemus, "since the other can do right whenever he pleases."

"It then follows that he who reads ill, from *design*, knows how to read well; but the other doth not?"

"It is true."

"Pray tell me," continued Socrates, "which of the two knoweth *best* what justice is, and what he *ought* to do; he who offends against the truth and deceives designedly, or he who does it without having any such design?"

"He, no doubt, who deceives designedly," replied Euthedemus.

"But you said, Euthedemus, that he who understands how to read, is *more* learned than one who does not?"

"I did so, Socrates; and it is certainly true."

"Then he who knows wherein justice consists, is more just than he who knows nothing of the matter?"

"So it seems," said Euthedemus; "and I know not how I came to say otherwise."

"But what would you think of the man, Euthedemus, who, however willing he might be to tell the truth, never tells you twice together the

same thing : but if you ask him about the road, will show you to-day to the east, and to-morrow to the west ; and make the very same sum amount sometimes to fifty, and sometimes to a hundred ; what would you say to this man, Euthedemus ?”

“ That it was plain he knew nothing of what he pretended to know.”

Socrates still went on, and said, “ Have you never heard people called base and servile ?”

“ Frequently.”

“ And why were they so called ? for their ignorance, or knowledge ?”

“ Not for their knowledge, certainly.”

“ What then ? for their ignorance in the business of a brazier ? building a house ? or sweeping a chimney ?”

“ Nor *this*, nor *that*,” replied Euthedemus ; “ for the men who are the most expert in employments of this nature, are generally the most abject and servile in their minds.”

“ It should seem then, Euthedemus, these appellatives only belong to those who are ignorant of what is just and good ?”

“ So I imagine.”

“ Doth it not then follow, that we ought to exert our powers to the utmost, to avoid this ignorance, which debases men so low ?”

“ O Socrates !” cried Euthedemus, with no little emotion, “ I will not deny to you that I have hitherto believed I was no stranger to philosophy, but had already gained that knowledge so necessary for the man who aspires after virtue. What then must be my concern to find, after all

my labour, I am not able to answer those questions which most importeth me to know? And the more, as I see not what method to pursue whereby I may render myself more capable!"

"Have you ever been at Delphos?"

"I have been there twice."

"Did you observe this inscription somewhere on the front of the temple--KNOW THYSELF?"

"Yes, I read it."

"But it seems scarcely sufficient to have read it, Euthedemus: did you consider it? and, in consequence of the admonition, set yourself diligently to find out what you are*?"

"I certainly did not," said Euthedemus; "for I imagined I must know this sufficiently already: and, indeed, it will be difficult for us to know any thing, if we can be supposed at a loss *here*."

"But for a man to know himself properly," said Socrates, "it is scarcely enough that he knows his own name. He who desires to purchase a horse, doth not imagine he hath made the proper trial of his merit, till by mounting him he hath found out whether he is tractable or unruly, strong or weak, fleet or heavy, with every thing else, either good or bad, in him: so likewise we should not say, he knows himself as he ought, who is ignorant of his own powers; or those duties which, as man, it is incumbent upon him to perform."

* "The subject-matter," says Epictetus, "of a carpenter, is wood; of a statuary, brass; and so of the *art of living*, the subject-matter is, each person's *own* life."

“ It must be confessed,” replied Euthedemus, “ that he who knoweth not his own powers cannot be said to know himself.”

“ And yet, who seeth not,” continued Socrates, “ how great the advantage arising from this knowledge; and what misery must attend our mistakes concerning it! For he who is possessed of it, not only knoweth himself, but knoweth what is best for him. He perceiveth what he can and what he cannot do; he applieth himself to the one, he gaineth what is necessary, and is happy; he attempts not the other, and therefore incurs neither distress nor disappointment. From knowing himself he is able to form a right judgement of others, and turn them to his advantage, either for the procuring some good or preventing some evil. On the contrary, he who is ignorant of himself, and maketh a wrong estimate of his own powers, will also mistake those of other men: he knows neither what he wants or undertakes, nor yet the means he maketh use of; so that he not only fails of success, but oftentimes falls into many misfortunes; while the man who sees his way before him, most commonly obtains the end he aims at; and not only so, but secures to himself renown and honour. His equals gladly attend to his counsel and follow his advice; and they who, by wrong management, have plunged themselves into difficulties, implore his help, and found all their hopes of being restored to their former ease, on the prudence of his administration: while they who blindly engage in business, as they choose ill, so they succeed worse; nor is the damage they

then sustain the only misfortune they incur; but they are disgraced for ever; all men ridiculing, despising, or blaming them. Neither doth it fare any thing better with commonwealths themselves," continued Socrates, "when mistaking their own strength, they engage eagerly in war with their more powerful neighbours, which ends either in the ruin of the state, or the loss of their liberty; compelled to receive their laws from the hand of the conqueror."

"Be assured," answered Euthedemus, "that I am now fully convinced of the excellence of the precept which bids us KNOW OURSELVES: but from what point shall the man set out, my Socrates, on so important an inquiry? To inform me of this, is now what I hope from you."

"You know what things are good, what evil, Euthedemus?"

"Certainly," replied Euthedemus; "for otherwise I should know less than the very lowest of our slaves."

"Show me then, I pray you, what you think good; what evil."

"Most willingly," answered Euthedemus; "and truly, I think, the task will not be difficult.—First, then, I count sound health, good; and sickness, evil; and whatever conduces to the one, or the other, are to be estimated accordingly; so that the food and exercise which keeps us in health, we may call good; and that which brings on us sickness and disease, evil."

"But might it not be as well to say, Euthedemus, that health and sickness are both of them

good, when they are the cause of good; and evil, when they are the cause of evil?"

"But when do we see," replied Euthedemus, "that health is the cause of evil; or sickness of good?"

"It is certainly the case," answered Socrates, "when levies are raising for some unsuccessful expedition; or embarkations made, which afterwards suffer shipwreck: for the healthy and the strong being selected on these occasions, they are unhappily involved in the same common misfortune; while the feeble and the infirm remain in safety."

"That is true," replied Euthedemus: "but then, on the other hand, you must own, my Socrates, that the healthful and strong have their share, and that to their no small advantage, in more fortunate undertakings; while the sickly and infirm are entirely excluded."

"These things being so, as indeed they are, sometimes profitable, and sometimes hurtful, we should not do amiss to set them down," said Socrates, "as being in themselves not more good than evil?"

"So indeed it appears," said Euthedemus, "from this way of reasoning: but knowledge, my Socrates, must ever remain an indubitable good; since he who hath knowledge, whatever the business, may certainly execute it with far greater advantage than he who wants it."

"Have you not heard then," said Socrates, "how it fared with the wretched Dædalus, on the account of his excelling in so many different

arts*? This man falling into the hands of Minos, was detained by him in Crete; at once torn from his country, and deprived of his freedom: and when afterwards attempting to escape with his son, he was the cause of the loss of the miserable youth. Neither was he able to secure himself; but being seized by the Barbarians, was compelled to return, again to endure all the evil of slavery."

"I have heard this," replied Euthedemus.

"You know too," continued Socrates, "the unhappy fate of Palamedes, whose praises all men celebrated†: he fell a sacrifice to the envy of Ulysses; and miserably perished, through the insidious artifices of his rival: and how many are now languishing in perpetual bondage, whom the king of Persia caused to be carried away, and still keeps near him, merely on the account of their superior talents?"

"But granting this to be as you say; yet certainly," replied Euthedemus, "we may esteem happiness an undoubted good?"

* He was the most ingenious artist in the world; and hence the proverb *Dædali opera*, when we would commend the curiousness of the workmanship. He invented the saw, the axe, the plummet, the auger, glue, cement, sails, and sail-yards; and made statues, with a device to make the eyes move as if living.

† Palamedes invented four Greek letters, and added them to the other sixteen already invented by Cadmus. He was skilful in astrology, and the first who found out the cause of an eclipse; and brought the year to the course of the sun, and the month to the course of the moon: he was skilful in ordering an army, and introduced the use of the watch-word; both which he took the hint of, as was said, from the conduct and the flying of cranes.

“ We may,” answered Socrates, “ provided this happiness ariseth from such things as are undoubtedly good.”

“ But how can those things which produce happiness, be otherwise than good?”

“ They cannot,” said Socrates, “ if you admit not of the number, health, strength, beauty, riches, fame, and such like.”

“ But we certainly do admit such things into the number,” replied Euthedemus; “ for how are we to be happy without them?”

“ Rather, how are we to be happy *with* them,” returned Socrates, “ seeing they are the source of so many evils? For how often hath a beautiful form been the cause of defilement! How often, from a persuasion of their strength, have men been induced to engage in hazardous undertakings, which overwhelmed them in ruin! How many have sunk into luxury by means of their riches; or fallen into the snares that were insidiously laid for them, by the people whose interest it was to procure their ruin! Even that glory, my Euthedemus, which results from our having well served our country, doth not seldom prove fatal to the man on whom it is bestowed.”

“ If I have then erred, in speaking well of happiness,” replied Euthedemus; “ I know not what it is for which I can yet supplicate the gods.”

“ It may be,” answered Socrates, “ you have not duly considered the matter, from thinking you were already sufficiently acquainted with it. But, (changing the subject,) they tell us, Euthedemus, you are preparing to take upon you the administration of our affairs. Now, since it is

the people who bear sway in Athens, I doubt not your having thoroughly studied the nature of a popular government?"

"You do right not to doubt it."

"Pray tell us, May we understand what a popular government is, without knowing who are *the people*?"

"I should suppose not."

"And who are *the people*?" said Socrates.

"I include under that denomination," replied Euthedemus, "all such citizens as are poor."

"You know those who are so?"

"Certainly."

"And who rich?"

"No doubt of it."

"Tell me then, I pray you, whom you think rich; whom poor?"

"I consider those as being poor, who have not wherewithal to defray their necessary expenses," said Euthedemus; "and I esteem those rich, who possess more than they want."

"But have you not observed, Euthedemus, there are people, who, although they have very little, have not only enough for their necessary expenses, but manage in such a manner as to lay up a part; while others are in want, notwithstanding their large possessions?"

"I own it," said Euthedemus; "and recollect some *princes*, whose necessities have compelled them to deal injuriously by their subjects; even so far as to deprive them of their possessions."

"It will follow then, Euthedemus, that we should place these princes among the poor, and the frugal managers of their little fortune among

the rich, since these may truly be said to live in affluence."

"They may," replied Euthedemus; "for I am not able to support any thing against your arguments: and, indeed, I believe silence for the future will best become me, since, after all, I begin to suspect that I know nothing."

On saying this he hastily withdrew, full of confusion and contempt of himself, as beginning to perceive his own insignificancy. But it was not Euthedemus alone to whom Socrates gave that sort of uneasiness*: many, who were once his followers, had forsaken him on that account, whom Socrates estimated accordingly: but it was otherwise with Euthedemus; his attachment to him after this increased daily, and he thought there was no other way to become a man of business than by conversing with Socrates; so that he never left him unless compelled to it by affairs of the greatest moment: carrying his admiration of him so far as to imitate many of his actions: which Socrates perceiving, he carefully avoided saying whatever might appear harsh or disgusting, but conversed with him freely, and instructed him, without reserve, concerning those things which it most imported him to know and practise.

"The school of a philosopher," says Epictetus, "is a surgery. You are not to go out of it with pleasure but with pain; for you come there not in health: but one of you hath a dislocated shoulder, another an abscess, a third a fistula, a fourth the head-ach: and am I then to sit uttering pretty trifling exclamations, that, when you have praised me, you may go away with the same dislocated shoulder, the same aching head, the same fistula, and the same abscess, that you brought?"—CARTER'S *Epict.*

CHAP. III.

YET was not Socrates ever in haste to make orators, artists, or able statesmen. The first business, as he thought, was to implant in the minds of his followers virtuous principles; since, these wanting, every other talent only added to the capacity of doing greater harm, and more especially to inspire them with piety towards the gods. But seeing many others have already related what they heard him speak upon that subject, I shall content myself with only mentioning in what manner he once discoursed, I being present with Euthedemus, concerning a Providence: for, turning towards him, he said:

“Have you never reflected, Euthedemus, how wonderously gracious the gods have been to men in providing all things useful for them?”

“I cannot say,” replied Euthedemus, “that I ever did.”

“And yet,” continued Socrates, “you want not to be informed how necessary this light is, or that it is the gods who have bestowed it upon us.”

“I do not,” replied Euthedemus; “nor yet that our state would be no better than that of the blind, were we deprived of it.”

“But because we stand in need of rest after our labour, they have likewise given to us the night, as the more proper time to repose in.”

“ They have,” replied Euthedemus; “ and we ought to be most thankful.”

“ But, as the sun by its light not only renders each object visible, but points out the hours of the day to us; for the stars have been ordained, together with the moon, to mark out the time throughout the darkness of the night season; whilst the last is still of farther use to us in regulating the months, and distinguishing the several parts of them.”

“ It is true,” answered Euthedemus.

“ And seeing that nourishment is so necessary for the support of man, observe you not, Euthedemus, how the earth hath been made to produce it for him? The convenient changings of the seasons, all serving to the same purpose? While such the variety and abundance bestowed upon us, as not only secures from the fear of *want*, but gives us wherewithal to indulge even to luxury !”

“ Undoubtedly,” cried Euthedemus, “ this goodness of the gods is a strong proof of their care for man.”

“ And what think you,” continued Socrates, “ of their having given to us water, so useful and even necessary for all the affairs of life? By the means of it the earth produces its fruits, whilst the dews from above carry them on to perfection. It maketh of itself a part of our nourishment, and is of use in the dressing and preparing our food; rendering it not only more beneficial but pleasant. And, seeing our wants of it are evidently so many, how bountiful are the gods who have supplied us with it in such profusion !”

“ A farther proof,” cried Euthedemus, “ of their great regard for man.”

“ Likewise, what shall we say,” continued Socrates, “ to their having provided us with fire, which secures from the cold, dispels the darkness, and is altogether so necessary for carrying on the arts of life, that mankind can produce nothing useful without it. The sun too, Euthedemus; observe you not how, winter being over, it turneth towards us; withering those fruits whereof the season is now past, at the same time that it matures others and brings them to perfection? This service once done, it retires again, that its heat may not annoy us; but having reached that point, beyond which it cannot pass without exposing us to the danger of perishing from its absence, it measureth back its steps to that part of the heavens in which its influence may be of the most advantage. And because we should be unable to bear the extreme, whether of heat or cold, when coming upon us suddenly, how can it otherwise than excite our admiration, when we consider those almost imperceptible degrees, whereby it *advanceth to*, and *retireth from* us: so that we can arrive at the highest point of either, without being, in a manner, at all sensible to the change?”

“ Truly,” said Euthedemus, “ these things put me in some doubt, whether the gods have any other employment than taking care of man. *This*, however, perplexes me; I see these gifts bestowed upon him only in common with other animals!”

“ And see you not,” replied Socrates, “ that

even all these themselves are produced and nourished for the service of man? For what animal, except himself, can turn to its use the hog, the goat, the ox, and the horse, together with the rest that every where surround him? So that it seemeth to me, that man is not more indebted to the earth itself, than to these, his fellow-creatures, whether for the conveniences or necessities of life; since few of us live on the fruits of the earth, but on milk, cheese, and the flesh of other animals; while we break them for our use, and tame them for our service; and receive assistance from them in war, as well as on other occasions."

"I own it," answered Euthedemus; "for although many of these are much stronger than man, yet he is able to make them so far subservient to him as to perform readily whatever he commands."

"Marvellous, likewise, must we acknowledge the goodness of the gods, and worthy of our consideration; inasmuch, as having given to man an infinite number of things, all good in themselves, yet still differing in their nature, they have therefore bestowed upon him a variety of senses, each peculiarly formed for the enjoyment of its proper object. They have likewise endued him with reason and understanding; by the means of which he examineth into those things the senses have discovered to him: he retaineth them in his memory, and findeth out their use; whereby they are made to serve many admirable purposes, both for his ease and security from danger. From the gods likewise it is that we have received the gift

of speech, which enables us to give and receive instruction and pleasure, unite into societies, promulgate laws, and govern communities. And, forasmuch as we are not able to foresee what may happen hereafter, or judge of ourselves what may be the best for us to do, they readily incline to such as seek to them for assistance; declaring by their oracles the things that are to come, and instruct us so to act as may be the most for our advantage."

"But," said Euthedemus, interrupting him, "the gods, my Socrates, deal still more favourably with you, for they stay not to be consulted, but show of themselves what things you ought or ought not to do."

"But that I spake not against the truth in so saying, you yourself shall know, if you wait not, Euthedemus, till the gods become visible; but it sufficeth you to see and adore them in their works, since it is by these alone they choose to manifest themselves to men. Even among all those deities who so liberally bestow on us good things, not one of them maketh himself an object of our sight. And He who raised this whole universe, and still upholds the mighty frame, who perfected every part of it in beauty and in goodness, suffering none of these parts to decay through age, but renewing them daily with unfading vigour, whereby they are able to execute whatever he ordains with that readiness and precision which surpass man's imagination; even he, the supreme God, who performeth all these wonders, still holds himself invisible, and it is only in

his works that we are capable of admiring him. For, consider, my Euthedemus, the sun, which seemeth, as it were, set forth to the view of all men, yet suffereth not itself to be too curiously examined; punishing those with blindness who too rashly venture so to do: and those ministers of the gods, whom they employ to execute their bidding, remain to us invisible: for, though the thunderbolt is shot from on high, and breaketh in pieces whatever it findeth in its way, yet no one seeth it when it falls, when it strikes, or when it retires: neither are the winds discoverable to our sight, though we plainly behold the ravages they every where make; and with ease perceive what time they are rising. And if there be any thing in man, my Euthedemus, partaking of the divine nature, it must surely be the soul which governs and directs him; yet no one considers this as an object of his sight. Learn, therefore, not to despise those things which you cannot see: judge of the greatness of the power by the effects which are produced, and REVERENCE THE DEITY."

"It is very sure," replied Euthedemus, "I shall never be wanting in my acknowledgements to the gods, and it even troubleth me that we cannot make a suitable return for the benefits they have conferred on us."

"Let not this afflict you," replied Socrates. "You know the answer which is given by the oracle at Delphos to those who inquire what they must do to make their sacrifices acceptable?—*Follow*, saith the god, *the custom of your country*. Now *this* is the custom which prevaieth every

where, that each one should offer according to his ability : and therefore, my Euthedemus, what better can we do to honour the gods, and show our gratitude towards them, than by acting in such a manner as they themselves have commanded? Let us however beware lest we fall short of that ability wherewith the gods have endued us ; since this would not be to honour but express our contempt : but, having done all in our power, there is no longer any thing left us whereof to be afraid ; nothing, indeed, which we may not hope for. For, from whom can we reasonably expect the most good, but from those beings who are possessed of the greatest power? Either what better can we do, to secure it to ourselves, than conciliate their favour—but we best conciliate their favour when we obey their commands.”

In this manner did Socrates instruct his followers in their duty to the gods : and forasmuch as all his precepts were ever accompanied with the practice of the purest devotion, he greatly advanced the piety of his friends.

CHAP. IV.

WITH regard to justice :—no one could doubt what were the sentiments of Socrates concerning it ; since all his actions, both public and private, sufficiently declared them. He was always willing

to assist whoever wanted his assistance ; to observe the laws, and to obey the legal commands of the magistrate ; so that, whether in the city or the camp, Socrates distinguished himself above all others, for the readiness and exactness wherewith he executed every order. When it came to his turn to preside in the public assemblies, he would suffer no decree to pass in them which appeared to him contrary to the laws, but stood up alone in defence of them ; opposing, on a time, so violent a tumult of the people, as, I think, none but himself could possibly have withstood ; and when the Thirty imposed upon him things which were unjust, he paid no regard to their injunctions, but continued to discourse with the young men as usual, after the time they had ordered him otherwise ; neither would obey, when they commanded him and three others to bring a certain person to execution, as knowing he had been condemned by them contrary to all law. And whereas it was common for others, when on their trial, to talk much with their judges ; to flatter, and shamefully solicit their favour, which oft-times they procured, in direct opposition to the laws ; Socrates would not avail himself of these arts, however easy it was to have brought himself off by any the smallest compliance with the custom ; but chose rather, as he himself said to those friends who counselled him otherwise, to die, continuing steadfast to the laws, than save his life by such indirect practices.

Now, though Socrates talked to several on that subject, yet I particularly remember a conversation

he once had with Hippias, the Elean, concerning justice. This man, after having been a long time absent from Athens, happened, on his return, to come accidentally to a place where Socrates was talking with some friends, and saying, "That if any one wanted to have a person taught the trade of a carpenter, a smith, or a shoemaker, he need not be at a loss for somebody to instruct him: or, if his horse was to be broke at the bit, or his ox to the yoke, many would be ready enough to undertake them: but, if he wanted to learn how he himself might become a good man, or have a son, or any other of his family made so, it was not an easy matter to find out whom to apply to."

Hippias having heard this, said to him jeeringly, "What, Socrates! still saying the same things we heard you say before I left Athens?"

"I am," replied Socrates; "and, what is still more wonderful, on the same subject; but you, Hippias, being so very learned, may perhaps do otherwise."

"You are in the right," said Hippias, "for I always endeavour to say something new."

"Is it possible!" said Socrates. "But pray," continued he, "suppose you were asked how many letters there were in my name, and what they were called, would you sometimes say one thing, and sometimes another? And would you not always answer, when asked, that five and five made ten?"

"As to such things," said Hippias, "I certainly should say the same as you; but we are now talking of justice, or the rule of right and

wrong; and I think I have now something to say concerning it, as can hardly be controverted either by you or any other."

"By the gods," replied Socrates, "the discovery will be most useful! The standard of right and wrong once fixed, all difference of opinion among the judges, all sedition among the people, all lawsuits between citizens, all wars and contentions among communities, must be at an end! And truly it would grieve me to leave you, Hippias, without knowing what this inestimable secret may be that you say you have discovered."

"But it is certain," said Hippias, "you will not know it without first telling us your sentiments concerning justice, or this rule of right: for you content yourself, Socrates, with asking questions, and afterwards confuting the answers that are made you, in order to turn those who make them into ridicule; but never advance any thing of your own, that you may not be called upon to support your opinion."

"How!" said Socrates; "perceive you not that I am continually demonstrating to the world my sentiments concerning justice?"

"And in what manner do you demonstrate them?" said Hippias.

"By my actions," replied Socrates; "at least as much deserving of credit as words."

"By Jupiter!" said Hippias, "I should fancy somewhat more; for I have heard many declaim loudly in behalf of justice who were all the time very far from being just: but he who is upright in his actions, must necessarily be an upright man."

“ But when have you known me,” said Socrates, “ bearing false witness, or slandering any man? Where was it that I sowed dissension between friends? stirred up sedition in the republic? or practised any other kind of injustice whatsoever?”

“ I cannot say,” answered the other.

“ And do you not think, that to refrain from injustice, is to be just?”

“ Ay, now Socrates,” said Hippias, “ you are endeavouring to get off, and care not to give us your opinion freely; for you only tell us what a just man should not do, but not one syllable of what he should.”

“ I thought,” replied Socrates, “ that a voluntary forbearance of all injustice was sufficient to denominate a person just; but, if it seemeth not so to you, Hippias, let us see if this will satisfy you better: I say then, that justice is no other than a due observance of the laws.”

“ Do you mean, that to be just, and to live agreeably to the laws, is the same thing?”

“ I do.”

“ I cannot comprehend you.”

“ Know you the laws of the city?”

“ Certainly.”

“ And what are they?”

“ Those things,” said Hippias, “ which the people ordain in a public assembly, after having agreed what ought or ought not to be done.”

“ Then he who lives in the republic according to these ordinances, lives according to the laws? and he who doth otherwise, must be deemed a transgressor?”

“ He must.”

“ And is not he who obeys these ordinances just? he who doth not obey them, unjust?”

“ Undoubtedly.”

“ But he who doth that which is just, is just: he who doth that which is unjust, unjust.”

“ It cannot be otherwise.”

“ Therefore,” said Socrates, “ they who observe the laws, are just; they who do not observe them, unjust.”

“ But,” said Hippias, “ what good can there be in obeying the laws; or even in the very laws themselves, when we see those who make them not only continually altering them, but even oft-times abrogating them wholly?”

“ Do not cities make war, and then again peace, with one another?”

“ They do.”

“ But may you not as well laugh at your enemies,” said Socrates, “ for putting themselves in a posture of defence in time of war, because a time of peace will come; as blame those who observe the laws, because they may afterwards happen to be abrogated? Besides, by so doing, you condemn all those who nobly expose their lives in the service of their country. And, farther—Can you suppose,” continued he, “ that Lycurgus could have brought the republic of Sparta to excel all others, if he had not wrought into the very minds of his citizens a strict observance of his laws? And are not they who show themselves the most diligent and active to secure this observance, always considered as the best magistrates, seeing it is the

certain way to render that city not only the most happy in time of peace, but by far the most formidable in time of war? Neither can you want to be informed," said Socrates, "of the benefits arising to the state from unanimity, since the people are daily exhorted thereto: and, even throughout all Greece, it is every where the custom to tender an oath to each person, whereby he engages to live in concord with his fellow-citizens. Now this is not done, as I suppose, for this purpose only, that all should be of the same opinion concerning the choruses; admire the same actor; praise the same poet; and delight in the same pleasures; but obey the same laws, as being what alone can give security, strength, and happiness to any nation: a concord," said he, "of that necessity, that not only states but private families cannot be well governed where it is wanting. For, with regard to our conduct, considered as individuals, what better means can we employ to avoid the incurring public punishment? what better for the procuring public honours and rewards, than a careful and steady observance of all the laws? What so likely to gain a process in our favour, when we have lawsuits depending before any of our tribunals? To whom do we intrust with equal confidence, our wealth, our sons, and our daughters? or even the whole city deem so deserving of their credit? Who is he that so faithfully dischargeth what he oweth to his father, to his mother, to his relations, to his domestics, to his friends, to his fellow-citizens, to foreigners? With whom would our enemies rather leave their

hostages during the truce; or more readily depend upon for the punctual performance of the articles of peace; or more desire to join with in strict alliance? Or to whom do our confederates rather intrust the command of their armies, or the government of their fortresses, than to the man who is careful not to infringe the laws? From whom can they, who bestow favours, be so sure of receiving the proper acknowledgements? And, consequently, to whom should we rather choose to show courtesy and kindness, than to him who is ever ready to confess the obligation? In short, who is there we should more earnestly desire for a friend, or less wish for an enemy, than he whom few would willingly offend; while many strive to obtain his favour? Now these, Hippias, are the advantages that accrue to us from a careful and diligent observance of the laws: but, with me, to be an observer of the laws, and to be just, imply the same thing. If it appears otherwise to you, show us, I beseech you, what may be your opinion."

"Truly," answered Hippias, "I do not see that what you have said of justice is at all different to my own notions of it."

"Have you never heard," continued Socrates, "of certain laws that are not written?"

"You mean such as are in force everywhere?"

"True:—Did all mankind concur in making them?"

"Impossible; since all mankind could not assemble in one place; neither would all have spoken the same language."

“ Whence then do you suppose we had them ? ”

“ From the gods, I should imagine ; for the first command every where is, TO ADORE THE GODS. ”

“ And is it not, likewise, as universally commanded, THAT PARENTS ARE TO BE HONOURED ? ”

“ It is. ”

“ And, THAT THEY OUGHT NOT TO MARRY WITH THEIR CHILDREN ? ”

“ But this last,” said Hippias, “ doth not seem to be from the gods. ”

“ And why not ? ”

“ Because,” replied Hippias, “ I see some who transgress it. ”

“ Neither, perhaps, do they observe the other better ; nevertheless,” continued Socrates, “ it ought always to be remembered, that no one ever violates the laws of the gods with impunity ; the punishment being ever annexed to the commission of the crime ; whereas means are often found to elude by fraud, or escape by force, the penalties incurred for the breach of such laws as are only of human institution. ”

“ But what is this punishment,” said Hippias, “ which you say is not to be avoided by those who marry with their own children ? ”

“ The greatest of any : for what can be worse than not to have *good* children ? ”

“ And from whence do you infer that such must necessarily have bad children ; since, if parents are good themselves, what should hinder their having good children ? ”

“ It is not enough,” said Socrates, “ that parents are virtuous ; they ought both of them to be in

the perfection of their age, if they would have their children such as they wish them. For do you suppose, Hippias, that children produced by parents not yet arrived to a state of maturity, or by such as are already past it, can be compared with the offspring of those who are in the prime of life and perfection of their nature?"

"I suppose they cannot."

"And which do you take to be the best?"

"Those, no doubt," said Hippias, "whose parents are in the perfection of their nature."

"Then children produced by such as are not yet arrived to a state of maturity, or are now far past it, are not good, or such as we desire to have them?"

"So it seemeth."

"People, then, who are under either of these circumstances, ought not to have children?"

"They ought not."

"Those, therefore," said Socrates, "who indulge themselves in this disorderly manner, what can they else than produce a miserable offspring?"

"They cannot, Socrates; for even in this point I am ready to agree with you."

"But what think you, Hippias; is not this also an universal law, THAT WE SHOULD DO GOOD TO THOSE WHO DO GOOD TO US?"

"Certainly."

"Yet it is transgressed by many," said Socrates: "howbeit they go not unpunished any more than the other, since thereby they lose their most valuable friends, and follow those who must hate them: for are not they, Hippias, our most

valuable friends from whom we receive the most essential acts of kindness? But he who neglects to acknowledge the kindness of his friends, or returns it with evil, must be hated for his ingratitude; yet, because of the advantages he still hopes to receive, he continues to pursue those who shun him, and this with the meanest, most servile assiduity."

"Assuredly," said Hippias, "these things are of the gods! For when I consider every breach of these laws, as carrying along with it the punishment of the transgressor, I cannot but allow them to proceed from a more excellent legislator than is to be found among the sons of men."

"But what think you, Hippias; do the gods make laws that are unjust?"

"So far from it," said Hippias, "that I believe it almost impossible for any but the gods to make such as are perfectly otherwise."

"Then certainly," replied Socrates, "the gods themselves show to us, that to OBEY THE LAWS, and to be JUST, is the same thing."

After this manner would Socrates reason concerning justice: and his actions being at all times conformable to his words, he daily increased the love of it in the minds of all his followers.

CHAP. V.

I SHALL next relate the arguments which Socrates employed in order to make his hearers *able* to practise what was right: and being of opinion that temperance was absolutely necessary for the well performance of any thing excellent; and having, in the first place, shown by his manner of living how far he surpassed all others in the exercise of this virtue, he endeavoured by his discourses, as well as by his example, to excite his friends to the practice of it. And as all his thoughts were only bent on the improvement of mankind, he never lost an opportunity of introducing into his conversation whatever he supposed might conduce to that end: and it was to this purpose that he once talked, as I remember, to Euthedemus in the following manner:

“Is it your opinion,” said he to him, “that liberty is a fair and valuable possession?”

“So valuable,” replied Euthedemus, “that I know of nothing more valuable.”

“But he who is so far overcome by sensual pleasure, that he is not able to practise what is the best, and consequently the most eligible, do you count this man free, Euthedemus?”

“Far from it,” replied the other.

“You think then,” said Socrates, “that freedom consists in being *able* to do what is right;—

slavery, in *not* being able; whatever may be the cause that deprives us of the power?"

"I do, most certainly."

"The debauchee, then, you must suppose in this state of slavery?"

"I do; and with good reason."

"But doth intemperance," Euthedemus, "only withhold from acting right? Or doth it not frequently urge us on to the practice of what is evil?"

"I believe it may do both," said Euthedemus.

"And what should you say to a master, who not only opposes your applying yourself to any one thing commendable, but obliges you to undertake many that must bring on you dishonour?"

"I should esteem him the worst in the world," replied Euthedemus.

"And what the worst servitude?"

"To serve such a master."

"Then it should follow," said Socrates, "that he who is intemperate, is the very lowest of all slaves?"

"I believe it," said Euthedemus.

"Doth not intemperance," continued Socrates, "rob us of our reason; that chief excellence of man! and drive us on to commit the very greatest disorders? Can he, who is immersed in pleasure, find time to turn his thoughts on things that are useful? But, and if he could, his judgement is so far overborne by his appetites, that, seeing the right path, he deliberately rejects it. Neither," continued Socrates, "should we expect modesty in such a character; it being most certain, that

nothing can well stand at a greater distance from this, than the whole life of the voluptuary."

"That is certain," replied Euthedemus.

"But what can be so likely to obstruct either the practice or the knowledge of our duty as intemperance? What can we suppose so fatally pernicious to man, as that which depriveth him of his understanding; makes him prefer with eagerness the things that are useless; avoid, or reject, whatever is profitable; and act in every respect so unlike a wise man?"

"Nothing, that I know of," said Euthedemus.

"Must not temperance produce the very contrary effects?"

"Most assuredly."

"But whatever produceth the contrary effects should be good?"

"No doubt of it."

"Then temperance must be deemed so?"

"I own it," said Euthedemus.

"But have you thoroughly considered this point, Euthedemus?"

"What point do you mean?"

"That, however intemperance may promise pleasure, it can never bestow any; for this must be the gift of temperance and sobriety."

"But why not?" answered Euthedemus.

"Because the intemperate will not endure thirst and hunger; nor submit to any other want of Nature; without which, however, no pleasure can arise from any sensual gratification; neither is it possible for that sleep to be sweet, which is not preceded by some degree of watchfulness: there-

fore, my Euthedemus, intemperance must ever be a stranger to the delight which arises from those actions, which are not only necessary, but of daily use; while the temperate man, ever willing to await the call of Nature, enjoys them to the full, and tastes pleasures that satiety cannot know."

"I believe it," replied Euthedemus.

"Furthermore," continued Socrates; "it is this virtue alone, Euthedemus, which places both the body and the mind in their utmost degree of perfection; qualifying the man for the study, the knowledge, and the practice of his duty; whereby he is enabled to govern his house prudently; serve his country and his friends usefully; conquer his enemies gloriously. Neither are they the many benefits arising from such a conduct, that alone recommend it; the consciousness of being thus employed, must yield perpetual complacency and satisfaction: but it is a complacency and satisfaction which belongeth not to the voluptuous: indeed, whom do we find at a greater distance from these, than the man whose every faculty is so entirely engaged in the pursuit of present pleasure, as to leave him no liberty for the performance of what is commendable."

"One would suppose," said Euthedemus, "from your manner of speaking, that no one virtue can belong to those who suffer themselves to be led away by sensual gratifications."

"And where is the difference," said Socrates, "between him who, staying not to examine what is the best, eagerly rushes to seize what seems pleasant; and the wolf, or the sheep, or any other

animal void of reason? But it is the temperate alone, my Euthedemus, who are able to inquire into the nature of things, and find out their difference; and carefully consulting both reason and experience, can select what is good; reject what is evil; and become by that means both wise and happy."

Socrates likewise added, that by a constant exercise of this discriminating power, men were taught to reason well: and that the term conference, given to their assemblies, implied, that the very *end* of their meeting was in order to examine into the nature of things, and class them properly: and he advised his followers to the frequent holding of these conferences; saying, "It would be the best means to mature their judgement; making them thereby truly great, and capable of governing both themselves and others*."

* Socrates in this place lays the greatest stress on dialectic, that is to say, that species of logic which is exercised in society and conversation by reciprocal questioning and answering; where, through the joint endeavours of the parties conversing, truth is distinguished from falsehood, and the former established, the latter rejected. The whole of the work here translated is an exemplification of this practice, as are also the dialogues of Plato, who learnt it, as well as Xenophon, from their common great master, Socrates.

As for the etymology, it appears that Socrates derived διαλέγεσθαι, the verb middle, signifying *to discourse together upon a subject*, from διαλέγειν, the verb active, signifying *to separate and distinguish, because in discourse things were distinguished according to the several kinds or genera*. For the truth of this assertion we may refer (as we have already) to the whole of this work, and in particular to the chapter following, where, by the help of this *distinctive* or *dialectic* process, we may find the nature and essence of many beings traced out and ascertained.—Mr. HARRIS.

CHAP. VI.

I SHALL next endeavour to explain in what manner Socrates improved his friends in this method of reasoning.

“Now, he always held, that whoever had acquired clear ideas himself, might, with equal clearness, explain those ideas: but it was no marvel, he said, if such as were deficient in that particular, should not only be led into error themselves, but mislead others. He therefore was never weary of conferring with his friends, and searching out wherein the peculiar property of all things consisted: but, as it would be difficult to relate the various subjects he endeavoured to explain, I shall mention no more than what I think may be sufficient to make his method of reasoning plainly appear: and, in the first place, he thus inquired into the nature of piety:—

“Can you tell us,” said he, “Euthedemus, what piety is?”

“A most excellent thing,” replied the other.

“And what a pious man?”

“One who serveth the gods,” answered Euthedemus.

“But, may every one serve them in what manner he pleaseth?”

“Not so, assuredly,” said Euthedemus, “since there are certain laws; and according to these laws we ought to serve them.”

“ He, then, who observeth these laws,” said Socrates, “ shall *know* in what manner he ought to serve the gods?”

“ So I imagine.”

“ But he who *knoweth* the way of serving them, will he prefer any other to that he *knoweth*?”

“ I suppose not.”

“ Will he not rather be careful,” said Socrates, “ *not* to serve them, contrary to what he *knoweth*?”

“ He will.”

“ The man then,” Euthedemus, “ who *knoweth* the laws that are to regulate his conduct in serving of the gods, will serve them according to these laws?”

“ No doubt.”

“ And he who serveth them according to these laws, will serve them as he *ought*?”

“ He will.”

“ But he who serveth them as he *ought*, is pious?”

“ Assuredly.”

“ Then he who *knoweth* how he ought to serve the gods, may rightly be defined a pious man*?”

* How sophistical is this way of reasoning; and how pernicious the notion it is endeavouring to establish! But I can no way so effectually show the ill tendency of it, as in borrowing, for the purpose, the words of one who will ever be, not only a credit to her sex, but an honour to her country. “ The most ignorant persons,” says Mrs. Carter, in one of her notes on Epictetus, “ often practise what they know to be evil; and they who voluntarily suffer, as many do, their inclinations to blind their judgement, are not jus-

“ So it seemeth.”

“ But tell me,” added Socrates; “ are we at liberty to behave towards each other in what manner we please?”

“ Not so,” answered Euthedemus: “ there are also certain laws to be observed by us with regard to men.”

“ And do they who live together according to these laws, live as they ought to do?”

“ One can suppose no other.”

“ And he who lives as he ought to live, treats mankind *properly*?”

“ He does.”

“ And they who treat mankind *properly*, execute *properly* all human affairs?”

“ One should suppose so.”

“ * But do you believe, Euthedemus, there are any who obey the laws, without *knowing* what the laws enjoin?”

“ I do not believe there are any.”

“ But when a man *knows* what he ought to do, will he think he ought to act otherwise?”

“ I do not imagine he will.”

tified by following it. The doctrine of Epictetus therefore, here, and elsewhere on this head, contradicts the voice of reason and conscience. Nor is it less pernicious than ill grounded: it destroys all guilt and merit; all punishment and reward; all blame of ourselves or others; all sense of misbehaviour towards our fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that such philosophers did not teach repentance towards God.”—Page 62.

* As the Greek text, in this part, is somewhat confused, the translation follows Mr. Charpentier.

“Then such men as *know* the laws to be observed by mankind in their dealings with each other, will observe them?”

“They will.”

“And those who observe to do what the laws command, do that which is just?”

“They do,” replied Euthedemus.

“But those who act justly, are just?”

“There are no other,” said Euthedemus, “who can be so.”

“May we not be said, then, to make a right definition, when we call *them* just who *know* the laws which mankind ought to observe, in their commerce with one another?”

“It seems so to me,” said Euthedemus.

“And what shall we say of wisdom, Euthedemus? Is it in regard to things they *know*, or do *not* know, that men are *wise*?”

“Certainly on the account of what they do *know*,” said Euthedemus; “for how can any one be *wise*, as to things which he understands not?”

“Then it is on account of their *knowledge* that men are wise?”

“Most certainly.”

“But wisdom is nothing else but the being wise?”

“It is not.”

“Consequently,” said Socrates, “*knowledge* is wisdom?”

“I grant it,” said Euthedemus.

“But do you think,” continued Socrates, “that any one man is capable of knowing all things?”

“No ; nor the thousandth part,” returned Euthedemus.

“Then it is impossible for him to be wise in all things?”

“It is.”

“It must follow, then, that no one is wise but in such things as he knoweth?”

“Certainly.”

“But can we, Euthedemus, discover the nature of *good*, by this, our present method of trying and comparing things?”

“What do you mean?” said Euthedemus.

“Is one and the same thing useful for all men, and to every purpose?”

“No, certainly.”

“It may then be useful to one man, and hurtful to another?”

“It may, assuredly.”

“Then, to constitute any thing good, it must be found useful?”

“It must.”

“Consequently,” replied Socrates, “that which is useful, is good for him to whom it is useful?”

“I own it.”

“And *beautiful*, Euthedemus ; may we not determine the same concerning *this*? for we cannot say of a body or vessel, of what kind soever, that it is beautiful with regard to *every* purpose.”

“We cannot.”

“Perhaps you would say then,” continued Socrates, “that it is beautiful with respect to that particular thing for which it is proper?”

“ I would.”

“ But that which is beautiful on the account of its being well suited to one thing; is it also beautiful with respect to every other?”

“ Not at all.”

“ Then, whatever is well suited, is beautiful with regard to that thing to which it is well suited?”

“ It is so,” said Euthedemus.

“ Also, courage, Euthedemus; do you look upon courage as any thing excellent?”

“ Most excellent,” answered Euthedemus.

“ Is it of much use on occasions of little moment?”

“ The advantage of it,” said Euthedemus, “ is chiefly in things of importance.”

“ Is it of service to us,” said Socrates, “ not to see our danger?”

“ I think not.”

“ But not to be frightened when we see no danger, is scarcely being valiant?”

“ It is not,” said Euthedemus; “ for, otherwise, there are madmen, and even cowards, who might be called brave.”

“ And what are they,” continued Socrates, “ who fear, where there is nothing to be feared?”

“ These I should think at a greater distance from courage than the other.”

“ They, therefore, who show themselves brave when sensible of their danger, are valiant; those who act otherwise, cowardly?”

“ It is true.”

“ But do you think, Euthedemus, any one can

behave as he *ought*, if he *knows* not in what manner he *ought* to behave?"

"I should imagine not."

"And are not they who behave ill, and they who know not how to behave, the same people?"

"I believe they are."

"Doth not every man behave as he thinks he ought to behave?"

"Certainly."

"Can we say, then, that he who behaves ill, *knows* in what manner he ought to behave?"

"We cannot."

"But he who *knows* how to behave as he ought, *doth* behave as he ought?"

"He is the only man," said Euthedemus, "who can do it."

"We will conclude then our discourse, my Euthedemus, with saying, That he who *knows* how to behave properly, in all cases of difficulty and danger, is brave; he who *knows* it not, a coward."

"I agree with you entirely," replied Euthedemus.

Socrates used to say, "That a regal government, and a tyranny, were each of them of that species of dominion which is called monarchical, but differed in this particular,—that the submission of men under a regal government was altogether voluntary, and nothing could be done in it which was not agreeable to the laws: whereas, under a tyranny, the people were compelled to obey; the will of the prince being the sole standard of the laws." As to the other forms of government, he would say, "That when the chief offices of the

commonwealth were lodged in the hands of a small number of the most eminent citizens, it was called an aristocracy; when with the richest, elected on account of their riches, a plutocracy; and when the whole people were admitted indifferently into power, this," he said, "was a democracy."

Now, when any one showed himself of a different opinion to Socrates, without producing a sufficient reason for his dissenting; as when, for example, on his commending any one, the preference was given to some other, as more valiant, or better skilled in the affairs of the administration; his custom was, to carry back the argument to the very first proposition; and, from thence, set out in the search of truth; saying to them, "You assert then, that the man whom you speak well of, is a far *better citizen* than he whom I recommend?" And being answered, "It was true:"—"We may not do amiss then," said Socrates, "to examine, first of all, what the office of a *good citizen* is, and what the man should be, who gains to himself the esteem of the republic."

"It is right," answered the other.

"If the affair, then, relates to the management of the treasury, I suppose it must be one who, during his administration, is the most careful of the public money? If to war, then he who renders his country victorious over its enemies will be held in the highest estimation?"

"Undoubtedly."

"When treaties are forming, should not he who, by his address, gains over to the interest of

the republic those who before were its enemies, be the most sure of our approbation?"

"He should."

"And, with regard to the business carried on in our public assemblies; to calm sedition, break cabals, and restore concord and unanimity, should best show the *good citizen*?"

This likewise being granted, and application made of these several particulars to the point in question, the truth shone forth to the acknowledgement of all; even of the very man who before had opposed him. And it was ever his manner, when he intended to examine any thing thoroughly, to begin with such propositions as were self-evident, and universally received; and said, that herein consisted the whole strength of reasoning. Nor have I ever yet known any man who could so readily bring others to admit the truth of what he wished to prove, as Socrates; and he thought Homer only gave Ulysses the appellation of the *irresistible* orator, because he would lead his argument, step by step, through such paths as lay obvious to the eyes of all mankind.

Thus have I, as it seemeth to me, made it sufficiently appear with what sincerity and openness Socrates conversed with his followers, and showed them his sentiments on every occasion.

CHAP. VII.

NEITHER must I omit to mention how solicitous Socrates always showed himself to have his friends become capable of performing their own business, that they might not stand in need of others to perform it for them. For this reason, he made it his study, more than any man I ever knew, to find out wherein any of his followers were likely to excel in things not unbecoming a wise and good man: and in such points as he himself could give them any instruction, he did it with the utmost readiness; and where he could not, was always forward to carry them to some more skilful master. Yet was he very careful to fix the bounds in every science; beyond which, he would say, no person, properly instructed, ought to pass. And, therefore,—in geometry, for example,—he thought it sufficient if so much of it was known as would secure a man from being imposed upon in the buying and selling of land; direct him in the proper distributions of the several portions of an inheritance, and in measuring out the labourer's work: all which, he said, was so easy to be done, that he who applied himself to this science, though almost ever so slightly, might soon find out in what manner to measure the whole earth, and describe its circumference.

But to dive deep into such things, and perplex the mind with various uncouth figures, and hard to be understood, although he himself had much knowledge therein, he approved not of it, as seeing no use in these nice inquiries; which consume all his time, and engross the whole man, taking off his thoughts from more profitable studies. He also advised his friends to gain such a knowledge of astronomy, as to be able to tell by the stars the hours of the night, the day of the month, and the seasons of the year, that they should not be at a loss when to relieve the sentinel, begin a journey or a voyage, or do any other thing which depends on this science: all which, he said, was easily to be learnt by conversing with seafaring men, or those whose custom it was to hunt in the night. But to go farther, in order to find out what planets were in the same declension, explain their different motions, tell their distances from the earth, their influences, together with the time necessary for the performance of their respective revolutions; *these*, and things like *these*, he strongly dissuaded his followers from attempting: not as being ignorant of them himself; but he judged of this science as he did of the former, that to examine deeply into the nature of such things, would rob us of all our time, divert our thoughts from useful studies, and, after all, produce nothing that could turn to our advantage. In short, he would not that men should too curiously search into that marvellous art, wherewith the Maker of the universe had disposed the several parts of it, seeing it was a

subject incomprehensible to the mind of man ; neither yet pleasing to the gods to attempt to discover the things, which they in their wisdom had thought fit to conceal. He also said, “ that the understanding, unable to bear these towering speculations, oftentimes lost itself in the inquiry ; as was the case with Anaxagoras, who gloried not a little in the extent of his knowledge : yet this very man asserted, ‘ that the sun was the same as fire ;’ forgetful that the eye can bear the light of the fire, whereas the lustre of the sun is too dazzling for it to behold. Neither did he consider that the rays of the sun change the skin black, which the fire doth not : as also, that its warmth produces and brings to perfection trees and flowers, and fruits of the earth, while it is the property of the fire to wither and consume them. He said, moreover, ‘ that the sun was no other than a stone thoroughly inflamed ;’ not perceiving,” added Socrates, “ that the stone shineth not in the fire ; neither can remain there any long time without wasting ; whereas the sun abideth still the same, —an inexhaustible source of light and warmth to us.”

Socrates also recommended the study of arithmetic to his friends ; and assisted them, as was his custom, in tracing out the several parts of it, as far as might be useful : but here, as elsewhere, fixed bounds to their inquiries ; never suffering them to run out into vain and trifling disquisitions, which could be of no advantage either to themselves or others.

He always earnestly exhorted his friends to be careful of their health: and, to this end, not only advised them to consult those who were skilful therein, but of themselves to be continually attentive to their diet and exercise; always preferring what would keep them in the best health; since they who did this would seldom, he said, want a better physician. And when he found any who could not satisfy themselves with the knowledge that lay within the reach of human wisdom, Socrates advised that they should diligently apply to the study of divination: asserting, that whoever was acquainted with those mediums which the gods made use of when they communicated any thing to man, should never be left destitute of divine counsel.

CHAP. VIII.

AND now, if any one should be inclined to conclude that Socrates asserted a falsehood, when he declared himself under the guidance of a good genius, seeing he acted in such a manner as to incur the sentence of death: let such a one, I say, consider that he was now already so far advanced in age, that if he died not then, he must die soon after, and that he only relinquished that part of life which is held the most painful, and when

the faculties of the mind are greatly impaired: whereas he now manifested to all the world the strength and vigour of his soul, and gained to himself immortal honour by the manner in which he spake while before his judges. And, indeed, no man was ever known to plead his own cause with that plainness, firmness, and steady regard to truth; at the same time that he received his condemnation with that meekness and magnanimity as altogether surpassed the example of former ages; it being on all hands universally acknowledged, that no man ever met death in like manner as Socrates.

After his sentence he was obliged to live thirty days in prison, the laws forbidding any one to be put to death until the return of the sacred vessel*: during which time his friends conversed with him daily, and saw no change in his behaviour, for he still retained that tranquillity of mind, and pleasing turn of humour, which had made him so justly admired by all mankind. Now, who could give greater proofs of fortitude? Either, what death could be attended with more honour? But the death which is the most honourable is likewise the most happy; and that which is the most happy is best pleasing to the gods.

I shall farther relate what I heard from Hermogenes, the son of Hipponius, concerning So-

* The ship which was sent every year from Athens to Delos, in memory of the victory obtained by Theseus over the Minotaur; when it was forbidden by the laws to put any man to death during the time of its being absent.

crates. This man being along with him, after the time that Melitus had accused him, and observing that he rather chose to discourse on any other subject than the business of the trial, asked, "Whether it was not necessary to be preparing for his justification?" — "And what!" answered Socrates, "suppose you, my Hermogenes! that I have not, throughout life, been preparing for this very thing?" Hermogenes then desiring him to explain his meaning: "I have," said he, "made it the business of my whole life to examine what things were just or unjust; and have as steadily persisted in practising the one and refraining from the other; and *this* I take to be the best way of preparing for my trial." — "But know you not," replied Hermogenes, "that here, in Athens, the judges oftentimes condemn those to death who have no way deserved it, only because their manner of speaking was displeasing; while, on the other hand, they not less frequently acquit the guilty?"

"I do know it," answered Socrates; "and be assured, my Hermogenes, that I did not neglect to take the matter of my defence under consideration,—but the Genius opposed me."

Hermogenes replying, that he talked marvelously: "But why," said he, "should it be marvellous that God should think *this* the very best time for me to die? Know you not that hitherto I have granted to no man that he hath lived either better, or even more pleasurably, than I; if, as I think it is, to be alone solicitous after the attainment of virtue be LIVING WELL; and the con-

sciousness of making some proficiency therein PLEASANT: and that I did make some proficiency therein I well perceived, by comparing myself with others, and from the testimony of my own conscience; my friends also saying the same concerning me. Not for that they love me: since, if so, every friend would think the same of *him* whom he was a friend to; but because, as it seemed to them, they themselves became better men from having much conversed with me. But if my life should be still prolonged, it can hardly be but the infirmities of old age will likewise come upon me: my sight will fail, my hearing grow heavy, and my understanding much impaired; so that I shall find it more difficult to learn, as less easy to retain what I have learnt already; deprived too of the power of performing many of those things which heretofore I have excelled in. And if, after all, I should become insensible to these decays, still life would not be life, but a wearisome burthen. And, if otherwise; if I indeed find and feel them, how unpleasant, how afflicting, must a state like *this* prove! If I die wrongfully, the shame must be *theirs* who put me wrongfully to death: since, if injustice is shameful, so likewise every act of it: but no disgrace will it bring on me, that others have not seen that I was innocent. The examples drawn from former ages sufficiently show us, that those who *commit* wrong, and they who *suffer* it, stand not alike in the remembrance of men: and I am persuaded that, if I now die, I shall be held in far

higher estimation by those who come after me than any of my judges: since posterity will not fail to testify concerning me, that I neither wronged, nor yet, by my discourses, corrupted any man; but, contrariwise, strove throughout life, to the utmost of my power, to make all those who conversed with me HAPPY."

In this manner did Socrates continue to discourse with Hermogenes and others: nor are there any among those who knew him, if lovers of virtue, who do not daily regret the loss of his conversation; convinced how much they might have been advantaged thereby.

As to myself, knowing him of a truth to be such a man as I have described; so pious towards the gods, as never to undertake any thing without having first consulted them: so just towards men, as never to do an injury, even the very slightest, to any one; whilst many and great were the benefits he conferred on all with whom he had any dealings: so temperate and chaste, as not to indulge any appetite, or inclination, at the expense of whatever was modest or becoming: so prudent, as never to err in judging of good and evil; nor wanting the assistance of others to discriminate rightly concerning them: so able to discourse upon, and define with the greatest accuracy, not only those points of which we have been speaking, but likewise of every other; and looking as it were into the minds of men, discover the very moment for reprehending vice, or stimulating to the love of virtue. Experiencing, as I have done,

all these excellencies in Socrates, I can never cease considering him as the most virtuous and the most happy of all mankind. But, if there is any one who is disposed to think otherwise, let him go and compare Socrates with any other, and afterwards let him determine.

END OF THE MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES.

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END OF THE MEMOIRS OF SOCRATES.

THE
BANQUET
OF
XENOPHON.

TRANSLATED BY

JAMES WELWOOD, M. D.

FELLOW OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, LONDON.

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I AM of opinion, that as well the *sayings* as the *actions* of great men deserve to be recorded, whether they treat of serious subjects with the greatest application of mind, or, giving themselves some respite, unbend their thoughts to diversions worthy of them. You will know by the relation I am going to make, what it was inspired me with this thought, being myself present.

During the festival of Minerva, there was a solemn tournament, whither Callias*, who tenderly loved Autolicus, carried him, which was soon after the victory which that youth had obtained at the Olympic games. When the show was over, Callias taking Autolicus and his father with him, went down from the city to his house

* Callias was of the noblest families in Athens, and was sur-named the rich.

at the Piræum *, with Nicerates the son of Nicias.

But upon the way meeting Socrates, Hermogenes, Critobulus, Antisthenes, and Charmides, discoursing together, he gave orders to one of his people to conduct Autolicus and those of his company to his house; and addressing himself to Socrates, and those who were with him, "I could not," said he, "have met with you more opportunely; I treat, to day, Autolicus and his father; and, if I am not deceived, persons who like you have their souls purified† by refined contemplations, would do much more honour to our assembly, than your colonels of horse, captains of foot, and other gentlemen of business, who are full of nothing but their offices and employments."—"You are always upon the banter," said Socrates; "for, since you gave so much money to Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus‡, to be instructed in wisdom, you make but little account of us, who have no other assistance but from ourselves to acquire knowledge."—"Tis true," said Callias, "hitherto I have concealed from you a thousand fine things I learnt in the conversation of those gentlemen; but if you will sup with me this evening, I will teach you all I know, and after

* The sea-port town of Athens.

† Socrates was called the purifying philosopher, because he purified the minds of those he conversed with from vice and errors of education.

‡ Three famous pedants that pretended to teach wisdom; *alias* sophists.

that I do not doubt you will say I am a man of consequence."

Socrates and the rest thanked him with the civility that was due to a person of so high a *rank*, that had invited them in so obliging a manner: and Callias showing an unwillingness to be refused, they at last accepted the invitation, and went along with him. After they had done bathing and anointing, as was the custom before meals, they all went into the eating-room, where Autolicus was seated by his father's side; and each of the rest took his place according to his age or quality.

The whole company became immediately sensible of the power of beauty, and every one at the same time silently confessed, that by natural right the sovereignty belonged to it, especially when attended with modesty and a virtuous bashfulness. Now Autolicus was one of that kind of beauties; and the effect which the sight of so lovely a person produced, was to attract the eyes of the whole company to him, as one would do to flashes of lightning in a dark night. All hearts surrendered to his power, and paid homage to the sweet and noble mien and features of his countenance, and the manly gracefulness of his shape.

It is very certain, that in those who are divinely inspired by some good dæmon there appears something which makes them behold with the strictest attention, and a pleasing astonishment: whereas, those who are possessed by some evil genius or power, besides the terror that appears in their looks, they talk in a tone that strikes horror,

and have a sort of unbounded vehemence in all they say and do, that comes but little short of madness. Thence it is, as it was in this case, that those who are touched with a just and well regulated love discover in their eyes a charming sweetness, in the tone of the voice a musical softness, and in their whole deportment something that expresses in dumb show the innate virtue of their soul.

At length they sat down to supper, and a profound silence was observed, as though it had been enjoined: when a certain buffoon, named Philip, knocked at the door, and bade the servant that opened it tell the gentlemen he was there, and that he came to sup with them; adding, there was no occasion to deliberate whether he should let him in, for that he was perfectly well furnished with every thing that could be necessary towards supping well on free cost, his boy being weary with carrying nothing in his belly, and himself extremely fatigued with running about to see where he could fill his own." Callias understanding the arrival of this new guest, ordered him to be let in, saying, "We must not refuse him his dish;" and at the same time turned his eyes towards Autolicus, to discover, probably, the judgement he made of what had passed in the company with relation to him: but Philip coming into the room, "Gentlemen," said he, "you all know I am a buffoon by profession, and therefore am come of my own accord. I chose rather to come uninvited, than put you to the trouble of a formal invitation, having an aversion to ceremony."—"Very

well," said Callias, "take a place then, Philip, the gentlemen here are full of serious thoughts, and I fancy they will have occasion for somebody to make them laugh."

While supper lasted, Philip failed not to serve them up, now and then, a dish of his profession; he said a thousand ridiculous things; but not having provoked one smile, he discovered sufficient dissatisfaction. Some time after he fell to it again, and the company heard him again without being moved. Thereupon up he got, and throwing his cloak over his head*, laid himself down at his full length on his couch, without eating one bit more. "What is the matter," said Callias; "has any sudden illness taken you?"—"Alas!" cried he, fetching a deep sigh from his heart; "the quickest and most sensible pain that ever I felt in my whole life; for, since there is no more laughing in the world, it is plain my business is at an end, and I have nothing now to do but to make a decent exit. Heretofore I have been called to every jolly entertainment, to divert the company with my buffooneries; but to what purpose should they now invite me? I can as soon become a god as say one serious word; and to imagine any one will give me a meal in hopes of a return in kind, is a mere jest, for my spit was never yet laid down for supper; such a custom never entered my doors.

While Philip talked in this manner, he held his

* The Greeks under any disgrace, threw their mantle over their head.

handkerchief to his eyes, and personated to admiration a man grievously afflicted. Upon which every one comforted him, and promised, if he would eat, they would laugh as much as he pleased. The pity which the company showed Philip having made Critobulus* almost burst his sides, Philip uncovered his face and fell to his supper again, saying, "Rejoice my soul, and take courage, this will not be thy last good meal; I see thou wilt yet be good for something." They had now taken away, and made effusion of wine in honour of the gods, when a certain Syracusan entered, leading in a handsome girl, who played on the flute; another, that danced and showed very nimble feats of activity; and a beautiful little boy, who danced and played perfectly well on the guitar. After these had sufficiently diverted the company, Socrates, addressing himself to Callias, "In truth," says he, "you have treated us very handsomely, and have added to the delicacy of eating, other things delightful to our seeing and hearing."

"But we want perfumes† to make up the treat," answered Callias: "What say you to that?"—"Not at all," replied Socrates; "perfumes, like habits, are to be used according to decency; some become men, and others women; but I would not that one man should perfume himself for the sake of another: and for the women, especially such

* It is thought that by Critobulus the author meant himself.

† It was the custom of the Greeks at great entertainments to perfume their guests, at which they sometimes expended great sums.

as the wife of Critobulus or Nicerates, they have no occasion for perfumes, their natural sweetness supplying the want of them. But it is otherwise if we talk of the smell of that oil that is used in the Olympic games, or other places of public exercise*. This, indeed, is sweeter to the men than perfumes to the women; and when they have been for some time disused to it, they only think on it with a greater desire. If you perfume a slave and a freeman, the difference of their birth produces none in the smell; and the scent is perceived as soon in the one as the other: but the odour of honourable toil, as it is acquired with great pains and application, so it is ever sweet, and worthy of a brave man.”—“This is agreeable to young men,” said Lycon; “but as for you and me, who are past the age of these public exercises, what perfumes ought we to have?”—“That of virtue and honour,” said Socrates.

Lycon. “And where is this sort of perfume to be had?”

Soc. “Not in the shops, I assure you.”

Lycon. “Where then?”

Soc. “Theognis sufficiently discovers *where*, when he tells us in his poem:

“When virtuous thoughts warm the celestial mind
With generous heat, each sentiment’s refin’d;
Th’ immortal perfumes breathing from the heart,
With grateful odours sweeten every part.

* At the Olympic and other games of Greece they rubbed their joints with hot oils, to make them more supple and active.

But when our vitious passions fire the soul,
The clearest fountains grow corrupt and foul;
The virgin springs, which should untainted flow,
Run thick, and blacken all the stream below."

"Do you understand this, my son?" said Lycon to Autolicus.—"He not only understands it, but will practise it too," said Socrates; "and I am satisfied, when he comes to contend for that noble prize, he will choose a master to instruct him, such as you shall approve of, who will be capable of giving him rules to attain it."

Then they began all to reassume what Socrates had said. One affirmed there was no master to be found that was qualified to instruct others in virtue; another said it could not be taught; and a third maintained, that if virtue could not be taught, nothing else could. "Very well," said Socrates; "but since we cannot agree at present in our opinions about this matter, let us defer the question to another opportunity, and apply ourselves to what is before us; for I see the dancing girl entering at the other end of the hall, and she has brought her cymbals along with her." At the same time the other girl took her flute; the one played and the other danced to admiration; the dancing girl throwing up and catching again her cymbals, so as to answer exactly the cadency of the music, and that with a surprising dexterity. Socrates, who observed her with pleasure, thought it deserved some reflexion: and therefore, said he, "This young girl has confirmed me in the opi-

nion I have had of a long time, that the female sex are nothing inferior to ours, excepting only in strength of body, or perhaps steadiness of judgment. Now you, gentlemen, that have wives amongst us, may take my word for it they are capable of learning any thing you are willing they should know to make them more useful to you.”—“If so, sir,” said Antisthenes; “if this be the real sentiment of your heart, how comes it you do not instruct Xantippe, who is, beyond dispute, the most insupportable woman that is, has been, or ever will be?”—“I do with her,” said Socrates, “like those who would learn horsemanship: they do not choose easy tame horses, or such as are manageable at pleasure, but the highest metalled and hardest mouthed; believing, if they can tame the natural heat and impetuosity of these, there can be none too hard for them to manage. I propose to myself very near the same thing; for having designed to converse with all sorts of people, I believed I should find nothing to disturb me in their conversation or manners, being once accustomed to bear the unhappy temper of Xantippe.”

The company relished what Socrates said, and the thought appeared very reasonable. Then a hoop being brought in, with swords fixed all around it, their points upwards, and placed in the middle of the hall, the dancing girl immediately leaped head foremost into it, through the midst of the points, and then out again, with a wonderful agility. This sight gave the company more surprise and fear than pleasure, every one believing

she would wound herself; but she received no harm, and performed her feats with all the courage and assurance imaginable.

“The company may say what they please,” said Socrates; “but, if I am not mistaken, nobody will deny but courage may be learned, and that there are masters for this virtue in particular, though they will not allow it in the other virtues we were just now speaking of; since a girl, you see, has the courage to throw herself through the midst of naked swords, which I believe none of us dare venture upon.”—“Truly,” said Antisthenes, to whom Socrates spoke, “the Syracusan may soon make his fortune, if he would but show this girl in a full theatre, and promise the Athenians that, for a considerable sum of money, he would instruct them to be as little afraid of the Lacedæmonian lances as this girl of her swords.”—“Ah!” cries the buffoon, “what pleasure should I take to see Pisander, that grave counsellor of state, taking lessons from this girl; he that is like to swoon away at the sight of a lance, and says it is a barbarous cruel custom to go to war and kill men.”

After this the little boy danced, which gave occasion to Socrates to say, “You see this child, who appeared beautiful enough before, is yet much more so now, by his gesture and motion, than when he stood still.”—“You talk,” said Carmides, “as if you were inclinable to esteem the trade of a dancing-master.”—“Without doubt,” said Socrates, “when I observe the usefulness of that exercise, and how the feet, the legs, the

neck, and indeed the whole body, are all in action, I believe whoever would have his body supple, easy, and healthful, should learn to dance. And, in good earnest, I am resolved to take a lesson of the Syracusan whenever he pleases." But it was replied, "When you have learned to do all this little boy does, what advantage can it be to you?"—"I shall then dance," said Socrates. At which all the company burst out a laughing: but Socrates, with a composed and serious countenance, "Methinks you are pleasant," said he. "What is it tickles you? Is it because dancing is not a wholesome exercise? or that after it we do not eat and sleep with more pleasure? You know those who accustom themselves to the long foot-race* have generally thick legs and narrow shoulders; and, on the contrary, our gladiators and wrestlers have broad shoulders and small legs. Now, instead of producing such effects, the exercise of dancing occasions in us so many various motions, and agitating all the members of the body with so equal a poise, renders the whole of a just proportion, both with regard to strength and beauty. What reason then can you find to laugh, when I tell you I design to dance? I hope you would not think it decent for a man of my age to go into a public school, and unrobe myself before all the company to dance? I need not do that; a parlour, like this we are in, will serve my turn. You

* Running was a part of the Olympic and other public games; and what is here called the *Dolic*, was the place where they ran, about the length of two English miles.

may see, by this little boy, that one may sweat as well in a little room as an academy, or a public place; and in winter you may dance in a warm apartment; in summer, if the heat be excessive, in the shade. When I have told you all this, laugh on, if you please, at my saying I design to dance. Besides, you know I have a belly something larger than I could wish; and are you surprised if I endeavour to bring it down by exercise? Have you not heard that Carmides, the other morning, when he came to visit me, found me dancing?"—"Very true," said Carmides; "and I was extremely surprised, and afraid you had lost your senses: but when you had given me the same reasons you have now, I went back to my house; and, though I cannot dance, I began to move my hands and legs, and practise over some lessons, which I remembered something of when I was young."

"Faith," said Philip to Socrates, "I believe your thighs and shoulders are exactly of the same weight; so that if you put one into one scale, and the other into the other, as the civil magistrate weighs bread in the market-place, you will not be in danger of being forfeited, for there is not an ounce, no not a grain difference between them."—"Well then," said Callias, "when you have an inclination for a lesson of dancing, Socrates, pray call upon me, that we may learn together."—"With all my heart," answered Socrates.—"And I could wish," said Philip, "that some one would take the flute, and let Socrates and me dance before this good company; for methinks I have a

mighty mind that way." With that he jumped up, and took two or three frisks round the hall, in imitation of the dancing boy and girl. Upon which every body took notice, that all those gestures or motions, that were so beautiful and easy in the little boy, appeared awkward and ridiculous in Philip: and when the little girl, bending backwards, touched her heels with her head, and flung herself swiftly round three or four times like a wheel, Philip would needs do the same, but in a manner very different; for, bending himself forward, and endeavouring to turn round, you may imagine with what success he came off. Afterwards, when every one praised the child for keeping her whole body in the exactest and most regular motion in the dance, Philip bade the music strike up a brisker tune, and began to move his head, his arms, and his heels, all at once, till he could hold out no longer: then throwing himself on the couch, he cried out, "I have exercised myself so thoroughly, that I have already one good effect of it, I am plaguy thirsty: boy, bring the great glass that stands on the sideboard, and fill it up to me, for I must drink."—"Very well," said Callias; "the whole company shall drink, if you please, master Philip, for we are thirsty too with laughing at you."—"It is my opinion too," said Socrates, "that we drink; wine moistens and tempers the spirits, and lulls the cares of the mind to rest, as opium does the body: on the other hand, it revives our joys, and is oil to the dying flame of life. It is with our bodies as with seeds sown in the earth; when they are over-watered

they cannot shoot forth, and are unable to penetrate the surface of the ground: but when they have just so much moisture as is requisite, we may behold them break through the clod with vigour; and pushing boldly upwards, produce their flowers, and then their fruits. It is much the same thing with us; if we drink too much, the whole man is deluged, his spirits are overwhelmed, and is so far from being able to talk reasonably, or indeed to talk at all, that it is with the utmost pain he draws his breath: but if we drink temperately, and small draughts at a time, the wine distils upon our lungs like sweetest morning dew (to use the words of that noble orator Gorgias). It is then the wine commits no rape upon our reason, but pleasantly invites us to agreeable mirth." Every one was of his opinion; and Philip said he had something to offer, which was this: "Your servants," said he, "that wait at the sideboard should imitate good coachmen, who are never esteemed such till they can turn dexterously and quick." The advice was immediately put in practice, and the servants went round and filled every man his glass.

Then the little boy, tuning his guitar to the flute, sung and played at the same time; which gave mighty satisfaction to all the company. Upon this Carmides spoke: "What Socrates," said he, "just now offered about the effects of wine, may, in my opinion, with little difference, be applied to music and beauty, especially when they are found together: for I begin in good earnest to be sensible that this fine mixture buries sorrow,

and is at the same time the parent of love." Whereupon Socrates took occasion to say, "If these people are thus capable of diverting us, I am well assured we are now capable ourselves, and I believe nobody here doubts it. In my judgement, it would be shameful for us, now we are met together, not to endeavour to benefit one another by some agreeable or serious entertainment. What say you, gentlemen?" They generally replied, "Begin then the discourse from which we are to hope so good an effect."—"I hope," said Socrates, "to obtain that favour of Callias, if he would but give us a taste of those fine things he learnt of Prodicus: you know he promised us this when when we came to sup with him."—"With all my heart," said Callias, "I am willing, but on condition that you will all please to contribute to the conversation, and every one tell, in his turn, what it is he values himself most upon."—"Be it so," said Socrates.—"I will tell you then," added Callias, "what I esteem most, and value myself chiefly upon: it is this, that I have it in my power to make men better."—"How so," said Antisthenes; "will you teach them to become rich or honest?"—"Justice is honesty," replied Callias. "You are in the right," said Antisthenes, "I do not dispute it; for though there are some occasions when even courage or wisdom may be hurtful to one's friends or the government, yet justice is ever the same, and can never mix with dishonesty."—"When, therefore, every one of us," says Callias, "has told wherein he chiefly values himself, and is most useful to others, I shall then

likewise make no scruple to tell you by what arts I am able to perform what I told you; that is, to make men better."

Soc. "But, Nicerates, what is the thing that you value yourself most upon?"

**Nic.* "It is that my father, designing to make a virtuous man of me, ordered me to get by heart every verse of Homer; and I believe I can repeat you at this minute the whole Iliad and Odyssey."—

"But you know very well," said Antisthenes, "every public rehearser†, or ballad-singer, does the same at all the corners of the streets."—"I acknowledge it," said Nicerates; "nor does a day pass but I go to hear them."

Ant. "I think them a pack of scandalous wretches: What say you?"

Nic. "I am of your opinion."

Soc. "It is certain they do not know the sense of one verse they recite: but you ‡, who have given so much money to Hesimbrotus, Anaximander, and other wise men, to instruct you in wisdom, you cannot be ignorant of any thing."

"Now it is your turn, Critobulus," continued Socrates: "tell us then, if you please, what it is you value yourself most upon?"—"On beauty," replied he.—"But will you say, Socrates, that yours is such as will help to make us better?"

Soc. "I understand you: but if I do not make

* Nicerates here represents a true pedant.

† These were people who got their livelihood by singing Homer's verses about the streets of Athens.

‡ This is spoken in raillery.

that out anon, then blame me. What says Antisthenes? upon what does he value himself?"

Ant. "I think I can value myself upon nothing in this world equal to that of being rich."

He had scarce done speaking, when Hermogenes took him up, and asked him how much he was worth? "Faith, not one halfpenny," said Antisthenes.

Her. "But you have a good estate in land?"

Ant. "I may perhaps have just as much as may afford dust for Autolicus, the next time he has a mind to wrestle*."

Soc. "Carmides, will you, in few words, acquaint us what it is you value yourself most upon?"

Car. "Poverty."

Soc. "Very well; you have made an excellent choice: it is indeed in itself of an admirable nature; nobody will be your rival; you may preserve it without care, and even negligence is its security. These are not small reasons, you see."

Callias. "But, since you have asked the whole company, may we not inquire of you, Socrates, what it is you value yourself upon?"

When Socrates, putting on a very grave and solemn air, answered coldly, and without hesitation, "I value myself upon *procuring*†." The gravity of the speaker, and the manner of speak-

* The wrestlers at the public games, after they had rubbed themselves with oils, had dust thrown upon them to dry it up.

† I cannot find a softer word in English for the Greek here. Socrates explains himself afterwards.

ing a word so little expected from Socrates, set the whole company a laughing. "Very well, gentlemen," said he, "I am glad you are pleased; but I am very certain this profession of mine, if I apply myself closely to it, will bring in money enough if I pleased."

When Lycon, pointing to Philip; "Well, what say you?"—"You, I suppose, value yourself upon making men laugh?"—"Yes, certainly," said Philip; "and have I not more reason to be proud of myself for this, than that fine spark, Callipides, who is so fond, you know, of making his audience weep, when he recites his verses in the theatre?"—"But, Lycon," said Antisthenes, "let us know what it is you value yourself most upon? What gives you greatest content?"—"You know very well," answered he, "what I esteem the most, and which gives me the greatest pleasure, it is to be the father of such a son as Autolicus."

"And for your son," said some of the company, "he, no question, values himself most upon carrying the prize the other day at the Olympic games?"—"Not so, I assure you," said Autolicus, blushing. And then the whole company turning their eyes with pleasure towards him, one of them asked him, "What is it then, Autolicus, you value yourself most upon?"—"It is," replied he, "that I am the son of such a father; and at the same time turned himself lovingly towards him for a kiss."—Callias, who observed it, said to Lycon, "Don't you know yourself to be the richest man in the world?"—"I cannot tell that," replied Lycon. "And yet

it is true," said Callias, "for you would not change this son of yours for the wealth of Persia."

Lycon. "Be it so; I am then the richest man in the world; nor will I contradict your opinion."

Then Nicerates addressing himself to Hermogenes: "What is it," said he, "that you value yourself most upon?"—"On virtue," answered he, "and the power of my friends: and that, with these two advantages, I have yet the good fortune to be beloved by these friends."

Then every one looking upon him, began to inquire who were his friends?"—"I will satisfy you," said he, "as you shall see, when it comes to my turn."

Then Socrates resumed the discourse: "Now you have all," said he, "declared your opinions, as to what you value yourselves most upon, it remains that you prove it. Let us now then hear every man's reasons, if you please, for his opinion."

"Hear me first then," said Callias; "for though you have all been inquiring what justice is, I alone have found the secret to make men just and honest."

Soc. "How so?"

Call. "By giving them money."

At these words, Antisthenes rising up, asked him hastily, "Is justice to be found in the heart or the pocket?"

Call. "In the heart."

Ant. "And would you then make us believe, that by filling a bag with money, you can make the heart honest or just?"

Call. "Most assuredly."

Ant. "How?"

Call. "Because when they have all things necessary for life, they will not, for the world, run any hazard by committing evil actions."

Ant. "But do they repay you again what they receive of you?"

Call. "Not at all."

Ant. "Nothing but gratitude, I hope; good thanks for good money."

Call. "Not that neither: for I can tell you something you will hardly believe; I have found some people of so evil a nature, that they love me less for receiving benefits from me." Then Antisthenes replied briskly,

Ant. "That is wonderful: you make men just and honest to others, and they prove unjust and dishonest only to you?"

Call. "Not so wonderful neither!"—"Have we not architects and masons, who build houses for other men, and live in hired lodgings themselves?"—"Have patience, my master," said he, (turning to Socrates) "and I will prove this beyond dispute."—"You need not," said Socrates; "for, besides what you allege for a proof, there is another that occurs to me: Do you not see there are certain diviners who pretend to foretell every thing to other people, and are entirely ignorant of what is to happen to themselves. Socrates said no more."

"It is now my turn to speak," said Nicerates*:

* Here Nicerates plays the pedant indeed, as if to be able to repeat Homer was to be truly learned.

“hear then to what I am going to say, attend to a conversation which will necessarily make you better, and more polite. You all know, or I am much mistaken, there is nothing that relates to human life but Homer has spoken of it. Whoever then would learn economy, eloquence, arms; whoever would be master of every qualification that is to be found in Achilles, Ajax, Ulysses, or Nestor; let him but apply himself to me, and he shall become perfect in them, for I am entirely master of all that.”—“Very well,” said Antisthenes, “you have learnt likewise the art of being a king; for you may remember Homer praises Agamemnon for that he was

“A noble warrior, and a mighty prince.”

Nicer. “I learnt too, from Homer, how a coachman ought to turn at the end of his career. He ought to incline his body to the left, and give the word to the horse that is on the right, and make use at the same time of a very loose rein. I have learnt all this from him, and another secret too, which, if you please, we will make trial of immediately: the same Homer says somewhere, that an onion relishes well with a bottle. Now let some of your servants bring an onion, and you will see with what pleasure you will drink.”—“I know very well,” said Carmides, “what he means; Nicerates, gentlemen, thinks deeper than you imagine. He would willingly go home with the scent of an onion in his mouth, that his wife may not be jealous, or suspect he has been kissing abroad.”—“A very good thought,” said Socrates;

“ but perhaps I have one full as whimsical, and worthy of him: it is, that an onion does not only relish wine, but victuals too, and gives a higher seasoning: but if we should eat them now after supper, they would say we had committed a debauch at Callias’s.”—“ No, no,” said Callias, “ you can never think so: but onions, they say, are very good to prepare people for the day of battle, and inspire courage; you know they feed cocks so against they fight: but our business, at present, I presume, is love, not war; and so much for onions.”

Then Critobulus began. “ I am now,” said he, “ to give my reasons why I value myself so much upon my beauty. If I am not handsome (and I know very well what I think of the matter), you ought all of you to be accounted impostors, for without being obliged to it upon oath, when you were asked what was your opinion of me, you all swore I was handsome; and I thought myself obliged to believe you, being men of honour that scorned a lie. If, then, I am really handsome, and you feel the same pleasure that I do when I behold another beautiful person, I am ready to call all the gods to witness, that were it in my choice either to reign king of Persia, or be that beauty, I would quit the empire to preserve my *form*. In truth, nothing in this world touches me so agreeably as the sight of Amandra; and I could willingly be blind to all other objects, if I might but always enjoy the sight of her I so tenderly love.

“ I curse my slumbers, doubly curse the night,
That hides the lovely maid from my desiring sight:

But, oh ! I bless the cheerful god's return,
And welcome with my praise the ruddy morn :
Light with the morn returns, return my fair,
She is my light, the morn restores my dear."

"There is something more in the matter, besides this, to be considered. A person that is vigorous and strong, cannot attain his designs but by his strength and vigour; a brave man by his courage; a scholar by his learning and conversation: but the beautiful person does all this, without any pains, by being only looked at. I know very well how sweet the possession of wealth is, but I would sacrifice all to Amandra; and I should with more pleasure give all my estate to her, than to receive a thousand times more from any other. I would lay my liberty at her feet if she would accept me for her slave; fatigue would be much more agreeable to me than repose, and dangers than ease, if endured in the service of Amandra. If, then, you boast yourself so much, Callias, that you can make men honester by your wealth, I have much more reason to believe I am able to produce in them all sorts of virtue by the mere force of beauty: for when beauty inspires, it makes its votaries generous and industrious; they thereby acquire a noble thirst after glory, and a contempt of dangers; and all this attended with an humble and respectful modesty, which makes them blush to ask what they wish most to possess. I think the government is stark mad, that they do not choose for generals the most beautiful persons in the state: for my part, I would go through fire to follow such a commander, and I believe

you would all do the same for me. Doubt not then, Socrates, but beauty may do much good to mankind; nor does it avail to say beauty does soon fade; for there is one beauty of a *child*, another of a *boy*, another of a *man*. There is likewise a beauty of *old age*, as in those who carry the consecrated branches* at the feast of Minerva; for you know for that ceremony they make choice always of the handsomest *old men*. Now, if it is desirable to obtain without trouble what one wishes, I am satisfied that, without speaking one word, I should sooner persuade that little girl to kiss me than any of you, with all the arguments you can use; no, not you yourself, Socrates, with all the strength of your extolled eloquence.”—“Why,” Critobulus, “do you give yourself this air of vanity,” said Socrates, “as if you were handsomer than me?”—“Doubtless,” replied Critobulus, “if I have not the advantage of you in beauty, I must be uglier than the Sileni†, as they are painted by the poets.” Now Socrates had some resemblance to those figures.

Soc. “Take notice, if you please, that this article of beauty will be soon decided anon, after every one has taken his turn to speak; nor shall we call Paris to make a judgement for us, as he did in the case of the three goddesses about the apple: and this very young girl, who you would make

* These were of the olive-tree, kept sacred in the citadel of Athens; and both old men and old women carried them by turns.

† The Sileni were the fosterfathers of Bacchus, and horridly deformed.

us believe had much rather kiss you than any of us, she shall determine it."

Crit. "And why may not Amandra be as good a judge of this matter?"

Soc. "Amandra must needs have a large possession of your heart, seeing, by your good will, you would never name any other name but hers."

Crit. "True; and yet when I do not speak of her, do you think she lives not in my memory? I assure you, if I were a painter or a statuary, I could draw her picture or statue by the idea of her in my mind, as well as if she were to sit to it."

Soc. "Since then you have her image in your heart, and that image resembles her so strongly, why is it that you importune me continually to carry you to places where you are sure to meet her?"

Crit. "It is because the sight of Amandra only gives me real joy.

"Th' idea does no solid pleasure give,
She must within my sight, as well as fancy, live."

Hermogenes interrupted the discourse; and addressing himself to Socrates, said, "You ought not to abandon Critobulus in the condition he is in, for the violent transport and fury of his passion makes me uneasy for him, and I know not where it may end."

Soc. "What! Do you think he is become thus only since he was acquainted with me? You are mightily deceived; for I can assure you this fire has been kindled ever since they were children.

Critobulus's father having observed it, begged of me that I would take care of his son, and endeavour, if I could, by all means to cure him of it. He is better now ; things were worse formerly : for I have seen, when Amandra appeared in company, Critobulus, poor creature, would stand as one struck dead, without motion, and his eyes so fixed upon her, as if he had beheld Medusa's head ; in-somuch, that it was impossible almost for me to bring him to himself.

“ I remember one day, after certain amorous glances, (this is between ourselves only,) he ran up to her and kissed her ; and Heaven knows nothing gives more fuel to the fire of love than kisses. For this pleasure is not like others, which either lessen or vanish in the enjoyment : on the contrary, it gathers strength the more it is repeated ; and flattering our souls with sweet and favourable hopes, bewitches our minds with a thousand beautiful images. Thence it may be, that to love and to kiss are frequently expressed by the same word in the Greek : and it is for that reason, I think, he that would preserve the liberty of his soul, should abstain from kissing handsome people.”

“ What, then,” said Carmides, “ must I be afraid of coming near a handsome woman ? Nevertheless, I remember very well, and I believe you do so too, Socrates, that being one day in company with Critobulus's beautiful sister, who resembles him so much, as we were searching together for a passage in some author, you held your head very close to that beautiful virgin ; and I thought you seemed to take pleasure in touching her naked

shoulder with yours.”—“ Good God !” replied Socrates, “ I will tell you truly how I was punished for it for five days after : I thought I felt in my shoulder a certain tickling pain, as if I had been bit by gnats, or pricked with nettles : and I must confess too, that during all that time I felt a certain, hitherto unknown, pain at my heart. But, Critobulus, take notice what I am going to tell you before this good company : it is, that I would not have you come too near me, till you have as many hairs upon your chin as your head, for fear you put me in mind of your handsome sister.”

Thus the conversation between these gentlemen was sometimes serious, sometimes in raillery. After this Callias took up the discourse : “ It is your turn now,” said he, “ Carmides, to tell us what reasons you have for valuing yourself so much upon poverty.”—“ I will,” replied Carmides, “ and without delay. Is any thing more certain, than that it is better to be brave than a coward ; a freeman, than a slave ; to be credited, than distrusted ; to be inquired after for your conversation, than to court others for theirs ? These things, I believe, may be granted me without much difficulty. Now, when I was rich, I was in continual fear of having my house broken open by thieves, and my money stolen, or my throat cut upon the account of it. Besides all this, I was forced to keep in fee with some of these petty-fogging rascals that retain to the law, who swarm all over the town like so many locusts. This I was

forced to do, because they were always in a condition to hurt me; and I had no way to retaliate upon them. Then I was obliged to bear public offices at my own charges, and to pay taxes: nor was it permitted me to go abroad for travel, to avoid that expense. But now that my estate, which I had without the frontiers of our republic, is all gone, and my land in Attica brings me in no rent, and all my household goods are exposed to sale, I sleep wonderfully sound, and stretched upon my bed as one altogether fearless of officers. The government is now no more jealous of me, nor I of it; thieves fright me not, and I myself affright others. I travel abroad when I please; and when I please I stay at Athens. What is to be free if this is not? Besides, rich men pay respect to me; they run from me, to leave me the chair, or to give me the wall. In a word, I am now perfectly a king; I was then perfectly a slave. I have yet another advantage from my poverty: I then paid tribute to the republic; now the republic pays tribute to me; for it maintains me. Then every one snarled at me, because I was often with Socrates. Now that I am poor, I may converse with him, or any other I please, without any body's being uneasy at it. I have yet another satisfaction: in the days of my estate, either the government or my ill fortune were continually clipping it: now that is all gone, it is impossible to get any thing of me; he that has nothing, can lose nothing. And I have the continual pleasure of hoping to be worth something again, one time or other."

“Don’t you pray heartily against riches?” says Callias. “And if you should happen to dream you were rich, would you not sacrifice to the gods to avert the ill omen?”—“No, no,” replied Carmides: “but when any flattering hope presents, I wait patiently for the success.” Then Socrates turning to Antisthenes; “And what reason have you,” said he, “who have very little or no money, to value yourself upon wealth?”

Ant. “Because I am of opinion, gentlemen, that poverty and wealth are not in the coffers of those we call rich or poor, but in the heart only: for I see numbers of very rich men, who believe themselves poor; nor is there any peril or labour they would not expose themselves to, to acquire more wealth. I knew two brothers, the other day, who shared equally their father’s estate. The first had enough, and something to spare; the other wanted every thing. I have heard likewise of some princes so greedy of wealth, that they were more notoriously criminal in the search of it than private men: for though the latter may sometimes steal, break houses, and sell free persons to slavery, to support the necessities of life; yet those do much worse: they ravage whole countries, put nations to the sword, enslave free states; and all this for the sake of money, and to fill the coffers of their treasury. The truth is, I have a great deal of compassion for these men, when I consider the distemper that afflicts them. Is it not an unhappy condition to have a great deal to eat, to eat a great deal, and yet never be satisfied?

For my part, though I confess I have no money at home, yet I want none; because I never eat but just as much as will satisfy my hunger, nor drink but to quench my thirst. I clothe myself in such manner that I am as warm abroad as Callias, with all his great abundance. And when I am at home, the floor and the wall, without mats or tapestry, make my chamber warm enough for me. And as for my bed, such as it is, I find it more difficult to awake than to fall asleep in it. If at any time a natural necessity requires me to converse with women, I part with them as well satisfied as another. For those to whom I make my addresses, having not much practice elsewhere, are as fond of me as if I were a prince. But don't mistake me, gentlemen, for governing my passion in this as in other things; I am so far from desiring to have more pleasure in the enjoyment, that I wish it less; because, upon due consideration, I find those pleasures that touch us in the most sensible manner deserve not to be esteemed the most worthy of us. But observe the chief advantage I reap from my poverty; it is, that in case the little I have should be taken entirely from me, there is no occupation so poor, no employment in life so barren, but would maintain me without the least uneasiness, and afford me a dinner without any trouble. For if I have an inclination at any time to regale myself and indulge my appetite, I can do it easily; it is but going to market, not to buy dainties (they are too dear), but my temperance gives that quality to

the most common food; and, by that means, the contentedness of my mind supplies me with delicacies, that are wanting in the meat itself. Now, it is not the excessive price of what we eat that gives it a relish, but it is necessity and appetite. Of this I have experience just now, while I am speaking; for this generous wine of Thasos*, that I am now drinking, the exquisite flavour of it is the occasion that I drink it now without thirst, and consequently without pleasure. Besides all this, I find it is necessary to live thus, in order to live honestly. For he that is content with what he has, will never covet what is his neighbour's. Further, it is certain the wealth I am speaking of makes men liberal. For Socrates, from whom I have all mine, never gave it me by number or weight; but, whenever I was willing to receive, he loads me always with as much as I can carry. I do the same by my friends; I never conceal my plenty. On the contrary, I show them all I have, and at the same time I let them share with me. It is from this, likewise, I am become master of one of the most delightful things in the world; I mean, that soft and charming leisure, that permits me to see every thing that is worthy to be seen, and to hear every thing that is worthy to be heard. It is, in one word, that which affords me the happiness of hearing Socrates from morning to night; for he having no great veneration for those that can only count vast sums of gold and silver, con-

* The noblest vines, that grew in one of the Grecian islands.

verses only with them who he finds are agreeable to him, and deserve his company."—"Truly," said Callias, "I admire you, and these your excellent riches, for two reasons: first, that thereby you are no slave to the government: and, secondly, that no body can take it ill you do not lend them money."—"Pray do not admire him for the last," said Nicerates*; "for I am about to borrow of him what he most values, that is, to need nothing; for by reading Homer, and especially that passage where he says,

"Ten golden talents, seven three-legg'd stools,
Just twenty cisterns, and twelves charging steeds;"

I have so accustomed myself, from this passage, to be always upon numbering and weighing, that I begin to fear I shall be taken for a miser." Upon this they all laughed heartily; for there was nobody there but believed Nicerates spoke what he really thought, and what were his real inclinations.

After this, one spoke to Hermogenes: "It is yours now," said he, "to tell us who are your friends; and make it appear, that if they have much power, they have equal will to serve you with it; and, consequently, that you have reason to value yourself upon them."

Hermog. "† There is one thing, gentlemen, universally received among Barbarians as well as Greeks; and that is, that the gods know both the

* Nicerates was both very rich and very covetous, being the son of Nicias, whose life is written by Plutarch.

† This is one of the noblest periods in all antiquity.

present and what is to come : and for that reason they are consulted and applied to by all mankind, with sacrifices, to know of them what they ought to do. This supposes that they have the power to do us good or evil ; otherwise, why should we pray to them to be delivered from evils that threaten us, or to grant us the good we stand in need of ? Now these very gods, who are both all-seeing and all-powerful, they are so much my friends, and have so peculiar a care of me, that be it night, be it day, whether I go any where, or take any thing in hand, they have me ever in their view and under their protection, and never lose me out of their sight. They foreknow all the events and all the thoughts and actions of us poor mortals : they forewarn us by some secret prescience impressed on our minds, or by some good angel or dream, what we ought to avoid, and what we ought to do. For my part, I have never had occasion yet to repent these secret impulses given me by the gods, but have been often punished for neglecting them.” — “ There is nothing in what you have said,” added Socrates, “ that should look incredible : but I would willingly hear by what services you oblige the gods to be so much your friends, and to love and take all this care of you ? ” — “ That is done very cheap, and at little or no expense,” replied Hermogenes, “ for the praises I give them cost me nothing. If I sacrifice to them after I have received a blessing from them, that very sacrifice is at their own charge. I return them thanks on all occasions ;

and if at any time I call them to witness, it is never to a lie, or against my conscience.”—“ Truly,” said Socrates, “ if such men as you have the gods for their friends, and I am sure they have, it is certain those gods take pleasure in good actions and the practice of virtue.”

Here ended their serious entertainment. What followed was of another kind; for all of them turning to Philip, asked him, “ What it was he found so very valuable in his profession?”—“ Have I not reason to be proud of my trade,” said he, “ all the world knowing me to be a buffoon? If any good fortune happens to them, they cheerfully invite me: but when any misfortune comes, they avoid me like the plague, lest I should make them laugh in spite of themselves.” Nicerates interrupting him, “ You have reason indeed,” said he, “ to boast of your profession, for it is quite otherwise with me: when my friends have no occasion for me, they avoid me like the plague; but in misfortunes they are ever about me, and, by a forged genealogy, will needs claim kindred with me, and at the same time carry my family up as high as the gods.”—“ Very well,” said Carmides, “ now to the rest of the company.”

“ Well,” Mr. Syracusan, “ What is it gives you the greatest satisfaction, or that you value yourself most upon? I suppose it is that pretty little girl of yours?”—“ Quite contrary,” says he; “ I have much more pain than pleasure upon her account: I am in constant apprehension and fear when I see certain people so busy about her, and

trying all insinuating ways to ruin* her.”—“ Good God!” said Socrates, “ What wrong could they pretend to have received from that poor young creature, to do her a mischief? Would they kill her?”

Syr. “ I do not speak of killing her; you do not take me, they would willingly get to bed to her.”

Soc. “ Suppose it were so; why must the girl be ruined therefore?”

Syr. “ Ay, doubtless.”

Soc. “ Do not you lie in bed with her yourself?”

Syr. “ Most certainly, all night long.”

Soc. “ By Juno thou art a happy fellow to be the only man in the world that do not ruin those you lie with. Well then, according to your account, what you are proudest of must be, that you are so wholesome and so harmless a bedfellow?”

Syr. “ But you are mistaken; it is not her I value myself for neither.”

Soc. “ What then?”

Syr. “ That there are so many fools in the world: for it is these kind of gentlemen, who come to see my children dance and sing, that supply me with the necessaries of life, which otherwise I might want.”

“ I suppose then,” said Philip, “ that was the meaning of your prayer you made the other day before the altar, when you asked the gods that there might be plenty of every thing in this world

* The word in the original signifies to kill, to ruin, or to corrupt.

wherever you came, but of judgement and good sense?"

"Immortal beings, grant my humble prayer;
Give Athens all the blessings you can spare;
Let them abound in plenty, peace, and pence,
But never let them want a dearth of sense."

"All is well hitherto," said Callias: "But, Socrates, what reason have you to make us believe you are fond of the profession you attributed to yourself just now, for really I take it for a scandalous one?"

Soc. "First, let us understand one another; and know in few words what this artist is properly to do, whose very name has made you so merry: but, to be brief, let us, in short, fix upon some one thing that we may all agree in. Shall it be so?"—"Doubtless," answered all the company: and during the thread of his discourse they made him no other answer but "Doubtless." Having begun so, "Is it not certainly true*," said Socrates, "that the business of an artist of that kind is to manage so as that the person they introduce be perfectly agreeable to one that employs him?"—"Doubtless," they replied. "Is it not certain, too, that a good face and fine clothes do mightily contribute towards the making such a person agreeable?"—"Doubtless."—"Do you not observe that the eyes of the same person look at

* It was a great advantage that Socrates had in conversation, that his arguments were generally by way of interrogation, by which he argued from the concessions that were made him what he designed to prove.

some times full of pleasure and kindness, and at other times with an air of aversion and scorn?" — "Doubtless." — "What, does not the same voice sometimes express itself with modesty and sweetness, and sometimes with anger and fierceness?" — "Doubtless." — "Are there not some discourses that naturally beget hatred and aversion, and others that conciliate love and affection?" — "Doubtless." — "If, then, this artist be excellent in his profession, ought he not to instruct those that are under his direction which way to make themselves agreeable to others in all these things I have mentioned?" — "Doubtless." — "But who is most to be valued; he who renders them agreeable to one person only, or he that renders them agreeable to many? Are you not for the last?" Some of them answered him as before, with "Doubtless;" and the rest said, it was very plain that it was much better to please a great many than a few. "That is very well," said Socrates; "we agree upon every head hitherto: But what if the person we are speaking of can instruct his pupil to gain the hearts of a whole state; will not you say he is excellent in his art?" This, they all agreed, was clear. "And if he can raise his scholars to such perfection, has he not reason to be proud of his profession? And deserves he not to receive a handsome reward?" Every one answered, it was their opinion he did. "Now," said Socrates, "if there is such a man to be found in the world, it is Antisthenes, or I am mistaken."

Ant. "How, Socrates! Will you make me one of your scurvy profession?"

Soc. "Certainly, for I know you are perfectly skilled in what may properly be called an appendix to it."

Ant. "What is that?"

Soc. "Bringing people together."

To this Antisthenes, with some concern, replied, "Did you ever know me guilty of a thing of this kind?"

Soc. "Yes, but keep your temper. You procured Callias for Prodicus, finding the one was in love with philosophy, and the other in want of money: you did the same before, in procuring Callias for Hippias, who taught him the art of memory; and he is become such a proficient, that he is more amorous now than ever; for every woman he sees, that is tolerably handsome, he can never forget her, so perfectly has he learnt of Hippias the art of memory. You have done yet more than this, Antisthenes; for lately praising a friend of yours, of Heraclea, to me, it gave me a great desire to be acquainted with him: at the same time you praised me to him, which occasioned his desire to be acquainted with me; for which I am mightily obliged to you, for I find him a very worthy man. Praising likewise in the same manner Esquilus to me, and me to him, did not your discourse inflame us both with such mutual affection, that we searched every day for one another with the utmost impatience till we came acquainted? Now, having observed you capable of bringing about such desirable things, had not I reason to say you are an excellent *bringer of people together*? I know very well,

that one who is capable of being useful to his friend, in fomenting mutual friendship and love between that friend and another he knows to be worthy of him, is likewise capable of begetting the same disposition between towns and states: he is able to make state-marriages; nor has our republic or our allies a subject that may be more useful to them: and yet you were angry with me, as if I had affronted you, when I said you were master of this art.

Ant. "That is true, Socrates; but my anger is now over; and were I really what you say I am, I must have a soul incomparably rich."

Now you have heard in what manner every one spoke, when Callias began again, and said to Critobulus, "Will you not then venture into the lists with Socrates, and dispute beauty with him?"

Soc. "I believe not; for he knows my art gives me some interest with the judges."

Crit. "Come, I will not refuse to enter the lists for once with you; pray then use all your eloquence, and let us know how you prove yourself to be handsomer than I."

Soc. "That shall be done presently; bring but a light, and the thing is done."

Crit. "But, in order to state the question well, you will give me leave to ask a few questions?"

Soc. "I will."

Crit. "But, on second thoughts, I will give you leave to ask what questions you please first."

Soc. "Agreed. Do you believe beauty is no where to be found but in man?"

Crit. "Yes certainly, in other creatures too, whether animate, as a horse or bull, or inanimate things, as we say that is a handsome sword, or a fine shield, &c."

Soc. "But how comes it then, that things so very different as these should yet all of them be handsome?"

Crit. "Because they are well made, either by art or Nature, for the puposes they are employed in."

Soc. "Do you know the use of eyes?"

Crit. "To see."

Soc. "Well! it is for that very reason mine are handsomer than yours."

Crit. "Your reason?"

Soc. "Yours see only in a direct line; but, as for mine, I can look not only directly forward, as you, but sideways too, they being seated on a kind of ridge on my face, and staring out."

Crit. "At that rate, a crab has the advantage of all other animals in matter of eyes?"

Soc. "Certainly: for theirs are incomparably more solid, and better situated than any other creature's."

Crit. "Be it so as to eyes: but as to your nose, would you make me believe that yours is better shaped than mine?"

Soc. "There is no room for doubt, if it be granted that God made the nose for the sense of smelling; for your nostrils are turned downward, but mine are wide and turned up towards heaven, to receive smells that come from every part, whither from above or below."

Crit. "What! is a short flat nose, then, more beautiful than another?"

Soc. "Certainly; because being such, it never hinders the sight of both eyes at once; whereas a high nose parts the eyes so much by its rising, that it hinders their seeing both of them in a direct line."

Crit. "As to your mouth, I grant it you; for if God has given us a mouth to eat with, it is certain yours will receive and chew as much at once as mine at thrice."

Soc. "Don't you believe too that my kisses are more luscious and sweet than yours, having my lips so thick and large?"

Crit. "According to your reckoning, then, an *ass's* lips are more beautiful than mine."

Soc. "And, lastly, I must excel you in beauty, for this reason: the Naiades, notwithstanding they are sea-goddesses, are said to have brought forth the Sileni; and sure I am much more like them than you can pretend to be. What say you to that?"

Crit. "I say it is impossible to hold a dispute with you, Socrates; and therefore let us determine this point by ballotting; and so we shall know presently who has the best of it, you or I: but pray let it be done in the dark, lest Antisthenes's riches and your eloquence should corrupt the judges."

Whereupon the little dancing boy and girl brought in the ballotting box, and Socrates called at the same time for a flambeau to be held before Critobulus, that the judges might not be surprised in their judgement. He desired likewise that the

conqueror, instead of garters and ribands, as were usual in such victories, should receive a kiss from every one of the company. After this they went to ballotting, and it was carried unanimously for Critobulus. Whereupon Socrates said to him, "Indeed, Critobulus, your money has not the same effect with Callias's, to make men juster; for yours, I see, is able to corrupt a judge upon the bench." After this, some of the company told Critobulus he ought to demand the kisses due to his victory; and the rest said, it was proper to begin with him who made the proposition. In short, every one was pleasant in his way except Hermogenes, who spoke not one word all the time; which obliged Socrates to ask him, "If he knew the meaning of the word *paroinia*?"

Her. "If you ask me what it is precisely, I do not know: but if you ask my opinion of it, perhaps I can tell you what it may be."

Soc. "That is enough."

Her. "I believe, then, that *paroinia* signifies the pain and uneasiness we undergo in the company of people that we are not pleased with."—"Be assured then," said Socrates, "this is what has occasioned that prudent silence of yours all this time."

Her. "How my silence! when you were all speaking?"

Soc. "No, but your silence when we have done speaking and made a full stop."

Her. "Well said, indeed! No sooner one has done but another begins to speak; and I am so

far from being able to get in a sentence, that I cannot find room to edge in a syllable.”—“ Ah, then,” said Socrates to Callias, “ cannot you assist a man that is thus out of humour ?”—“ Yes,” said Callias ; “ for I will be bold to say, when the music begins again, every body will be silent as well as Hermogenes.”

Herm. “ You would have me do then as the poet Nicostrates, who used to recite his grand iambics to the sound of his flute : and it would be certainly very pretty if I should talk to you all the time the music played.”—“ For God’s sake do so,” said Socrates ; “ for as the harmony is the more agreeable that the voice and the instrument go together, so your discourse will be more entertaining for the music that accompanies it ; and the more delightful still, if you give life to your words by your gesture and motion, as the little girl does with her flute.”—“ But when Antisthenes,” said Callias, “ is pleased to be angry in company, what flute will be tuneable enough to his voice ?”

Ant. “ I do not know what occasion there will be for flutes tuned to my voice ; but I know, that when I am angry with any one in dispute, I am loud enough, and I know my own weak side.”

As they were talking thus, the Syracusan observing they took no great notice of any thing he could show them, but that they entertained one another on subjects out of his road, was out of all temper with Socrates, who he saw gave occasion at every turn for some new discourse. “ Are

you," said he to him, "that Socrates who is surnamed the *Contemplative*?"

Soc. "Yes," said Socrates: "and is it not much more preferable to be called so, than by another name, for some opposite quality?"

Syr. "Let that pass. But they do not only say in general that Socrates is *contemplative*, but that he contemplates things that are *sublime*."

* *Soc.* "Know you any thing in the world so sublime and elevated as the gods?"

Syr. "No. But I am told your contemplations run not that way. They say they are but trifling; and that, in searching after things above your reach, your inquiries are good for nothing."

Soc. "It is by this, if I deceive not myself, that I attain to the knowledge of the gods; for it is from above that the gods make us sensible of their assistance; it is from above they inspire us with knowledge. But if what I have said appears dry and insipid, you are the cause, for forcing me to answer you."

Syr. "Let us then talk of something else. Tell me then the just measure of the skip of a flea; for I hear you are a subtle *geometrician*, and understand the *mathematics* perfectly well."

But Antisthenes, who was displeased with his discourse, addressing himself to Philip, told him: "You are wonderfully happy, I know, in making

* Here Socrates banters the Syracusan; and in the Greek it is a play of words which cannot be imitated in English.

comparisons*. Pray who is this Syracusan like, Philip? Does he not resemble a man that is apt to give affronts, and say shocking things in company?"—"Faith," said Philip, "he appears so to me, and I believe to every body else."—"Have a care," said Socrates; "do not affront him, lest you fall under the character yourself that you would give him."

Phil. "Suppose I compare him to a well-bred person: I hope nobody will say I affront him then?"

Soc. "So much the more," said Socrates; "such a comparison must needs affront him to some purpose."

Phil. "Would you then that I compare him to some one that is neither honest nor good?"

Soc. "By no means."

Phil. "Who must I compare him to then? To nobody?"

Soc. "Nobody."

Phil. "But it is not proper we should be silent at a feast."

Soc. "That is true; but it is as true we ought rather to be silent than say any thing we ought not to say."

Thus ended the dispute between Socrates and Philip. However, some of the company were for having Philip make his comparisons; others were against it, as not liking that sort of diversion; so that there was a great noise about it in the room:

* To make biting comparisons was a part of the buffoons of that age.

which Socrates observing, "Very well," said he, "since you are for speaking all together, it were as well, in my opinion, that we should sing all together;" and with that he began to sing himself. When he had done, they brought the dancing girl one of those wheels the potters use, with which she was to divert the company in turning herself round it. Upon which Socrates, turning to the Syracusan: "I believe I shall pass for a *contemplative person* indeed," said he, "as you called me just now, for I am now considering how it comes to pass that those two little actors of yours give us pleasure in seeing them perform their tricks, without any pain to themselves, which is what I know you design. I am sensible, that for the little girl to jump head foremost into the hoop of swords, with their points upwards, as she has done just now, must be a very dangerous leap; but I am not convinced that such a spectacle is proper for a feast. I confess likewise, it is a surprising sight to see a person writing and reading at the same time that she is carried round with the motion of the wheel, as the girl has done; but yet I must own it gives me no great pleasure. For would it not be much more agreeable to see her in a natural easy posture, than putting her handsome body into an unnatural agitation, merely to imitate the motion of a wheel? Neither is it so rare to meet with surprising and wonderful sights; for here is one before our eyes, if you please to take notice of it. Why does that lamp, whose flame is pure and bright, give all the light to the room, when that looking-glass gives none at all, and

yet represents distinctly all objects in its surface? Why does that oil, which is in its own nature wet, augment the flame; and that water, which is wet likewise, extinguish it? But these questions are not proper at this time. And, indeed, if the two children were to dance to the sound of the flute, dressed in the habits of nymphs, the graces, or the four seasons of the year, as they are commonly painted, they might undergo less pain, and we receive more pleasure.”—“ You are in the right, sir,” said the Syracusan to Socrates; “ and I am going to represent something of that kind, that certainly must divert you:” and at the same time went out to make it ready, when Socrates began a new discourse.

“ What then,” said he, “ must we part without saying a word of the attributes of that great demon, or power, who is present here, and equals in age the immortal gods, though, to look at, he resembles but a child? That demon, who by his mighty power is master of all things, and yet is engrafted into the very essence and constitution of the soul of man; I mean *Love*. We may indeed with reason extol his empire, as having more experience of it than the vulgar, who are not initiated into the mysteries of that great god as we are. Truly, to speak for one, I never remember I was without being in love: I know, too, that Carmides has had a great many lovers, and being much beloved, has loved again. As for Critobulus, he is still of an age to love, and to be beloved; and Nicerates too, who loves so passionately his wife, at least as report goes, is equally beloved by her.

And who of us does not know that the object of that noble passion, and love of Hermogenes, is virtue and honesty? Consider, pray, the severity of his brows, his piercing and fixed eyes, his discourse so composed and strong, the sweetness of his voice, the gayety of his manners. And what is yet more wonderful in him, that, so beloved as he is by his friends the gods, he does not disdain us mortals. But for you, Antisthenes, are you the only person in the company that does not love?"

Ant. "No! for in faith I love you, Socrates, with all my heart."

Then Socrates rallying him, and counterfeiting an angry air, said, "Do not trouble me with it now; you see I have other business upon my hands at present."

Ant. "I confess you must be an expert master of the trade you valued yourself so much upon a while ago; for sometimes you will not be at the pains to speak to me, and at other times you pretend your demon will not permit you, or that you have other business."

Soc. "Spare me a little, Antisthenes; I can bear well enough any other troubles that you give me, and I will always bear them as a friend; but I blush to speak of the passion you have for me, since I fear you are not enamoured with the beauty of my *soul*, but with that of my *body*."

"As for you, Callias*, you love, as well as the

* Here Socrates shows a wonderful address in turning the passion of Callias from Autolicus, to something more elevated, and beyond personal beauty.

rest of us: for who is it that is ignorant of your love for Autolicus? It is the town-talk; and foreigners, as well as our citizens, are acquainted with it. The reasons for your loving him, I believe to be, that you are both of you born of illustrious families; and, at the same time, are both possessed of personal qualities that render you yet more illustrious. For me, I always admired the sweetness and evenness of your temper; but much more, when I consider that your passion for Autolicus is placed on a person who has nothing luxurious or affected in him; but in all things shows a vigour and temperance worthy of a virtuous soul; which is a proof, at the same time, that if he is infinitely beloved, he deserves to be so.

“ I confess, indeed, I am not firmly persuaded whether there be but one Venus or two, the celestial and the vulgar: and it may be with this goddess, as with Jupiter, who has many different names, though there is still but one Jupiter. But I know very well that both the Venuses have altogether different altars, temples, and sacrifices. The vulgar Venus is worshipped after a common, negligent manner; whereas the celestial one is adored in purity and sanctity of life. The vulgar inspires mankind with the love of the body only, but the celestial fires the mind with the love of the soul, with friendship, and a generous thirst after noble actions. I hope that it is this last kind of love that has touched the heart of Callias. This I believe, because the person he loves is truly virtuous; and whenever he desires to con-

verse with him, it is in the presence of his father, which is a proof his love is perfectly honourable."

Upon which Hermogenes began to speak: "I have always admired you, Socrates, on every occasion, but much more now than ever. You are complaisant to Callias, and indulge his passion. And this your complaisance is agreeable to him; so it is wholesome and instructive, teaching him in what manner he ought to love."—"That is true," said Socrates; "and that my advice may please him yet the more, I will endeavour to prove that the love of the soul is incomparably preferable to that of the body. I say then, and we all feel the truth of it, that no company can be truly agreeable to us without friendship; and we generally say, whoever entertains a great value and esteem for the manners and behaviour of a man, he must necessarily love him. We know likewise, that among those who love the body only, they many times disapprove the humour of the person they so love, and hate perhaps at the same time the mind and temper, while they endeavour to possess the body. Yet further, let us suppose a mutual passion between two lovers of this kind; it is very certain that the power of beauty, which gives birth to that love, does soon decay and vanish: and how is it possible that love, built on such a weak foundation, should subsist, when the cause that produced it has ceased? But it is otherwise with the soul; for the more she ripens, and the longer she endures, the more lovely she becomes. Besides, as the constant use of the finest delicacies is attended, in

progress of time, with disgust; so the constant enjoyment of the finest beauty palls the appetite at last. But that love that terminates on the bright qualities of the soul, becomes still more and more ardent; and, because it is in its nature altogether pure and chaste, it admits of no satiety. Neither let us think, with some people, that this passion, so pure and so chaste, is less charming, or less strong than the other. On the contrary, those who love in this manner are possessed of all that we ask in that our common prayer to Venus: 'Grant, O goddess! that we say nothing but what is agreeable, and do nothing but what does please.' Now, I think it is needless to prove, that a person of a noble mien, generous and polite, modest and well-bred, and in a fair way to rise in the state, ought first to be touched with a just esteem for the good qualities of the person he courts, for this will be granted by all. But I am going to prove, in few words, that the person thus addressed to must infallibly return the love of a man that is thus endued with such shining accomplishments. For, is it possible for a woman to hate a man, who she believes has infinite merit, and who makes his addresses to her upon the motive of doing justice to her honour and virtue, rather than from a principle of pleasing his appetite? And how great is the contentment we feel, when we are persuaded that no light faults or errors shall ever disturb the course of a friendship so happily begun, or that the diminution of beauty shall never lessen one's affection? How can it ever happen otherwise, but that per-

sons who love one another thus tenderly, and with all the liberties of a pure and sacred friendship, should take the utmost satisfaction in one another's company, in discoursing together with an entire confidence, in mingling their mutual interests, and rejoicing in their good fortune, and bearing a share in their bad? Such lovers must needs partake of one another's joy or grief, be merry and rejoice with one another in health, and pay the closest and tenderest attendance on one another when sick, and express rather a greater concern for them when absent, than present. Does not Venus and the Graces shower down their blessings on those who love thus? For my part, I take such to be perfectly happy; and a friendship like this must necessarily persevere to the end of their lives, uninterrupted and altogether pure. But I confess I cannot see any reason why one that loves only the exterior beauty of the person he courts, should be loved again. Is it because he endeavours to obtain something from her, that gives him pleasure, but her shame? Or is it, because in the conduct of their passion they carefully conceal the knowledge of it from their parents or friends? Somebody, perhaps, may object, that we ought to make a different judgement of those who use violence, and of those who endeavour to gain their point by the force of persuasion: but, I say, these last deserve more hatred than the first. The first appear in their proper colours, for wicked persons; and so every one is on their guard against such open villany: whereas the last, by sly insinuations, insensibly cor-

rupt and defile the mind of the person they pretend to love. Besides, why should they, who barter their beauty for money, be supposed to have a greater affection for the purchasers, than the trader, who sells his goods in the market-place, has for his chapman that pays him down the price. Do not be surprised, then, if such lovers as these meet often with the contempt they deserve. There is one thing more in this case worthy of your consideration: we shall never find that the love which terminates in the noble qualities of the mind has ever produced any dismal effects. But there are innumerable examples of tragical consequences, which have attended that love which is fixed only on the beauty of the body. Chiron and Phenix loved Achilles, but after a virtuous manner, without any other design than to render him a more accomplished person. Achilles likewise loved and honoured them in return, and held them both in the highest veneration. And indeed I should wonder, if one that is perfectly accomplished should not entertain the last contempt for those who admire only their personal beauty. Nor is it hard to prove, Callias, that gods and heroes have always had more passion and esteem for the charms of the soul, than those of the body: at least this seems to have been the opinion of our ancient authors. For we may observe in the fables of antiquity, that Jupiter, who loved several mortals upon the account of their personal beauty only, never conferred upon them immortality. Whereas it was otherwise with Hercules,

Castor, Pollux, and several others ; for having admired and applauded the greatness of their courage, and the beauty of their minds, he enrolled them in the number of the gods. And, whatever some affirm to the contrary of Ganymede, I take it he was carried up to Heaven from mount Olympus, not for the beauty of his body, but that of his mind. At least his name seems to confirm my opinion, which in the Greek seems to express as much as, ‘to take pleasure in good counsel, and in the practice of wisdom.’ When Homer represents Achilles so gloriously revenging the death of Patroclus, it was not properly the passion of love that produced that noble resentment, but that pure friendship and esteem he had for his partner in arms. Why is it, that the memory of Pylades and Orestes, Theseus and Perithous, and other demigods, are to this day so highly celebrated? Was it for the love of the body, think you? No! by no means: it was the particular esteem and friendship they had for one another, and the mutual assistance every one gave to his friend, in those renowned and immortal enterprises, which are to this day the subject of our histories and hymns. And pray, who are they that performed those glorious actions? Not they that abandoned themselves to pleasure, but they that thirsted after glory; and who, to acquire that glory, underwent the severest toils, and almost insuperable difficulties.

“ You are then infinitely obliged to the gods, Callias, who have inspired you with love and

friendship for Autolicus, as they have inspired Critobulus with the same for Amandra; for real and pure friendship knows no difference in sexes. It is certain Autolicus has the most ardent passion for glory; since, in order to carry the prize at the Olympic games, and be proclaimed victor by the heralds, with sound of trumpet, as he lately was, he must needs have undergone numberless hardships and the greatest fatigues: for no less was required towards gaining the victory in so many different exercises*. But if he proposes to himself, as I am sure he does, to acquire further glory, to become an ornament to his family, beneficent to his friends, to extend the limits of his country by his valour, and by all honest endeavours to gain the esteem of Barbarians as well as Greeks; do not you believe he will always have the greatest value for one who he believes may be useful and assistant to him in so noble a design? If you would then prove acceptable, Callias, to any one you love, you ought to consider and imitate those methods by which Themistocles rose to the first dignities of the state, and acquired the glorious title of, *The deliverer of Greece*; the methods by which Pericles acquired that consummate wisdom, which proved so beneficial, and brought immortal honour to his native country. You ought to ponder well how it was, that Solon be-

* There were *five* exercises, leaping, running, throwing the javelin, fighting with the whitebat, and wrestling, and the victor was to conquer in them all.

came the lawgiver to this republic of Athens, and by what honourable means the Lacedæmonians have arrived to such wonderful skill in the art of war: and this last you may easily acquire, by entertaining, as you do, at your house, some of the most accomplished Spartans. When you have sufficiently pondered all these things, and imprinted those noble images upon your mind, doubt not but your country will some time or other court you to accept the reins of government, you having already the advantage of a noble birth, and that important office of high priest, which gives you a greater lustre already, than any of your renowned ancestors could ever boast of: and let me add that air of greatness, which shines in your person, and that strength and vigour that is lodged in so handsome a body, capable of the severest toils, and the most difficult enterprises."

Socrates having said all this to Callias, addressed himself to the company, and said: "I know very well this discourse is too serious for a feast, but you will not be surprised, when you consider that our commonwealth has been always fond of those who, to the goodness of their natural temper, have added an indefatigable search after glory and virtue. And in this fondness of mine for such men, I but imitate the genius of my country."

After this, the company began to entertain one another, upon the subject of this last discourse of Socrates: when Callias, with a modest blush in his face, addressed himself to him: "You must then lend me," said he, "the assistance of your art, to

which you gave such a surprising name* a while ago, to render me acceptable to the commonwealth, and that when it shall please my country to intrust me with the care of its affairs, I may so behave myself as to preserve its good opinion, and never do any thing, but what tends to the public good.”—“ You will certainly succeed; do not doubt it,” said Socrates. “ You must apply yourself in good earnest to virtue, and not content yourself, as some people do, with the appearance of it only, as if that might suffice. For know, Callias, that false glory can never subsist long. Flattery or dissimulation may for a while varnish over such a rotten structure; but it must tumble down at last. On the contrary, solid glory will always maintain its post; unless God, for some secret reasons, hid from us, think fit to oppose its progress: otherwise, that sublime virtue, which every man of honour should aim at, does naturally reflect back upon him such rays of glory, as grow brighter and brighter every day, in proportion as his virtue rises higher and higher.”

The discourse being ended, Autolicus rose to take a walk, and his father following him, turned towards Socrates, and said; “ Socrates, I must declare my opinion, that you are a truly honest man.”

After this, there was an elbow chair brought into the middle of the room, and the Syracusan appearing at the same time; “ Gentlemen,” said he, “ Ariadne is just now entering; and Bacchus, who has made a debauch to day with the gods, is

Then Bacchus addressing himself to Ariadne, said, manner than is generally acted on the stage.

* Procuring.

coming down to wait upon her: and I can assure you, they will both divert the company and one another. Immediately Ariadne entered the room, richly dressed, in the habit of a bride, and placed herself in the elbow chair. A little after Bacchus appeared, while at the same time the girl that played on the flute struck up an air that used to be sung at the festival of that god. It was then that the Syracusan was admired for an excellent master in his art: for Ariadne being perfectly well instructed in her part, failed not to show, by her pretty insinuating manner, that she was touched with the air of the music; and that though she rose not from her chair to meet her lover, she yet expressed sufficiently the great desire she had to do it. Bacchus perceiving it, came on dancing toward her, in the most passionate manner, then sat himself down on her lap, and taking her in his arms, kissed her. As for Ariadne, she personated to the life a bride's modesty; and for a while, looking down to the ground, appeared in the greatest confusion: but at length recovering herself, she threw her arms about her lover's neck, and returned his kisses. All the company expressed the great satisfaction the performance gave them; and, indeed, nothing could be better acted, nor accompanied with more grace in the acting. But when Bacchus rose, and took Ariadne by the hand to lead her out, they were still more pleased; for the pretty couple appeared to embrace and kiss one another after a much more feeling manner than is generally acted on the stage. Then Bacchus addressing himself to Ariadne, said,

“Dost thou love me, my dearest creature?”—
“Yes, yes,” answered she, “let me die if I do not; and will love thee to the last moment of my life.” In fine, the performance was so lively and natural, that the company came to be fully convinced of what they never dreamed of before; that the little boy and girl were really in love with one another: which occasioned both the married guests, and some of those that were not, to take horse immediately, and ride back full speed to Athens, with the briskest resolutions imaginable. I know not what happened afterwards; but for Socrates, and some who staid behind, they went a walking with Lycon, Autolicus, and Callias.

END OF THE BANQUET OF XENOPHON.

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END OF THE BANQUET OF XENOPHON.

HIERO:
ON THE
CONDITION OF ROYALTY.

TRANSLATED BY
THE REV. R. GRAVES.

H I R O :

FOR THE

CONDITION OF ROYALTY.

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HIERO:

ON THE

CONDITION OF ROYALTY.

A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIERO AND SIMONIDES.

CHAP. I.

THE poet Simonides being come to reside at the court of Hiero king of Syracuse, one day as they were conversing at their leisure, "Will you, Hiero," said Simonides, "inform me of some particulars, which, it is reasonable to suppose, you must know much better than I can do?"

"What particulars then do you imagine," said Hiero, "I can possibly know better than so learned and wise a man as you are generally acknowledged to be?"

"Why," replied Simonides, "I have known you, when you were yet a *private* man, and now see you advanced to *royalty*. It is probable, therefore, that you, who have experienced both these states, should know better than I can do,

wherein the life of a king differs from that of a private man, in regard to the pleasures or inconveniences attendant on each state."

"Well then," said Hiero, "but as you are now in a private station, ought not you first to recall to my remembrance the pleasures and inconveniences of a private life? By which means, I shall be better enabled to show you the difference of the two states in question."

To this Simonides thus replied: "I think then, Hiero, I have observed, that men in private life possess all the genuine feelings of nature. They receive pleasure and pain from the proper objects of their several senses; from visible objects by their eyes; of sounds by their ears; of scents by their nostrils; of food by the palate; and other sensual enjoyments, the source of which every one knows.

"It appears to me likewise," added he, "that we receive agreeable or painful sensations from heat and cold, from things hard and soft, heavy and light, in the whole and in every part of the body. But to perceive pleasure or pain from what is good or evil (in a moral sense), belongs, I think, to the mind alone: yet, in some sense, to the mind and body in conjunction*.

"I find by experience also, that we receive pleasure from sleep; but, from what source, and from what kind of sleep, and when this pleasure arises, I own myself at a loss to explain. Neither is this at all surprising, as we certainly have less

* The meaning here is not very obvious.

distinct perceptions when asleep, than when we are awake."

To this Hiero answered: "I confess, Simonides, I know not any sensations of pleasure or pain that a king can receive, besides those which you have mentioned. And consequently I do not see, hitherto, in what the life of a king differs from that of a private person."

"Yet even in these particulars," answered Simonides, "there is a very material difference. And, in each of these, kings experience infinitely more pleasure and less pain than private persons."

"Ah!" cried Hiero, "this is by no means the case: but be assured, that in all these respects, kings taste much less pleasure, and feel much more chagrin, than those individuals who are placed in the middle ranks of life."

"What you say," replied Simonides, "is altogether incredible. For, if it were so, why should such numbers, and those who are esteemed for their sense and wisdom, be so ambitious of royalty? And, why do all mankind envy kings?"

"Because," said Hiero, "they form their opinions without having experienced both these conditions of life. But I will endeavour to convince you of the truth of what I assert, and will proceed in the same order which you have suggested, and begin with the pleasures of *sight*: for it was thence, I think, that you commenced this discourse."

CHAP. II.

“ IN the first place then, if we reason from the objects of sight, I am convinced that kings have the least share of pleasure in that respect.

“ Every country has its curiosities; which deserve to be visited and viewed by strangers. Now men in private stations can come or go to any part of the world without ceremony; and into whatever cities they please, for the sake of the public spectacles; and into those general assemblies* of all Greece, where are collected together, whatever is thought worthy of the attention and curiosity of mankind.

“ As for kings†, they can rarely amuse themselves with spectacles of any kind. For neither would it be safe for them to go, where they would not be superior to any force which could be exerted against them; nor are their affairs usually so firmly established at home, that they could securely trust the administration of them to others, and go out of their kingdoms. They could not do it without the danger of being deprived of their sovereignty; and, at the same time, of being unable to avenge themselves on those who had injured them.

“ Yet you will tell me, perhaps, that spectacles

* The Olympic games. See the Appendix.

† The word *kings* must here mean *tyrants*.

of this kind may be presented to kings, though they remain at home. But I assure you, Simonides, this is the case only with regard to a very few: and even for those, such as they are, kings must generally pay extremely dear. As they who have obliged a king with any trifling exhibition of this kind, expect to be dismissed at once with a greater reward than they could hope for from any other man after a whole life's attendance*."

CHAP. III.

"WELL then," said Simonides, "granting that you are in a worse condition, with regard to the objects of *sight*, yet you have greatly the advantage from the sense of *hearing*; as you are incessantly entertained with the most delightful of all music, that of your own praises. For all those who approach you, applaud every thing you say and every thing you do. And, on the contrary, you are never exposed to what is most painful, the hearing yourself censured or reproached. For no one will venture to rebuke a king to his face."

"Alas!" answered Hiero, "what pleasure do you imagine a king can receive from those who do

* It is probably a common remark, which I often heard from a man of rank and large fortune, that he could not afford to receive presents.

not *speak* ill of him, when he is convinced that, although they are silent, they *think* every thing that is bad of him? Or what delight can they afford, who applaud him when he has so much reason to suspect their praises of adulation?"

"Why really," replied Simonides, "I must so far entirely agree with you, that those praises must be most agreeable, which are bestowed on us by men who are entirely free and independent*."

CHAP. IV.

"HOWEVER," added Simonides, "with regard to the sense of *taste*, you surely cannot convince any one but that you enjoy the pleasures of the table more than the rest of mankind."

"I know," said Hiero, "that most men imagine we must necessarily receive more pleasure in eating and drinking; because they would do the same, from the variety with which our tables are served, than from what they usually meet with at their own. For whatever is rare, and excels what we are accustomed to, affords a greater pleasure. For which reason all men expect with joy the approach of a feast, except kings; for *their* tables being constantly provided to the full, can

* Xenophon says of Agesilaus, "That he was much pleased with the *praises* of those who would have *blamed* him with equal freedom, if he had acted improperly."—AGESIL. ch. ii. §. 5.

have no sort of addition on any festival occasions. In this respect then, in the first place, by being deprived of *hope*, kings are less happy than private men.

“ I make no doubt, likewise, but you yourself have experienced that the more superfluous dishes are set before us, the sooner we are cloyed with eating. So that, with regard to the *duration* of this pleasure, he who is served with such profusion is in a much worse condition than one who lives in a more frugal and less plentiful style.”

“ But after all,” replied Simonides, “ as long as the appetite for food continues, those must certainly find more pleasure who feed at a sumptuous table, than those who are confined to cheap and ordinary provisions.”

“ Do not you imagine then, Simonides,” said Hiero, “ that in proportion to the delight which any one takes in any thing, the more fondly he is usually attached to it?”

“ Undoubtedly,” says Simonides.

“ Have you then ever remarked, that kings approach with greater delight to the food which is prepared for them, than private persons do to their frugal viands?”

“ No, really,” answered Simonides, “ the very reverse seems to me to be the truth of the case.”

“ For have you not observed,” says Hiero, “ those many artificial preparations and variety of sauces, of a sharp and poignant relish, to stimulate the appetite, which are served up at the table of kings?”

“ I certainly have,” replied Simonides; “ and

am convinced these high sauces are quite unnatural, and inimical to the health of man."

"Do you think then," said Hiero, "that these unnatural delicacies can afford pleasure to any one, but to those whose palates are vitiated by luxury and indulgence? For my part, I know by experience (and you cannot be ignorant), that those who have a good appetite want no artificial preparations of this kind."

CHAP. V.

"THEN as to those expensive perfumes which you make use of," said Simonides, "I really believe that those who approach your persons have more enjoyment of them than you yourselves have. As in respect to those who have eaten any thing of a disagreeable odour, the person himself is not so much incommoded by it, as those who come too near him."

"That is precisely the case," replied Hiero, "with those who have constantly a variety of food set before them. They eat nothing with an appetite: whereas he who but rarely meets with any delicacy, feeds upon it with a true relish, whenever it makes its appearance."

CHAP. VI.

“BUT, after all,” says Simonides, “perhaps the greatest incitement to your aspiring after royalty are the pleasures of love. For in this respect it is in your power to enjoy every object, the most beautiful in its kind.”

“Alas!” cries Hiero, “you have now produced an instance, in which you must certainly know we are far less happy than private persons. For, in the first place, those marriages are generally esteemed most honourable, and to confer the greatest dignity, as well as pleasure, which we contract with our superiors in rank and fortune: and in the second place, are those of equals with their equals: but to form an alliance of that kind with an inferior, is disgraceful and injurious to our character. Unless a king marries a stranger, therefore, he must necessarily marry an inferior; so that he can never enjoy what is most agreeable in the married state.

“The attention and respect also which is paid us by a woman of birth and spirit gives a man great pleasure; but, when paid us by a slave, it affords us very little satisfaction. Yet if they fail of that respect which is our due, we are provoked and chagrined.

“In short, with regard to the mere sensual pleasures of love, where marriage is out of the question, kings have still less of that pleasure to

boast of: for we all know, that it is love alone which renders fruition so exquisitely delightful; but love is more rarely excited in the breast of kings than of any other men. For we despise easy and obvious pleasures; but the passion is nourished by hope. And as a person who is not thirsty never drinks with pleasure, so he who is not stimulated by love knows not the true pleasure of enjoyment."

Hiero having thus spoken, Simonides, with a smile, replied: "What is this which you assert, O Hiero! that love cannot be excited in the breast of kings? Whence comes it to pass then, that you are so fond of Dailocha, the most beautiful of her sex?"

"Why truly, my Simonides," said he, "it is not for what I could with so much ease obtain of her, but for what it is least of all in the power of kings to effect.

"I own I love Dailocha for what we naturally desire to obtain from a beautiful object. Those favours, however, which I so earnestly wish to receive *voluntarily*, and with mutual affection, I could no more endure to extort by force, than I could to do violence to my own person.

"To plunder and take by force from an enemy, we consider as a real cause of exultation: but no favours from a beloved object can give us any joy, except those which are voluntarily bestowed. From such an object, who returns our passion, every thing is agreeable: her slightest regards; her trifling questions; her childish answers; and the most agreeable of all, perhaps, and the most

alluring, are her struggles and counterfeited resentments. But, to possess by force a woman whom we love, is, in my opinion, to act more like a robber than a lover. A robber indeed receives some gratification from the idea of gain, and perhaps from having done an injury to an adversary; but to take a pleasure in giving pain to a person whom we love, and to treat one for whom we profess a regard, as if we really hated them; and to torment a woman, to whom our caresses are odious and disgusting, is surely most detestable and inhuman.

“ In short, if a private person receives favours from a woman whom he loves, it is an unequivocal pledge of her affection; as he knows she is under no necessity to comply with his solicitations.

“ But a king has no right to imagine that he is ever sincerely beloved*. For we know, that those who submit to our pleasure through fear, counterfeit as much as is in their power the air and manner of those whose compliance is the effect of a sincere affection. Yet, never are conspiracies against kings so frequently conducted as by those who affect to love them with the greatest sincerity.”

* Un roy, qui peut s'assurer de cent mille bras, ne peut guères s'assurer d'un cœur.—FONTENELLE *Dialog. des Morts*.

CHAP. VII.

To all this Simonides replied: "Well, my good Hiero, in regard to what you have hitherto alleged, I confess they are but trifles; for I see many men of respectable characters, who voluntarily refrain from the pleasures of the table, and are indifferent to what they eat or drink, and also entirely abstain from all intercourse with the fair sex.

"But in another respect there is certainly a striking superiority of kings over private men; that you conceive and readily execute great projects; that you have a greater abundance of whatever is excellent in its kind; you possess the finest and most spirited horses; the most beautiful arms; the richest ornaments for your women; the most magnificent palaces, and those adorned with the most sumptuous furniture; you are attended with a greater number of domestics, and those of the most expert and dexterous that can be found. Add to this, that you have the most ample means of avenging yourselves on your enemies, and of rewarding your friends."

"Alas! my Simonides," said Hiero, "that the multitude are dazzled with the splendor of royalty I am not at all surprised; for the vulgar in general seem to me to judge of happiness and misery merely by appearances. Now, as royalty displays to the eyes of the world those possessions

which are commonly esteemed the most valuable, so it conceals the evils to which kings are exposed in the inmost recesses of their soul, where alone real happiness or misery reside.

“That these things, therefore, should escape the notice of the multitude, I am not at all surprised, as I said; but, that you should be under the same mistake, who form your judgement from reflexion more than from external appearances, I own, excites my astonishment. For my part, Simonides, I assure you, from my own experience, that kings have the least share of the greatest goods, and much the largest portion of the greatest evils, incident to human life.

“For instance, if peace is esteemed in the opinion of mankind the greatest good, it is certain, the smallest portion of that good is allotted to kings: and likewise, if war is the greatest evil, the greatest part of that evil is the portion of kings.

“In the first place then, unless the whole country be engaged in a civil war, private individuals may securely go where they please, without danger to their persons. Whereas kings* find it always necessary to march as through an

* The reader must here advert, that in the Attic writers, the word “tyrant” has three distinct senses. Sometimes,—1st, a lawful king, appointed by the constitution of any country: 2dly, one who usurps the sovereign power in a free state, whether he exercise it with moderation, or with cruelty and injustice: 3dly, a despot, or absolute monarch, who rules by force. In the sequel of this discourse it is generally used in the last sense.

enemy's country; armed themselves, and attended by guards completely armed.

“Moreover, private persons, if they go to make war in an enemy's country, as soon as they return home find themselves again in perfect security; but kings, (I mean arbitrary despots) when they return to their own capitals, find themselves in the midst of the greatest number of enemies. And if a more powerful enemy make war upon any city, those who are attacked may be in danger so long as they are without the walls; but as soon as they have retreated within their intrenchments, they find themselves in perfect security: whereas a tyrant, far from finding himself safe, even within his own palace, has then the greatest cause to be upon his guard.

“Again, when by negotiation peace is restored, private persons find themselves freed from the inconveniences of war; but tyrants never really are at peace with those whom they hold in subjection; nor dares a tyrant rely upon the faith of any treaty which he makes with the rest of mankind.

“In short, there are wars indeed which free states are obliged to carry on with each other, as there are those which kings are forced to wage with those whom they have deprived of their liberty: but whatever inconveniences these states may experience from such wars, the same occur in those which kings are obliged to maintain.

“Both the one and the other are under a necessity of being always armed, and continually upon their guard, and of exposing themselves to

great dangers: and if they chance to lose a battle, or meet with any disaster, they are both thrown into equal consternation.

“ And thus far wars are nearly upon the same footing, both with kings and free states. But then the agreeable circumstances which those experience from victory who serve under a free state, to these tyrants are entirely strangers. For when the individuals of a free city gain the advantage over their adversaries in a battle, it is not easy to express the pleasure which they feel to see their enemies put to flight; their alacrity in the pursuit, and their delight even in the havoc which they make of their foes: how much they glory in such an exploit; how splendid their triumph; and how much they exult in the idea of having augmented the strength of the commonwealth*; every individual gives himself the credit of having had a part in planning the expedition, and of contributing to its success. Nay, you will hardly find a man who does not magnify his own prowess, and pretend to have slain more with his own hand, than perhaps were left dead on the field of battle. So glorious to every individual does the victory appear, which was obtained by a free state†.

“ As for a king, or tyrant, when he suspects

* Xenophon seems to speak with the feelings of a soldier and a patriotic statesman.

† We might add here what Rousseau observes, “ How many sovereigns have been made unhappy by the loss of countries which they had never seen!”

and is actually convinced that his subjects are forming dangerous designs against him, if he puts some of them to death, he is certain that he shall not by that means bring over the whole city to his interest; and is sensible at the same time, that he is diminishing the number of his subjects; of course he can neither rejoice (much less can he pride himself) on such an achievement. Nay, he extenuates, as far as is in his power, and makes an apology for what he has done, as having been void of any ill intention.

“ And even after the death of those who were the chief objects of his fear, he is so far from being freed from his apprehensions, that he finds it necessary to be still more upon his guard than he was before. And thus does a tyrant live in a continual state of war; as, from experience, I can testify.

CHAP. VIII.

“ OBSERVE, in the next place, what kind of friendships kings are capable of enjoying: but let us first consider how great a blessing friendship is to mankind. For when a man is sincerely beloved, his friends are always happy in his presence, and delight in serving and doing him good. When he is absent, they anxiously wish for his return; and when he does return, receive him

with transports of joy : they rejoice with him in his good fortune, and are eager to assist him in his adversity.

“ Neither has it escaped the attention of several states, that friendship is the greatest and most valuable good that mortals can enjoy. For, under many governments, the laws permit adulterers alone to be slain with impunity. And for this reason ; that they suppose them to alienate that affection and friendship which a woman ought to have for her husband. For if a woman, by any *extraordinary concurrence* of circumstances, should be guilty of an act of infidelity, the husband may not perhaps esteem her the less, if he is convinced that her friendship for him continues inviolate and undiminished*.

“ For my part, I esteem it so great an happiness to be beloved by our friends, that we can hardly have any thing further to wish for from gods or men. But of this happiness, I am convinced, no one enjoys less than tyrants or kings. That what I assert is true, Simonides, attend to the following particulars.

“ The firmest friendships then seem to be those which reciprocally subsist between parents and their children ; between brothers and brothers ; between husbands and their wives ; and lastly, those which a daily intercourse produces between companions and acquaintance.

* Comfortable doctrine. If a china dish *happens* to *slip* out of a poor girl's *hand*, and is broken, who can blame her ?

“ Now, if you consider the affair attentively, Simonides, you will find that private persons enjoy the greatest share of this affection: but amongst kings or tyrants, how many do you find who have put to death their own children; or, on the contrary, have perished by their own offspring! How many brothers who have slain each other to arrive at the sovereign power! How many tyrants, possessed of that power, have been murdered by their wives, and by their associates who have professed the greatest friendship for them? If, therefore, those who were prompted by natural affection, or obliged by the laws, to show a regard to kings, have nevertheless expressed their detestation of them; how is it probable, do you think, that any others should entertain any friendship for them?

CHAP. IX.

“ AGAIN; as mutual confidence among mankind is a very great blessing, is not he who has the least share of this confidence deprived of a very great blessing? For, with what pleasure can men converse familiarly together without mutual confidence? What happiness can exist between the sexes in marriage, if this confidence is banished? or, how can we bear even a domestic in our family, if we have not an opinion of his fidelity?

“Of this happiness then, I mean, of relying with confidence on those about us, no one partakes less than a tyrant: since he lives in a continual state of suspicion, even when the most delicious food, or the most exquisite liquors, are set before him. Insomuch that, before he makes any offering or libation to the gods, he obliges some domestic first to taste it, lest even in those sacred viands something poisonous should be concealed.

CHAP. X.

“MOREOVER, to every other mortal, their country is held dear, and the chief object of their affection: and the citizens of the same state protect each other, without stipend, against their slaves, and against other base assassins, that no one may be exposed to any violent death. And this precaution has been carried so far, that many laws have been enacted, declaring those polluted who should associate or converse with an homicide. Thus every private citizen lives in security under the protection procured him by his country; but even in this respect the very reverse is the case with tyrants. For, so far from punishing those who put a tyrant to death, they usually reward them with distinguished honours. And, instead of excluding them from the religious rites, as they do those who have murdered a private

citizen, they generally erect statues to them in the temples of the gods.

“ But should you imagine, that a king is more happy, from possessing more wealth, than a private individual, in this, my Simonides, you are extremely mistaken. For as an athlete never prides himself on vanquishing one who is ignorant of the gymnastic exercises, but is sensibly mortified if he is overcome by his antagonist; thus a king takes no pleasure in having larger possessions than a private subject; but he is greatly chagrined to see other kings more opulent than himself: for these only he considers as his antagonists, or rivals, with regard to riches.

CHAP. XI.

“ NEITHER can a king, in general, gratify his wishes more readily than a private man. For the object of a private man's utmost ambition is, perhaps, no more than a house, a field, or a slave; but a king usually aims at the acquisition of cities, of extensive provinces, harbours, or fortified citadels; which are obtained with much more difficulty and danger than those objects which excite the wishes of private individuals.

“ Nay, you will find but few that are really poor amongst private persons, in comparison with those who may be called so amongst sovereigns:

For an abundance, or a sufficiency*, is not to be estimated by the number of our possessions, but by the exigences of our station: and, according to this idea, whatever exceeds a sufficiency, may be called *too much*, and what falls short of it, *too little*. Now, much more ample revenues may not be sufficient for the necessary expenses of a king, than what would suffice a private person. As for private persons, they are at liberty to contract their daily expenses, as they find it convenient; but kings have not the same privilege: for, as their greatest and most necessary expenses are employed for the maintenance of those who guard their persons, to retrench these expenses, seems to threaten their immediate destruction.

“Then, how can we consider those as poor, and the objects of compassion, who can obtain, by lawful means, whatever they stand in need of? But those who are under a necessity of being guilty of unjust and dishonourable actions, how can we but esteem them really poor and miserable beings? But tyrants are often forced to pillage the temples of the gods, and plunder men, through mere want of their necessary supplies: for, when engaged in war, they must either keep on foot a sufficient force, or inevitably perish by their adversaries.”

* See this subject elegantly treated by our author, at the beginning of his *Economics*, infra.

CHAP. XII.

“BUT, give me leave, my Simonides, to mention another difficulty to which kings are exposed. They are equally capable, with private persons, of distinguishing the merit of accomplished, of wise, and of virtuous men. But, instead of viewing them with pleasure and admiration, they behold them with fear. They dread men of courage, lest they should make some bold attempt in favour of liberty. They dread men of great parts, lest they should engage in some dangerous plot; and virtuous men, lest the multitude should wish to raise them to the sovereign power.

“Now when, from suspicion, they have secretly freed themselves from men of this respectable character, whom have they left to employ in their service, but dishonest, or debauched, or slavish wretches? They trust these dishonest miscreants, because men of that character must fear, as much as the tyrant himself, that if a city become free, they will meet with their deserts: the debauched, because from their luxury and sloth they will be attached to the present power: slaves, because being accustomed to the yoke, they will not wish to be free. This then, in my opinion, is a most mortifying reflexion; to behold with approbation men of virtue, and to be under a necessity of employing men of a character entirely the reverse.”

CHAP. XIII.

“It is likewise necessary for a tyrant to show a love and regard for the city under his dominion: for he cannot be happy, nor even safe, independently of the affection of the citizens. And yet the necessity he is under to support his authority, obliges him, in some measure, to treat them with severity. For tyrants do not wish to render their subjects brave, or to see them well-armed; but they love to raise the power of a foreign force over their countrymen, and to use them as the guards of their person.

“Neither do they rejoice with their fellow-citizens, when a fruitful year of *corn* produces every thing in abundance. For the more indigent the people are, the more humble and more submissive they expect to find them.”

CHAP. XIV.

“But I will now lay before you, my Simonides,” added Hiero, “a true account of those pleasures which I enjoyed, when I was a private man, and which I find myself deprived of since I became a king. I then conversed familiarly with

my equals ; delighted with their company, as they were with mine : and I conversed also with myself, whenever I chose to indulge in the calm of solitude.

“ I frequently spent my time in convivial entertainments, and drinking with my friends, so as to forget the chagrins to which human life is obnoxious ; nay, often to a degree of extravagance ; to singing, dancing, and every degree of festivity, unrestrained but by our own inclinations. But I am now debarred from the society of those who could afford me any delight, as I have slaves alone for my companions, instead of friends : nor can I converse agreeably with men in whom I cannot discover the least benevolence or attachment to me ; and I am forced to guard against intoxication or sleep, as a most *dangerous* snare.

“ But now, to be continually alarmed, either in a crowd, or in solitude : to be in fear when without guards, and to be afraid of the guards themselves : to be unwilling to have them about me without their arms, and to be under apprehensions to see them armed ; what a wretched state of existence is this !

“ Moreover, to place a greater confidence in strangers than in one's own countrymen ; in Barbarians, than in Greeks ; to be under a necessity of treating freemen like slaves, and to give slaves their freedom ; are not all these things evident symptoms of a mind disturbed and quite deranged by fear ? Now this passion of fear not only creates uneasiness, and diffuses a constant gloom over the mind, but, being mixed with all

our pleasures, deprives us of all kind of enjoyment.

“ But, if you have had any experience of military affairs, Simonides, and have ever been posted near a body of the enemy ; only recollect, how little you were disposed either to eat or to sleep in that situation. Such as were your uneasy sensations on that occasion ; such, or rather more dreadful, are those to which tyrants are continually exposed : for their imagination not only represents their enemies as encamped in their sight, but as surrounding them on every side.”

To this Simonides answered, “ Your observation is extremely just. War is undoubtedly subject to continual alarms. Nevertheless, even during a campaign, when we have previously disposed our sentinels, we eat and sleep in the utmost security.”

“ That is very true,” said Hiero, “ for the laws watch over the guards themselves ; so that they are as much in fear on their own account as on yours. But kings have only mercenaries for their guards, whom they pay as they do their labourers in *the harvest*. And though the principal duty of guards is to be faithful to their trust, yet it is more difficult to find one of that description faithful, than the generality of workmen in any branch of business ; especially, when these guards enlist themselves for the sake of the stipend, and have it in their power, in a short time, to gain a much larger sum, by assassinating a tyrant, than they would receive from the tyrant by many years’ faithful attendance.”

CHAP. XV.

“As for what you observed,” continued Hiero, “that kings were to be envied for the power which they enjoy, of serving their friends, and of subduing their enemies; neither is this by any means true. As for our friends, how can you suppose that we should be very desirous to serve them; when we are convinced, that he who is under the greatest obligation to us, will be the first to withdraw himself from our sight, and to avoid any further intercourse with us: for no one considers what he has received from a tyrant as his property, till he is escaped from his power.

“Then, as for his enemies, how can you say, that tyrants can so readily subdue them, when they are sensible that every one is their enemy who is subject to their power. They cannot put them all to death, nor confine them all in prison. For over whom could they, in that case, exercise their dominion? But, although he knows them all to be his enemies, he is under a necessity at the same time, both to guard himself against them, and yet to make use of their service.

“Be assured of this then, my Simonides, that with regard to their fellow-citizens whom they thus fear, it is equally painful to tyrants to see them alive, and to put them to death. It is with them as with a spirited horse, which we are afraid to mount, yet are unwilling to put him to death

on account of his good qualities, though we dare not make use of him for fear of some fatal accident.

“The same is applicable to other possessions, which are useful, and yet attended with some inconvenience; though we possess them with anxiety, we cannot lose them without pain and vexation.”

CHAP. XVI.

SIMONIDES having listened to Hiero, replied: “Well then, Hiero; but honour and respect appear to me to be objects of so much importance, that men submit to every kind of toil and danger to obtain them. And you yourself, it should seem, notwithstanding the many inconveniences which you say attend on royalty, yet are thus strongly attached to it, that you may be honoured and respected; that all your orders may be implicitly obeyed; that all men may have their eyes upon you; may rise from their seats, or give you the way on your approach: in short, that all who are about you, may testify their respect by their words and their actions: for it is by these, and every other instance of deference, that subjects continually show their respect to their kings.

“For my part, Hiero, I confess that I think this desire of esteem and honour is the distinguishing characteristic of man from other animals: for it appears probable, that the pleasure arising from

eating, drinking, sleeping, and other natural functions, are common to all animals. But the love of honour is not discoverable in brutes, nor in all men: insomuch, that those in whom the love of honour or glory is most conspicuous, are usually the furthest removed from mere brutes; and are commonly named *men**, in its most noble sense, by way of eminence. So that it is not without reason, in my opinion, that you submit to all these inconveniences which attend on royalty, when you are so much more honoured and respected than other men. For, of all the pleasures which mankind can enjoy, no one seems to approach nearer to divine than that which they receive from being honoured and respected."

To this Hiero replied: "But, I assure you, my Simonides, that the honours which are paid to kings are extremely similar to the pleasures which, I have already shown you, they receive from love†. For neither are those compliances which are shown us by them who are void of a reciprocal affection, to be esteemed as favours; nor can those which are extorted by force, give us any pleasure. In like manner, we ought not to consider as marks of respect, those honours which are paid us by such as fear us‡. For how can we suppose, that they who rise from their seats to those who have injured them, or that give the way to those who tyrannise over them, can possibly entertain any real honour or regard for them? We, every day,

* The Greek has two words to express this; *ἀνδρες*, and *ἀνδρωτοι*.

† See chap. vi.

‡ See the Appendix.

make presents to those whom we hate; and this at the very time when we are most apprehensive of suffering from their power; but these things ought certainly to be considered as acts of servility: whereas real respect must proceed from quite contrary causes. For when we think a man is capable to do us service, and we really enjoy the effects of his good-will, we then celebrate his praises with pleasure; every one considers him as his benefactor; pays him the utmost deference; rises from his seat on his approach, not from fear, but love; they present him with *crowns** and other donations, as a tribute to his virtue and public spirit. In this case, in my opinion, both those who bestow these marks of respect on such a man confer substantial honour, and he who is thought worthy of them is truly and effectually honoured; and I cannot but pronounce him an happy man who is thus honoured and respected. For, instead of forming conspiracies against such a man, I observe, that every one is solicitous to prevent his suffering any injury; so that he spends his life happily, free from fears, from envy, and from danger: a tyrant, on the contrary, assure yourself, Simonides, passes every day and night as if all mankind had already condemned him to death for his injustice."

* This is to be taken in its literal sense, as it was a custom amongst the Athenians to present a *crown* to any citizen who had signalized himself on any particular occasion. This gave rise to Demosthenes's well-known Oration, "*de Corona*."

CHAP. XVII.

HAVING heard all these particulars, "Whence comes it to pass then," cries Simonides, "if the condition of royalty is so wretched, and you are convinced that it is so, that you, Hiero, do not free yourself from so great an evil? Yet neither you, nor any one else, who was in possession of royalty, ever voluntarily resigned it."

"It is for that very reason, my Simonides," replied he, "that the condition of a king is the most wretched state imaginable: for there is really no possibility of resigning it with safety. Indeed, how can a tyrant find sufficient resources, either to restore that wealth which he has extorted from his subjects; or to recompense those whom he has suffered to languish in prison? or how can he restore life to those whom he has put to death?"

"In short, my Simonides, if ever any man could be a gainer by *hanging** himself, a tyrant would be so: for he alone is in a situation to which he can hardly submit, nor yet gain any thing by quitting it."

* *Απαγξασθαι*: literally so.

CHAP. XVIII.

SIMONIDES, resuming the discourse, thus replied: "Now then, O Hiero! I am no longer surprised, that *you* speak so disadvantageously of the condition of royalty: since, ambitious as you are to gain the friendship of mankind, you find it an invincible obstacle to your wishes. I think, however, I can convince you, that sovereign power is so far from preventing one who is possessed of it from being beloved, that it gives him a great advantage in that respect over a private individual.

"In considering this subject, however, I will not insist, that, because a king has more power, he therefore can bestow greater favours upon his friends: but, suppose a private person and a king do the same thing, let us inquire which confers the greatest obligation.—To begin with matters of the least importance.

"Suppose a king and a private person to address any one whom they chance to see in an obliging and affectionate manner; to which of the two will such a one listen with the greatest satisfaction? Or, let them proceed to praise or compliment him; whose praises, do you imagine, would affect him the most sensibly? Or, let each of them invite him to an entertainment after the

sacrifice*; to which of the two do you think he would esteem himself the most obliged for that honour? Let both of them pay him the same attention when he is sick; is it not evident likewise, that the kind offices of those who have the most power, give him the most sensible pleasure? Lastly, let each of them make him equal presents; is it not visible also, that favours of half the value from a great man have more weight, and impress him with a deeper sense of gratitude, than those of double the value from a private person?

“Nay, there appears to me a certain dignity and grace which the gods have attached to the very person of a king; which not only adds a lustre to his appearance, but makes us really behold the same man with more pleasure, when vested with authority, than when in a private station: and, in general, we certainly take a pride and are more delighted to converse with our superiors than with our equals†.

“As for the favours of the fair sex, which supplied you with the principal complaint against the condition of royalty, they are the least disgusted with the old age of a prince, and the reputation of those with whom he has an amour do not suffer any diminution. For the honour which he does them, adds a lustre to their character: so

* Among the Greeks, they usually invited their friends, after the sacrifice, to partake of what remained of the victims; that is, the best and greatest part, says Mons. COSTE.

† This sentiment will not be relished in this enlightened age; but, perhaps, the philosopher intended it as a delicate compliment to Hiero, who had been a private man.

that what is ignominious in such a connexion seems to disappear, and what is honourable appears with more splendour.

“Then, as by equal services you confer greater obligations, why ought not you to be more beloved than private persons, since you have it in your power to be much more useful to mankind, and to bestow more liberal donations than any private individual can possibly do?”

“It is,” replied Hiero, with some vivacity, “because, my Simonides, we are under the necessity of doing more invidious and unpopular acts than private persons usually do. We must raise money by imposing taxes, if we would have sufficient for our ordinary expenses: we must have persons to guard what is necessary to be guarded: we must punish crimes, and restrain the injurious and petulant; and when any occasion requires expedition, and an attack is to be made, either by sea or land, we are responsible for the success, and must take care not to give the charge either to negligent or cowardly commanders.

“Moreover, a king is obliged to have mercenary troops, and nothing is more odious or insupportable to a free city, than the burthen of such an expense: for they naturally suppose, that these troops are kept in pay, not merely for state, but to enable him to tyrannise over his subjects.”

CHAP. XIX.

To this Simonides again replied: "I do not deny, O Hiero! that all these affairs must be carefully managed. But, amidst this variety of concerns, as there are some which render those who have the charge of them extremely odious, there are others which have a contrary effect.

"Thus, to instruct mankind in things the most excellent, and to honour and applaud those learned men who perform this service with industry and care, is a duty, the performance of which must procure the love of all good men. On the contrary, to be forced to rebuke and treat with severity, to fine and chastise, those who do ill, these things must certainly render a king odious and unpopular.

"I should think it advisable, therefore, for a prince, when the occasion requires it, to employ others to inflict punishments, and to reserve to himself the distribution of rewards. And that this conduct is attended with good effects, experience testifies.

"Thus, for instance, at our public solemnities, when the different choirs contend for victory, he that presides over the contest, distributes the prizes, but leaves to the magistrate the care of collecting the bands, and to others, that of instructing them, and of correcting those who are

defective in the performance. By this means the agreeable part is executed by the president, and whatever is of a contrary kind is committed to others. What forbids, therefore, to manage other political affairs in the same manner? For all cities are usually divided, some into tribes, others into classes, and others into centuries and the like; and each of these divisions has its proper chief, who presides over them.

“ If, therefore, we were to propose rewards to these different bodies, (as we do in the musical contests to the different choirs) to those who were the best armed, or who kept their ranks best, or showed most skill in horsemanship, or most courage in an engagement, or most justice in their civil transactions, it is reasonable to suppose, that, through emulation, all these several duties would be more strenuously performed; and, animated by the love of glory, they would be more ready to march whenever the service required, and would more cheerfully contribute to the necessities of the public.

“ Again: one of the most useful employments in any state, but which it never has been usual to encourage by motives of emulation, is *agriculture*. Now this would flourish much more, if rewards were publicly established in different parts of the country and the villages, for those who showed the greatest skill in the cultivation of their land; and from thence great advantages would accrue to those individuals who diligently applied themselves to their occupation: the public revenues would be greatly augmented; temperance and so-

briety would attend this laborious occupation, as vice and immorality seldom spring up amongst those who are constantly employed.

“ If, likewise, trade or commerce is advantageous to the commonwealth; if he were to be the most honoured, who applied himself with the greatest diligence to trade, the number of merchants would be increased in proportion. And if it were publicly made known, that he who should discover any new method of increasing the public revenue, without detriment to individuals, should be well rewarded; neither would this kind of speculation be so much neglected.

“ In short, if, in every branch of science, it were made manifest, that no one who discovered or introduced any thing useful to the state would be unrewarded, this consideration would excite numbers to apply themselves strenuously to make such discoveries. And when many rival competitors for this honour were thus constantly employed in the service of the public, a greater number of useful discoveries must necessarily be made.

“ But if you are apprehensive that all these prizes and rewards should be attended with too great expense, consider, O Hiero! that there are no commodities that cost less than those which are purchased by this means. Do you not see, every day, to what vast expense, to what cares and toils, men submit, for a very trifling reward, in the chariot-races, the gymnastic exercises, and in the musical contests between the several choirs*?”

* At the public festivals and solemnities.

CHAP. XX.

“WHAT you observe, my Simonides, is extremely reasonable,” said Hiero; “but in regard to the troops which I have in pay, can you give me any advice how to render myself less odious to my subjects on that account? or, would you say, perhaps, that if a prince could make himself beloved, he would have no longer need of guards?”

“By no means,” replied Simonides, “he certainly would still want guards. For, I am sensible, it is with some men, as with some horses, the more plenty they have, and the better they are fed, the more fierce and unmanageable they are. Now nothing can keep in awe these turbulent spirits, but a strong military force, such as you now employ.

“As for the virtuous and peaceable citizens, you cannot, in my opinion, do them a greater service, than by maintaining these troops in your pay. You maintain these mercenaries, ’tis true, as guards of your own person: but it frequently happens, that the masters have been massacred by their slaves. You ought, therefore, particularly to give it in charge to your guards, to consider themselves as the protectors of the citizens *in general*: and to give them immediate assistance if ever they perceive them forming any such dangerous designs against them. For there are (as every one knows) in all cities those desperate

villains, over whom, if your *guards* are ordered to keep a watchful eye, the citizens, in this respect, would acknowledge their utility.

“ Further yet, your troops may probably give protection and security to the labourers and to the cattle in the country; not only to your own private possessions, but to the proprietors in general. And, likewise, by guarding certain advantageous posts, leave the citizens at leisure to attend their private affairs in the utmost tranquillity.

“ Add to this, that to discover and prevent any secret and sudden irruption of enemies to the state, who can be more alert or more ready at hand, than such a standing force, always under arms and united in one body? And, in time of war, what can be more useful to the citizens, than these mercenary troops? For it is natural to suppose, that they will be more willing to undergo fatigue, and to expose themselves to danger, and more vigilant for the public good.

“ In fine, the neighbouring states must necessarily be more desirous to live in peace with those who have constantly an armed force on foot; for these regular troops have it most in their power to protect their friends, and to annoy their enemies.

“ Now, if your subjects are convinced that these forces never injure those who do no injury to others; but, on the contrary, keep in awe the turbulent, and assist those who are unjustly oppressed; watch over and expose themselves to danger for the public good: how can they avoid

contributing with pleasure to their support? At least they often maintain guards at their own private expense for things of infinitely less moment.

CHAP. XXI.

“It is necessary likewise, Hiero! that you should contribute cheerfully part of your own revenues for the service of the public. For it appears to me, that what a king lays out for the public, is more usefully bestowed than what he spends on his own private account. Let us consider the affair more minutely. Which of the two, do you imagine, would be most to your credit;—a palace, built in an elegant style, at an enormous expense, for your own use; or to adorn the whole city with public edifices, walls, temples, porticoes, squares, and harbours? Or which would make you more formidable to your enemies;—to be adorned yourself with the most splendid armour, or to have the whole city completely armed?

“Or, which do you think the most probable method of augmenting your revenues;—by managing to advantage your own private property alone, or by contriving by what means the industry of the whole city may turn to the best account?

“As the breeding horses for the chariot-race is esteemed one of the most noble and most magni-

ficent amusements for a prince, which do you suppose is most honourable ;—that you* alone should provide and send to the public games more chariots than all the rest of Greece ; or, that the greatest part of your subjects should breed horses and contend for the prize at those games ? Which do you deem the most noble ;—the superiority which you gain over others in the managing your chariot ; or that which you acquire by making happy the city over which you preside ?

“ For my part, Hiero ! I think it by no means consistent with propriety, or even decent, for a prince to enter the list with private persons ; for, if you are victorious, you would be so far from being applauded, that you would incur the odium of the public, as having supplied the expenses of your victory from the substance of many wretched families. And if you were vanquished, you would be exposed to more ridicule than any private individual.

“ But, if you would listen to me, Hiero, permit me to advise you to enter the lists against the governors of other states : and if you can render the city over which you preside, more happy than those, you may be assured, that you obtain the victory in the most noble contest in which a mortal can engage.

“ And, in the first place, you will succeed immediately in the grand object of your ambition,

* Hiero, it is well known from the Odes of Pindar, was particularly attached to the Olympic games. See West's and Banister's translations of Pindar.

the gaining the love of your fellow-citizens : and, in the next place, this victory of yours will not merely be proclaimed by a single herald, (as at the Olympic games) but all mankind will concur in celebrating your virtue.

“ And you will not only attract the respect of a few individuals, but the love of whole cities; and not only be admired privately within the walls of your own palace, but publicly, and by the whole world.

“ You may also, if you desire it, either go abroad to see any thing rare or curious, or satisfy your curiosity though you remain at home. For there will always be a crowd of those about you, who will be proud to exhibit whatever they have discovered, either ingenious, beautiful, or useful; and of those who will be ambitious to serve you.

“ Every one who is admitted to your presence, will be devoted to your person; and those who live at a distance will passionately desire to see you. So that you will not only be respected, but sincerely and cordially beloved by all men. You will be under no necessity of soliciting the favours of the fair sex, but must even suffer yourself to be solicited by them. You will not be afraid of any one, but every one will be anxious for your preservation.

“ Your subjects will pay you a voluntary obedience, and carefully watch for the safety of your person. And should you be exposed to any danger, you will find them alert, not only to assist you, but to protect you*, and avert the danger,

* Προμαχης.

at the hazard of their own lives. You will be loaded with presents; nor will you want friends to whom you may have the pleasure of imparting them. All men will rejoice in your prosperity, and will contend for your rights as earnestly as for their own. And you may consider the wealth of your friends* as treasure laid up for your use.

“Take courage then, Hiero, enrich your friends with a liberal hand; for by that means you will enrich yourself. Augment the power of the state, for thus you will render yourself more powerful, and secure alliances in time of war.

“In a word, regard your country as your own family; your fellow-citizens, as your friends; your friends, as your own children; and your children, as your own life: but endeavour to surpass them all in acts of kindness and beneficence. For if you thus secure the attachment of your friends by acts of beneficence, your enemies will not be able to resist you.

To conclude: if you regulate your conduct according to these maxims, be assured, Hiero, you will obtain the most honourable and most valuable possession which mortals can possibly enjoy; you will be completely happy, yet unenvied by any one.”

* See Appendix.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

RESPUBLICA, res est populi, cum benè et justè geritur; sive ab unô rege, sive a paucis optimatibûs, sive ab universô populô. Cum verò injustus est rex, quem *tyrannum* voco; aut injusti optimates, quorû consensus *factio* est; aut injustus est populus, cui nomen usitatum nullum reperio; nisi ut etiam ipsum *tyrannum*, adpellem; non jam vitiosa sed omninò nulla respublica est: Quoniam non est res populi, cum tyrannus eam factiove capessat; nec ipse populus jam *populus* est, si sit injustus; quoniam non est multitudo juris consensû et utilitatis communione sociata.

FRAGM. l. 3. *de Republicâ.*

“ A legitimate commonwealth is where the *common-weal* or good of the whole is consulted; whether under a king, an aristocracy, or a democracy. But if either of these act unjustly, or in defiance of the law, there is no longer a commonwealth; nor are the people properly a people, but a mob; because not united under common laws, or a community of rights and advantages.” This is partly the sense, but it cannot well be literally translated.

No. II.

TULLY, in his pleadings against Verres, not only calls Syracuse, “*maximam Græciæ urbem pulcherrimamque*,”—the largest and most beautiful city of Greece,—but is so minute in his description of its harbours, temples, and theatres, and of the statues and pictures of which Verres plundered them, that it seems to have exceeded almost any other city in the world; which is partly confirmed by the ruins yet remaining, as described by Mr. Brydone, Watkins, &c.

No. III.

DIODORUS SICULUS calls him φιλάργυρος και βιαίος, covetous and cruel, &c. But Pindar, who resided much at the court of Hiero, and has celebrated his victories at the Olympic games, speaks of him as a truly virtuous character. And indeed a man that was notorious for any crime or depraved morals, could not be a candidate at those games. And the glory acquired by a victory in the chariot-races, or in the gymnastic exercises, or the more liberal arts, history, poetry, &c. seemed to supersede all other virtues.

The mere English reader, who has taken his ideas of the Olympic and other games of ancient Greece, from what he has seen or heard of our Newmarket sports, or our boxing-matches, which are usually an assembly of gamblers and pick-pockets, attended with every species of profligacy and blackguardism, will be astonished at the veneration in which those games were held by all ranks of people, and the almost divine honours which were paid to them who gained the prize on those occasions, who were almost literally exalted to the rank of demigods, as Horace has observed:

“Palmaque nobilis

“Terrarum dominos evehit ad Deos.”

OD. i. b. i.

But these solemn games were originally instituted by the command of the Delphic oracle, to put a stop to a great pestilence, which, with the continual wars between the petty states of Greece, had almost depopulated the country: so that they had partly a religious and partly a political view: as, during these solemnities, even states that were at war with each other were obliged to suspend their hostilities, and join the general assembly of all Greece.

The utility of the gymnastic exercises, to render the body more hardy and active; and of the chariot-races, to encourage the breeding and management of horses*, was indeed in time de-

* The Greeks were so ignorant, in the earlier ages, of the management of horses, that the fable of the Centaurs, probably, took its rise from seeing some Thessalians on their backs at a distance.

feated, by their sacrificing the end to the means, and making them mere prize-fighters, instead of good soldiers, &c.*

Plutarch has recorded a few wise sayings and anecdotes of Hiero, which seem to indicate this mixed and motley character.

He said, "That no man was impertinent, who told him freely what ought not to be concealed; but that he who told what ought to be concealed, did an injury to the person to whom he told the secret: for we not only hate the man who *discovers*, but him who has *heard* what we wish to conceal."

It is a common anecdote of Hiero, that a stranger having hinted to him that his breath was offensive, he expostulated with his wife for having never mentioned that circumstance to him. "I thought," said she, (with great simplicity) "all *men's* breath smelled the same." An amiable and artless proof of her fidelity to a suspicious husband!

I am sorry to add, "that Hiero *fined* the celebrated comic-poet, Epicharmes, for having uttered something indecent when his wife was present." A *frown* from a king would have been sufficient, and have shown a love of virtue; a *fine* savoured rather of the love of money.

* See West on the Olympic Games, p. 184.

No. IV.

“ Non enim Poeta solum suavis, verum etiam ceteroqui
doctus sapiensque.”

De Nat. Deorum, lib. i.

SIMONIDES seems to have been a very elegant writer, from the fragments which remain of his poetry.

The coarseness of his satire on women must be imputed to the simplicity of the age in which he lived; (about four hundred and fifty years after the Trojan war) and to the low rank of the ladies who were the subject of his satire.

Mr. Addison has given the substance of this satire in the third volume of the *Spectator*, No. 209. But, in the character of a slut, whom Simonides compares to a sow, Mr. A. has, out of delicacy, lost the idea of the original, *παιίνεται*, “ she grows *fat* amidst the filth of her sty;” which he translates, “ her family is no better than a *dunghill*.” He concludes his satire with a description of a good woman, whom he compares to a bee. Solomon concludes his book of Proverbs in the like manner; but as that of Simonides is a mere sketch, it cannot be compared with Solomon’s beautiful picture*.

* Proverbs, chap. xxxi.

Horace has almost literally translated some of his moral sentences, L. ii. Od. 13; and L. iii. Od. 2.

“ Mors et fugacem persequitur virum.”

Θάνατος ἐφῆκε καὶ τὸν φευγομανόν.

Tully has recorded his answer to Hiero, who asked him “ what God was ?” Simonides desired a day to consider of it. Being asked the same question the next day, he desired two days for that purpose, and thus often doubled the number.

Hiero, being greatly surprised at this, inquired the reason of his conduct. “ Because,” said Simonides, “ the longer I consider the subject, the more obscure it seems to be.”—*De Naturâ Deor.* lib. i.

The following reflexions on human life, though now trite, were *not* so, probably, three thousand years ago. It appears to have been the received opinion at that time, that Homer was a native of Chios; that, at least, was his chief residence, where the present inhabitants pretend to point out the very place in which he established a school in the latter part of his life.

ON THE BREVITY OF HUMAN LIFE:

FROM SIMONIDES.

How swiftly glide life's transient scenes away!

“ Like vernal leaves men flourish and decay.”

Thus sung, in days of yore, the Chian bard;

This maxim all have heard, but none regard.

None keep in mind this salutary truth,
 Hope still survives, that flatters us in youth.
 What fruitless schemes amuse our blooming years!
 The man in health, nor age nor sickness fears;
 Nay, youth's and life's contracted space forgot,
 Scarce thinks that *death* will ever be *his* lot.
 But thou thy mind's fair bias still obey,
 Nor from the paths of *virtue* ever stray.

The original seems to inculcate the Epicurean maxim of "*indulge genio*," as Buchanan translates it; which would incline one to believe that these lines were of an age subsequent to Simonides.

No. V.

NOTHING can give us a more lively idea of the perpetual alarms and anxiety of a tyrant, than Tully's sketch of the elder Dionysius; which, though familiar to every scholar, may not be disagreeable to the English reader.

After describing him as possessed of many natural advantages, and as a man of great abilities, and (as an ingredient of happiness) very *temperate* in his way of life, he proceeds:—

"Though Dionysius," says he, "had a number of friends and relations, with whom he lived on the most intimate and familiar terms, yet he placed no *confidence* in any of them; but committed to those slaves whom he had selected from wealthy

families, and given them their freedom, and to some foreign mercenaries, the guard of his person. Thus, from an unjustifiable ambition of domineering over other people, he delivered himself up to a kind of voluntary imprisonment.

“ Nay, he grew at length so astonishingly suspicious, that he would not trust his throat to a barber, but taught his own daughters to shave: so that these young princesses, like little female barbers*, performed the mean and servile offices of shaving and cutting the hair of their own father. And even from them, when they grew up, he took away his razors and every thing of steel, and instructed them to burn off his beard with the inner rinds† and shells of the walnut.

“ Neither did he ever go to the apartments of his two wives‡, by night, till it had been first searched and scrutinized with the utmost care. And having his bed-chamber surrounded with a broad ditch, the passage was secured by a narrow wooden bridge, which, after fastening his door, he himself drew up. In short, to such an extreme did his apprehensions carry him, that he never ventured to harangue the people but from the top of a lofty tower.

“ But this tyrant himself has sufficiently shown us what degree of happiness he enjoyed. For, when Damocles, one of his flatterers, was enumerating the abundance of his wealth, his grandeur,

* Ut Tonstriculæ.

† Putaminibus.

‡ It may be worth while to read the account of the magnificence with which he brought home his two wives,—one drawn by four white horses, &c.—*Univer. Hist. from Diod. Sic.*

his power, and the magnificence of his royal palaces; and, in a strain of adulation, insisted upon it, that there never was a more *happy* man existed." "Will you then, Damocles," says the tyrant, "since you are so delighted with my way of life, have yourself a taste of it, and make the experiment?" "As Damocles, of course, answered in the affirmative, he ordered him to be seated on a golden sofa, covered with a fine mattress, and sumptuous carpets, highly wrought in the most elegant taste; the table set out with the most exquisite dainties; the room adorned with cabinets, with gold and silver vases, highly embossed; perfumes, garlands of flowers, and incense burning: to crown all, he was served by the most beautiful slaves, who were ordered carefully to watch his eye, and attend his nod. In short, Damocles felt himself the happiest of mortals.

"But, alas! in the midst of these splendid preparations, Dionysius had ordered a glittering naked sword to be suspended from the ceiling, by a single horse-hair, immediately over the head of this *happy* man.

"Now, therefore, the whole visionary scene instantly vanished: he no longer beheld the beautiful attendants, nor the plate, so artificially carved; nor could he touch any of the delicacies on the table; the garlands dropped from his head. In short, he begged of the tyrant to let him depart, for he did not wish to be happy upon such terms." Does not Dionysius himself, then, sufficiently demonstrate, that no one can possibly be happy in a state of continual terror and anxiety,

like that of the tyrant?—*Tusc. Quest. lib. v. c. xx.*

I cannot forbear mentioning a peculiar source of misery to Dionysius: he unfortunately took it into his head, that he excelled all others in poetry, as well as in power; and was so offended with his friend Philoxenus, for attempting to undeceive him in that particular, that he in his wrath sent him instantly to that horrible dungeon, called the *Latumiæ*, or *Stone-Quarries*. He was set at liberty, however, the very next day, and restored to favour: and the tyrant made a noble entertainment on the occasion. But, in the midst of their jollity, the prince was determined to gain the applause of Philoxenus, whose approbation he preferred to that of a thousand flatterers. He desired him, therefore, to divest himself of *envy*, (for Philoxenus was a poet as well as a critic) and declare his real sentiments. Philoxenus could not dissemble; and therefore, without making any answer to Dionysius, turned to the guards, who always attended, and with an humorous air, *desired them to carry him back to the Stone-Quarries.*

Dionysius (though probably piqued) said, the *wit* of the poet had atoned for his *freedom*.—*Plut. Moral.*

N. B. It was Dionysius the younger, who, after enduring the miseries of royalty, was *condemned* to be a schoolmaster.

No. VI.

MONTAIGNE, who has pillaged every ancient classic author, quotes and enlarges upon some of Hiero's sentiments; but gives them the vulgar turn, to prove that kings and beggars, if stripped of their external appendages, are upon a level, which few people now a day will dispute. The following, however, are put in a striking light.

“The honour we receive from those that fear us does not deserve the name; that respect is paid to my royalty, not to me. Do I not see, that the wicked and the good king, he that is hated, and he that is beloved, has the one as much reverence paid him as the other? My predecessor *was*, and my successor *will* be, served with the same ceremony and parade as myself. If my subjects do not injure me, it is no proof of their good-will towards me. It is not in their power, if they were inclined to do it. No one follows me from any friendship which subsists between us: there can be no friendship contracted, where there is so little connexion or correspondence. All that they say or do is pretence and show: I see nothing around me but disguise and dissimulation.”—
Lib. i. c. 42.

No. VII.

I SHALL conclude these extracts with a short one from Lord Bolingbroke's "Letter on Patriotism." Speaking of superior spirits, whether invested with royalty, or placed in other elevated situations, "They either appear," says he, "like ministers of divine vengeance, and their course through the world is marked by desolation and oppression, by poverty and servitude; or, they are the guardian angels of the country they inhabit; busy to avert even the most distant evil, and to maintain or to procure peace, plenty, and the greatest of human blessings, LIBERTY."

P. S. I have availed myself of Peter Coste's French translation, but have never adopted an expression without having first examined the original with the most scrupulous attention.

END OF HIERO : ON THE CONDITION OF ROYALTY.

THE SCIENCE
OF
GOOD HUSBANDRY;
OR
THE ECONOMICS OF XENOPHON.

TRANSLATED BY

R. BRADLEY, F. R. S.

PROFESSOR OF BOTANY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

THE SCIENCE

OF

GOOD HUSBANDRY;

THE ECONOMICS OF XENOPHON.

TRANSLATED BY

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THE SCIENCE

OR

GOOD HUSBANDRY;

OR

THE ECONOMICS OF XENOPHON.

I REMEMBER once to have heard the learned Socrates reasoning with Critobulus, concerning the management of an house, in the following manner :

Soc. “ Tell me, Critobulus, whether the ordering of an house is a science, such as that of physic, of the brasiers, and of the masons?”

Crit. “ My opinion is, that the good management of an house is as great a science as either masonry, physic, or any other; from whence we may infer there is a distinct business or duty belonging to an economist or housekeeper, as well as to any science whatever: a farmer or a master of a family ought to be a good judge of every particular which relates to the good ordering of his farm or house.”

Soc. "But may we not find a trusty steward well skilled in this science, who may take the management of the household upon him, and save the master the trouble? for a master mason employs a deputy under him, who will do his work as well as himself; and for the same reason we may expect that a steward well skilled in the management of an house, may be as serviceable to his master as the mason's deputy."

Crit. "I am of the same opinion, good Socrates."

Soc. "Then the man who is well skilled in this science, though he has no property of his own, may gain a comfortable living by directing another man's house. For the man would be worthy of the master's favour, and a good steward, if in the discharging of his stewardship he could improve his master's house. But what do we mean by the word house, or the economy of it? Is it only the good distribution of the things that are in the house? or is it the good management and improvement of every thing belonging to an house, and the master of it?"

Crit. "It is my opinion, that a man's estate, whether it lie in or about the house, or remote from it, yet every branch of that estate may be said to belong to the house; nay every thing that a man has, except his enemies, which some men have in great numbers, but these are not to be reckoned among his goods or substance. It would be ridiculous if we were to say that the man who had been the occasion of making us more enemies than we had before, should be rewarded with favour or money; but a man's ene-

mies, or any thing which he possesses to his hurt or prejudice, must not, I suppose, be reckoned among his goods: therefore I conclude, that those things only which contribute to the welfare of a man may be reckoned among his riches, or be properly called his goods."

Soc. "I am of the same mind, that whatever is injurious to a man must not be esteemed a part of his goods; for if a man buy a horse, and for want of skill to manage him, he falls from him and hurts himself, can that horse be reckoned amongst his goods? No, certainly; because those things should only be called goods that are beneficial to the master. Neither can those lands be called goods, which by a man's unskilful management put him to more expense than he receives profit by them; nor may those lands be called goods, which do not bring a good farmer such a profit as may give him a good living: so likewise if a man has a flock of sheep, and they come to damage by his unskilful management, he cannot reckon them among his goods."

Crit. "So those may only be called goods which are profitable, and those which are hurtful be deemed the contrary."

Soc. "You distinguish right, that nothing ought to be esteemed goods to any man which he does not receive advantage by; and that those things which bring him disprofit must be esteemed the contrary. A flute, when it is in the hands of a person who can play well upon it, is an advantage, and may be reckoned among his goods; but the same instrument in the possession of one

who does not know the use of it, is no better to him than a stone, unless he sells it, and then the price of it may be accounted among his goods; but if he keeps it, when he has no knowledge of its use, it cannot be ranked among them."

Crit. "I agree with you in this point, that those things only which are profitable may be called goods: the flute, while we keep it unemployed, is no part of our goods, for we have no advantage from it; but if we sell it, it is then profitable to us."

Soc. "You say right, if a man has wit enough to sell it well: but when it is sold, and the man has not wisdom enough to use the value of it to his advantage, yet whatever price he gets for it cannot be esteemed to be good."

Crit. "By this you seem to intimate that money itself is not good, if it is in the hands of one who does not know how to use it."

Soc. "Yes, certainly; for we have already agreed that nothing may be esteemed good but what we can get profit by. If a man bestow the money he gets upon harlots, and by continual conversing with them he impairs his health, and abandons the care of his estate, then his money is no profit to him; but, on the contrary, is an errant poison, which will shortly bring him to destruction: therefore, friend Critobulus, money is good only to those who know how to use it; but to those who know not rightly the value of it, it were better for them to cast it away, to avoid the damage it would do them."

Crit. "But what say you of friends? if a man

knows how to use them, and make them profitable to him, what shall we esteem them to be?"

Soc. "These may truly be called goods; they ought to be preferred before our houses, our land, our cattle, or our flocks; the profit which may arise by them may be superior to all others."

Crit. "Then by the same rule our enemies may be esteemed goods, if we know how to profit ourselves by them."

Soc. "Undoubtedly they are so; therefore it behoves a master of a house to use his enemies with that discretion that he may make them advantageous to him by any means: for how many instances have we, good Critobulus, of ordinary men, as well as of noblemen and kings, who have increased and amplified their fortunes by law, and warring with their enemies."

Crit. "You reason well, good Socrates, of these matters. But what think you of those who have good learning, and many other good properties, whereby they have every opportunity of improving their estates, and yet never put their minds to it? We have many instances of men with these qualifications, who never regard the advancement of their fortunes; shall we then reckon their learning, or their other properties, among their goods, seeing they make no advantage of them, or ought we to esteem them the contrary?"

Soc. "I imagine you mean bondmen, or such other vile persons."

Crit. "No, good Socrates; but the persons I speak of are young gentlemen, who are expert in affairs of war, as well as peace; and yet they

abandon their knowledge for trifles ; and such as them I esteem in a worse condition than bondmen ; for I suppose they do not employ themselves in the sciences they have been bred to, because they have not masters to direct them or set them to work."

Soc. "How can that be, friend Critobulus, that they are without directors? they have many masters, which, when they would study their felicity and their advantage, lead them away from their virtuous inclinations."

Crit. "These masters then are invisible!"

Soc. "Not so invisible, good Critobulus, but that we may easily discover them to be the most mischievous of any that reign upon earth. What think you of sloth, idleness, negligence, want of public spirit? Where these govern, what can we expect but mischief? But, besides these, there are others which govern under the name of pleasures ; as gaming, lewd company, rioting, and such others, which in process of time teach their adherents that pleasures are not without their inconveniences. These rulers keep them so much in servitude, that they do not allow them the least liberty to do any thing for their advantage."

Crit. "But there are others, friend Socrates, who have none of these directors to prevent their welfare, but apply themselves assiduously to business, and give their minds entirely to the advancement of their fortunes, and yet waste their estates, ruin their families, and destroy themselves, without hope of redemption."

Soc. "These also are bondmen, and are rather

worse slaves than the others, for these have the most severe masters of the two: some are under the tyranny of drunkenness, others slaves to gluttony, and some to vanity and vain-glory: all which keep their subjects in that severity of servitude, that as long as they find them young, lusty, and able to work, they make them bring all that they can get by any means to bestow upon these lusts and pleasures; but as soon as they perceive them to grow so old, that they can labour no longer for them, they are then turned off to lead the remainder of their days in want and misery, while their quondam masters are contriving to ensnare others in their room. Wherefore, good Critobulus, we ought by all means to resist such invaders of our liberties, even with as much force and resolution as we would oppose an enemy who with sword in hand attempts to bring us into slavery. There are some enemies who have wisdom and goodness enough, when they have brought men into their subjection, to learn them government and moderation, which before were proud and arrogant. But as for the tyrants I have mentioned before, they never cease harassing and tormenting both the bodies and estates of those which fall into their hands, till they have utterly destroyed them.

Crit. “You have sufficiently spoken to this point; and, now I examine myself, I verily believe I have conduct and courage enough to resist such deceitful invaders; and I now desire your advice concerning the management of my house, that both myself and fortune may be improved;

for I am persuaded I shall not be overcome by those enemies to reason which you have so largely exposed. And therefore, good Socrates, give me your deliberate opinion how I shall act for the good of myself and estate; although perhaps you may think that we are already rich enough."

Soc. "For my own part, if I am one of those you speak of, I want nothing, I have riches enough; but for yourself, Critobulus, I esteem you a very poor man; and, by the faith I owe to the gods, I often pity you."

Crit. "Your discourse makes me laugh! If you are so very rich as you esteem yourself, pray inform me what may be the value of all your estate if it were sold, and what do you imagine is the worth of all my possessions?"

Soc. "Perhaps, if I sell all my possessions at a good market, I may gain five or six pounds for them: but I know very well, that were your whole estate to be sold, the price would be more than a thousand times as much; and yet though you know this, you are still desirous to increase your estate, and upbraid me with my poverty. What I possess is enough to supply me with necessities; but to support your grandeur, and draw the respect due to your quality and the post you possess, I am of opinion, that were you master of four times as much as you have already, you would still be in want."

Crit. "I do not conceive how that can be."

Soc. "In the first place, your rank requires you to feast and make entertainments for the people, to gain their good-will, and command

their respect. In the next place, you must live hospitably, and receive and entertain all strangers, and gain their esteem. And in the third place, you must continually be doing good offices to your fellow citizens, that upon an emergency you may find friends. Besides, I already observe that the city of Athens begins to put you upon expensive works; viz. to furnish them with horses, to raise public buildings, to muster men, to erect theatres, and to treat the citizens with plays. But if this nation should be once involved in war, I am sure their demand upon you in taxes, and other duties, will be as much as your purse will be able to bear. And when that happens, if you are discovered to conceal any of your riches, or do not answer their demands to your full power, you must undergo the same punishment as if you had robbed the common treasury. And besides, I find you possessed with the opinion that you have riches enough, and therefore give yourself up to vain and trifling pleasures, which is the effect of your riches. It is for these reasons, good Critobulus, that I grieve for you, lest you fall under misfortunes that may end in the greatest poverty without remedy: and for myself, if I should be necessitous, you know very well that many would relieve me; and if I received but a little of every one, I should have more money than would satisfy my wants: but, as for your friends, though they have more riches in their stations, than you possess in yours, they have yet expectations of preferment from you."

Crit. “I confess I find nothing amiss in your discourse. I so much approve of it, that my greatest desire is, that you will instruct me with such good precepts as may preserve me from the misery you speak of, and that I may never be an object of your compassion, unless it be in a good cause.”

Soc. “I suppose then, friend Critobulus, you are not now in the same laughing mind you was in, when I told you I had riches enough; do you now believe I know wherein consists the value of riches? You ridiculed me when you made me confess that I had not by a thousandth part so much as you have, and now you desire my most friendly instructions to keep you from extreme poverty.”

Crit. “I perceive, good Socrates, that you have sufficient wisdom to instruct a man how to gain true riches, even in the greatest plenty; and I am persuaded, that the man who knows how to make the most of a little, is no less capable of managing the greatest fortune.”

Soc. “You may remember, that towards the beginning of our discourse I told you that horses ought not to be reckoned among the goods of those who know not how to use them, nor land, nor sheep, nor money, or any other thing whatever; and yet every one of these are profitable, when they are used discreetly. As for my own part, I have never had any of these; and how then should I be able to inform you of the use of them? But though a man has neither money nor

goods, yet I am persuaded there is such a science as the good ordering of an house. Why then, good Critobulus, should you not be master of this science? For the reason why every man cannot play well upon the flute, is either because he has not a flute of his own, or cannot borrow a flute of another to practise upon. The same impediment have I in the science of ordering an house; for I was never yet master of the implements belonging to housekeeping, neither goods nor money; nor was there ever any who intrusted me with the management of their house, or estate, although you now desire my directions. But you are sensible, that learners of music in the beginning spoil their instruments; so that were I now to begin my practice upon your estate, I should destroy it."

Crit. "Thus you endeavour to evade the business I desire you to undertake, and would shun taking share with me in the management of my affairs."

Soc. "That is not the case. I am willing to serve you in any thing, within the bounds of my capacity. But suppose you was in want of fire, and came to me for it, and I had none, but directed you to a place where you might have it; would not that be of the same account? Or if you want water, and I have it not, but direct you where to have it, will not that be as agreeable to you? And if you would be instructed in music, and I directed you to a better judge in music than myself, would not that answer your design?"

Therefore, since I have no knowledge of myself in the affair you speak of, the best pleasure I can do you, is to recommend you to such persons who are most expert in the business you require; and that, I judge, I am able to do; for I have made it my business to search out the most ingenious of all sorts in every quarter of the city, having observed that among the practisers of the same service, and the same trade, some of the practitioners were hardly capable of subsisting, or getting their bread, while others got estates. This, I confess, made me admire; till at length I discovered that some men ran headlong upon their business without any consideration, and are so rash in their undertakings, that they always come off losers; while, on the other hand, I observed that all those who went about their work deliberately, and advised well upon their business before they set about it, these men accomplished their affairs with more facility, more despatch, and to more advantage. Which observation may serve, as a lesson, to instruct you how your fortune may be advanced upon a sure foundation."

Crit. "Then I am resolved not to part from you till you have acquainted me with those wise men you speak of, who are capable of informing me of the matters I want."

Soc. "Will it be amiss if I show you some men who have been at vast expenses in building, and set about their work with so little judgement or consideration, that after an immense treasure has been spent by them, they have only raised an

unprofitable pile to their discredit? And, on the contrary, there are other men, who with much less charge have erected useful and profitable buildings. Will not this be one step towards the good ordering of an house?"

Crit. "You are surely right."

Soc. "Will it then be improper, if I show you, in the next place, that some men have plenty of rich and useful furniture for their houses, and for all uses; and when any part of it should be used, it is out of the way, and to seek, and it is not known whether it be lost, or laid in safety? This, wherever it happens, discomposes the master of the house, and occasions him to be angry with his servants. But there are others, who have no more goods or furniture, or, perhaps, have not half so much, and yet have every thing ready at hand to answer their occasions."

Crit. "The reason is plain, good Socrates; the first have no order in the distribution of their goods, but let them lie in confusion; the others have a regard that every thing should be laid up in its proper place."

Soc. "You are in the right, good Critobulus; but it is not only necessary that every thing should be set in its place, but also, that there should be a proper and convenient place to set it in."

Crit. "This also is necessary towards the good ordering of an house."

Soc. "Suppose I likewise show you, that in some places the slaves and servants are chained

and strictly watched, and yet often run away from their masters; while, in other places, where they are in freedom, and have their liberty, they work heartily for their masters, and are perpetually striving who shall act most for their advantage. Is not this a point worthy the regard of an house-keeper?"

Crit. "Certainly, it is very worthy the regard of a master."

Soc. "Nor will it be of less use, if I show you that some husbandmen continually complain of want, and are in a starving condition; while others, who practise the same science of husbandry, have every thing necessary about them, and live upon the fat of the land."

Crit. "This will surely be of good use. But perhaps the first you speak of bestow their money and goods improperly; or dispose of what they get to the disadvantage of themselves and their families."

Soc. "There are surely some such husbandmen; but I only speak of those who call themselves husbandmen, and yet can hardly find themselves with a sufficiency of meat and drink."

Crit. "What should be the cause of this?"

Soc. "I will bring you among them, that you may learn by their example."

Crit. "That is my desire, good Socrates."

Soc. "But first you must learn how to distinguish between the good and the bad, when you see them. I have known you rise early in the morning, and travel long journies to see a co-

medy, and you have pressed my company with you ; but you never invited me to such a sight as this we speak of."

Crit. " Dear Socrates, forbear your banter, and proceed in your good instructions."

Soc. " Suppose I show you some men, who by keeping great stables of horses are reduced to extreme poverty ; while others, by the same means, have got great estates, and live splendidly ?"

Crit. " I have seen them, and know them both ; but I cannot discern what advantage that will be to me."

Soc. " The reason is, that you see them as you do plays, not with a design of becoming a poet, but purely for amusement and recreation ; and perhaps you do not amiss in that, if your genius does not lead you to be a poet ; but as you are obliged to keep horses, is it not necessary that you should understand what belongs to them, that by your skill you may reap an advantage by them ?"

Crit. " You mean that I should breed horses."

Soc. " By no means ; for you may have a good servant without the trouble of bringing him up from a child. There are ages both of horses and men wherein they are immediately profitable, and will improve every day upon your hands. Moreover, I can show you some men, who have been so discreet in the management of their wives, that their estates have been greatly advantaged by them ; but there are others, and not a few, who by means of their wives have been utterly ruined."

Crit. "But who is to be blamed for this; the husband, or the wife?"

Soc. "If a sheep is out of order, we commonly blame the shepherd; and if a horse have not his goings as he should, but is skittish and mischievous, we blame the breaker: and as for a wife, if her husband instruct her well in his affairs, and she neglect them, she is not wise; but if her husband does not his part, in giving her proper instructions for her government, and she behaves herself disorderly, and unbecoming her sex, or herself as a mistress of an house, is not then the man to blame?"

Crit. "Yes, without doubt; and it is a subject that I should be glad to discourse with you about: and, by the friendship we owe one another, tell me sincerely and freely, Is there any one among all your friends whom you intrust with so great a share of your household affairs as your wife?"

Soc. "It is true, I do not: but tell me likewise, Is there one you converse with seldomer upon that subject than you do with your wife?"

Crit. "You judge right; for if there are any, there are very few, who know less of my affairs than my wife."

Soc. "You married her very young, before she had seen or heard much of the world; therefore it would be more to be admired if she acted as she ought to do, than if she did amiss."

Crit. "Then, good Socrates, do you imagine that those, who bear the character of good housewives, have been taught to be so?"

Soc. "I will not dispute that with you at present, but refer you to my wife Aspasia, who will inform you better than I can myself. But, to proceed: I esteem a wife to be a good and necessary companion for the master of an house, and one who ought to bear the next share of government under the master of the house: there is only a little more power in the husband than in the wife: the substance of the estate is generally increased by the industry and labour of the man; but the wife, for the most part, has the care upon her to distribute and order those things that are brought into the house: and if, therefore, the husband and wife agree in their management, the houses and estates improve; but where there is not this harmony, they must necessarily decay. I could likewise inform you in many other sciences, if the instruction were needful."

Crit. "There is no occasion, good Socrates; for the richest man has not occasion to employ men of all faculties, nor is there any man who has occasion to practise them all. But such sciences as are honourable and becoming my province to understand, those I desire to learn, as well from the persons you may judge most capable of teaching me, as from yourself, whom principally I shall depend upon to give the finishing stroke."

Soc. "You reason well, friend Critobulus; for there are many crafts which are not necessary for you to know: those are called handicrafts, and are the least regarded in our city and commonwealth; for they destroy the health of those who

practise them, by keeping their bodies in the shade, and confining them to a sedentary habit, or else by employing them all day over the fire, which is yet as unhealthful; and when once the body is tender and feeble, the stomach and spirits must certainly be weak. And besides, men of such occupations can have no time to bend their minds either to do their friends any good, or can have leisure to assist the commonwealth: therefore such people cannot readily serve their friends, if they should happen to be in distress; nor are fit persons to serve their country in time of adversity. For which reason, in some cities and commonwealths, especially such as are deeply engaged in war, a citizen is not suffered to practise any handicraft."

Crit. "What faculties then, good Socrates, would you advise me to use?"

Soc. "The king of Persia, I think, may set us a good example; for we are told that the sciences which are most esteemed by him are war and husbandry: these, of all others, he reckons the most honourable as well as the most necessary, and accordingly gives them encouragement."

Crit. "And can you imagine, good Socrates, that the king of Persia has any regard for husbandry?"

Soc. "I shall endeavour to satisfy you whether he has or not. You will allow with all the world, that he delights in war, because of his obligations on the princes under him to furnish him with certain numbers of troops by way of tribute; either to keep his subjects in awe and prevent

rebellion, or to guard his country against foreign enemies that may come to invade it. Besides these, he keeps large garrisons in several castles, and appoints a treasurer to pay their wages duly, that they may be kept in good order. His tributary troops are all mustered once in twelve months, that they may be disciplined and ready for an engagement, if any commotion or invasion should happen; but the garrisoned forces and his own guards he reviews himself, and intrusts the inspection of his remoter troops to such a lieutenant as he can best confide in, upon whose report he either rewards or punishes the leaders of the several legions, according as they have acted for his honour in their several stations. Those especially who have their troops in the best order and discipline, he confers on them the greatest honours, and rewards them with such presents as may put them above the world ever after; and for those who have neglected their duty and abused the soldiers under them, he dismisses them from their governments, and loads them with shame. It cannot be doubted but a prince that acts with this conduct must understand war, and is well skilled in the military science.

“ On the other hand, he employs great part of his time in riding about his neighbouring part of the country, and observing the state of husbandry, whether the lands are tilled as they ought to be; and for the remote parts, he sends such deputies to examine them as are esteemed to be the properest judges; and when he finds that his governors and deputies have kept their several countries well

inhabited, and the ground well cultivated, with such produce as it will best bear, he raises them in honours, loads them with presents, and enlarges their governments; but if he finds the country thin of people, or the ground uncultivated, or that extortions or cruelties have been committed by his governors, he inflicts severe punishments on them, and discharges them from their employments. From these examples, do you believe that the king of Persia has not as great regard to the peopling his country, and the science of husbandry, as he has to keeping an army in such an order as may defend it? But it is to be observed among his high officers, that no one of them has the charge of two commissions at one time; for some are appointed to be overseers of his lands and husbandmen, and to receive his tributes that arise by them, while others are employed to overlook the soldiery and garrisons; so that if the governor of the garrison neglects his duty in keeping good order or defending his country, the lieutenant over the affairs of husbandry accuses him, that his land is not cultivated for want of a sufficient defence against the encroaching parties, which are common enough in those parts. But if the governor of the garrison performs his duty, and keeps the country under his jurisdiction in peace; and the director of affairs of husbandry neglects his business, so that the country is in want of people, and the lands are not ordered as they ought to be, then he is accused by the governor of the garrison; for if the husbandry is neglected, the soldiers must

starve, and the king himself must lose his tribute. But in some part of Persia there is a great prince called Satrapa, who takes upon him the office both of soldiery and husbandry."

Crit. "If the king acts as you inform me, he seems to take as much delight in husbandry as he does in war."

Soc. "I have not yet done concerning him; for in every country where he resides, or passes a little time, he takes care to have excellent gardens, filled with every kind of flower or plant that can by any means be collected, and in these places are his chief delight."

Crit. "By your discourse it appears also, that he has a great delight in gardening; for, as you intimate, his gardens are furnished with every tree and plant that the ground is capable of bringing forth."

Soc. "We are told likewise, that when the king distributes any rewards, he first appoints the principal officers of his soldiery, who have the greatest right to his favour, to appear before him, and then bestows on them presents according to their deserts: for the tilling of ground would be of no effect, unless there were forces well managed to defend it. And after the soldiers he next distributes his honours and preferments among those who have taken good care that his lands were well cultivated and the people kept from idleness; observing at the same time that vigilant soldiers could not subsist without the care of the industrious husbandmen. We are told likewise, that Cyrus, a king famed for his wisdom and warlike

disposition, was of the same mind, with regard to husbandry; and used to distribute rewards to his most deserving soldiers and husbandmen, telling them at the same time, that he himself had deserved the presents he gave away, because he had taken care of the tillage of his country, and had also taken care to defend it."

Crit. "If this is true of Cyrus, it is evident enough that he had as much love for husbandry as he had for war."

Soc. "If Cyrus had lived, he would have proved a very wise prince, for we have many extraordinary proofs of his wisdom and conduct: one passage in particular I may take notice of, which is, when he met his brother in battle to decide the dispute who should be king, from Cyrus no man deserted, but many thousands deserted from the king to Cyrus; which surely must be the effect of his virtue, for there is no greater argument of a prince's goodness, than the love of the people, and especially when they pay him a voluntary obedience, and stand by him in time of distress. In this great contest the friends of Cyrus stood fighting about him while he was yet alive, and even after his fall maintained their post till they were all slain by his side, except Ariæus, who was posted in the left wing of the army. When Lysander brought presents to Cyrus from the cities of Greece, that were his confederates, he received him with the greatest humanity, and among other things showed him his garden, which was called "the Paradise of Sardis;" which when Lysander beheld, he was struck with ad-

miration of the beauty of the trees, the regularity of their planting, the evenness of their rows, and their making regular angles one to another; or, in a word, the beauty of the quincunx order in which they were planted, and the delightful odours which issued from them. Lysander could no longer refrain from extolling the beauty of their order, but more particularly admired the excellent skill of the hand that had so curiously disposed them; which Cyrus perceiving, answered him: 'All the trees that you here behold are of my own appointment; I it was that contrived, measured, and laid out the ground for planting these trees, and I can even show you some of them that I planted with my own hands.' When Lysander heard this, and saw the richness of his robes, and the splendour of his dress, his chains of gold, and the number and curiosity of the jewels about him, he cried out with astonishment, 'Is it possible, great king, that you could condescend to plant any of these trees with your own hands?'—'Do you wonder at that, Lysander?' answered Cyrus. 'I assure you, that whenever I have leisure from war, or am the most at ease, I never dine till I have either done some exercise in arms, or employed myself in some point of husbandry, till I sweat.' To which Lysander replied: 'You are truly fortunate, great king, in being a wise and good man.' This, good Critobulus, I thought proper to acquaint you of, that you may know how much the richest and most fortunate among men delight themselves in husbandry: for it is a business of that nature, that at the same time it is

delightful and profitable, both to the body and estate, affording such exercise as will increase a man's health and strength, and such advantages as may greatly improve his fortune. By husbandry the ground gives us every thing necessary for our food and nourishment, and such things likewise as afford the greatest pleasures. Moreover, it furnishes us with beautiful flowers, and other excellent materials for the ornament and decoration of the temples and altars, affording the richest gayety, and most fragrant odours. So likewise it produces meats for the use of men; some without much trouble, others with more labour; for the keeping of sheep is a branch of husbandry. But though it gives us plenty of all kinds of things, yet it does not allow us to reap them in sloth and idleness, but excites us to health and strength by the labour it appoints us. In the winter, by reason of the cold; and in summer, by reason of heat; and for them who labour with their hands, it makes them robust and mighty; and those who only oversee their works, are quickened and prompted to act like men; for they must rise early in the morning, and must exercise themselves with walking from one place to another. For, both in the fields and in cities, whatever is undertaken to the purpose, must be done in a proper time and season. Again: if a man is inclined to practise horsemanship, and grow expert in that science for the defence of his country, an horse can be no where better kept, than in the country; or if a man choose to exercise himself on foot, or in running, husbandry

gives him strength of body, and he may exercise himself in hunting: here is also meat for his dogs, as well as entertainment for wild beasts, and beasts of the game: and the horses and dogs, thus assisted by husbandry, return as good service to the ground; for the horse may carry his master early in the morning to oversee that the workmen and labourers do their duty in the fields, and returns with the master again at night at the latest hour, if his presence should be required till that time; and the dogs are a defence against wild beasts, that they spoil not the fruits of the earth, nor destroy the sheep, and even keep a man safe in a wilderness. Again: the practice of husbandry makes men strong and bold, enabling them to defend their country; for in open countries the husbandmen are not without robbers, who would invade their lands, and carry off their crops, if they had not strength and courage enough to resist them. What faculty will sooner encourage a man to leap, to run, or draw a bow, than husbandry? and what science is there that brings a man more advantage for his labour? What science is more agreeable to a studious man? for he finds in it every thing he can have occasion for. Where shall a stranger be better received and entertained? or where shall a man live more commodiously in winter, than in the place where he may be accommodated with firing enough and hot baths? Where can we abide with greater pleasure in summer, than near rivers, springs, woods, groves and fields, where gentle breezes fan the air? Where may a man treat his guests more agreeably,

or make more triumphant banquets? What place do servants delight in more? Or what other place is more agreeable to the wife? Where do children covet more to be? Or where are friends better received, or better satisfied? There is no science, in my mind, more delightful than this, if a man has a convenient substance to put him to work; nor any business more profitable to a man, if he has skill and industry. Again: the ground may teach men justice, if they have discretion enough to observe it; for it rewards those very liberally, who take care of it and assist it. But if it should happen that a country, by means of wars, should be obliged to lie uncultivated; yet those who have been bred up to husbandry are hardy and fit for soldiers, and may by that means get their living; and oftentimes it is more certain seeking a livelihood with weapons of war, in time of war, than with instruments of husbandry.

“The science of husbandry also brings men to good discipline, and prepares them to go to war when there is occasion. For the ground cannot be tilled without men; and a good husbandman will always provide the strongest, lustiest workmen he can get for that purpose, and such especially as will readily obey his commands, and are tractable in their business; and this is much the same with the business of a general when he is ordering his army: in either case those are rewarded that behave themselves well, or those are punished who are obstinate and neglect their duty. A good husbandman must as often call upon his workmen and encourage them, as a general or

leader of an army ought to encourage his soldiers; for bondmen should be no less encouraged and fed with hopes by their masters than freemen; nay rather more, that their inclinations may bind them to their masters, and keep them from running away. He was surely a wise man who said, that husbandry was the mother and nurse of all other sciences; for if husbandry flourish, all other sciences and faculties fare the better; but whenever the ground lies uncultivated, and brings no crop, all other sciences are at a loss both by sea and land."

Crit. "Good Socrates, you reason well of this matter; but you are sensible there are many unforeseen accidents that happen in husbandry, which sometimes will destroy all our hopes of profit, though an husbandman has acted with the greatest skill and diligence; sometimes hail, droughts, mildews, or continual rains, spoil our crops, or vermin will even eat up the seed in the ground; and also sheep, though they have never so good pasture, are sometimes infected with distempers, which destroy them."

Soc. "I thought, good Critobulus, that you allowed the gods to have the direction of husbandry, as well as the battle. We all know that before our generals lead forth their armies, they make vows, prayers, and offer sacrifices to the gods, to bribe them in favour of their enterprise, and consult the oracles what is best to do. And think you that, in the business of husbandry, we ought not to implore the favour of the gods as much as we do in the affair of war? Be assured,

friend Critobulus, that all virtuous men attend the temples with sacrifices, prayers, and oblations for the welfare of all their fruits, their oxen, their sheep, their horses, and of every thing else that they possess."

Crit. "I agree with you, good Socrates, that in all our undertakings we ought, before we set about them, to consult and implore the pleasure of the gods, as their power is superior to all others, as well in war as in peace: but our purpose is to consult about the well-ordering of an house; therefore I desire you will resume your discourse, and proceed to the purport of our design: for I confess you have already made such an impression on me with regard to the ordering of an house, and how a man ought to live, that I long for your farther instructions."

Soc. "Will it not then be proper to have a respect to our foregoing arguments, and make a recapitulation of those things that we have agreed in, that in the progress of our discourse we may know what has been settled between us?"

Crit. "It will be a great pleasure; for when two men have lent money to one another, there is nothing more agreeable to them both, than to agree in their reckoning: so now in our discourse it will be no less agreeable to know what particulars we have settled betwixt us."

Soc. "We first agreed, that the ordering of an house is the name of a science; and that to act for the increase and welfare of an house, is that science.

"Secondly, we agreed, that by the word *house*,

we mean all a man's possessions, and such goods as are useful to a man's life; and we found that every thing was profitable to a man that he knew how to use with judgement: wherefore we concluded it was impossible for a man to learn all manner of sciences; and as for the handicrafts, we thought proper to exclude them, as many cities and commonwealths do, because they seem to destroy bodily health; and this particularly where there is danger of enemies invading the country, or where there are wars; for were we on that occasion to set the handicraftmen on one side, and the husbandmen on the other, and ask them whether they would rather go out against their enemies, or give up their fields and defend the cities; those who had been used to the labour of the field would rather go out to fight and deliver their country, and the artificers would choose rather to sit still in the way they had been brought up, than put themselves into the least danger: we, moreover, recommended husbandry as a good exercise, and a calling of that profit that will bring its master every thing that is necessary: besides, it is a business soon learned, and extremely pleasant to them who practise it; it also makes the body robust and strong, gives a bloom to the face, and qualifies a man with a generosity of spirit to assist his friends and his country: besides this, we have also joined in opinion, that the practice of husbandry makes men hardy and courageous, and able to defend their country; because, by the fields lying open and exposed to invaders, they have frequent skirmishes, and therefore know the better

how to fight. It is for these reasons that husbandry is esteemed the mother of sciences and the most honourable in all governments: it is healthful, and breeds good men, and occasions generosity of spirit and good will towards one's friends and country."

Crit. "You have fully persuaded me that husbandry is a most pleasant and profitable occupation; but I remember in your discourse you told me of some husbandmen who get plentiful fortunes by their practice, and that there were others who through mismanagement became beggars by it: I desire you would clear up these two things to me, that when I come to practise this science, I may follow that way which will be the most advantageous, and avoid the contrary."

Soc. "But suppose I should first tell you, good Critobulus, of a discourse I once had with a man who might truly be called good and honest; for it will assist in what you desire."

Crit. "I shall be glad to hear that discourse, which may inform me how to gain the worthy name of a truly good and honest man."

Soc. "That which first led me to consider the value of one man more than of another, was by finding among the artificers, such as builders, painters, and statuaries, those were always esteemed the best and most worthy whose works were the most perfect; so that it was their works that gained them the applause of the people. I had likewise heard that there were those among the people, who had so behaved themselves, that they were esteemed good and

honest men : these men, above all others, I coveted to converse with, that I might learn how they gained that character ; and because I observed that good and honest were companions in their character, I saluted the first man I met that had a goodly presence, expecting to find the character of good and honest in the most comely personage, rather than any other : but I soon found I was far from my aim, and began to recollect myself that there are many fair faces, and personages of graceful appearance, that possess the most sordid dispositions, and ungenerous souls ; so that now I was sensible the good and honest man was not to be known by the external appearance, but that the surest way to find what I sought for, was to search for one of those that bore the character. In the course of my inquiries I was recommended to one whose name is Ischomachus, a man esteemed by both the sexes, citizens and strangers, as truly worthy the character I sought for ; and I soon made it my business to find him out. When I first saw him, I found him sitting in a portico of one of the temples alone ; and as I concluded he was then at leisure, I placed myself by him, and addressed myself to him in the following manner :—

“ Good Ischomachus, I much wonder to see you thus unemployed, whose industry leads you ever to be stirring for the good of some one or other.”—“ Nor should you now have found me here, good Socrates,” said Ischomachus, “ if I had not appointed some strangers to meet me at this place.”—“ And if you had not been here,” said

Socrates, "where would you have been? or, I pray you, how would you have employed yourself? for I wish to learn what it is that you do to gain the character from all people of a good and honest man: the good complexion of your features seems to denote, that you do not always confine yourself to home." At this, Ischomachus, smiling, seemed to express a satisfaction in what I had said, and replied: "I know not that people give me the character of a good and honest man, for when I am obliged to pay money either for taxes, subsidies, or on other occasions, the people call me plainly Ischomachus: and for what you say concerning my not being much at home, you conjecture right, for my wife is capable of ordering such things as belong to the house."—"But pray tell me," said Socrates, "did you instruct your wife how to manage your house, or was it her father and mother that gave her sufficient instructions to order an house before she came to you?"—"My wife," answered Ischomachus, "was but fifteen years old when I married her; and till then she had been so negligently brought up, that she hardly knew any thing of worldly affairs."—"I suppose," said Socrates, "she could spin, and card, or set her servants to work."—"As for such things, good Socrates," replied Ischomachus, "she had her share of knowledge."—"And did you teach her all the rest," said Socrates, "which relates to the management of an house?"—"I did," replied Ischomachus, "but not before I had implored the assistance of the gods, to show me what instructions were necessary for her; and that she

might have an heart to learn and practise those instructions to the advantage and profit of us both.”—“ But, good Ischomachus, tell me,” said Socrates, “ did your wife join with you in your petition to the gods?”—“ Yes,” replied Ischomachus, “ and I looked upon that to be no bad omen of her disposition to receive such instructions as I should give her.”—“ I pray you, good Ischomachus, tell me,” said Socrates, “ what was the first thing you began to show her? for to hear that, will be a greater pleasure to me, than if you were to describe the most triumphant feast that had ever been celebrated.”—“ To begin then, good Socrates, when we were well enough acquainted, and were so familiar that we began to converse freely with one another, I asked her for what reason she thought I had taken her to be my wife, that it was not purely to make her a partner of my bed, for that she knew I had women enough already at my command; but the reason why her father and mother had consented she should be mine, was because we concluded her a proper person to be a partner in my house and children: for this end I informed her it was, that I chose her before all other women; and with the same regard her father and mother chose me for her husband: and if we should be so much favoured by the gods that she should bring me children, it would be our business jointly to consult about their education, and how to bring them up in the virtues becoming mankind; for then we may expect them to be profitable to us, to defend us, and comfort us in our old age. I further

added, that our house was now common to us both, as well as our estates; for all that I had I delivered into her care, and the same she did likewise on her part to me; and likewise that all these goods were to be employed to the advantage of us both, without upbraiding one or the other, which of the two had brought the greatest fortune; but let our study be, who shall contribute most to the improvement of the fortunes we have brought together; and accordingly wear the honour they may gain by their good management.'

"To this, good Socrates, my wife replied, 'How can I help you in this? or wherein can the little power I have do you any good? for my mother told me, both my fortune, as well as yours, was wholly at your command, and that it must be my chief care to live virtuously and soberly.'—'This is true, good wife,' answered Ischomachus, 'but it is the part of a sober husband and virtuous wife to join in their care, not only to preserve the fortune they are possessed of, but to contribute equally to improve it.'—'And what do you see in me,' said the wife of Ischomachus, 'that you believe me capable of assisting in the improvement of your fortune?'—'Use your endeavour, good wife,' said Ischomachus, 'to do those things which are acceptable to the gods, and are appointed by the law for you to do.'—'And what things are those, dear husband?' said the wife of Ischomachus. 'They are things,' replied he, 'which are of no small concern, unless you think that the bee which remains always in the hive, is unemployed: it is her part to oversee the bees

that work in the hive, while the others are abroad to gather wax and honey; and it is, in my opinion, a great favour of the gods to give us such lively examples, by such little creatures, of our duty to assist one another in the good ordering of things; for, by the example of the bees, an husband and wife may see the necessity of being concerned together towards the promoting and advancing of their stock: and this union between the man and woman is no less necessary to prevent the decay and loss of mankind, by producing children which may help to comfort and nourish their parents in their old age. It is ordained also for some creatures to live in houses, while it is as necessary for others to be abroad in the fields: wherefore it is convenient for those who have houses and would furnish them with necessary provisions, to provide men to work in their fields, either for tilling the ground, sowing of grain, planting of trees, or grazing of cattle; nor is it less necessary, when the harvest is brought in, to take care in the laying our corn and fruits up properly, and disposing of them discreetly. Little children must be brought up in the house, bread must be made in the house, and all kinds of meats must be dressed in the house; likewise spinning, carding, and weaving, are all works to be done within doors; so that both the things abroad, and those within the house, require the utmost care and diligence; and it appears plainly, by many natural instances, that the woman was born to look after such things as are to be done within the house: for a man naturally is strong of body, and capable of enduring

the fatigue of heat and cold, of travelling and undergoing the harsher exercise; so that it seems as if Nature had appointed him to look after the affairs without doors: the woman being also to nurse and bring up children, she is naturally of a more soft and tender nature than the man; and it seems likewise that Nature has given the woman a greater share of jealousy and fear than to the man, that she may be more careful and watchful over those things which are intrusted to her care; and it seems likely, that the man is naturally made more hardy and bold than the woman, because his business is abroad in all seasons, and that he may defend himself against all assaults and accidents. But because both the man and the woman are to be together for both their advantages, the man to gather his substance from abroad, and the woman to manage and improve it at home, they are indifferently endowed with memory and diligence. It is natural also to both to refrain from such things as may do them harm, and likewise they are naturally given to improve in every thing they study, by practice and experience; but as they are not equally perfect in all things, they have the more occasion of one another's assistance: for when the man and woman are thus united, what the one has occasion for is supplied by the other: therefore, good wife, seeing this is what the gods have ordained for us, let us endeavour, to the utmost of our powers, to behave ourselves in our several stations to the improvement of our fortune: and the law, which brought us together, exhorts us to the same purpose. And also, as it is natural,

when we are thus settled, to expect children, the law exhorts us to live together in unity, and to be partakers of one another's benefits : so Nature, and the law which is directed by it, ordains that each severally should regard the business that is appointed for them. From whence it appears, that it is more convenient for a woman to be at home and mind her domestic affairs, than to gad abroad ; and it is as shameful for a man to be at home idling, when his business requires him to be abroad : if any man acts in a different capacity from that he is born to, he breaks through the decrees of Nature, and will certainly meet his punishment, either because he neglects the business which is appointed for him, or because he invades the property of another. I think that the mistress bee is an excellent example for the wife.' — ' And what is the business of the mistress bee,' said the wife of Ischomachus, ' that I may follow the example of that which you so much recommend to me, for it seems you have not yet fully explained it?' — ' The mistress bee,' replied Ischomachus, ' keeps always in the hive, taking care that all the bees, which are in the hive with her, are duly employed in their several occupations ; and those whose business lies abroad, she sends out to their several works. These bees, when they bring home their burthen, she receives, and appoints them to lay up their harvest, till there is occasion to use it, and in a proper season dispenses it among those of her colony, according to their several offices. The bees who stay at home, she employs in disposing and ordering the combs,

with a neatness and regularity becoming the nicest observation and greatest prudence. She takes care likewise of the young bees, that they are well nourished, and educated to the business that belongs to them; and when they are come to such perfection that they are able to go abroad and work for their living, she sends them forth under the direction of a proper leader.'—'And is this my business, dear Ischomachus?' said his wife.—'This example, good wife,' replied Ischomachus, 'is what I give you as a lesson worthy your practice: your case requires your presence at home, to send abroad the servants whose business lies abroad, and to direct those whose business is in the house. You must receive the goods that are brought into the house, and distribute such a part of them as you think necessary for the use of the family, and see that the rest be laid up till there be occasion for it; and especially avoid the extravagance of using that in a month which is appointed for twelve months' service. When the wool is brought home, observe that it be carded and spun for weaving into cloth; and particularly take care that the corn, which is brought in, be not laid up in such a manner that it grow musty and unfit for use. But, above all, that which will gain you the greatest love and affection from your servants, is to help them when they are visited with sickness, and that to the utmost of your power.' Upon which his wife readily answered, 'That is surely an act of charity, and becoming every mistress of good nature; for, I suppose, we cannot oblige people more than to help them when

they are sick: this will surely engage the love of our servants to us, and make them doubly diligent upon every occasion.'—This answer, Socrates," said Ischomachus, "was to me an argument of a good and honest wife; and I replied to her, 'That by reason of the good care and tenderness of the mistress bee, all the rest of the hive are so affectionate to her, that whenever she is disposed to go abroad, the whole colony belonging to her, accompany, and attend upon her.'—To this the wife replied: 'Dear Ischomachus, tell me sincerely, Is not the business of the mistress bee, you tell me of, rather what you ought to do, than myself; or have you not a share in it? For my keeping at home and directing my servants, will be of little account, unless you send home such provisions as are necessary to employ us.'—'And my providence,' answered Ischomachus, 'would be of little use, unless there is one at home who is ready to receive and take care of those goods that I send in. Have you not observed,' said Ischomachus, 'what pity people show to those who are punished by pouring water into sieves till they are full? The occasion of pity is, because those people labour in vain.'—'I esteem these people,' said the wife of Ischomachus, 'to be truly miserable, who have no benefit from their labours.'—'Suppose, dear wife,' replied Ischomachus, 'you take into your service one who can neither card nor spin, and you teach her to do those works, will it not be an honour to you? Or if you take a servant which is negligent, or does not understand how to do her business, or has been subject

to pilfering, and you make her diligent, and instruct her in the manners of a good servant, and teach her honesty, will not you rejoice in your success? and will you not be pleased with your action? So again, when you see your servants sober and discreet, you should encourage them and show them favour; but as for those who are incorrigible and will not follow your directions, or prove larcinaries, you must punish them. Consider, how laudable it will be for you to excel others in the well-ordering your house; be therefore diligent, virtuous, and modest, and give your necessary attendance on me, your children, and your house, and your name shall be honourably esteemed, even after your death; for it is not the beauty of your face and shape, but your virtue and goodness, which will bring you honour and esteem, which will last for ever.'—After this manner, good Socrates," cried Ischomachus, "I first discoursed with my wife concerning her duty and care of my house."—"And did you perceive," said Socrates, "that she improved by what you taught her?"—"Yes," replied Ischomachus, "she was as extremely diligent to learn and practise what was under her care, as one of her tender years could be, who knew nothing of her duty before. Once I saw her under a great concern, because she could not readily find a parcel which I had brought home; but when I perceived her grieved, I bid her take no further thought about it, for it was time enough to grieve when we wanted a thing which we could not purchase, but this was not our case; and even though what I asked for

was then out of the way, it was not her fault, because I had not yet appointed proper places or repositories for the several things that belonged to the house ; but that I would take care to do it, that she might put every thing in proper order, allotting to every particular thing its place, where it might be found when there was occasion for it. ‘ There is nothing, dear wife,’ said Ischomachus, ‘ which is more commendable or profitable to mankind, than to preserve good order in every thing.

“ ‘ In comedies and other plays, where many people are required to act their parts, if the actors should rashly do or say whatever their fancy led them to, there must of necessity be such confusion as would disgust the audience : but, when every person has his part perfect, and the scenes are regularly performed, it is that order which makes the play agreeable and pleasing to the beholders.

“ ‘ So likewise, good wife, an army, when it is once in disorder, is under the greatest confusion and consternation, if the enemy is at hand ; for the enemy has little to do to overcome them ; their own hurry and confusion will contribute more to their overthrow than the attacks of the adversary. Here you may imagine waggons, footmen, horsemen, chariots, elephants and baggage, all intermixed and crowded together ; obstructing and hindering one another. If one runs, he is stopped by him that would stand the battle ; and he that stands, is jostled by every messenger that passes him : the chariots over-run the men of arms ;

and the elephants and horsemen, which in their proper places would be useful, are intermixed among the foot, trampling on them, and in a great measure doing them as much mischief as their enemies would do. And suppose, while an army is in this confusion, they are attacked by their enemy in good order, what can they expect but destruction? But an army drawn up in good order, how glorious a sight is it to their friends, and how terrible to their enemies! How delightful it is to see the infantry drawn up and exercising in good order, or marching with so much exactness and regularity, that the whole body moves like one man! How agreeable is this to their friends! And to observe an army drawn up in a line of battle, well-disciplined, and advancing in good order, have not their enemies reason to fear them? Or what makes a galley, well-furnished with men, so terrible to the enemy, and so pleasant a sight to their friends, but because of its swift passage upon the waters? And what is the reason that the men within it do not hinder one another, but that they sit in order, make their signs in order, lie down in order, rise up in order, and handle their oars in order?

“ ‘ As for confusion and disorder, I can compare it to nothing better, than if a countryman should put together in one heap, oats, wheat, barley and pease, and when he had occasion to use any one of them, he must be obliged to pick out that sort grain by grain. Wherefore, good wife, by all means avoid confusion as much as possible, and study good order in every thing, for it will be

both pleasant and profitable to you. Every thing then, as you have occasion for it, will be ready at hand to use as you please, and what I may happen to ask for will not be to seek; let us therefore fix upon some proper place where our stores may be laid up, not only in security, but where they may be so disposed, that we may presently know where to look for every particular thing. And when once we have done this in the best order we can, then acquaint the steward of it, that when any thing is wanted he may know where to find it; or when any thing is brought into the house, he may at once judge of the proper place to lay it in. By this means we shall know what we gain and what we lose; and, in surveying our storehouses, we shall be able to judge what is necessary to be brought in, and what may want repairing, or what will be impaired by keeping. When we have visited these a few times, we shall grow perfect in the knowledge of all our goods, and readily find what we seek for.'

"I remember, good Socrates," said Ischomachus, "I once went aboard a Phœnician ship, where I observed the best example of good order that I ever met with: and, especially, it was surprising to observe the vast number of implements, which were necessary for the management of such a small vessel.

"What numbers of oars, stretchers, ship-hooks, and spikes, were there for bringing the ship in and out of the harbour! What numbers of shrowds, cables, halsers, ropes, and other tackling, for the guiding of the ship! With how

many engines of war was it armed for its defence! What variety and what numbers of arms, for the men to use in time of battle! What a vast quantity of provisions were there for the sustenance and support of the sailors! And, besides all these, the loading of the ship was of great bulk, and so rich, that the very freight of it would gain enough to satisfy the captain and his people for their voyage: and all these were stowed so neatly together, that a far larger place would not have contained them, if they had been removed. Here, I took notice, the good order and disposition of every thing was so strictly observed, that, notwithstanding the great variety of materials the ship contained, there was not any thing on board which the sailors could not find in an instant: nor was the captain himself less acquainted with these particulars than his sailors: he was as ready in them, as a man of learning would be to know the letters that composed the name Socrates, and how they stand in that name. Nor did he only know the proper places for every thing on board his ship; but, while he stood upon the deck, he was considering with himself what things might be wanting in his voyage, what things wanted repair, and what length of time his provisions and necessaries would last: for, as he observed to me, it is no proper time, when a storm comes upon us, to have the necessary implements to seek, or to be out of repair, or to want them on board; for the gods are never favourable to those who are negligent or lazy; and it is their goodness that they do not destroy us when we are

diligent. When I had observed the good order which was here practised, I informed my wife of it; at the same time admonishing her to observe the great difficulty there must needs be to keep up such a regular decorum on board a ship, where there were such numerous varieties of materials, and such little space to lay them in: 'But how much easier, good wife,' said Ischomachus, 'will it be for us, who have large and convenient store-houses for every thing to its degree, to keep a good decorum and order, than for those people on board a ship, who yet are bound to remember where, and how, every thing is distributed in the midst of a storm at sea? But we have none of these dangers to disturb and distract our thoughts from the care of our business; therefore we should deserve the greatest shame, and be inexcusable, if we were not diligent enough to preserve as good order in our family as they do on board their vessel. But we have already said enough,' continued Ischomachus, 'concerning the necessity and advantage of good order; nor is it less agreeable to see every thing belonging to the dress, or wearing-apparel, laid carefully up in the wardrobe; the things belonging to the kitchen, let them be there; and so those belonging to the dairy, likewise in the dairy: and, in a word, every thing which regards any kind of office belonging to the house, let it be neatly kept and laid up in its proper office. And this is reputable both to the master and mistress of the house; and no one will ridicule such good management, but those who are laughed at for their own ill management.

'This, good wife,' said Ischomachus, 'you may be sensible of at an easy rate, with little trouble. Nor will it be difficult to find out a steward, who will soon learn from you the proper places or repositories for every thing which belongs to the house; for in the city there is a thousand times more variety of things than ever we shall have occasion for; and yet if we want any thing, and send a servant to buy it for us, he will readily go to the place where it is to be had, from the good disposition of things in the several shops which are proper for them, and from the remembrance he will have of observing them in such and such places. There can be no other reason for this, than the disposing every thing in the market or city in its proper place, as all kinds of fowls at the poulterers', all sorts of fish at the fishmongers', and the like of other things which have places determined for them: but if we go about to seek a man, who at the same time is seeking us, how shall we find one another, unless we have beforehand appointed a meeting place?' Then, as for setting our household goods in order, I spoke to her in the following manner."—"But tell me, good Ischomachus," said Socrates, "did your wife understand and practise what you taught her?"—"She promised me," answered Ischomachus, both by words and by her countenance, that she agreed to what I said, and was delighted that *method* and *good order* would take off so great a share of her trouble: she rejoiced to think she should be delivered from the perplexed state she was in before, and desired that I would not delay

putting my promise in practice as soon as possible, that she might reap the fruits of it.”—“ And how did you proceed, good Ischomachus?” said Socrates. “ I answered her,” said Ischomachus, “ in such a manner, that she might learn first what an house was properly designed for ; that it was not ordained to be filled with curious paintings or carvings, or such unnecessary decorations ; but that the house should be built with due consideration, and for the conveniency of the inhabitants ; and as a proper repository for those necessaries which properly belong to a family, and, in some measure, directs us to the proper places wherein every particular ought to be placed : the most private and strongest room in the house seems to demand the money, jewels, and those other things that are rich and valuable ; the dry places expect the corn ; the cooler parts are the most convenient for the wine ; and the more lightsome and airy part of the house for such things as require such a situation. I showed her likewise,” continued Ischomachus, “ which were the most convenient places for parlours and dining-rooms, that they might be cool in summer and warm in winter ; and also, that as the front of the house stood to the south, it had the advantage of the winter’s sun ; and in the summer it rejoiced more in the shade, than it could do in any other situation. Then,” said Ischomachus, “ I appointed the bed chambers, and the nursery, and apartments for the women, divided from the men’s lodging, that no inconveniency might happen by their meeting without our consent or approba-

tion ; for those who behave themselves well, and we allow to come together to have children, they will love us the better for it ; but those, who through subtilty will endeavour to gain their ends with any of the women without our consent, will be always contriving and practising ways to our disadvantage, to compass or carry on their lewd designs. When we were come thus far," proceeded Ischomachus, " we began to set our goods in order. In the first place, we assorted all the materials belonging to sacrifices : after that, my wife's apparel was assigned to their proper places ; her richest habits by themselves, and those which were in more common use by themselves. Next to these, we appointed a wardrobe for the master's clothes ; one part for his armour and such accoutrements as he used in war, and another for his wearing apparel, to be used upon common occasions : after these, we directed places for the instruments which belong to spinning, and for the bakehouse, the kitchen, and the baths ; and took care, in the appointment of all these things, to make a division between those things which are most commonly required to be in use, and such as are only in use now and then : we likewise separated those things which were for a month's service from those which were to serve twelve months ; for by this means we might know the better how our stock is employed. When we had done this, we instructed every servant respectively where every thing belonging to his office might be found, and directed them carefully to observe, that every implement under

their care should be put into the same place where they took it from, when they had done using it ; and as for such things as are but seldom required to be used, either upon festivals, or upon the reception of strangers ; those we delivered into the care of a discreet woman, whom we instructed in her province ; and when we had made an account with her of the goods delivered into her care, and taken it in writing, we directed her to deliver them out to those under her, as she saw proper occasions, and be careful to remember who were the persons to which she delivered every particular ; and that upon receiving again the things which she had delivered out, they should be every one laid up in their proper place. In the next place, we chose a discreet, sober, and judicious woman to be our storekeeper or housekeeper, one who had a good memory, and was diligent enough to avoid faults, studying our pleasure and satisfaction in all her business, and endeavouring to gain our esteem, which we always signified by presents, by which means we gained her love and friendship for us ; so that, whenever we had occasion to rejoice, we made her partaker of our mirth ; or if any accident happened which brought sorrow with it, we made her acquainted with that likewise, and consulted her in it : this made her bend her mind to the advancement of our fortunes. We instructed her to show more esteem for those servants in the house whom she found were deserving of favour, than the others who neglected their duty ; for we took care to observe to her, that those who did well were worthy re-

ward in the world; while those who were deceitful and evil-minded, were rejected of the people. And then, good Socrates," said Ischomachus, "I let my wife know that all this would be of little effect, unless she was careful to observe that every thing was preserved in the good order we had placed it: for in cities, and in other governments that are well ordered, it is not enough to make good laws for their conduct, unless there are proper officers appointed to see them put in execution, either to reward those who deserve well, or punish the malefactors. 'This, dear wife, I chiefly recommend to you,' continued Ischomachus, 'that you may look upon yourself as the principal overseer of the laws within our house. And I informed her also, that it was within her jurisdiction to overlook, at her own pleasure, every thing belonging to the house, as a governor of a garrison inspects into the condition of his soldiers, or as the senate of Athens review the men of arms, and the condition of their horses; that she had as great power as a queen in her own house, to distribute rewards to the virtuous and diligent, and punish those servants who deserved it. But I further desired her, not to be displeased, if I intrusted her with more things, and more business, than I had done any of our servants; telling her at the same time, that such as were covenant-servants have no more goods under their care and trust, than are delivered to them for the use of the family; and none of those goods may be employed to their own use, without the master's or mistress's consent: for whoever is master or mis-

tress of the house, has the rule of all that is within it, and has the power of using any thing at their pleasure; so that those who have the most profit by goods, have the most loss by them, if they perish or are destroyed. So it is therefore the interest of them that have possessions, to be diligent in the preservation of them.”—“ Then,” said Socrates, “ tell me, good Ischomachus, how did your wife receive this lesson?”—“ My wife,” replied Ischomachus, “ received it like a woman ready to learn and practise what might be for the honour and welfare of us both, and seemed to rejoice at the instructions I gave her.” ‘ It would have been a great grief to me,’ said she, ‘ if, instead of those good rules you instruct me in, for the welfare of our house, you had directed me to have no regard to the possessions I am endowed with; for as it is natural for a good woman to be careful and diligent about her own children, rather than have a disregard for them; so it is no less agreeable and pleasant to a woman, who has any share of sense, to look after the affairs of her family, rather than neglect them.’

“ When I heard,” continued Socrates, “ the answer which the wife of Ischomachus gave him, I could not help admiring her wisdom.”—“ But I shall tell you yet much more of her good understanding,” said Ischomachus: “ there was not one thing I recommended to her, but she was as ready to practise it, as I was willing she should go about it.”—“ Go on, I pray you, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “ for it is far more delightful to hear the virtues of a good woman

described, than if the famous painter Zeuxis was to show me the portrait of the fairest woman in the world.”—“ Then,” continued Ischomachus, “ I remember, on a particular day, she had painted her face with a certain cosmetic, attempting to make her skin look fairer than it was ; and with another mixture had endeavoured to increase the natural bloom of her cheeks ; and also had put on higher shoes than ordinary, to make her look taller than she naturally was. When I perceived this,” said Ischomachus, “ I saluted her in the following manner : ‘ Tell me, good wife, which would make me the most acceptable in your eyes, to deal sincerely by you, in delivering into your possession those things which are really my own, without making more of my estate than it is ; or for me to deceive you, by producing a thousand falsities which have nothing in them : giving you chains of brass instead of gold, false jewels, false money, and false purple, instead of that which is true and genuine ? ’ To which she presently replied : ‘ May the gods forbid that you should be such a man ! for, should you harbour such deceit in your heart, I should never love you. ’—‘ I tell you then, dear wife,’ replied Ischomachus, ‘ we are come together, to love one another, and to delight in each other’s perfections : do you think I should be the more agreeable to you in my person, or should you love me the better, if I was to put a false lustre upon myself, that I might appear better complexioned, more fair in body, or more manly than what Nature has made me ; or that I should paint and anoint my face, when you

receive me to your arms, and give you this deceit instead of my natural person?'—'Surely, dear Ischomachus,' replied his wife, 'your own person, in its natural perfections, is preferable to all the paints and ointments you can use to set it off; nor can all the art you might use be comparable to your natural appearance.'—'Believe then, good wife,' said Ischomachus, 'that I have the same abhorrence of false lustre that you have: can there be any thing more complete in Nature than yourself? or would there be any thing less engaging to me than that you should use any means to hide or destroy those perfections in you which I so much admire? The God of Nature has appointed beauties in all creatures, as well in the field as among the human race; the magnificence of the male to be admired by the female, and the tender and curious texture of the female to be admired by the male. It is natural for the creatures in the field to distinguish one another by the purity of their beauties; there is no deceit, there is no corruption: so the men always admire that body which is most pure, or the least deformed by art. Such wiles and deceits may, perhaps, deceive strangers, because they will not have opportunities of discovering and laughing at them; but if such things should be practised between those who are daily conversant with one another, how soon will the imposition be discovered! how soon will they be ridiculed! For these deceits appear at the rising out of bed, and from that time, till the persons have had opportunity of renewing them; as well as when they sweat, when they

shed tears, when they wash, and when they bathe themselves.'

"What answer, good Ischomachus," said Socrates, "did your wife give you to this lecture?"—"The best that could be," replied Ischomachus, "for she has never since attempted any of these false glosses, but has constantly appeared in her natural beauties, and repeated her solicitations to me to instruct her, if there was any natural means of assisting them. I then directed her that she should not sit too much, but exercise herself about the house as a mistress, to examine how her several works went forward; sometimes to go among the spinners or weavers, to see that they did their duty, and to instruct those who were ignorant, and encourage the most deserving among them; sometimes to look into the bake-house, to see the neatness and order of the woman that looks after it; and sometimes visit her housekeeper, to account with her for the yarn, or other commodities, that are brought into her charge: and now and then to take a turn about her house, to see that every thing is disposed in its proper place. This method, I supposed," said Ischomachus, "would be a means of giving her an healthful exercise, and at the same time of leading her to that business which would be for her advantage, in benefiting our fortune. I also told her, the exercise of bolting, baking, and looking after the furniture of her house, to brush it and keep it clean, when she wanted something to do, would be commendable, and help to employ her; for I recommended exercise to her as a great

benefit: 'for exercise,' said Ischomachus, 'will create you an appetite to your meat, and by that means you will be more healthful, and add, if possible, to the bloom of your beauty: and also the clean appearance of the mistress among the servants, and her readiness to set her hand to work, will encourage them to follow her example; for a good example does more than all the compulsion that can be used. Those, who study nothing but their dress, may indeed be esteemed by those who understand nothing else; but the outside appearance is deceitful. And now, good Socrates, I have a wife who lives up to the rules given her.'—"Then," said Socrates, "good Ischomachus, you have fully satisfied me concerning the duty of a wife, as well as of your wife's good behaviour, and your own management. I beg now you will acquaint me, good Ischomachus," continued Socrates, "what method it is that you have taken on your part towards the management of your fortune, and especially what it is that has gained you the character of a good and honest man; that when I have heard what you have done, I may give my thanks according to your deserts."—"I shall be glad," replied Ischomachus, "to satisfy you in any thing within my power, provided you will correct my errors, if I am guilty of any."—"But," answered Socrates, "how can I correct you, when you are already possessed of the character of a good and honest man? and especially when I am the man who is taken for the greatest trifler, and who employs himself in nothing but measuring the air; or, which is a far

worse character, that I am a poor man, which is a token of the greatest folly? This, indeed, might have been a trouble to me, if I had not met the other day an horse belonging to Nicias, with a crowd of people about him, admiring his good qualities, and talking abundance in praise of his strength and spirit: this made me ask the question of the master of the horse, Whether his horse was very rich? but he stared upon me, and laughed at me, as if I had been a madman; and only gave me this short answer: ‘How should a horse have any money?’ When I heard this, I went my way contented, that it was lawful for a poor horse to be good, on the account only of his free heart and generous spirit; and therefore, I conclude, it is likewise possible for a poor man to be good: for which reason, I beseech you, good Ischomachus, tell me your manner of living, that I may endeavour to learn it, and model my life after your example; for that may well be called a good day, when a man begins to grow good and virtuous.”—“ Good Socrates, you seem to banter me,” said Ischomachus: “ however, I will tell you, as well as I can, the whole method of my living, which I design constantly to follow till the day of my death. I perceived, that except a man knew well what was necessary to be done, and diligently applied himself to put his knowledge in practice, the gods would not suffer him to prosper. And I also observed, that those who act with wisdom and diligence, the gods reward them with riches. Therefore, first of all, I paid my adoration to the gods, and implored their assistance in

all that I had to do, that they would be pleased to give me health, strength of body, honour in my city, good will of my friends, safety in the day of battle, and that I might return home with an increase of riches and honour.”—“ When I heard that,” said Socrates, “ I asked him, Are riches then so much worthy your esteem, good Ischomachus; seeing that the more riches you have, the more care and trouble you have to order and preserve them?”—Then Ischomachus replied: “ I have no small care to provide me with riches, for I have great pleasure in serving the gods honourably with rich sacrifices; and also to serve my friends, if they happen to want; and likewise to help the city in time of danger or distress.”—“ Truly, what you say, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “ is honourable, and becoming a man of power and substance.”—To which Ischomachus answered: “ These are my reasons, good Socrates, why I think riches worth my labour; for there are some degrees of men who cannot subsist without the help of others; and there are also some who think themselves rich enough, if they can get what is barely necessary for their support. But those who order their houses and estates with such discretion and good judgement, that they advance their fortunes and increase their riches; and by that means become serviceable and honourable to the city, and are capable of serving their friends; why should not such men be esteemed wise and generous, and deserve power?”—“ You are in the right,” replied Socrates; “ there are many of us that may well respect such men: but I pray you,

good Ischomachus, go on to relate what method you take to support your health and strength of body, and what means you use to return home honourably from the war: and as for the ordering and increasing of the estate, we may hear that by and by.”—“ I think,” said Ischomachus, “ these things are so chained together, that they cannot well be separated; for when a man has a sufficient store of meat and drink, and uses a convenient share of exercise, his body must of necessity be healthful and strong; and such a body, when it is well exercised in the affairs of war, is most likely to return home from battle with honour. And he, who is diligent and industrious in his business, must as surely improve his estate.”—“ Good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “ all that you have yet said I grant to be good, that he who uses diligence and exercise will increase his fortune. But tell me, I beseech you, what exercise do you take to maintain your good complexion, and to get strength, and how do you exercise yourself to be expert in war, and what methods do you follow to increase your estate, that enables you to help your friends, and assist the city in honour and strength? These things I desire to learn.”—“ To tell you freely, good Socrates,” said Ischomachus, “ I rise so early in the morning, that if I have any one to speak with in the city, I am sure to find him at home; or if I have any other business to do in the city, I do it in my morning’s walk: but when I have no matter of importance in the city, my page leads my horse into the fields, and I walk thither, for I esteem the walk into the free

air of the country to be more healthful than to walk in the galleries or piazzas of the city; and when I arrive at my ground where my workmen are planting trees, tilling the ground, or sowing, or carrying in of the fruits, I observe how every thing is performed, and study whether any of these works may be mended or improved: and when I have diverted myself enough at my villa, I mount my horse, and make him perform the exercise of the academy, such as is serviceable in war; and then ride him through all the difficult paths, waters, through trenches, and over hedges, to make him acquainted with those difficulties as much as possible, without hurting him: and when I have done this, my page takes my horse, and leads him trotting home, and takes along with him, to my house, such things out of the country as are wanted, and walk home myself: then I wash my hands, and go to such a dinner as is prepared for me, eating moderately, and never to excess, or too sparingly."

"Good Ischomachus," said Socrates, "you do your business very pleasantly; and your contrivance is excellent, in performing so many good things at one time, as increase your health, your strength, your exercise in war, your study for the increase of your estate: all these to be done under one exercise is a great token of your wisdom; and the good effect of this exercise is apparent enough to all that know that you are healthful and strong, and every one allows you to be the best horseman in this country, and one of the richest men in the city."—"Alas! good Socrates," an-

swered Ischomachus; "and yet, though I believe this to be true, I cannot escape detraction. You thought, perhaps, I was going to say, that it was these things which gave me the name of an honest and good man."—"It was my thought," said Socrates; "but I have a mind to ask you, how you guard against detractors, and whether you speak in your own cause, or in such causes as relate to your friends?"—"Do you believe," answered Ischomachus, "that I do not sufficiently do my part against my detractors, if I defend myself by my good deeds, in doing no wrong, and acting as much as I can for many men's good? or do you not think I am in the right if I accuse men who are mischievous, and do injustice in private cases, and to the city?"—"I pray you explain yourself," said Socrates. "I must tell you," said Ischomachus, "I am always exercising myself in rhetoric and eloquence, and in the practice of justice; for if I hear one of my servants complain of another, or justify his own cause, I always endeavour to settle the truth between them; or if I discover any dispute among my friends or acquaintance, I endeavour to make it up, and recover their friendship for one another, by showing them the happiness and profit of friendship, and the distraction and inquietude which attend those who are at variance with one another. I praise and defend those who are accused wrongfully, or are oppressed without a cause; and before the lords of our government I accuse them who are promoted unworthily; I praise them who set about their business with

care and deliberation, and blame such who go rashly about their work. But I am now brought to this dilemma, whether I am to bear with faults, or punish them.”—“What is your meaning in that,” said Socrates, “and who is the person you mean?”—“It is my wife,” said Ischomachus.—“In what manner then are your disputes?” said Socrates.—“We have very little occasion for that,” replied Ischomachus, “as yet; nor have we more words in our disputes than, such a thing is not done so carefully as it might have been; and that we may learn by a false step how to guide ourselves for the future: but if she should be unfortunate enough to give her mind to lying and deceit, there is no reforming her.” To this Socrates answered: “If she should at any time tell you a lie, you will hardly insist upon the truth of the matter. But, perhaps, good Ischomachus, I detain you from your business, and I would by no means hinder a man of your capacity and understanding from proceeding in your affairs.”—“You are no hindrance to me,” answered Ischomachus, “for I am determined to stay here till the court is up.”—“This gives me another token of your justice,” said Socrates; “it is an instance of your circumspection, and regard to maintain the noble character the world has given you, of being a good and honest man; for, notwithstanding the many employments you usually engage yourself in, and the delightful method you take in the exercise of them, yet because of your promise to these strangers, to wait for them in this place, you choose to neglect your own busi-

ness and pleasure, rather than prove worse than your word.”—“As for the business you speak of,” said Ischomachus, “I have taken care that nothing shall be neglected; and my greatest pleasure is in being punctual with those that I appoint; for in my farm I have my bailiff or steward of husbandry, and deputies who take care of my business.”—“Since we are fallen into this discourse, pray tell me, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “when you have occasion for a good bailiff or steward for your country affairs, do you use the same method as if you wanted a good builder, to inquire after one who is best skilled in the science? or do you teach and instruct those you hire into your service, in the business you want to employ them in?”—“Good Socrates,” answered Ischomachus, “I endeavour to teach them myself; for he whom I instruct in the management of my affairs, when I am absent, will know the better how to carry on my works agreeable to my liking; rather than if I was to employ one who already had a pretence to knowledge of the business I wanted him for: as I guess I have experience enough to set men to work, and to direct them how they shall go about their business, I therefore suppose I am able to teach a man what I can do myself.”—“Then, surely, your bailiff in husbandry,” replied Socrates, “must be always ready and willing to serve you; for, without he has a love for you, he will never use the utmost of his diligence for the advancement of your affairs, though he be never so expert in his business.”—“You say right,” answered Ischomachus: “but the first

of my endeavours is to gain his love and affection to me and my family, by which means he has a regard to my welfare.”—“ And what method do you take, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “ to bring the man to love and respect you and your family? Is it by the benefit you do him, by learning him a profitable business?”—“ I do not suppose that,” said Ischomachus; “ but, whenever the gods are favourable to me in the advancement of my fortune, I always reward my steward.”—“ So I suppose,” said Socrates, “ that you mean by this, that such people as you assist with money or goods will bear you the best service and respect.”—“ Yes, certainly,” said Ischomachus, “ for there are no instruments in the world so engaging, or that will prevail so much over mankind, as money or profit.”—“ But is it sufficient for him to love you?” replied Socrates; “ for we have instances enough that men love themselves before all others; and we have also some examples of those who are lovers of themselves, and yet are so negligent to their own profit, that they never reap those things they wish for.”—Ischomachus answered: “ But, good Socrates, before I choose them among my servants that I have brought to love me, to dignify with the places of stewards or deputies, I teach them the good consequence of diligence and industry.”—“ Is it possible you can do that?” said Socrates; “ for, in my opinion, we can hardly bring men to do another man’s business as punctually as he might do it himself.”—“ That I allow,” said Ischomachus: “ I mean, that we can never instruct a man to use the same

diligence for another that he would do for himself."—"But," replied Socrates, "who are those, then, whom you think worthy of employment, or of receiving your instructions?"—To this Ischomachus answered: "Those, in the first place, who cannot avoid drunkenness, are excluded from this care; for drunkenness drowns the memory, and is the occasion of forgetfulness."—"And is this the only vice," said Socrates, "which is the occasion of negligence?"—"No," replied Ischomachus, "for those who indulge themselves in sleep, are incapable of such employments."—"And are there any more," said Socrates, "whose vices make them unfit for your service?"—"Yes," answered Ischomachus; "for I am persuaded those who are addicted to the flesh, bend their minds so much to that thought, that they neglect all other business; for their whole hope and study is upon those they love: and if one was to order them to business, it would be the greatest punishment that could be inflicted on them; for there can be no greater pain laid upon any creatures in nature, than to prevent them from the object of their desires. For these reasons, when I find people engaged in such affairs, I set them aside, and never take the pains to instruct them in the matters that relate to my estate."—"But what say you," said Socrates, "of those who have a provident thought, and are saving on their own account; do you believe these would not be diligent in the management of your estate?"—"These," replied Ischomachus, "I choose to employ before all others; for they are sooner brought to be diligent than

those who have contrary sentiments ; and, besides, it is easy to show them the profit of diligence : and if such a man happens to come in my way, I commend him and reward him.”—“ But how do you treat those servants,” said Socrates, “ who are ready to obey you in all your commands, and are diligent at your word, and have a moderate share of good order in the management of themselves ? ” —“ These,” said Ischomachus, “ I have a great regard for ; for I carefully reward those who are diligent, and lay as many hardships as I can upon those who are idle and careless.”—“ But tell me, dear Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “ is it possible to reform a man who is naturally negligent ? ” —“ No more,” answered Ischomachus, “ than it would be for a man who is ignorant in music, to teach and instruct another man in that science ; for it is impossible to make a good scholar, if the master does not know his business ; and, by the same rule, no servant will be diligent when his master sets him the example of neglect. I have heard often enough, that bad masters made bad servants ; and I have often seen a small reproof to a servant has put him or her upon their duty. However, the best way to make a good servant, is for the master to set him a good example of industry, and be careful and watchful to oversee and regard, that every one about him is diligent in their respective office, and reward those who are deserving, and punish the negligent. The king of Persia once spoke much to the purpose in a case of this nature. When he was riding upon a fine horse, one of the company asked him what

made his horse so fat : his reply was, ‘ The eye of his master ;’ and we have many beside, good Socrates, who think that every thing whatever is improved by the same regard of the master.”—“ But, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “ when you have trained up your steward to be diligent, and to observe your directions, do you esteem him thoroughly qualified to be your steward or bailiff, or has he then any thing else to be instructed in?”—“ Then,” answered Ischomachus, “ there is yet more which is necessary for him to understand ; for he must learn the particulars of his business, to know when and how he must dispose of every thing ; for, without the knowledge of these particulars, a steward is an insignificant person ; he is like a physician who has the care of a patient, and is up early and late to attend him, and at last knows nothing of his distemper.”—“ But when he has learnt all this, good Ischomachus,” said Socrates, “ is he then perfectly qualified to be your steward, or director of your farm?”—“ There is still more required of him,” replied Ischomachus, “ for he must learn to rule, as well as direct the workmen.”—“ And is it possible,” said Socrates, “ that you can teach a man to govern, or know the great science of command?”—“ I think,” said Ischomachus, “ there is no difficulty in it ; though, perhaps, the reasons I may give for it are ridiculous.”—“ An affair of this consequence,” said Socrates, “ is no laughing matter ; for the man who can instruct others how to govern, must himself be a person of great wisdom, and deserve the highest character ; for he,

who can teach men how to rule, may teach them how to become masters; and he who can raise them to that dignity, may teach them those princely virtues, which will make them worthy the command of kingdoms.”—“ Good Socrates,” answered Ischomachus, “ let us look into the fields among the beasts for an example of the facility of learning to govern. Those creatures who are restiff and stubborn are beaten into obedience; while, on the other hand, those who obey our directions are treated handsomely, and rewarded. Colts, when they are under the management of the breaker or jockey, are caressed when they take their lessons kindly; but when they are restiff or disobedient, they receive the correction of the lash; and by these means they are brought to make good horses. If we breed spaniels, we treat them in the same manner, to learn them to hunt, to take the water, to fetch and carry, and be watchful; but, as for men, we may persuade them, and bring them to obedience, by setting before them rewards and punishments, and teaching them that it will be for their advantage to obey; but, as for bondmen, or those of the lowest rank, they may be brought to obedience another way; provide well for their bellies and they will do any thing; while those, who have noble spirits, are best encouraged by praise, for praise is no less welcome to them, than meat and drink is to those of the meaner sort. And when I have instructed my steward to govern by my example, I add this, as an instruction to him, that in the bestowing of clothes or

apparel among my workmen, he should always give the best to those among them who are most diligent in their business; for industrious men ought always to have better dress, and have the pre-eminence in all things, before the lazy and negligent; for I am of opinion there is nothing more irksome to industrious servants, than to see those who are negligent in their business promoted or encouraged, while they themselves are neglected and overlooked. It discourages them from minding their business for the future; therefore I always take care to keep that difference among my servants. And when I observe that my bailiff shows the same regard for those servants under his care, I praise him for it; but when I perceive he has preferred any one unworthily, by means of flattery or some such deceit, I never suffer his award to pass, but blame him and reprimand him.”—“Then,” said Socrates, “tell me, good Ischomachus, when you have thus taught your steward to rule, and discipline the workmen and servants under his care, is he then completely qualified for your service? or is there any thing else that you are to instruct him in?” To this Ischomachus replied: “There is yet a very material point, which concerns the business and character of a good steward; and that is, honesty; for if after he has received all my former instructions, he gives his mind to pilfer, and clandestinely to make away with my goods, his diligence in overseeing the management of my lands will be but of little profit to me, or it may be I may happen to be out of pocket by his service, so that I had much

better be without the industry of such a man.”—
“ But, good Ischomachus, I pray you tell me,”
said Socrates, “ Are you capable of teaching men
justice and honesty ?”—“ Yes,” replied Ischoma-
chus ; “ but I find that it is not every one I teach
or instruct in these ways of truth and equity, who
follow my instructions : but, that I may yet make
my servants follow the rules of justice which I
teach them, I use those laws of Draco and Solon,
which say, that little pilferers must be punished,
but the great robbers must be imprisoned and put
to death. Whereby it appears, that those, who
enrich themselves by indirect methods, and amass
to themselves fortunes by thievish practices, those
goods shall not be profitable to them. And to
these laws I likewise add some of the Persian
laws : for those of Draco and Solon only inflict
punishments on those who do amiss ; but those of
the king of Persia do not only punish those who
do wrong, but reward those who do right. There
are some men, who out of covetousness care not
what they do, nor what indiscreet means they take,
so that they gather riches together ; seeing that
others can amass great fortunes in an honest way ;
believing that so long as riches may be got by
honest men, every one who is rich shall be ac-
counted an honest man : but these have never any
pleasure or good advantage in their ill-got goods ;
or it is very rarely that they preserve them : but
those, who get their riches by industry and honesty,
are always prosperous, and have pleasure in what
they have got, especially because they have
wronged no man. If among my people I dis-

cover any such who have that covetous and deceitful temper, and do not receive benefit by my instructions, I discharge them out of my service. And, on the other hand, those who make honesty their rule and study, behave themselves as true and faithful servants, without having so much regard to profit, as honour and praise from me; if they are bondmen, I give them their liberty; and do not only promote them and advance their fortunes, but take every opportunity of recommending them to the world as good and honest men; for I judge, that the man may be esteemed good and honest, who upon the principle of virtue will employ himself for his master's interest, and will not scruple going through a little difficulty for his master's service, when there is occasion, without a design of making his advantage of him by deceitful or indiscreet means. Such a man, when I have once gained his esteem and affection, by instructing him in the science of making a good advantage of the work he is employed in, and have sufficiently instructed him to rule; I am persuaded he will transact every thing for his master's advantage, as well as if the master was continually to be present: and, with these qualifications, I think a man sufficiently capable of the business of a steward, and worthy of being employed in that office."—"But, methinks," said Socrates, "the principal part of a steward's business you have not yet explained."—"What is that, good Socrates?" said Ischomachus.—"I remember," said Socrates, "in your discourse you said, that before all things a steward ought to know

every particular of his business, and how to order every thing for his master's profit; for, without that, you observed that diligence would be of little use."—"Then, I suppose, good Socrates," answered Ischomachus, "you would have me instruct you in the science of husbandry?"—"That is my desire," said Socrates; "for the science of husbandry is extremely profitable to those who understand it; but it brings the greatest trouble and misery upon those farmers who undertake it without knowledge."—"I shall first of all, good Socrates," said Ischomachus, "acquaint you, that husbandry is an honourable science, and the most pleasant and profitable of any other: it is favoured by the gods, and beloved by mankind, and may be learned with ease. Husbandry, therefore, is becoming a gentleman; for if we were to take a view of all creatures upon earth, those only are esteemed, and worthy our regard, which are docile enough to become profitable to us; while the others, which are wild and fierce in their nature, and are not capable of becoming useful to us, are rejected."—"If I remember right," said Socrates, "you have already instructed me, that a steward or deputy should first love you, then be diligent; in the next place, he should be able to rule, and then be honest; but I am impatient to hear how he must behave himself in the practice of husbandry, with regard to the works, when and how they are to be done; but hitherto you have not explained those particulars, but passed them over as if you imagined I knew as much of the affair as yourself, or under-

stood the business. For my part, I am in the same state, with regard to husbandry, that a man would be who does not understand letters, and you were to show him a writing; he will be never the better for seeing that writing, unless he knew the use of the letters that composed it. So I imagine, that it is not enough to be diligent in the science of husbandry, but a man must understand every particular of it. This I suppose you are a master of, but you have not yet acquainted me with the matter. Therefore, if I was now to set about the business of husbandry, I should be like a quack in physic, who went about visiting of sick people, and neither knew their distempers, nor what medicines were proper for them. Therefore, good Ischomachus, I desire you will learn me every particular point of the husbandry you practise.”—“ Good Socrates,” replied Ischomachus, “ the science of husbandry is not like other sciences, which require length of time to study them, or a great deal of labour to compass them before a man can get his living by them; for husbandry is easily learned, by observing the workmen now and then, and by consulting those who understand it. By these means you may instruct your friends in it. Again, we may observe, that men of other sciences, which are artificers, will always keep some secret of their business to themselves; but the husbandmen are open and free in their discoveries, that every one may learn from them. The husbandman, who has the greatest knowledge in planting of trees, is proud of being observed, or that any man takes notice of his

excellence in that art. And the sower is no less pleased to have any one stop to look upon him. And if you ask him about any thing which has been well done in his way, he will be free enough to inform you how it was done. And so, good Socrates, we may see by this, that husbandry teaches men good manners and good nature.” —“ This,” said Socrates, “ is a good beginning : and now you have come thus far, I cannot leave you till you have given me every particular relating to husbandry ; and especially I insist upon it, because you say it is a science so easy to learn. You will therefore have the less trouble to instruct me ; and it will be the greater shame to me, if I do not learn it by your instructions, particularly since it is so profitable a science.” —“ I am very willing to answer your desire,” said Ischomachus, “ and instruct you in every point of husbandry. The principal part, which men dispute about, is the soil. On this account, all the philosophers, who have busied themselves about it, have given us more words than truth ; for they throw some occult quality in the way, which leaves us as we were before ; and at the best tell us, that he, who designs to be an husbandman, must first know the nature of the soil.” —“ It is not contrary to my opinion,” said Socrates, “ that one ought to know the quality of the soil ; for those who do not know what the ground will bring forth, how can they appoint either trees, plants, or seeds for it, which are natural to its intent, or are proper for it ? ” —“ Dear Socrates,” said Ischomachus, “ this is easily discovered, by observing the grounds of

other people, where you may see the diversities of plants growing on them, and, by a little observance that way, you will learn what they will produce, and what are contrary to their nature; and when a man has once made his due observation of this, he will see that it will be unprofitable to resist Nature or the will of Providence. For when a man plants or sows those things which he accounts necessary for his use, and the soil does not delight in the nourishment or production of them, or has not a will to bring them forth, his expense and trouble is to no purpose. But if he cannot discover the nature of the grounds next about him, which either through idleness, or any other cause, have been mismanaged or neglected, let him consult other lands remoter from him; and if even they happen not to be cultivated, he may learn by the weeds that grow upon them, what they will produce; for those plants, which grow wild, show best the inclination and disposition of the soil; so that husbandmen may even learn their business by observing what the ground will produce of itself."—"Then," replied Socrates, "I perceive that a man need not abstain from husbandry purely because he does not know how to describe the nature of a soil; for, I remember, I have seen fishermen who have employed themselves continually upon the sea, without inquiring what the water is, or its principles, but pass over it, and when they find any thing to their advantage they take it, and leave the rest. The same, I suppose, is the design of husbandmen: when they look upon soils, it is to observe what they

bring forth that is valuable, and what they will not.”—“ In what point of husbandry would you have me begin,” said Ischomachus, “ dear Socrates, for you talk like an adept in that science? Your reasoning is good, and must proceed from understanding.”—“ All that I mean by my reasoning with you,” replied Socrates, “ is to know how I shall till the ground, so as to reap the most profitable crops of corn, or other fruits, from it; for it is becoming a philosopher to inquire into those things which are pleasant and profitable.”—“ I suppose,” said Ischomachus, “ you already understand that the stirring or breaking of the ground, which one may call fallowing, is of great advantage.”—“ This,” answered Socrates, “ I believe.”—“ And suppose we were to fallow or plough the ground in winter?” said Ischomachus.—“ That I don’t approve of,” said Socrates; “ for the earth is then too wet, in my opinion.”—“ And what do you think if we were to turn it up in the summer?” said Ischomachus.—“ Then, I doubt,” said Socrates, “ it would be too dry and hard for the plough.”—“ Then let us plough,” said Ischomachus, “ in the spring.”—“ I think you are much in the right,” said Socrates, “ for then the ground is most free and ready to open itself to the plough, and also is most ready to distribute its virtue.”—“ It is not only so,” answered Ischomachus, “ but then whatever weeds are upon the ground, being turned into the earth, enrich the soil as much as dung. And again, these plants are not grown to such a point of maturity or perfection that their seeds are ripe, and therefore cannot fill the ground

with weeds; and besides, I suppose you know that both the fallowing and tilling of ground is always the better, as the ground has the fewer weeds in it; for, besides the hindrance the weeds may give to corn, or other profitable herbs, they prevent the ground from receiving the benefit of the sun and free air.”—“ This I agree to,” said Socrates.—“ Then,” replied Ischomachus, “ do not you think that often stirring the ground in summer will be the best way for it to enrich itself by the air and sun, as well as to destroy the weeds?”—“ I am very sensible,” said Socrates, “ that weeds will wither and dry quickly in the summer; and the ground can never receive more benefit from the sun, than if it is stirred with the plough, or fallowed in the heat of summer: and if a man dig his ground in summer, he will have the same advantage in destroying of weeds, which will then soon die; or else, by turning them in before they seed, they will enrich the ground: and by the turning up of the earth at that season, the sourness and rawness of that, which is turned up, will be corrected by the sun.”—So I find,” said Ischomachus, “ that we are both of one opinion concerning the stirring and fallowing of the ground.”—“ It is true,” said Socrates; “ but, to proceed to sowing, do you allow that the old opinion, which is agreed to and followed by the present operators in husbandry, concerning the season of putting the seed into the ground, is agreeable to reason, or are you of another opinion?”—To this Ischomachus replied: “ When summer is once past, and September is upon us, all

men then wait the pleasure of the gods to send rain to moisten the ground and prepare it for the seed; and, as soon as the rains fall, then every one employs himself in sowing, as the gods seem to direct."—"Then," said Socrates, "it seems that all men in the world have determined, by one assent, that it is not convenient to sow when the ground is dry; and those who act against this rule of nature are sufferers by it, as if they had offended the gods, by practising against their laws.

"We agree likewise in this," said Ischomachus."—"Then," Socrates replied, "I perceive that mankind consent to the order of nature, which is the will of the gods; as, for example, every one thinks it convenient to wear furred gowns and warm clothes in the winter, and then also to make a good fire, if he can get wood."—"But there are many," said Ischomachus, "who vary in their opinions concerning the time of sowing; some will sow sooner, others later."—"There is good reason for that," replied Socrates, "for the gods do not always give us the same kind of weather one year as another. Therefore it is sometimes best to sow early, and at other times it is better to sow late."—"I allow what you say," said Ischomachus: "but whether is it best to sow much seed, or little?"—"I am of opinion," answered Socrates, "that it is best to allow seed enough, and distribute it truly and equally upon the ground; but one may sow the seed too thick, as well as employ too small a quantity of it."—"I agree with you," said Ischomachus, "in this point."—"I imagine," said So-

crates, "there is a great art in sowing."—"It is surely so," replied Ischomachus; "for there are many sorts of grain, and all of them must be cast upon the ground by a man's hand."—"I have seen that," said Socrates.—"But some men," replied Ischomachus, "can cast it even, and distribute it equally upon the ground, and others cannot."—"Then, I suppose," said Socrates, "that the skill in sowing the seeds depends upon the frequent practice and exercise of the hand; as those who play upon the harp, or other instruments of music, must keep their hands continually in practice, that their fingers may readily follow their mind."—"You reason well," said Ischomachus: "but suppose the ground is light and open, or suppose it is stiff and heavy?"—"What would you have me understand by that?" said Socrates: "do you not take the lighter ground to be the weakest, and the heavy ground to be the strongest?"—"I am of that opinion," said Ischomachus.—"I would then fain know of you," said Socrates, "whether you would allow the same quantity of seed to one kind of ground as you would to another, or whether you make any difference?"—"You know, good Socrates," said Ischomachus, "that it is as natural to put the most water to the strongest wines, and the stronger a man is, the greater burden he may carry; so some men are nourished with a very spare diet, while others require a greater share of nourishment: the same ought to be considered in our present case."—"Will not the ground," said Socrates, "grow more strong by the more

use, as horses and mules are thought to do?"—
"This I take as a jest," said Ischomachus: "but what I think necessary to acquaint you of, is, that you sow your grain when the ground is moist, and has the best advantage of the air; and when the corn is come up, and is high in the blade, if you then turn it into the ground with a plough, it will greatly enrich the land, and give it as much strength as a good dunging would do: and we must also remark, that if we continue to sow for a long space the same sort of grain upon any ground, but upon that especially which is weak or overcharged with seed, it will impoverish the ground, and wear it out of heart. We may compare this to a sow who suckles many pigs, and sustains them till they grow large; the more pigs she suckles, the more will she be weakened."—
—"You intimate by this," said Socrates, "that one ought to sow the smaller quantity of grain upon the weakest soil."—"It is true," replied Ischomachus, "and is what we have partly agreed on before, that to overburden ground with seeds or corn, is the ready way to weaken it."—
"But for what reason, good Ischomachus, do you make ditches or thorows in the corn fields?"—
—"You know very well," replied Ischomachus, "the winter is subject to wet weather."—"What mean you by that?" said Socrates.—
—"When the rains fall in great quantity," replied Ischomachus, "the wet is apt to do great damage to corn; for sometimes our corn fields are incommoded with waters, and the corn, in some of its parts, smothered with mud; and beside, the roots of

the corn in other places will be washed bare; the waters also carry the seeds of weeds to the lower parts of the ground, and by that means fill the corn with weeds."—"I presume," said Socrates, "what you say is agreeable to reason."—"And do you think," said Ischomachus, "that corn which is subject to these inconveniences ought not to be assisted?"—"Undoubtedly," answered Socrates.—"Then what shall we do," said Ischomachus, "to prevent the waters from covering the corn with mud?"—"I find then," said Socrates, "it is proper to ease the ground from wet to secure the corn."—"But," said Ischomachus, "if the roots of the corn should be laid bare, and the earth about them worn away?"—"Then I suppose," continued he, "the best way to remedy that, is to find some means of covering the roots with earth, that they may be well nourished."—"But if the weeds, which may come up by this management," replied Socrates, "should suck up, or destroy the nourishment which the corn ought to receive, like the drone-bees in an hive, who are of no value in themselves, and yet live upon the industry of the working bees, and destroy the provisions which they have laid up to be manufactured into wax and honey."—"The weeds," replied Socrates, "should then be plucked up, as the drones in an hive are killed and discharged from it."—"Do you think then," said Ischomachus, "that water-thorows, or trenches in the ground to draw off the water, are not good to save corn?"—"I see now the use of similies," said Socrates; "for there is

nothing can instruct me so much as similes; for by them you have learnt me to know the disadvantage of weeds among corn, as well as instructed me that drones are not always advantageous to bees. But now I desire of you, dear Ischomachus, to tell me what is the business of harvest?"—"This," replied Ischomachus, "I shall be ready to do, if you are not already as wise as myself. I suppose," continued he, "you have heard that corn must be reaped?"—"Certainly," said Socrates; "but I am impatient till you proceed to inform me what are your sentiments in the affair of reaping, or getting in the harvest."—"Which do you think, good Socrates, we ought to do;—to stand to reap with the wind, or to reap against it?"—"I suppose," said Socrates, "it would be improper to reap against the wind, for it would increase the labour; it would hurt the eyes, and be likewise more difficult to the hands; for we sometimes meet with corn that is laid or beat down by the wind."—"And then," replied Ischomachus, "how will you cut it? will you cut the tops only? or cut it close to the ground?"—"If the straw is short," replied Socrates, "I would cut it near the ground, for the advantage of the straw; but if the straw is very long, then I would rather cut it about the middle, for two reasons. In the first place, because the corn will be separated more easily from the straw: and in the next place, the remaining straw, if it is burnt, will enrich the ground very much; or if it is afterwards cut and mixed with dung, it will increase it."—"Good Socra-

tes, your discourse," said Ischomachus, "shows me plainly, that you understand reaping as well as I do."—"As you agree with me," said Socrates, "in what I say concerning reaping, I suppose I am right in my argument; but let me now see if I understand how to separate the corn from the straw."—"You know, undoubtedly," said Ischomachus, "that horses do that work."—"I am sensible," said Socrates, "that it is not only horses that separate corn from the straw, by treading upon it, but asses and oxen also are used on the same occasion."—"But how do you think, good Socrates," said Ischomachus, "that horses, or the other creatures you speak of, can so equally tread the corn as to get it all clear of the straw*?"—"The men who have the care of this work," said Socrates, "take care to stir the corn as they see occasion, that it may be all equally separated from the straw, flinging into the way of the cattle's feet such corn as they observe to lie still in the straw."—"I perceive," said Ischomachus, "that you understand this part of husbandry as well as myself."—"In the next place," said Socrates, "let us examine how we ought to clean corn from the husk or chaff."—"I suppose," said Ischomachus, "you know that if you begin to winnow your corn on that side of the winnowing place which is next the wind, the chaff will be scattered all over the winnowing floor?"—"It must certainly be so," said Socrates.—"And it must also fall upon the corn," said Ischomachus.

* It was the method among the ancients, to have the corn trodden out by cattle, for the flail is a modern invention.

—“This,” said Socrates, “is certain; but it is the skill of a good husbandman to winnow his corn in such a manner that the chaff may fly from it, and be carried to its proper place.”—“But when you have cleaned the corn,” said Ischomachus, “as far as the middle of the winnowing place, will you rather let it remain there, or carry the clean corn to another place where you design to lodge it?”—“When I have a sufficient quantity of corn clean,” said Socrates, “I would set that by; lest, in cleaning the rest, the corn I have already cleaned, and lies scattered abroad upon the floor, should partake of the chaff from the corn that is cleaning, and then I shall be obliged to do my work twice over.”—“I find, good Socrates,” said Ischomachus, “that you are sufficiently skilled in the management of corn, even to the cleaning of it, for the markets; and I am of opinion that you are well able to instruct, rather than to be instructed. In my discourse with you on this branch of husbandry, I find that I have yet some remembrance of the management of corn. If there is no more in it than what we have mentioned, I knew as much of it many years ago. And now I recollect that once I could play upon the harp, and the flute, could paint, and carve, and knew many other sciences, and yet I never had a master to teach me any of these sciences, no more than I had one to instruct me in this branch of husbandry: but I have seen men work as well in the sciences I speak of as in husbandry. You are satisfied,” said Ischomachus, “that husbandry is a pleasant science, and that it is easy to

learn.”—“I am persuaded,” said Socrates, “that I now understand, and have long since known, the business of sowing and reaping of corn. But I was not certain in my judgement, till I had the opportunity of conversing with you about it: but I desire you to tell me, whether setting of trees is any part of husbandry?”—“Yes,” replied Ischomachus.—“Then,” said Socrates, “though I know something relating to sowing and cleaning of corn, yet I doubt I am ignorant in the business of planting of trees.”—“I guess,” said Ischomachus, “you have as much knowledge in the one as in the other.”—“I must certainly be ignorant,” said Socrates, “in the art of planting trees, because I do not know what sort of earth a tree should be planted in, nor what depth, nor of what size the tree should be; nor yet, when it is planted, what is the best means to make it grow.”—“I am ready to instruct you,” said Ischomachus, “in any thing you are ignorant of. Have you observed, good Socrates, what holes or pits are commonly made to plant trees in?”—“I have observed that very often,” said Socrates. “Have you ever observed these deeper,” said Ischomachus, “than three feet?”—“No,” replied Socrates, “nor yet more than two feet and an half.”—“And the breadth of the trench which is made for planting a tree, did you ever observe that?” said Ischomachus; “for by such inquiries you may guess at the size of the trees which are fit to be transplanted.”—“I never,” said Socrates, “saw any wider than two feet and an half.”—“And have you ever seen any shallower

than two feet?" said Ischomachus. "I have not observed," said Socrates, "any of those trenches which are dug for planting trees less than two feet and an half deep; for if the trees were to be set shallow, the summer heats would soon make them wither, and scorch the roots."—"Then I suppose," said Ischomachus, "that your opinion is, that the trenches or holes, which are to be dug for planting of trees, ought to be no deeper than two feet and an half, and just as much over?"—"I guess," said Socrates, "they should be so."—"But do you consider the nature of the ground," said Ischomachus, "and make the proper differences,—which is dry, and which is wet?"—"The ground," said Socrates, "which lies about Licabectus, I call dry ground; and the ground about Phalericus I call wet ground, for that is a marsh."—"I then desire to know," said Ischomachus, "whether you would plant trees deeper, or shallower, in wet, than in dry soil?"—"My opinion is," said Socrates, "that in the dry ground we ought to dig the trenches the deeper, for in wet ground we shall soon come to the water, and I do not think it convenient to plant trees deep in such wet places."—"You argue very rightly," said Ischomachus; "but do you know, good Socrates," continued he, "when you have the choice of these grounds, which are those trees which are most proper to plant in them?"—"I think I do," said Socrates.—"And do you think," replied Ischomachus, "that when you set a tree to the best advantage, it will be best to plant it in such earth as has been made very fine by work-

ing, or in such as has not been made loose and open by culture?"—"It is my opinion," said Socrates, "that a tree planted in well-loosened earth will prosper much better than in that which has been uncultivated."—"Do you allow, then," said Ischomachus, "that the earth ought to be fine and prepared on this occasion?"—"I guess it should be so," said Socrates.—"But concerning the branch or cutting of a vine, when you plant it," continued Ischomachus, "will it grow better if you set it upright in the ground, or lay it along in the earth*?"—"Certainly," said Socrates, "it will grow the stronger if we plant it, or lay it lengthwise in the ground; for the more roots it gains, the greater strength it will have in its shoots."—"We are both of one opinion," said Ischomachus. "But when you plant one of these cuttings or branches of vines, would you leave it with the earth loose about it, or tread it hard over the part of the cutting which you bury?"—"I am of opinion," said Socrates, "that it is best to tread down the earth very close about it, for else the ground would lie so hollow all round, that the air and moisture would come unequally to it, and rot and spoil the roots; or else the sun's heat would too soon reach it, and prove of as bad consequence."—"So far we are of one opinion," said Ischomachus.—"And must I plant or raise a fig-tree," answered Socrates, "as I do the vines?"—"I

* The laying the cuttings of vines lengthwise in the ground, is the French way now practised; for they strike root at every joint; and the more joints they have the more roots they get, and the stronger shoots they make.

suppose so," said Ischomachus; "for he who is master of the art of raising vines, may as well raise figs, or most sorts of trees."—"But is there not," replied Socrates, "something particular in the propagating of olive-trees?"—"You may observe that," said Ischomachus, "on every highway side, when we set a large truncheon of an olive tree, we dig deep holes, and plant them very deep in the ground, covering the top of the truncheon with clay, and yet we do not find that any other trees or plants are covered in this manner."—"I know this," replied Socrates, "for I have often seen it."—"Surely then," answered Ischomachus, "when you have seen an experiment, you must remember it; and especially in this common case you know that it is not sufficient to put clay over the large top of the olive truncheon, but also to cover the clay close with a shell*."

"All that you have said relating to this, I likewise know perfectly," said Socrates; "but when we began to discourse whether I understood the planting of trees, I was not satisfied whether I was sure of the right method: and when you came to particulars, I gave you my opinion freely; and it happened to agree with you, who of all men upon the face of the earth are esteemed the most perfect husbandman. I am happy, good Ischomachus," continued Socrates, "in what you

* In the modern practice we find it necessary to keep out the air and rain from those large incisions, or places which have suffered amputation, by a soft wax, or such vegetable mummies as I have taught Mr. Whitmill to make and sell. The shell over the clay is, I suppose, put there to keep out the wet and ill weather.

have taught me, which by degrees I brought you to do : you have taught me every particular of good husbandry ; and have led me, by your instructions in those things I did not understand, to those that I find I have some knowledge in ; and, by your easy way of reasoning, I shall be capable of remembering every thing you have laid before me.”—“ Do you believe,” said Ischomachus, “ that if I were to discourse with you concerning the goodness and fineness of silver and gold, that you could answer as pertinently as you have done to the affair of husbandry ? or, if I were to ask you concerning music and painting, do you think that you could reason about them so well as you have done in husbandry ? ”—“ I think so,” said Socrates ; “ for you have satisfied me that I am not ignorant in husbandry, and yet I never had any master to instruct me in it.”—“ You may remember,” said Ischomachus, “ that in this discourse I told you that husbandry was easily learned by a little observation and conversation ; for the practice of it teaches us many particulars, which no master can ever teach us, or would ever have thought on. In the first place, the vine will, of its own accord, run up trees, if there are any near it. This natural disposition in the vine shows us, that we ought to sustain the vine with props. Again : we observe that it spreads its leaves abroad the most at that time of the year when its fruit is in its growth ; which shows us, that the fruit, during its growth, should be shaded from the too scorching rays of the sun. And again, we may observe, that about

the time when grapes ripen, the leaves shrink, and lay the fruit more open to the sun, that they may ripen the better: so it appears that shade is necessary to help the growth of fruit, and a full sun is natural to the good ripening of fruit. And also when we see the vine full of clusters, we find some ripe, and others green; then let the ripe clusters be gathered, for otherwise they would spoil and rot, as it is in the fruit of the fig-tree; gather those which you perceive are completely ripe, lest they drop and are lost.”—“It is surprising to me,” said Socrates, “that seeing husbandry is so easy to learn, we find such a vast difference among the husbandmen: some we may observe to be very rich, while others have hardly bread to eat.”—To this Ischomachus replied: “It is not the want of knowledge which makes the poor husbandman, for both the rich and the poor may have the same knowledge in sowing or planting, or in the virtue of the soil, and what is best to plant upon it, and in the ordering of vines; or that ground is improved by fallowing and by manuring: but that which makes some farmers poor and some rich, is because the first are negligent and lazy, and the latter are industrious and thrifty. The poor farmers often lose the profit of a year by neglecting to make proper provision either by fallowing, manuring, or sowing; nor has he any wine through his neglect in planting of vines, or taking care to prune and dress those vines he has already: such a man has neither oil, nor figs, for he neglects the care of his tree. It is for

these causes, good Socrates, that you find one farmer richer than another; for the knowledge of farming, or any thing else, is of no service or advantage, if it is not industriously practised. And so among generals of armies, it is likely that they all understand their business, but yet we perceive that some of them gain more honour and more riches than others. Their case is like that of the husbandmen; the industrious are always gainers, while the negligent always come off losers. If a general leads an army through an enemy's country, and be discreet and careful, he will march his forces in good order, and be vigilant; so that upon any occasion he is prepared for battle; and yet there are some generals who know these things, and do not act with that care, which ever brings them either honour or profit. All these are convinced that there is a necessity of keeping watches, and sending out scouts to reconnoitre the enemy, or observe their motion; but yet some neglect this business, and lose themselves by it. So likewise we all know that manuring the ground is necessary; but yet some are negligent, and never employ themselves about it, though it may as well be done by turning of cattle into it, as by other means. Some farmers use all their industry to gather together all the sorts of manures they can find; and others, though they might as well enrich their ground by the same means, yet never set their minds about it. The rain falls in hollow places, and remains there to the injury of the ground; and where this happens, it shows the carelessness of the farmer: the weeds which

rise on this occasion are witnesses of his negligence; for the diligent farmer always takes care to lay his ground in good order, and to clear it of weeds; and the very weeds he pulls up reward him for that work; for if he cast these weeds into a pit of water, and let them rot there, they will produce as good manure as dung itself. For there are no herbs or plants which will rot by lying in water, that will not make good manure for land; nor is there any sort of earth which will not make very rich manure, by being laid a due time in a standing water, till it is fully impregnated with the virtue of the water*. We may yet remark further, that if the ground be too wet to sow upon, or too surly or sour to plant in, there is still a remedy for it: if it be wet, we may drain it by ditches or thorows; and if the ground be stiff and sour, mix it with such things as are light and dry, or of a contrary nature to the soil. We find some husbandmen have regard to this, and some have no thought of it, and throw away those things which might prove to their profit. But suppose we were to know nothing of ground, or what it would bring forth, or can see neither tree nor plant upon it; nor have the opportunity of consulting, or learning, from some experienced husbandman, the worth of the ground;

* This is a remark very well worthy our observation, especially where manures are scarce. As for the common notion, that weeds will breed weeds, it is an error, unless we suppose that weeds have their seeds ripe when we use them on this occasion; and as for earth being laid in water for a manure, it is much more beneficial to lands than the cleaning of ponds and ditches.

may we not satisfy ourselves at a very easy rate, by trying what it will bear or bring forth, in making a few experiments upon it? Is not this more easy than to experience what a horse or a man is? for in all that we can discover by our experiments upon soils, we are sure of the truth of what we see; there is no deceit; there is no dissimulation: therefore the ground is the best master or director for the husbandman, in showing him what things are proper for it, and what are the contrary; and it gives us satisfactory proofs who among the farmers are diligent and discerning, and who are not. For the science of husbandry is not like other sciences, or trades or callings; for in them the artificers may excuse themselves by saying they wanted skill in what they wanted to undertake; but husbandry, we know, is within the compass of every man's knowledge; so that whenever we see that the ground is tilled and sown, it will always produce something beneficial, and is the most pleasant of all others; and therefore I suppose it is that husbandry, above all other sciences, encourages men to practise it: and besides, this is preferable to all others, because every man, who has the least regard to himself, must surely know that no man can live without necessaries: and what does not this produce? We may therefore know, that those who will not learn such sciences as they might get their living by, or do not fall into husbandry, are either downright fools, or else propose to get their living by robbery or by begging. But we will suppose that some of the husbandmen we

speaking of, are such as employ deputies or bailiffs to look over their workmen; and the overseers of some do right, and the greater part do wrong. Those who do right will take care to see their work done in season; but the negligent steward will not keep his workmen to their business; he will let them leave their business when they think convenient, without regard to his master's profit. And to compare the diligent and careless steward, there will be the difference; that he who sets his people to work regularly, and keeps them employed, gains half as much more as the man who is careless of his labourers: it is like two men who are sent out to travel fifty miles, who are both equally strong and in health; the man who is the most industrious shall perform his day's journey to the utmost of his power, and lose no time; while the other stops at every spring, at every shade, and at every refreshment he can get, and loses so much in his progress, that though they both run and walk alike, the lazy and negligent man makes two days of the same length that the industrious man makes in one day: so, in all sorts of works, there is a great deal of difference between the man who sets himself heartily about his business, and him who is careless and does not regard his work; for when these last happen to weed or clean the vines at such an improper season that the weeds spring again, they rather spoil than mend their vineyards: their absolute neglect would have been more excusable. Such errors as these are the occasion why many farmers are sufferers. A man who has a large

family, and is at great expenses for the maintenance of his house, if he cannot get enough by his rents and by his husbandry to find him and his people with necessaries, must certainly come to poverty. But such as are diligent, and apply themselves to husbandry, will as certainly increase their substance, and may easily grow rich. I remember my father had an excellent rule, which he advised me to follow; that if ever I bought any land, I should by no means purchase that which had been already well improved, but should choose such as had never been tilled; either through the neglect of the owner, or for want of capacity to do it: for he observed, that if I was to purchase improved grounds, I must pay an high price for them, and then I could not propose to advance their value, and must also lose the pleasure of improving them myself, or seeing them thrive better by my endeavours. It was my father's opinion, that both land and cattle, with good management and industry, would doubly improve, and reward the master, and be no less pleasant than profitable to him. There is nothing which brings us a better return for our care and labour, than such ground as has lain a long time without culture; nor is there any thing so agreeable and pleasant, as to observe the good use such lands make of the industry and labour we bestow on them. Nothing rewards our labours so much as these; and I assure you," continued Ischomachus, "that I have often brought such land, as had never produced any thing of value, to bring such crops as were twice as much worth as

the price I gave for the ground. This, I suppose, you will remember, and teach to those who fall into the way of your instructions. I may observe to you also, good Socrates, that my father neither learnt this, nor any other branch of husbandry, from any one; his genius led him to study the reason of it, and even to assist in the working part: for he delighted extremely to see the reward of his own labour and industry, and well knew that he could never expect so great a return from cultivated and improved grounds, as from uncultivated lands, which he took in hand. I believe, good Socrates, that you have heard of my father's excellence in husbandry above all the Athenians, and of his natural bent of fancy towards it."—Then Socrates replied: "Tell me, good Ischomachus, did your father, when he had improved such parcels of land, keep them to himself, or sell them to good advantage?"—"Now and then," replied Ischomachus, "he sold a parcel of land when he could receive a sufficient advantage for his improvements; and immediately bought fresh unimproved land in the room of it, that he might enjoy the pleasure of bringing it to his own mind."—"By what I can understand," said Socrates, "your father was wise and diligent in the science of husbandry, and had no less desire towards it, than the corn merchants have to find out where the best wheat is to be had; not even scrupling to pass the roughest seas, or run any other hazard to gain their intent; and when they have bought up as much corn as they can purchase, they then immediately despatch it to their

own houses; and reserve it in their warehouses till they see a good opportunity of selling it. I suppose then they do not sell it without consideration, or carelessly dispose of it at low markets; but are first assured where they may sell it at the dearest price.”—“ You seem to banter,” replied Ischomachus; “ but can we say the mason is in the wrong who builds houses and sells them, and perhaps has afterwards an advantage in repairing or improving them?”—“ I am very well persuaded,” said Socrates, “ from what you say, that your opinion is, every man ought to study that thing chiefly which may redound the most to his advantage, with the greatest facility. For, in the discourse we have had, you have insisted that husbandry is the science most easily learnt of any other, and particularly have given proofs of its being the most profitable study a man can pursue: and what you have observed in your discourse relating to it, has convinced me that husbandry is as pleasant and profitable as you represent it.”—“ It is certain, as I have told you,” replied Ischomachus, “ that husbandry is a most delightful and beneficial study; and it is as sure that it may be greatly advanced by the application, industry, and good management of the professors of it: we may compare it to a galley upon the sea, which is obliged to make its way as far in a day with oars, as it should with sails. We find that those masters or overseers of the rowers, who keep them encouraged with good words and proper rewards, gain so much upon the good-will of the labourers under their command, that they even outdo

themselves, and perform almost as much work as double the number would do of such who are under the discipline of careless or surly masters: for, where such evil masters happen to rule over any sets of people, they never have their work done with a good-will, nor to the purpose: but a generous spirit in a master creates a free, hearty spirit in his servants, which makes them work merrily and heartily, sweating and pressing upon one another who shall excel in his business: so there are likewise some captains, who are of that ill disposition towards their soldiers, and use them with that vile barbarity, that they can never gain their will to perform any thing for their service either in peace or war; and in time of war especially, rather than assist, will expose their captains to the utmost danger. Nor can such leaders ever bring the men under their commission to be ashamed of any thing they do, even though they commit the worst actions; for the unmerciful or careless officer hardens the soldiers, that they have neither a regard for right or wrong: but there are other captains, who have discretion and prudence enough to manage their soldiers with so much good order, and gain so much upon their affections, that if these were to have the command of the same which we have been speaking of, would bring them to duty, and to act as one man in their officers' defence and service, in time of necessity; and instruct them to be ashamed of every thing that is base or dishonourable; exciting them to diligence, and to work with good will in such things as are becoming them to do, praising their

labours, and rewarding them on all occasions. Such rule and management gains the captain victory and honour; for it is not only the business of the soldier to learn to draw the bow, or throw the javelin, but to know how and when to obey the word of command: and nothing will bring them sooner to this, than to gain their love and affection; for the general or captain who has good sense enough to gain the good esteem of the men under his command, may lead them through the greatest dangers. It is, therefore, such generals as have good generosity and discretion, who, in the management of their soldiers, commonly gain the characters of valiant and expert officers: for, though the number of the soldiers contribute to gain the battle, yet without the commanding officer gives them good instructions, and gains their love and affection to him, they never act to the purpose; nor can their captain gain any reputation by them; so that the great name is rather gained by wisdom and prudence, than by labour and strength of body: and it is no less to be observed in the science of husbandry, or other sciences, that those stewards, who have discretion and generosity enough to gain the good-will of the men they employ, such will always find their work well done, and increase their riches. But if a master, or his overseer, be careless, and at the same time has the power of rewarding and punishing those under his direction, and, when he views his workmen, does not make them sensible, either one way or other, of his authority; whenever he comes, or goes, it is the same thing to them; they

work or play at their discretion. Such a one is very little worth the regard of any man: but the man who ought to be admired and valued, is he, who, when he comes among his servants, creates in them a pleasant countenance, and makes them rejoice, every one running or striving in their business to serve him, and using all ways to get his praise and love. Such a man as this is worthy the rank of a king. A master of any science, as well as husbandry, who has good sense enough to bring his family to such affection toward him, and good order, he does not possess this by learning only, but he must receive his good nature and wisdom from the gods; he must be born with a generous nature, which must proceed from the gods; for I have never yet found the true gift of government, but it was attended with generosity. Where these excellent qualities appear, all under that direction are willing to obey, and especially if the power of rule be in the hands of those who are endowed with virtue and temperance: but where a master exercises himself in cruelty, or acts in a tyrannical way, against the good-will and reason of mankind, he can never hope for the least ease or comfort."

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
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